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	<title>Legal analysis - Transparency International Ukraine</title>
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	<title>Legal analysis - Transparency International Ukraine</title>
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		<title>What Lies Ahead for Public Procurement in 2027–2030</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-lies-ahead-for-public-procurement-in-2027-2030/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Анна Куц]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:01:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34309</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Five Goals of the New Strategy</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-lies-ahead-for-public-procurement-in-2027-2030/">What Lies Ahead for Public Procurement in 2027–2030</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i>The Cabinet of Ministers has approved the Public Procurement Development Strategy for 2027–2030. In this article, we look at the changes the government is planning.</i></p>
<p>On October 13, 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Public Procurement Development Strategy for 2027–2030 (<a href="https://radnuk.com.ua/pravova-baza/rozporiadzhennia-kmu-pro-skhvalennia-stratehii-reformuvannia-systemy-publichnykh-zakupivel-na-2024-2026-roky-ta-zatverdzhennia-operatsijnoho-planu-ii-realizatsii-u-2024-2025-rokakh/">the Strategy</a>) and the Operational Plan for its implementation. The step was long awaited and important, and our European partners are following it closely.</p>
<p>In its recent Enlargement Report, the European Commission <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/a-step-forward-but-not-the-finish-line-what-the-european-commission-said-about-ukraine-s-procurement/">praised</a> the implementation of the previous Strategy. It also stressed the importance of the next one, together with the public procurement section of the Anti-Corruption Strategy.</p>
<p>The new Strategy sets out five goals, the tasks and measures for achieving them, and the problems that gave rise to them.</p>
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<h2><b>Stable legislation aligned with the EU acquis</b><b></b></h2>
<p>The Strategy’s first goal is <b>stable legislation aligned with European Union law (the EU acquis).</b> The Strategy notes that legislation needs to move closer to EU law while keeping the domestic practices that work well. The goal covers public-private partnerships and concessions as well as public procurement. Like the Strategy as a whole, however, it leaves out defense procurement, which will get a separate strategy of its own. Importantly, the Strategy is concerned with more than compliance with a number of EU directives. It also calls for legislation that is stable, clear, and predictable, and for consistent practice. In other words, the legislation should no longer change as often as it has in recent years.</p>
<p>Beyond the approximation itself, another task under this goal is to make sure the sector operates under the Law. Specifics for applying the Law are allowed, but only to the extent required by martial law.</p>
<p>To achieve this goal, <b>in 2027 the government plans to draft yet another bill amending</b> <a href="https://radnuk.com.ua/pravova-baza/zakon-ukrainy-pro-publichni-zakupivli-n2/"><b>the Law of Ukraine on Public Procurement No. 4888-IX of May 27, 2026</b></a> <b>(Law No. 4888 or the new Law)</b> to complete the harmonization of procurement legislation. It also plans to approve the Specifics for applying the Law and to prepare a separate draft law on concessions and public-private partnerships.</p>
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<h2><b>Conditions for competition and efficient use of public funds</b></h2>
<p>To <b>create conditions for competition and the efficient use of public funds</b>, the government plans to act on the factors that partly determine how much competition there is. These include the quality of procurement planning and preparation and how requirements are set for the subject matter of procurement, technical specifications, estimated value, participation conditions, and contract performance.</p>
<p>To this end, as early as next year the government plans to develop a new procedure for determining the subject matter of procurement and a procedure for creating and populating an electronic marketplace, including fees for its use. To shift the focus from the lowest price to the best price-quality ratio, the Cabinet of Ministers plans to develop a methodology for applying tender evaluation criteria next year. It also plans to monitor every year how contracting authorities apply non-price criteria.</p>
<p>In 2028, the government intends to develop model tender documentation and a methodology for determining the estimated value of the subject matter of procurement. The methodology is meant to improve procurement planning so that it is based on substantiated needs and the results of market analysis.</p>
<p><b>Improving how localization requirements are applied</b> is a separate task. To this end, a register of dishonest manufacturers that submitted inaccurate information (documents) to have goods included in the list of localized goods is to start operating in early 2027. In 2028, the government plans to analyze how the requirements are applied in practice and to amend the legislation if the analysis shows a need for it.</p>
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<h2>P<b>rofessional and results-oriented procurement</b></h2>
<p>To this end, the government plans to launch a free online course on the updated legislation at the end of 2027. Every year, it also plans to: deepen cooperation with higher education institutions; hold at least two information and training events for contracting authorities; train civil servants responsible for public procurement under the standard general professional (certificate) advanced training program. By the end of 2030, a scholarship support mechanism for professional training in public procurement is expected to be available to budget-funded regional contracting authorities.</p>
<p>Besides training and professional development, this goal includes two more tasks:</p>
<ul>
<li aria-level="1">Develop the <b>secondary legislation and the methodological and advisory framework</b> for procurement activities, management of the procurement process, and assessment of procurement performance. In practice, this means the Ministry of Economy will exercise its existing powers every year: drafting methodological recommendations and summarizing practice. By the end of 2028, it will also build an advisory support service for the sector. The service will use technology to process typical queries automatically and provide advice faster.</li>
<li aria-level="1">Develop <b>centralized procurement</b> and other mechanisms for organizing procurement professionally. To achieve this, by the end of 2028 the government plans to update the model for designating authorized persons, which will be based on regulating outsourcing in procurement. A new operating model for centralized procurement organizations (CPOs) will also be introduced by the end of 2030.</li>
</ul>
<p>In describing this goal, the Strategy stresses that contracting authorities need to learn how to manage contract performance. This includes overseeing performance, responding to risks promptly, and taking performance results into account in later planning.</p>
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<h2><b>Digital transformation and development of the Prozorro system</b></h2>
<p>First and foremost, the electronic system must be adapted to the new legislation. Early next year, the <b>new procurement methods</b> introduced by the new Law are to become available on Prozorro.</p>
<p>Electronic <b>information exchange</b> between Prozorro and other state electronic information resources will also be expanded. A study due by the end of 2028 will determine which resources exactly. It is already known, however, that early next year the connection between Prozorro and the information and communication system of the <b>State Treasury Service</b> will be improved.</p>
<p>Within Prozorro itself, the <b>analytical tools</b> for planning, monitoring, control, and risk management are to be strengthened. This work will also begin with a study and is scheduled for 2028–2029. Among other things, users will get a <b>convenient way</b> to search decisions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and monitoring reports.</p>
<p>To make the system more cyber-resilient and keep it running without interruption under martial law, the government plans to take cybersecurity measures every year. These include testing, fixing vulnerabilities, and backing up and restoring critical data.</p>
<p>E-contracting will also be developed next year. The structure of the electronic contract will be defined, and functionality for drafting, concluding, amending, and performing electronic contracts will be introduced.</p>
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<h2><b>An environment of integrity and effective control and review systems</b></h2>
<p>To make control more effective, the government has identified <b>reasonable time limits for court appeals against monitoring reports</b> as a priority. To achieve this, the State Audit Service of Ukraine and its co-implementers will draft a bill by the end of next year.</p>
<p>Work on <b>updating automatic risk indicators</b> will also continue. Next year, a flexible mechanism for updating the indicators on an ongoing basis will be introduced. The indicators will then be reviewed and the corresponding changes made on Prozorro. The government also intends to update the Roadmap for Strengthening Control over Public Procurement, without specifying how.</p>
<p>The government has also set a rather general task: improving the mechanisms for preventing corruption and minimizing corruption risks in the sector. To this end, it plans to analyze corruption risks strategically every year and to develop proposals and recommendations for eliminating or minimizing them, including on <b>integrity and counterparty due diligence</b>. By the end of 2029, the government will also study whether <b>tools for detecting signs of collusion</b> among participants and other anti-competitive concerted actions could and should be introduced on Prozorro. If the study confirms that this is feasible, such tools will be introduced by the end of 2030.</p>
<p>Finally, the government plans to keep the mechanisms for <b>complaint review and protection of participants’ rights</b> working effectively. To achieve this, by the end of 2028 the electronic tools for filing and reviewing complaints will be improved. This will apply not only to procurement but also to public-private partnerships and concessions. In addition, the AMCU and the Ministry of Economy will summarize procurement review practice every year and propose ways to resolve systemic problems in how the legislation is applied.</p>
<p>Overall, the government’s adoption of the Strategy deserves support. The sector needs a policy document that sets out the key directions of its development for the coming years, and approving it also advances European integration. In substance, the Strategy is fairly balanced and moderate. It relies largely on secondary legislation already provided for in the new Law and contains no overly controversial ideas likely to draw objections. In places, the plans are stated only in general terms. Even so, the tasks and measures can be made more precise later by amending the Strategy. How much the Strategy changes the sector will depend largely on the content of the acts adopted under it and on how well the measures are carried out in practice.</p>
<p><i>This material was made possible with the support of the MATRA program of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. Responsibility for the content lies with the author and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Embassy. </i></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-lies-ahead-for-public-procurement-in-2027-2030/">What Lies Ahead for Public Procurement in 2027–2030</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>What Does the 2026 European Commission’s Report Recommend?</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-does-the-2026-european-commission-s-report-recommend/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 16:34:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34183</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The European Commission has published its 2026 EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine as a candidate country.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-does-the-2026-european-commission-s-report-recommend/">What Does the 2026 European Commission’s Report Recommend?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission has published its 2026 EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine as a candidate country.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2026_en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Enlargement Report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the European Commission notes that Ukraine has remained committed to the EU integration reform agenda. In particular, it states that the country continues to demonstrate that its institutional framework for the fight against corruption is effective and that its specialized anti-corruption institutions generally continue to operate independently and effectively.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the slowdown in legislative decision-making during the reporting period is a matter of concern for European partners. Since the end of the summer, however, there has been increased focus on reforms and the actual implementation of policy conditionality under the Ukraine Facility and Ukraine Support Loan. In October 2026, Ukraine and the European Commission established a joint Task Force to help accelerate progress on the interim benchmarks and advance essential rule-of-law and anti-corruption reforms.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also noted that the ten priority reforms agreed with the Ukrainian authorities on 10 December 2025 (the “Kachka–Kos plan”) remain mostly outstanding.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the fourth year, Transparency International Ukraine has analysed the Enlargement Report in the following areas:</span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption (Chapter 23);</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">corruption prevention and the effectiveness of the NACP (Chapter 23);</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">management and confiscation of criminal assets (Chapter 24);</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">public procurement (Chapter 5);</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">financial control (Chapter 32);</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">regional policy (Chapter 22).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Let’s take a closer look at the Commission’s assessment of Ukraine’s progress and recommendations in TI Ukraine’s areas of expertise.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Criminal Prosecution of High-Level Corruption (Chapter 23)</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the fight against corruption. The Commission notes that some progress is primarily attributable to the results achieved by the NABU, the SAPO and the HACC, which continue building a track record of investigations, prosecutions, and final verdicts in high-level corruption cases.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the Commission describes limited progress on previously recommended legislative and institutional reforms as a </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“major concern.”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> It stresses that anti-corruption institutions continue to report pressure from state institutions, law enforcement, and security agencies, and that their situation remains fragile overall.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The European Commission assesses progress in the institutions’ track record as good. This reflects successful NABU and SAPO operations exposing high-level corruption, an increase in indictments and convictions, shorter proceedings at the HACC, an increase in judicial staffing and the adoption of strategic documents. The Commission also notes that the NABU has improved its case prioritization, with tangible results. European partners further highlight the contribution of an exceptionally active civil society in safeguarding institutional independence.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Despite these achievements, no legislation substantially advancing the anti-corruption framework has been adopted. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission recalls that ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention remains incomplete because the necessary amendments to criminal legislation have not been adopted. It also calls for refraining from legislative initiatives that carry corruption risks (concerning politically exposed persons (PEPs), criminal proceedings in economic crime cases and free-of-charge privatisation of land).</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Proceedings at the HACC remain too lengthy, and its backlog needs to be reduced. In 2025, ten defendants in high-level corruption cases were released from criminal liability because the statutes of limitations had expired. Access to independent forensic expertise remains problematic, independent wiretapping capabilities are still lacking, Parliament has not changed the frequency of the NABU’s external assessment from annual to biennial, and SAPO’s external audit has yet to take place. The incumbent SAPO Head’s term expires in July 2027. In March 2026, following the resignation of the First Deputy Head in November 2025, the Prosecutor General appointed a commission to select SAPO’s leadership. The Commission explicitly identifies breaches of NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction by other law enforcement agencies as a problem undermining the Bureau’s mandate.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission explicitly points to continuous attempts to put pressure on the NABU and the SAPO, including criminal investigations and surveillance of NABU staff by other law enforcement and security agencies, as well as media campaigns targeting the institutions. Amid a NABU investigation, the Prosecutor General resigned in September and was dismissed by Parliament. Before that, he had left Ukraine and signed notices of suspicion against the NABU Director and a close associate of the SAPO Head; these notices were subsequently revoked by the Prosecutor General’s Office.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the next 12 months, the Commission recommends that Ukraine:</span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">further consolidate the track record in corruption cases, including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen NABU’s and SAPO’s autonomy in investigating cases involving Members of Parliament without prior approval by the Prosecutor General;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">expand NABU’s jurisdiction to cover high-risk positions, including the leadership of the Office of the President and heads of regional state administrations;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopt legislation ensuring anti-corruption bodies’ access to high-quality forensic expertise;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">introduce robust safeguards against interference with the NABU and the SAPO and circumvention of their exclusive jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">xpand the scope of declarants and improve asset declaration verification to effectively detect and confiscate unexplained wealth;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure the timely selection of a new Head and Deputy Head of SAPO;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">amend the Criminal Procedure Code to address procedural impediments, eliminate automatic case closures and revise statutes of limitations in line with European standards, and adopt amendments enabling single-judge adjudication of civil and administrative cases at the HACC.</span><b> </b></li>
</ul>
<p><b>Almost all these concerns and recommendations fully coincide with those identified by TI Ukraine in its Shadow Report.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission refers to a notice of suspicion against a Deputy Head of the Office of the President but does not link it to attempts to influence selection procedures for anti-corruption bodies (the correspondence disclosed by the SAPO on 5 August and </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52026000000000092"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Operation “Forrest Gump”</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">).</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission does not specify what </span><b>“safeguards against interference”</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> should entail. TI Ukraine proposes disciplinary liability for heads of investigative units that breach investigative jurisdiction, a clear procedure and deadlines for transferring cases to NABU, and liability for failure to comply with an order to transfer case materials.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Prevention and Effectiveness of NACP (Chapter 23)</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission continues to note that the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), which adopted its institutional strategy in 2025, retains a central role in anti-corruption policymaking and prevention. At the same time, it continues to express concerns about the impartiality and effectiveness of certain NACP functions. The Commission also mentions unsubstantiated bribery allegations involving NACP officials following a NABU investigation.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The Commission welcomes the NACP’s increased oversight of compliance with lobbying rules, the establishment of a dedicated unit and the adoption of a separate monitoring and control procedure. In the Commission’s view, the latter should be reviewed in light of initial implementation experience. It also notes that the Transparency Register is fully operational and contains all necessary information accessible to the public.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also notes that extensive digitalization of public services has helped reduce corruption risks in the relevant sectors.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The report further acknowledges that Ukraine has achieved a high implementation rate for its current State Anti-Corruption Program and is in the process of adopting a new anti-corruption policy framework for 2026–2030.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Concerns raised by the Commission. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most concerns repeat those from last year. The Commission again stresses the need for the NACP to implement the recommendations of the 2023 external audit report and to conduct the next assessment without delay, using robust methodology and criteria.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The report again calls for strengthening the electronic asset declaration system. The Commission identifies practical and legal shortcomings in declaration verification, including the need for a comprehensive review of the risk-based methodology. It reiterates that asset declaration obligations should also cover staff working in the private offices of senior officials, including advisers and assistants, and top managers of all state-owned enterprises. The report also calls for legislative amendments to minimise risks related to declarations of cash held outside the banking system.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The system of anti-corruption units and designated anti-corruption officers should be reformed to improve its effectiveness. In particular, the quality of corruption risk assessments and anti-corruption programs adopted by public authorities often remains low. The Commission states that the NACP should comprehensively review its corruption risk assessment methodology, including by applying a sector-specific approach, and that further efforts are needed to better integrate corruption risk management into public-sector institutions’ overall risk management systems.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The legal framework for whistleblower protection still needs to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. The report also calls for reviewing legislation on conflicts of interest and related restrictions to address identified gaps, inconsistencies and disproportionate restrictions.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also notes that the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 has not yet been adopted by Parliament and that a new State Anti-Corruption Program must also be developed and adopted. To prevent future implementation problems, capacities, expertise and resources should be strengthened, particularly at the NACP. In addition, to increase ownership of reforms, responsibilities should be clearly divided between line ministries and enforcement bodies, with regular involvement of political coordination bodies, including at the highest level.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the Commission </span><b>recommends</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in line with the Ukraine Plan, that Ukraine:</span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopt an ambitious Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Program;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure effective reduction of identified corruption risks in vulnerable sectors (energy, defence, procurement, construction and land management, justice and law enforcement) through national anti-corruption and relevant sectoral strategic frameworks.</span><b> </b></li>
</ul>
<p><b>Almost all these concerns and recommendations fully coincide with those identified by TI Ukraine in its Shadow Report.</b><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, this year, the Commission does not explicitly mention the need for some degree of external oversight of logical and arithmetic checks of asset declarations. Nor does it positively assess the effectiveness and results of the NACP’s lifestyle monitoring of public officials, as it did previously. TI Ukraine did not share that positive assessment, since we consider the current lifestyle monitoring procedure insufficiently regulated.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Compared with the previous report, the Commission also no longer raises the issue of insufficient NACP staffing or provides the number of confirmed whistleblowers alongside an assessment of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Management and Confiscation of Criminal Assets (Chapter 24)</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the Commission, Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation under Chapter 24 in the fight against serious and organised crime.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regarding assets, the Commission finds that the use of financial investigations, asset freezing and confiscation has increased but remains limited overall. Its assessment of the legislative framework is clearly critical: Ukraine has made no progress in aligning legislation with the EU acquis on the fight against serious and organised crime, while the adoption of strategic documents, including the Financial Investigation Strategy and Asset Recovery Strategy, has been delayed.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> First, the ARMA reform has advanced: an independent assessment of the Agency’s effectiveness was conducted, an inventory of assets under management was completed, and most secondary legislation needed to implement the reform was adopted. Second, improvements were noted in the fight against money laundering: in 2025, the numbers of criminal proceedings, indictments and convictions increased, while confiscation decisions nearly doubled, from 51 to 96. Third, the Commission notes that the NABU and the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) established specialized financial investigation units.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Concerns raised by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The first competition for the Head of the ARMA concluded without a result and has therefore been relaunched. Despite the adoption of secondary legislation, the Commission identifies shortcomings in the selection of asset managers and the lack of judicial oversight of this process. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code are still needed to regulate cooperation between the ARMA and prosecutors. The Asset Recovery Strategy and its action plan expired in 2025, and replacement documents have not been adopted. Practical guidance and templates for implementing the 2024 joint order on financial investigations are also lacking.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>The most significant concern is the absence of consolidated statistics on asset freezing and confiscation, which the Commission identifies as a major obstacle to assessing the effectiveness of these mechanisms. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the Commission’s view, available data indicate insufficient use of confiscation in criminal proceedings. In money-laundering cases, most convicted persons received suspended sentences (188 out of 271 in 2025); courts are overburdened and the backlog has grown. Legislation establishing registers of natural persons’ bank accounts and of beneficial owners of trusts remains blocked in Parliament. The MONEYVAL assessment has been postponed.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>The Commission’s recommendations in this area are to:</b></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">finalize the selection of the Head of ARMA and begin implementing the recommendations of the Agency’s independent external assessment;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish a register of accounts and individual bank safes of natural persons and ensure access for competent authorities;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopt and start implementing the Financial Investigation Strategy and the 2026–2030 Asset Recovery Strategy and, under the anti-corruption chapter, consolidate the track record in seizure and confiscation of assets;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopt legislation ensuring the operational independence of the financial intelligence unit, with a transparent competitive selection of its head;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">align the provisions concerning politically exposed persons (PEPs) with the EU acquis.</span><b> </b></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All these recommendations fully coincide with those TI Ukraine made in its Shadow Report.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the Commission devoted less attention this year to gaps in the legislative regulation of confiscation mechanisms. This issue is included in the Rule of Law Roadmap, but the Commission did not single it out in this section of the report.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Public Procurement (Chapter 5)</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission notes that Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in public procurement. Legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis, while the rules governing review procedures are largely aligned.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the Commission, public procurement contracts worth EUR 19.74 billion were concluded in 2025, excluding defence and gas procurement. In practice, the State Audit Service identified violations in 63% of the procurements it monitored, while the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine upheld 66% of complaints. The Commission also refers to Operation “Midas” in the context of preventing corruption in public procurement, noting that the investigation uncovered alleged large-scale embezzlement and high-level political influence over defence contract awards.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission notes some progress, primarily due to implementation of the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/76-2024-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Strategy for Reforming the Public Procurement System</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for 2024–2026 and adoption of the new </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4888-20#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Law on Public Procurement</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The law further aligned the legislative framework with the EU acquis and marked a significant step towards meeting Ukraine’s public procurement obligations under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also notes that in 2025, 72.3% of public procurement contracts, excluding defence and gas procurement, were awarded through competitive procedures. The government also approved a </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1390-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Control</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The State Audit Service improved procedures for accessing the personal data of persons responsible for violations, while its findings were rarely challenged in court and challenges were seldom successful. Progress was also reported in updating training programmes for procurement professionals and economic operators.</span><b></b></p>
<p><b>Concerns raised by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Last year’s recommendations were only partially implemented. The Commission draws attention to continuing exceptions to competitive procedures, including direct contracting for the protection of critical infrastructure.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The report specifically raises concerns about pilot </span><b>framework agreements for certain construction works that allow purchases</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> without tenders and provide limited opportunities for monitoring and review. In other words, the government’s experiments have not gone unnoticed. Single-bidder tenders accounted for 70.6% of tender value. The Commission also considers contracting authorities’ capacity and internal and external control mechanisms for preventing corruption and bid rigging to be weak.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Other concerns include gaps in aligning public-private partnership (PPP) and concession legislation with the EU acquis and the unresolved distinction between ordinary public procurement and defence procurement. Regarding procurement monitoring, the Commission observes that only a small share of monitoring procedures were triggered by automatic risk indicators.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><b>The Commission recommends that Ukraine:</b></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">align all public procurement legislation with the EU acquis, including legislation on utilities, concessions, PPPs, and defence procurement, while ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of EU companies in Ukrainian PPP projects;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">improve e-procurement functionality, including by introducing new EU-compliant procedures in Prozorro, improving e-contracting and reducing exemptions;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">implement and, where necessary, adjust the new </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1120-2026-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Public Procurement Development Strategy for 2027–2030</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen integrity checks and exclusion grounds for tenderers, enhance monitoring, and build the capacity and integrity of procurement management within all contracting authorities.</span><b> </b></li>
</ul>
<p><b>Conceptually, the Commission’s recommendations align with those of </b><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/public-procurement-2025-how-the-sector-lived-and-changed/"><b>TI Ukraine’s Shadow Report on public procurement</b></a><b>.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> However, some Commission observations require additional context and further research. When discussing exceptions, the Commission primarily refers to the exemption for critical infrastructure protection. In our view, the focus should instead be on unjustified exemptions that are not objectively necessary.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also refers to certain problems with deadlines for submitting complaints. We have not observed such problems, so the issue warrants further examination. Its reference to problems with the automatic suspension of a procedure when a contracting authority’s decision is challenged also raises questions.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Furthermore, the report should consider not only the procurement procedure itself but also the contract implementation stage.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also positively assessed implementation of the Strategy for Reforming the Public Procurement System for 2024–2026. However, a significant share of measures under the Strategy had been postponed until the adoption of the updated public procurement law. Moreover, no action plan was approved for 2026.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Financial Control (Chapter 32)</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission noted some progress in financial control. However, most positive developments in this chapter concern strategic and regulatory changes, while their implementation remains uneven. The Commission also notes that its recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain relevant.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key concerns include insufficient effectiveness of internal control, staffing constraints at the Accounting Chamber, and the need to further strengthen the fight against fraud involving EU funds.</span></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The Commission notes the approval of the strategic framework for developing public internal financial control for 2026–2030, the start of aligning national internal audit standards with the Global Internal Audit Standards, and the establishment of audit committees at key budget spending units.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also positively assesses the Accounting Chamber’s work, particularly its application of new audit methodologies based on ISSAI standards and stronger cooperation with parliamentary committees in overseeing public spending.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission separately highlights the adoption of a national anti-fraud strategy to protect the EU’s financial interests in July 2026 and the developing role of the State Audit Service as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS). Despite progress, further improvements are needed in the practical effectiveness of public internal financial control, the institutional capacity of the Accounting Chamber, and the State Audit Service’s powers to protect the EU’s financial interests.</span></p>
<p><b>Concerns raised by the Commission.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Despite some progress, particularly in strengthening the regulatory framework, the assessment of practical results in financial control remains cautious.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission’s main concerns relate to the institutional capacity and independence of financial control bodies. In particular, it reiterates the need to fill vacancies at the Accounting Chamber and strengthen its financial independence. Regarding the State Audit Service, the Commission identifies the need to expand its powers as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS), which are currently limited to reporting irregularities under the Ukraine Facility.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another unresolved issue is the incomplete alignment of national legislation with EU requirements for protecting the Union’s financial interests.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In public internal financial control, the Commission highlights uneven reform implementation, insufficient coordination and differences in institutional capacity. In particular, it calls for strengthening the Ministry of Finance’s Central Harmonization Unit and managers’ accountability for internal control and risk management.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission recommends focusing on three priorities:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>strengthening the Accounting Chamber </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">— filling vacancies, enhancing institutional and financial independence, extending financial audit coverage of strategically important public expenditure and improving performance audits;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>strengthening the fight against fraud</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — primarily by developing cooperation with OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), and aligning national legislation with EU law;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>improving the effectiveness of public internal financial control </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">— implementing the Global Internal Audit Standards, strengthening the Central Harmonization Unit, ensuring effective audit committees and expanding risk management practices.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Importantly, the process of filling vacancies at the Accounting Chamber has finally moved forward: the Verkhovna Rada has established the Advisory Group of Experts required to conduct the competition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All the report’s recommendations fully coincide with TI Ukraine’s concerns.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, we believe that strengthening the Accounting Chamber’s financial independence requires a balanced approach that takes into account both international principles governing the independence of supreme audit institutions and budgetary constraints under martial law. The current approach appears balanced, and completely exempting the Accounting Chamber from general budget planning procedures may be premature.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Furthermore, although the overall quality of Accounting Chamber audits shows a positive trend, including its audits of the HACC and the ARMA, insufficient depth of analysis in individual cases still undermines the completeness and soundness of the findings.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regional Policy (Chapter 22)</span><b> </b></h2>
<p><b>Ukraine is making progress in establishing rules and instruments of European governance, but their practical implementation at regional and local levels remains weak and uneven.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The principal positive developments concern updates to the regulatory framework and strategic planning for regional development.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the Commission pays particular attention to the insufficient coherence between strategic planning, financing and public investment management. Ukraine needs to prepare the institutional architecture for the future management of EU funds, strengthen administrative capacity at all levels and ensure meaningful participation of local authorities and civil society in policy development and monitoring.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also considers that the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/963-2026-%D0%BF#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reorganization of the responsible ministry into two separate bodies</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has adversely affected reform continuity and implementation of previous commitments.</span></p>
<p><b>Positive developments identified by the Commission. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission notes several positive developments in </span><b>regional policy and strategic planning</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, including updates to the regulatory framework and the action plan for implementing the State Regional Development Strategy, and the start of preparations for the 2028–2034 strategy. The Interdepartmental Coordination Commission for Regional Development has also resumed its work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>Progress in public investment management reform</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is also assessed positively: a medium-term plan for priority public investments for 2027–2029 was approved, a single state project pipeline for 2027 was developed, and regional and local authorities advanced preparation of the relevant documents.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some progress has also been achieved in </span><b>financial control </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">through legislative changes and improved internal control mechanisms. At the municipal level, anti-corruption tools were piloted, including procurement integrity procedures, integrity plans and internal audits. However, the Commission stresses that these initiatives still require systematic implementation and greater practical effectiveness.</span></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Concerns raised by the Commission. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission highlights several systemic problems holding back the development of Ukraine’s regional policy.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">National, regional and local strategic documents remain insufficiently aligned, and their links to reconstruction needs, investment priorities and funding are weak. The State Fund for Regional Development is still not fully operational. Local authorities and civil society have limited involvement in shaping regional policy, and staff capacity remains insufficient.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine has yet to establish a fully functioning management, monitoring and audit system for future EU funds. Public internal financial control remains fragmented, the practical impact of local anti-corruption programmes is limited, and the functionality of DREAM as a transparency and corruption prevention tool requires further improvement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission recommends that Ukraine:</span></p>
<ul>
<li><b>strengthen institutional coordination:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> adopt a government action plan to meet Chapter 22 benchmarks, clearly delineate the responsibilities of the relevant ministries and ensure the full operation of the Interdepartmental Coordination Commission;</span></li>
<li><b>improve strategic planning:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> enhance reporting on implementation of the State Regional Development Strategy, prepare a new strategy for 2028–2034, and finalise regional and local strategies that reflect investment priorities;</span></li>
<li><b>ensure transparent regional development financing:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> make the State Fund for Regional Development fully operational and digitalised and improve fund allocation and project selection mechanisms;</span></li>
<li><b>increase administrative capacity:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> develop the skills of public authorities at all levels, particularly in investment project preparation, public procurement and EU fund management;</span></li>
<li><b>strengthen stakeholder participation:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> systematically involve local and regional authorities, civil society and partners in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of regional programmes;</span></li>
<li><b>improve financial control and integrity:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> strengthen internal audit, develop risk management, ensure transparent use of resources and improve DREAM as a tool for accountability and corruption prevention.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thus, the European Commission notes some progress in improving the effectiveness and transparency of multilevel governance. Achievements include adoption of legislation to ensure legality and transparency in local self-government and the 2025 update of the Concept for its reform. At the same time, the report pays insufficient attention to the practical implementation of adopted legislation, namely access to information, digital capacity and local authorities’ accountability to residents. In particular, it lacks an assessment of how open council meetings, access to adopted decisions, public reporting by mayors and council members, municipal open data and electronic services actually work in practice.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The pilot </span><a href="https://transparentcities.in.ua/european-city-index"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European City Index</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> reveals substantial problems in these areas: average compliance with open data requirements is only 23.1%, while the overall score of the 11 cities assessed is 44 out of 100. This confirms the need to assess EU integration progress not only through legislative changes and national systems, but also by examining how European standards of openness, accountability and accessible services are implemented in local communities.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Other Important Recommendations</span></h2>
<h2><b style="font-size: 16px;">1. International experts in selection procedures.</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission describes as a “challenge” the legislature’s longstanding resistance to the temporary involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners in various selection and vetting procedures. The report warns that ending their role prematurely, before national appointment bodies have been fully reformed, would put judicial reform at risk.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>The Commission therefore calls for urgent extension of the meaningful involvement of such experts in the selection of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ),</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in line with the Ukraine Facility, and the High Council of Justice (HCJ). It also calls for their temporary involvement to improve the selection and integrity vetting of Supreme Court and other high-court judges. This aligns with our recommendations on draft laws Nos. 13382 and 16018 concerning the extension of international experts’ participation in HQCJ selection, our recommendation to involve the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) in Supreme Court competitions and integrity declaration checks, and our conclusion that international experts’ decisive vote remains a critical safeguard against politicisation of selection procedures.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These are among the Commission’s strongest concerns in the judiciary chapter.</span></p>
<p><b>2. Prosecutor General and prosecution service.</b> The Commission calls for improving the procedures for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General and repealing provisions permitting the transfer and appointment of prosecutors without competition, as well as those granting the Prosecutor General access to pre-trial investigation materials.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission also calls for legislation on the selection of management-level prosecutors, improved disciplinary accountability for prosecutors in line with GRECO recommendations, stronger capacity of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, and the launch of electronic criminal case-management modules.</span></p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BVJwWXNDZT70qCt1DVglQ3GzdiOgS5_B/preview" width="640" height="480"></iframe></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-does-the-2026-european-commission-s-report-recommend/">What Does the 2026 European Commission’s Report Recommend?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Urgent Searches: An Analysis of Draft Law No. 15488 and Its Alternatives</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/urgent-searches-an-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15488-and-its-alternatives/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:47:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34119</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Regulating urgent searches remains a pressing issue, not only because the legislation is flawed but also because of problems with the quality of judicial oversight over the legalization of urgent searches.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/urgent-searches-an-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15488-and-its-alternatives/">Urgent Searches: An Analysis of Draft Law No. 15488 and Its Alternatives</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On October 28, Parliament </span><a href="https://meeting.rada.gov.ua/work/vote/voting/15488-3_skl9/ed20261028#131825"><span style="font-weight: 400;">supported</span></a> <a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70585"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15488-3</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> at first reading with 265 votes in favor. The draft law proposes to set out in greater detail in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine the grounds for urgent entry into a person’s home or other premises to save property. It was adopted as a basis, with its provisions to be refined before the second reading in accordance with Article 116(1) of the Law on the Rules of Procedure.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Earlier, on August 7, 2026, MPs Fedir Venislavskyi, Roman Kostenko, and others registered</span> <a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70436"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15488</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the Verkhovna Rada. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">MPs then registered three more alternative draft laws: </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70552"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15488-1</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Serhii Vlasenko, No.</span> <a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70577"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15488-2</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Antonina Slavytska and Oleksandr Tkachenko, the aforementioned No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70585"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15488-3</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Serhii Ionushas, and No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70587"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15488-4</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">by Hryhorii Mamka</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regulating urgent searches remains a pressing issue, not only because the legislation is flawed but also because of problems with the quality of judicial oversight over the legalization of urgent searches.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the authors, the draft law should strengthen the constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of a person’s home or other premises, ensure legality when such premises are entered, rule out unlawful searches, and improve the quality of subsequent judicial oversight of searches conducted without a prior ruling of an investigating judge.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine experts analyzed all of these draft laws.</span></p>
<h2><b>Key takeaways:</b></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3, recommended by the committee, deserves support, as it eliminates the key shortcoming of the main draft law: it gives the owner or possessor the right to take part in the consideration of a motion for authorization of a search that has already been conducted;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">when Draft Law No. 15488-3 is finalized, its own shortcomings should be corrected, and the shortcomings of the main and alternative draft laws should not be allowed to carry over into it.</span></li>
</ul>
<h2><b>What we propose:</b></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remove the possibility of appealing rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search or inspection;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish that filing a motion after the deadline must be grounds for denying the motion concerning the search, unless the prosecution proves that objective and insurmountable obstacles prevented it from applying in time;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that a report of a criminal offense will be registered if it substantiates that an offense has occurred;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">avoid the risky provisions of draft laws No. 15488, No. 15488-1, No. 15488-2, and No. 15488-4 identified in this legal analysis.</span></li>
</ul>
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			            	According to the authors, the draft law should strengthen the constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of a person’s home or other premises, ensure legality when such premises are entered, rule out unlawful searches, and improve the quality of subsequent judicial oversight of searches conducted without a prior ruling of an investigating judge.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What is the current situation?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At present, the Criminal Procedure Code, in particular Article 233(3), regulates the “legalization” of an urgent search as follows:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the owner or possessor of the searched home or other premises does not take part in the consideration of the motion concerning the urgent search;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search cannot be appealed;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Code does not specify the deadline by which the investigator and prosecutor must file a motion for authorization of an urgent search that has already been conducted;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">there is no special deadline for returning property seized during an urgent search if its subsequent legalization is refused.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, Article 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which governs the grounds for and commencement of pre-trial investigations, provides that criminal proceedings are opened on any report of a criminal offense, and refusing to accept such a report is not permitted.</span></p>
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			            	At present, the Criminal Procedure Code, in particular Article 233(3), regulates the “legalization” of an urgent search as follows.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What changes are proposed?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative Draft Law</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> No. 15488-3, supported by MPs at first reading, proposes the following changes regarding urgent searches:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the owner or possessor of the searched home or other premises will be able to take part in the consideration of the motion concerning the urgent search;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search may be appealed;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the investigator or prosecutor will have 72 hours to file a motion concerning an urgent search with the investigating judge, and the judge will have three days to consider it;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">property temporarily seized during an urgent search is to be returned if the prosecutor does not approve the motion concerning the search or if the investigating judge refuses to authorize it.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The author of the document, MP Serhii Ionushas, also proposes giving investigators and prosecutors the right to refuse to open criminal proceedings if a report contains insufficient information about the criminal offense committed.</span></p>
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			            	The author of the document, MP Serhii Ionushas, also proposes giving investigators and prosecutors the right to refuse to open criminal proceedings if a report contains insufficient information about the criminal offense committed.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What are the advantages of alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Five draft laws, four of them alternatives, propose to regulate urgent searches, which confirms how pressing the problem is. They reflect </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">two different approaches to change. Some try to strengthen the safeguards of subsequent judicial oversight but at the same time create new risks to the effectiveness of investigations (No. 15488) and to the admissibility of evidence (No. 15488-1 and No. 15488-2); others go far beyond the subject of the main draft law (No. 15488-4). </span></p>
<p><b>The decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Law Enforcement to support alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 by Serhii Ionushas at first reading, with revisions under Article 116 of the Law of Ukraine on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was the right one.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft contains precisely those procedural mechanisms, namely the person’s participation in subsequent judicial oversight and appellate review, whose absence was one of the central concerns about the main Draft Law No. 15488. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although some of its provisions also need adjustment, this version is the best basis for meaningful changes to judicial oversight of urgent searches as a legal institution. It responds directly to the key problem of the main draft and gives the possessor of the property the right to take part in the consideration of the motion for authorization of a search already conducted.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, compared with the main draft law, Draft Law No. 15488-3 takes a more systematic approach to returning property temporarily seized during an urgent search, since the Criminal Procedure Code currently provides no grounds whatsoever for returning such property. The draft law proposes that property seized during an urgent search be returned on the basis of a prosecutor’s decision or a court ruling refusing authorization of the search.</span></p>
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			            	The decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Law Enforcement to support alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 by Serhii Ionushas at first reading, with revisions under Article 116 of the Law of Ukraine on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was the right one.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which risky provisions should be removed from the alternative draft law?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Serhii Ionushas’s alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 contains a number of positive innovations that improve oversight of urgent searches and inspections, as well as of the return of property temporarily seized during them. Above all, it deserves credit for allowing the possessor of such property to take part in the hearing on authorization of an urgent search or inspection. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the draft law itself has certain shortcomings and gaps, which, in our view, should be corrected.</span></p>
<h2><b>1. Appeals against rulings on urgent searches or inspections</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the most critical concerns about alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 is that it opens the possibility of appealing rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search or inspection.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is true that as early as 2006, in </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/974_274#Text"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Panteleyenko v. Ukraine</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the ECHR found that Ukraine had violated Article 13 of the Convention on Human Rights because the possessor of searched property had no domestic remedy against violations of the right to respect for one’s home guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The ECHR set out its most recent concerns on this issue in 2025 in </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/974_061-25#Text"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Korniyets and Others v. Ukraine</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, noting that national (Ukrainian) law does not allow the owner or user of property to take part in the consideration of a motion for authorization of a search or inspection that has already been conducted (that is, an urgent one).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Scholars </span><a href="https://dspace.nlu.edu.ua/server/api/core/bitstreams/d2feee57-86b9-4230-a4eb-06344157cf62/content"><span style="font-weight: 400;">believe</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that reviewing the lawfulness and justification of such a restriction at later stages of court proceedings may not be an effective means of restoring the violated rights, so a prompt review mechanism is objectively needed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 does fix this shortcoming by expressly granting the person whose home or other premises were searched and inspected the right to take part in the consideration of the investigator’s or prosecutor’s motion for authorization of the urgent search or inspection.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The author also proposes allowing appeals against rulings authorizing a search or inspection and against rulings refusing such authorization. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Proposals to grant such a right of appeal have already appeared in some earlier draft laws, in particular </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/56993"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 13599</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. However, this proposal seems premature and risks overloading the appellate courts. It also threatens to create unequal conditions for possessors of property searched in the ordinary manner, that is, on the basis of a court ruling.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, under this draft law, persons whose premises were subjected to an urgent search will already have the right to present their position before the investigating judge, which will introduce a domestic remedy against violations of the right to respect for privacy.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, the possibility of appealing rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search or inspection should be removed from the alternative draft law.</b></p>
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			            	The possibility of appealing rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search or inspection should be removed from the alternative draft law.
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<h2><b>2. Consequences of missing the deadline for obtaining authorization of an urgent search or inspection</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the most appropriate proposals of alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 is to introduce a clear deadline for the investigator or prosecutor to file a motion for authorization of an urgent search after it has been conducted. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft proposes that such a motion be filed not “immediately,” but no later than 72 hours after the relevant investigative action.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">An analysis of case law and scholarship shows that, after conducting such urgent investigative actions, the prosecution does not always apply to the investigating judge for authorization equally urgently. In one </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/125366666"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, for example, the investigator applied to the investigating judge for authorization of an urgent search only five days after it was conducted. The text of the decision gives no explanation of why the investigator was unable to do so “immediately”; what is more, the case concerned the illegal handling of weapons.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its ruling in </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/122272945"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 466/525/22</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the Supreme Court stated:</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “arbitrary compliance with the rule of immediate retrospective judicial review, that is, after the time objectively required for this has elapsed, does not meet the criterion of ‘immediacy’ unless the circumstances in the criminal proceedings file indicate objective and insurmountable obstacles to filing the relevant motion as soon as possible, and constitutes a violation of Article 233(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to </span><a href="https://humanitarian.com.ua/index.php/juridical/article/view/2060/2192"><span style="font-weight: 400;">scholars</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, such practices generally escape proper procedural assessment by investigating judges, which leads to the legalization of search results obtained in breach of the law.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the 72-hour deadline alone cannot discipline the prosecution, since missing it carries no negative consequences. Therefore, the new deadline rule will be merely declaratory.</span></p>
<p><b>Given the need to ensure the fastest possible retrospective judicial review of interference with the right to respect for private and family life, it is necessary to establish that filing a motion after the deadline must be grounds for returning the motion, unless the prosecution proves that objective and insurmountable obstacles prevented it from applying in time.</b></p>
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			            	To ensure the fastest possible retrospective judicial review of interference with the right to respect for private and family life, it is necessary to establish that filing a motion after the deadline must be grounds for returning the motion, unless the prosecution proves that objective and insurmountable obstacles prevented it from applying in time.</p>
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<h2><b>3. Commencement of a pre-trial investigation based on a report</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The debate over the unconditional obligation of an investigator or prosecutor to accept a report of a criminal offense and open an investigation has been going on for years. On the one hand, abolishing this obligation would relieve pre-trial investigation bodies of the need to register, and later close, criminal proceedings opened on the basis of completely meaningless reports. On the other hand, unjustified refusals to open investigations into actual criminal offenses would become more frequent.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Statistics from the State Judicial Administration also show that </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/storage/portal/main_site/zvit_2025/1-%D0%BA_4.2025.xls"><span style="font-weight: 400;">in 2025</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, out of 42,270 complaints against refusals to register criminal proceedings, investigating judges found in 25,066 cases that law enforcement had unlawfully refused to register proceedings, and found the refusal justified in only 8,662 cases.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Indeed, on the one hand, the statistics show that unjustified refusals by investigators and prosecutors to accept reports outnumber justified ones; on the other hand, they confirm the quality of judicial oversight in this area.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The authors propose relieving law enforcement agencies by creating a preliminary filter under which investigators and prosecutors would check whether a report contains</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “circumstances that may indicate the commission of a criminal offense</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.” The draft law also proposes to clarify that a report must contain “</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">a sufficient body of information enabling the investigator, inquiry officer, or prosecutor to reach a reasoned conclusion that </span></i><b><i>a person’s actions or omissions constitute a socially dangerous act containing the elements of a criminal offense</i></b><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> under the Criminal Code of Ukraine.”</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, this proposal deserves support, but the criteria for screening reports appear overly strict. Read literally, these provisions mean that only reports clearly setting out all the elements of a criminal offense will be registered, which is unrealistic for the average citizen.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A more appropriate approach would be to require that a report contain information enabling the investigator and prosecutor to reach a reasoned conclusion that a criminal offense has occurred, rather than that all the elements of the offense are present.</span></p>
<p><b>It should therefore be provided that a report of a criminal offense is registered if it substantiates that an offense has occurred, since proving the presence of the elements of the offense, including the person’s intent to commit it, would place an excessive burden on the victim or the person filing the report.</b></p>
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			            	It should therefore be provided that a report of a criminal offense is registered if it substantiates that an offense has occurred, since proving the presence of the elements of the offense, including the person’s intent to commit it, would place an excessive burden on the victim or the person filing the report.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be avoided when finalizing Draft Law No. 15488-3?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Once alternative Draft Law No. 15488-3 has been adopted as a basis, it is important that problematic proposals from the main and other alternative draft laws do not find their way into it during finalization.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In particular, this concerns the requirement in the main Draft Law No. 15488 that the prosecutor must state the following in the decision to conduct an urgent search:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">information about</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “specific, individually identified property in respect of which sufficient evidence has been gathered in the criminal proceedings to provide reasonable grounds to believe that such property has or may have the characteristics of physical evidence”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the reality of a </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“specific and immediate threat of destruction, damage, or loss” </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">of such property;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the impossibility of obtaining an investigating judge’s ruling authorizing entry into a person’s home or other premises because of the risk of losing such property.</span></li>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such changes could undermine the “urgency” of a search or inspection by making it harder to conduct, which would ultimately also increase the risk of property, including evidence, being destroyed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Serhii Vlasenko’s alternative Draft Law No. 15488-1 also carries significant risks. It proposes to link almost any deviation from the requirements for conducting an urgent search, regardless of its nature and significance, to the inadmissibility of all evidence obtained directly or derivatively</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The Supreme Court has repeatedly </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/133475377"><span style="font-weight: 400;">emphasized</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">that</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “not every formal failure to comply with the requirements of the criminal procedure law renders evidence inadmissible </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">…</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to declare evidence inadmissible under Article 87(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court must specify the violation of which fundamental right or freedom resulted in obtaining this evidence</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.” The proposed changes could lead to criminal proceedings being closed or defendants being acquitted solely because of minor formal violations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft law No. 15488-2 by Antonina Slavytska and Oleksandr Tkachenko largely reproduces the main draft as regards urgent entry and therefore retains its key problems, including the requirement concerning specific, individually identified property. However, it proposes much broader changes to the Criminal Procedure Code: applying the general principles of criminal proceedings to gaps in the law exclusively in the interests of the defense, which could undermine their coherence and the adversarial nature of proceedings. It also proposes declaring inadmissible any evidence obtained in breach of the procedure, regardless of the nature and significance of the breach. This distorts the current approach of assessing inadmissibility on the merits, which is </span><a href="https://lpd.court.gov.ua/legal-position/233"><span style="font-weight: 400;">upheld</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">among others, by the Supreme Court. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft law No. 15488-4 by Hryhorii Mamka goes far beyond the issue of urgent searches. It simultaneously changes the powers of the prosecutor, depriving prosecutors of the right to conduct investigative actions, as well as the rules for conducting investigative and covert investigative actions, temporary access, the commencement of pre-trial investigations, and other institutions of the Criminal Procedure Code. </span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, when finalizing the main draft law, the risky provisions of Draft Laws No. 15488, No. 15488-1, No. 15488-2, and No. 15488-4 should be avoided.</b></p>
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			            	When finalizing the main draft law, the risky provisions of Draft Laws No. 15488, No. 15488-1, No. 15488-2, and No. 15488-4 should be avoided.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Urgent searches as a legal concept have needed reform for years, and Draft Law No. 15488-3 could become a good basis for closing the most critical gaps, which the ECHR, among others, has highlighted.</span></p>
<p><b>Transparency International Ukraine therefore supports the adoption of Draft Law No. 15488-3 at second reading, provided that it is revised</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. During its revision under Article 116 of the Law of Ukraine on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, our recommendations must be taken into account:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remove the possibility of appealing rulings granting or refusing authorization for an urgent search or inspection;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish that filing a motion after the deadline must be grounds for denying the motion concerning the search, unless the prosecution proves that objective and insurmountable obstacles prevented it from applying in time;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that a report of a criminal offense is registered if it substantiates that an offense has occurred, rather than that all the elements of the offense are present;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">avoid the risky provisions of Draft Laws No. 15488, No. 15488-1, No. 15488-2, and No. 15488-4.</span></li>
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			            	Transparency International Ukraine therefore supports the adoption of Draft Law No. 15488-3 at second reading, provided that it is revised.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/urgent-searches-an-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15488-and-its-alternatives/">Urgent Searches: An Analysis of Draft Law No. 15488 and Its Alternatives</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 11:20:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34093</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The current forensic examination system cannot provide the NABU and the SAPO with expert opinions that are complete, of adequate quality, and delivered within procedural time limits.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/">Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On August 27, 2026, MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, Maksym Khlapuk, and Nataliia Pipa registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70616"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the Verkhovna Rada. The draft law concerns the operation of the Research Center for Independent Forensic Examinations (RCIFE), which would give the NABU and the SAPO access to independent forensic examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law is needed because the current forensic examination system cannot provide the NABU and the SAPO with expert opinions that are complete, of adequate quality, and delivered within procedural time limits. Moreover, the possibility of undue influence on experts undermines the quality of investigations and the overall capacity of the NABU and the SAPO.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two alternative draft laws were registered on September 7 and 15, 2026. MP Serhii Vlasenko submitted alternative </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70705"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569-1</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “on ensuring the exercise of the right to a genuinely independent forensic examination.” MP Volodymyr Kabachenko submitted </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70754"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569-2</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “on improving the legal framework for forensic expert activity.”</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways</span></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law deserves unequivocal support. It establishes in law an independent expert institution that will be able to provide timely, high-quality, and objective forensic examinations in NABU and SAPO cases.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The expert institution’s independence is ensured through a special procedure for appointing its management and staff and for bringing them to disciplinary liability. It is also ensured by a Supervisory Board with special mechanisms for reporting interference in the work of experts and the institution’s management.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The institution’s mandate must be clearly tied to criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 and No. 15569-2 do not deserve support. They do not create conditions for timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations in NABU cases. They could also destabilize the forensic examination sector by abolishing full-fledged procedures for certifying experts and bringing them to disciplinary liability.</span></li>
</ul>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the main draft law, clearly extend the RCIFE’s mandate to criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the main draft law, clarify certain technical points in the mechanism for responding to pressure on experts. These are a deadline for considering a report of pressure, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform the NABU and the SAPO of interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reject alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 “on ensuring the exercise of the right to a genuinely independent forensic examination” and No. 15569-2 “on improving the legal framework for forensic expert activity.” Both propose deregulating forensic expert activity without safeguards against corruption risks and without a balanced approach.</span></li>
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			            	The possibility of undue influence on experts undermines the quality of investigations and the overall capacity of the NABU and the SAPO.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What is the current situation?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reform of forensic examinations is a long-standing and unresolved problem in Ukraine’s justice system. The reasons include the following:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine has no independent expert institution specializing in examinations in criminal proceedings under NABU jurisdiction. Similar specialized institutions do exist under other agencies, namely the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Border Guard Service, and the Security Service of Ukraine.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">There are no dedicated legal mechanisms for responding to pressure on experts.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a general rule, any expert institution has 90 days to conduct an examination, and this period can be extended.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Not all expert institutions can prioritize examinations or have criteria for doing so.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Examinations are assigned to experts by the head of the institution rather than by an automated system.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">By law, an expert’s minimum base salary is 10 subsistence minimums. However, this provision has been suspended by budget laws for 8 years, so actual pay may be lower.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Register of Forensic Examination Methodologies publishes only a list of methodologies, without their content.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Private expert institutions have no right to conduct any criminalistic examinations.</span></li>
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			            	Reform of forensic examinations is a long-standing and unresolved problem in Ukraine’s justice system.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What does the main draft law propose?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law would establish an independent expert center that would prioritize NABU and SAPO cases. It would also provide better financial, material, and technical conditions for other experts. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To this end, the authors propose to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reorganize the Research Center for Independent Forensic Examinations (RCIFE) in line with the law’s requirements, so that it conducts forensic examinations in a specific category of cases, in particular corruption and corruption-related cases, based on the criteria of NABU jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">guarantee the RCIFE’s independence by establishing a Supervisory Board of 5 members (3 of them from international partners), which would hold a competitive selection of the center’s director. The authors also plan to introduce independent certification of experts and an independent procedure for bringing them to disciplinary liability, an audit of the center every 2 years, separate funding, and other safeguards;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish a procedure for responding to pressure on experts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">set a shorter period of 60 days for the RCIFE to conduct an examination, with the possibility of extension;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the RCIFE director to give priority to examinations for NABU and SAPO;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure automated assignment of examinations among RCIFE experts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">raise minimum base salaries to 40 subsistence minimums for RCIFE experts and to 30 for experts at other institutions, and prohibit budget laws from reducing them;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">publish in the Register of Forensic Examination Methodologies not only the list of methodologies but also their content, except for restricted information;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow private expert institutions to conduct certain criminalistic examinations at the RCIFE, with the list to be determined by the Ministry of Justice.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-lg-3 offset-lg-1 d-flex align-items-center">
<div class="blockquote-block">
<p class="quote">
			            	The main draft law would establish an independent expert center that would prioritize NABU and SAPO cases. It would also provide better financial, material, and technical conditions for other experts.
			            </p>
</p></div>
</p></div>
</p></div>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What are the advantages of the main draft law?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law offers a comprehensive solution to one of the most acute problems in complex NABU and SAPO corruption and corruption-related cases: the Bureau’s lack of access to independent forensic examination. The European Commission, the IMF, and other international partners, on whom Ukraine’s EU accession and financial support depend, have repeatedly drawn attention to this problem.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Rule of Law Roadmap also </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stresses</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that NABU must have effective access to impartial, timely, and high-quality forensic examinations. Independent examinations for NABU will support high-quality investigations, which may in turn make it possible to recover criminal assets, including taxpayers’ money that officials sought to profit from. According to the </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/07/23/8045475/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Head of SAPO</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, it is precisely the lack of such examinations that directly affects how quickly and effectively corrupt officials are brought to criminal liability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In complex corruption cases, expert opinions are often what makes it possible to establish the amount of damage, the origin of assets, and the substance of financial transactions, and to examine documents and digital evidence. Accordingly, the quality and speed of examinations directly affect both the prospects of proving the charges and the state’s ability to recover proceeds of crime.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The latest example, from the Themis and Forrest Gump cases, confirms this from the mouth of one of the persons involved himself: giving the NABU access to independent examination would cause him and his alleged accomplice a great many problems.</span></p>
<p><b>The main advantage of the draft law is that it creates an institutionally independent examination system for NABU and SAPO cases.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The RCIFE will have separate funding, a special governance procedure, and its own guarantees of independence. Its director will be selected through a competition and may be dismissed only on grounds set out in law. This is a fundamental departure from the current model, under which the heads of state expert institutions are appointed and dismissed by the Ministry of Justice or another agency. At the same time, a Supervisory Board involving international experts will serve as an additional safeguard against political or administrative interference in the Center’s work.</span></p>
<p><b>The institution’s independence is complemented by personal guarantees for RCIFE experts themselves.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Their certification and disciplinary liability will be handled by a separate Expert Qualification Commission and Disciplinary Chamber. This should reduce the scope for pressuring experts with the threat of dismissal, loss of qualification, or disciplinary proceedings. In the event of undue influence, an expert will also be required to report it to the director or the Supervisory Board.</span></p>
<p><b>These guarantees are reinforced by adequate pay for the center’s staff</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The draft law proposes setting the minimum base salary of RCIFE experts at 40 subsistence minimums (UAH 133,120 in 2026) and that of experts at other state institutions at 30 subsistence minimums (UAH 99,840 in 2026). This should help attract and retain qualified specialists and, at the same time, reduce corruption risks associated with low pay. This is especially relevant given that experts currently </span><a href="https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3563513/sudova-ekspertyza-sudova-reforma"><span style="font-weight: 400;">earn</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> UAH 25,000–30,000, while the statutory minimum salary of even 10 subsistence minimums has not been applied in practice since 2018, as it is suspended every year by the State Budget laws.</span></p>
<p><b>Another important change is ending the manual assignment of examinations to experts.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> At present, the specific expert in a state expert institution is usually chosen by its head. The draft law instead introduces automated assignment of examinations among RCIFE experts. This significantly narrows administrative discretion and makes it harder to hand a sensitive examination to the “right” expert in advance.</span></p>
<p><b>Faster examinations are just as important</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Long waits for expert opinions are one of the factors that drag out complex NABU investigations. One example is the </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/129889152"><span style="font-weight: 400;">multi-episode proceedings</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> related, among other things, to possible influence on examinations in the “Medvedchuk pipeline” case, in which investigators needed several different types of examinations at once. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem of time limits is compounded by the risk of leaks. </span><a href="https://nabu.gov.ua/news/u-mene-dostatn-o-amb-tc-i-ta-nstrument-v-shchob-dati-b-i-bud-iakomu-tisku-sprobam-vplinuti-na-nezalezhn-st-nabu-semen-krivonos/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fearing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> premature disclosure of investigation materials, the NABU is in some cases forced to delay handing them over to experts. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A separate institution with stronger guarantees of independence, combined with a shorter standard examination period (</span><b>60 days</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> instead of 90) and the ability to prioritize the most urgent examinations, should reduce both risks.</span></p>
<p><b>Finally, the draft law may make expert opinions more predictable and easier to verify</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Publishing the content of forensic examination methodologies, except for restricted information, will allow the parties and the court to check how an opinion was reached and whether the examination followed the established methodology. This should also help standardize expert practice and reduce cases in which similar examinations produce substantially different results without proper scientific justification.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law’s merit, therefore, is not simply that it creates yet another state expert institution. It proposes </span><b>to change the very model of forensic examination in high-level corruption cases</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">: to protect the institution from external administrative influence, the expert from personal pressure, each examination from manual assignment, and the investigation from excessive delays.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A further advantage of the document is that it sets out in detail the transition from the existing Research Center for Forensic Examinations of the Ministry of Justice to the independent RCIFE. The </span><b>Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine</b> <b>will have three months from the law’s entry into force to ensure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a decision on reorganizing (transforming) the existing Center in line with the new requirements and to form the Supervisory Board in the manner set out in the law. It is at this stage that the key safeguard of independence, a supervisory body with international participation, is meant to begin operating. Within the same three months, when preparing the draft State Budget Law for 2027, the government is expected </span><b>to provide a separate budget expenditure program for the RCIFE’s operation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which is a practical guarantee of the institution’s separate funding. The government must also ensure the adoption of secondary legislation and bring ministries’ regulations into line with the new Law. </span></p>
<p><b>The Ministry of Justice</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> will have five months </span><b>to approve the RCIFE Charter</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in line with the Law’s requirements. Within another six months, the Ministry must take</span><b> inventory of forensic examination methodologies</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, both those already entered in the Register of Methodologies and those applied outside it. This will make it possible to identify all restricted methodologies and the grounds for restricting them. It will also ensure that methodologies are published in the Register, except for restricted information, as open data available for free viewing. The draft law thus does not merely declare the principle that methodologies should be transparent; it sets a specific timeline and institutional mechanism for putting it into practice.</span></p>
</div>
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<div class="blockquote-block">
<p class="quote">
			            	In complex corruption cases, expert opinions are often what makes it possible to establish the amount of damage, the origin of assets, and the substance of financial transactions, and to examine documents and digital evidence.
			            </p>
</p></div>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why should the alternative draft laws be rejected?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The alternative draft laws by MPs Serhii Vlasenko and Volodymyr Kabachenko do not propose a separate forensic expert institution for the NABU or any other legislative measures that would give the Bureau real access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations. The two draft laws are virtually identical, apart from a few provisions. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In fact, neither document proposes changes that would ensure high-quality examinations in high-level corruption cases, since none of the risks of influence on experts are eliminated. Nor do they fulfill Ukraine’s international commitments to give the NABU access to high-quality examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead, the alternative documents propose to formally enshrine in the Law of Ukraine on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine rights that NABU detectives already have under criminal procedure legislation: to order an examination on their own and to determine the questions put to the expert. In other words, </span><b>this provision changes absolutely nothing.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, a large block of amendments is devoted to deregulating forensic expert activity, in particular by abolishing the certification procedure. Both authors of the alternative draft laws propose allowing forensic examinations to be conducted by </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“individuals who have the special knowledge necessary to provide an opinion on the questions under examination and at least five years of professional experience in the relevant field of knowledge.”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> This means that any individual, in some fields even without higher education, would be able to provide expert opinions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such practice is indeed common in foreign jurisdictions. Alongside experts with special status, other specialists may be engaged ad hoc, and their opinions may be recognized as proper expert evidence. However, </span><b>admitting such experts does not, as a rule, remove the need to verify their competence</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Competence must be confirmed either in advance through an appropriate professional or registration procedure or directly when the expert is engaged in specific proceedings. Likewise, the absence of special certification does not rule out other mechanisms for ensuring an expert’s proper conduct and accountability. </span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2025/909/pdfs/uksi_20250909_en.pdf?view=extent"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Several</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> foreign legal systems also lack the </span><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2025/909/pdfs/uksi_20250909_en.pdf?view=extent&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clear distinction</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> between the procedural status of an expert and that of a specialist that is characteristic of Ukrainian criminal procedure. This allows a wider range of persons to be engaged as experts, with their competence confirmed by knowledge and skills rather than special status.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the model proposed by MPs Vlasenko and Kabachenko does not reflect international best practices: it allows any individuals with sufficient experience and practice to conduct examinations. Moreover, the draft laws do not even specify who would be responsible for their quasi-certification, that is, for verifying their experience, practical skills, and knowledge.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another important argument is made in a study on the qualifications of forensic experts. It </span><a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11757667/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">states</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that a forensic expert’s specialized knowledge should not be equated solely with knowledge in the fields of science and technology on which the classes, kinds, types, and subtypes of examinations are based. In the author’s view, </span><b>without knowledge of the general scientific foundations of forensic examination and its procedural framework, it is impossible to conduct an examination properly and document its results so that the expert opinion is admissible and reliable evidence</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The model in the Vlasenko and Kabachenko draft laws is underdeveloped. It proposes “delicensing” forensic expert activity without an adequate alternative for verifying an expert’s subjective and objective competence. As a result, it could open the door to abuse, undermine trust in forensic expert opinions, and overload court proceedings with checks on the reliability of such opinions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Worse still, Kabachenko’s draft law No. 15569-2 also seeks to insert into the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination, bypassing the Criminal Procedure Code, provisions declaring inadmissible all evidence that the prosecution refused to provide to the defense for examination.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The alternative amendments also propose to deregulate the procedure and grounds for bringing forensic experts to disciplinary liability. Only experts in employment or service relationships would be punished for disciplinary offenses, while others would not be subject to such liability. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, Vlasenko and Kabachenko propose deleting entirely from the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination the articles on expert qualification commissions, which are also responsible for imposing disciplinary penalties on experts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine does need deregulation of the forensic examination sector, but the approach must take into account and minimize all the associated risks. Deregulation on this scale, without a well-grounded alternative model, will only increase corruption risks, lower the quality of forensic expert opinions, and make them harder to use in court.</span></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	The alternative draft laws by MPs Serhii Vlasenko and Volodymyr Kabachenko do not propose a separate forensic expert institution for the NABU or any other legislative measures that would give the Bureau real access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be improved in the main draft law</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes genuinely high-quality changes that can make a real difference to the effectiveness and results of NABU and SAPO investigations. However, to bring it as close to ideal as current conditions allow, two aspects should be improved.</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1">
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Clarify the list of proceedings in which the RCIFE may conduct examinations</span></h4>
</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes adding to Article 7-2(1) of the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination a provision establishing the RCIFE as an independent expert institution that would conduct forensic examinations in the following categories of cases:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">criminal proceedings concerning corruption offenses and corruption-related criminal offenses under Article 45 of the Criminal Code, as well as Articles 206-2, 209, and 211 of the Criminal Code, if at least one of the conditions set out in paragraphs 1–3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code is met;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state (civil forfeiture).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, the proposed wording of Article 7-2(1) of the Law on Forensic Examination would not, in practice, allow the NABU to have independent examinations conducted at the RCIFE in all cases under the Bureau’s jurisdiction. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The reason is that, under certain conditions, NABU jurisdiction also covers cases under Articles 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, and 396 of the Criminal Code (Article 216(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code); cases under Articles 354 and 364–370 of the Criminal Code if committed by a Bureau employee (the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code); and cases under other articles of the Criminal Code if the NABU Director so decides with the consent of the Head of SAPO (the third subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Therefore, to cover examinations in all NABU cases as fully as possible</span><b>, the wording should be expanded so that the RCIFE conducts forensic examinations specifically in criminal proceedings investigated by NABU, including those under NABU jurisdiction, as well as in cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state.</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1">
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Specify certain technical provisions of the draft law</span></h4>
</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On reporting pressure: the law only obliges an expert to notify the RCIFE Director within two working days (or the Supervisory Board, if the pressure comes from the Director), but sets out no further procedure. There is no deadline for the Director or Supervisory Board to respond to the report, no list of possible response measures (removal from the case, reassignment to another expert, referral to law enforcement), and no obligation to inform the NABU and SAPO, as a party to the proceedings, of the interference with the expert’s work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the higher education of Supervisory Board members (Article 17-1(3)): the wording </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“higher education in law, forensic examination, audit, or financial control”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> also raises questions, since </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“forensic examination”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is not a separate field of knowledge or specialty in Ukraine’s </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/266-2015-%D0%BF#n11"><span style="font-weight: 400;">List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for higher education. It is therefore unclear which diploma would satisfy this requirement, which could leave room for arbitrary interpretation when the list of candidates is drawn up.</span></p>
<p><b>The draft law should therefore set a deadline for considering reports of pressure on experts, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform NABU and SAPO of the interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties. </b></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	The draft law should therefore set a deadline for considering reports of pressure on experts, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform NABU and SAPO of the interference.
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine supports adopting the main Draft Law No. 15569 at first reading, with its provisions to be refined before second reading. The document has significant potential to resolve the long-standing problem of NABU and SAPO access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, to fully implement the proposed innovations, our recommendations should be taken into account:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clearly extend the RCIFE’s mandate to all criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clarify certain technical points in the mechanism for responding to pressure on experts: a deadline for considering a report of pressure, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform the NABU and SAPO of the interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Addressing these comments will preserve the draft law’s strengths and create a more coherent and predictable model of forensic expert activity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 and No. 15569-2 do not deserve support because they are ineffective and risk destabilizing the forensic examination sector, so they should be rejected.</span></p>
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			            	The document has significant potential to resolve the long-standing problem of NABU and SAPO access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.
			            </p>
</p></div>
</p></div>
</p></div>
<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/">Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>New Rules for Selecting Members of the HQCJ and the HCJ: Analysis of Draft Law No. 16018</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/new-rules-for-selecting-members-of-the-hqcj-and-the-hcj-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16018/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:14:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34043</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The main reason for the changes is the upcoming renewal of the HQCJ: in June 2027, the terms of office of 15 of its 16 members expire.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/new-rules-for-selecting-members-of-the-hqcj-and-the-hcj-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16018/">New Rules for Selecting Members of the HQCJ and the HCJ: Analysis of Draft Law No. 16018</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 3, 2026, Members of Parliament Volodymyr Vatras, Ivan Kalaur, and Mykola Stefanchuk registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70649"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 16018</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the Verkhovna Rada. It would amend the Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges and certain other laws of Ukraine to improve the competitive procedures for the positions of member of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine and member of the High Council of Justice. On September 10, 2026, the government registered alternative </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70729"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 16018-1</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main reason for the changes is the upcoming renewal of the HQCJ: in June 2027, the terms of office of 15 of its 16 members expire. Just as important, Ukraine’s financing </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/1923/oj/eng/pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">depends</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the entry into force of these amendments, which are meant to extend the participation of international experts in the selection of HQCJ and HCJ members. Formal adoption of the law is not enough, however. The amendments must be developed in close dialogue with the Venice Commission.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For this reason, somewhat earlier, in July 2026, former Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Taras Kachka submitted to the Venice Commission the first draft of the alternative bill, which differs somewhat from the version later registered as No. 16018-1. This Council of Europe body has since </span><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/opinion-1295"><span style="font-weight: 400;">published</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> its opinion, which was </span><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-pl-pv-2026-003syn-e"><span style="font-weight: 400;">endorsed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> at the Venice Commission’s plenary session.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nevertheless, on September 30, 2026, the parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy decided to </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70729"><b>reject</b></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the government’s alternative Draft Law No. 16018-1. Instead, it recommends that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 16018 at first reading as a basis, with revisions before the second reading that take into account the provisions of alternative Draft Law No. 16018-1 and the Venice Commission’s opinion.</span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key findings</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law does not resolve the question of the long-term participation of international experts. For the HQCJ, this participation effectively ends after the upcoming two-year term of the second composition of the Selection Commission. Meanwhile, the powers of the first composition of the Ethics Council, which is involved in selecting HCJ members and also includes international experts, expire in November 2027.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The current version of the main draft law diminishes the role of international experts in assessing the professional competence of HQCJ candidates: the relevant decision will be made by a simple majority, regardless of whether a given vote belongs to an international or a national expert. It will also create uncertainty, as the authors removed the rule that, in a 3–3 tie, the decision supported by at least two international members prevails.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the main draft law moves some procedures for forming the HQCJ and the HCJ in the right direction. For both bodies, it will allow a single competition to be held for several vacancies at once and will clearly separate formal admission, special vetting, and the assessment of integrity and of professional competence. It will also preserve the international component in the Selection Commission for HQCJ members for another two years. </span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">What do we propose?</span></h4>
<p><b>On the procedure for selecting HQCJ members:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend the participation of members nominated by international partners not only to the second but also to at least the third composition of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, refrain from introducing a quota for Ukrainian citizens in it, and preserve its ability to engage assistants;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">leave unchanged the current voting procedure of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, with the decisive vote of international experts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide for a first stage at which candidates for HQCJ membership undergo a standardized assessment of their professional knowledge and analytical skills through testing and/or a practical assignment; assess the other components of professional competence during a structured interview; and conduct the integrity check only for candidates who have passed the first stage.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><b>On the procedure for selecting HCJ members:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend the participation of international experts to at least the second composition of the Ethics Council;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish uniform rules for assessing the professional competence of HCJ candidates for congresses, conferences, and parliamentary committees: common criteria, indicators, and a requirement to give reasons for decisions;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow HCJ candidates to submit documents to the parliamentary committee electronically, and make the admission criteria uniform for all bodies. </span></li>
</ul>
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			            	Ukraine’s financing depends on the entry into force of these amendments, which are meant to extend the participation of international experts in the selection of HQCJ and HCJ members. Formal adoption of the law is not enough, however. The amendments must be developed in close dialogue with the Venice Commission.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">How do things stand now?</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At present, the </span><b>formation of the HQCJ</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> does not involve three international experts, because the term of office of the first composition of the Selection Commission was two years and expired in June 2025. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the Selection Commission itself reviews candidates’ documents and compiles the list of persons admitted to the interview. A decision of the Selection Commission is adopted if four members vote for it, including at least two international members.</span></p>
<p><b>In the formation of the HCJ,</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> international members participate in the first composition of the Ethics Council only for a six-year term, which ends in November 2027. The Ethics Council determines whether candidates meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity, while the body that nominated the candidate checks compliance with the criterion of professional competence. The HCJ Secretariat has the power to accept documents from, and admit to the competition, candidates for the High Council of Justice who are elected by congresses or a conference. </span></p>
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			            	At present, the formation of the HQCJ does not involve three international experts.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What does the main draft law propose?</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes two major sets of changes: one concerning the selection of HQCJ members and one concerning the selection of HCJ members.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the </span><b>selection of HQCJ</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> members, it proposes the following changes.</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">A competition may be held simultaneously for all vacant HQCJ positions if there is more than one vacancy. The HCJ must announce it no later than three months before the end of the term of office of the relevant HQCJ member, or within ten days after the early termination of that member’s powers or the member’s dismissal.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The competition is conducted by the second composition of the Selection Commission, which includes three members nominated by international and foreign organizations. At least one of these three members must be a Ukrainian citizen. The Commission’s term of office is two years, after which it will be formed under the general rules of Article 95-1 of the Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The High Council of Justice, rather than the Selection Commission, will review the documents submitted by candidates for HQCJ membership and decide whether to admit them to the competition.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The competition will consist of three separate stages, each handled by a different body. First, the HCJ will check whether the candidate and the candidate’s documents meet the statutory requirements. Next, the HCJ Secretariat will organize special vetting. Finally, the Selection Commission will determine whether the candidate meets the integrity criterion and, separately, the professional competence criterion.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Only if there are reasonable doubts about a candidate’s integrity will the Selection Commission be able either to hold an interview or to request written explanations from the candidate for HQCJ membership. To assess compliance with the professional competence criterion, the Selection Commission will hold only an interview.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Selection Commission will make decisions by a simple majority, without a mandatory quota of two votes from international experts, and a tie vote will remain unresolved.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The HCJ must receive at least two recommended candidates per vacancy. For positions to be filled by judges or retired judges, at least two candidates for the relevant vacancy must also belong to this category.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For </span><b>the selection</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of</span><b> HCJ </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">members, it proposes the following changes. </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law sets a uniform starting point of the competitive procedure for the various bodies that elect HCJ members: no later than six months before the end of an HCJ member’s term of office, or within 14 days after the early termination of that member’s powers. It will also be possible to hold a single competition for several vacancies at once.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The acceptance of documents and the initial screening of candidates will pass from the HCJ to the body that convenes the relevant congress or conference. That body will also interview the candidates who have passed special vetting and been recommended by the Ethics Council, in order to assess their professional competence.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Ethics Council will continue to assess professional ethics and integrity, and it will pass on to the electing body not only its opinions and the list of recommended persons, but also the documents and information concerning them.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the Verkhovna Rada, the draft law extends the deadline for submitting documents from 25 to 30 days and explicitly allows minor errors and inaccuracies to be corrected. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead of holding a “preliminary discussion,” the parliamentary committee will conduct full-fledged interviews with candidates to assess their professional competence, and the Verkhovna Rada will receive a broader package of materials on each candidate.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government’s alternative Draft Law No. 16018-1, rejected by the Committee on Legal Policy, is virtually identical to the main one, except that the </span><b>government proposed partially preserving the decisive vote of international members when assessing the integrity of HQCJ candidates: such a decision would have required four votes, at least two of them from international members.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> For professional competence, however, a simple majority would have sufficed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the government’s draft did require the Selection Commission for HQCJ members to hold an integrity interview with every candidate, with no option to rely on written explanations instead and no precondition of reasonable doubts.</span></p>
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			            	The government’s alternative Draft Law No. 16018-1, rejected by the Committee on Legal Policy, is virtually identical to the main one, except that the government proposed partially preserving the decisive vote of international members when assessing the integrity of HQCJ candidates.
			            </p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be improved?</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although the main draft law contains a number of useful procedural changes, it creates significant risks for the effectiveness of the competitions and for the role of the international component.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law’s greatest flaw is that it waters down the role of international experts in the competitive selection of HQCJ and HCJ members. Taken individually, each change may not raise serious concerns. Taken together, however, they produce a vulnerable competitive procedure in which the international component loses its key advantage: independence and objectivity. Moreover, the draft law contains procedural changes that could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the selection. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To eliminate all these risks, we offer the following recommendations for improving this legislative act. The Venice Commission has also endorsed some of these concerns about the changes to the HQCJ and HCJ selection procedures.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h4><b>1. The full participation of international members in the Selection Commission for HQCJ members and in the Ethics Council for selecting HCJ members should last longer</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Under the logic of the draft law, this competition for HQCJ members will be the last one conducted with international experts. Afterwards, once the two-year term of the second composition of the Selection Commission ends, it will consist of persons delegated by the judicial, prosecutorial, legal, and academic communities in accordance with Article 95-1 of the Law on the Judiciary.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Something similar, or even worse, will happen to the HCJ competition. The first composition of the Ethics Council for forming the HCJ, with the participation of foreign experts, was established on November 9, 2021, and its members serve a six-year term. As a result, </span><b>a year from now, in 2027, the first composition of the Ethics Council will lose its powers</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and its next composition will be formed from the judicial, prosecutorial, legal, and academic communities.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regrettably, the draft law does not propose extending the participation of international experts in forming the HCJ and the HQCJ any further, even though such selection models have proven </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2025/08/12/7525641/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">genuinely effective</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for top positions in Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The proposal that at least one of the three international experts be Ukrainian is also concerning. Currently, nothing prevents or prohibits international partners from recommending Ukrainian citizens to commissions in such competitions. The inclusion of a Ukrainian citizen is therefore not problematic in itself, but it becomes a sensitive issue if the international component loses its decisive vote at every stage of the assessment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just as importantly, the draft law removes the Selection Commission’s specific power to engage assistants at the request of its members. Such assistance is needed to verify information about candidates and to organize the Commission’s work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its urgent opinion, the Venice Commission also supported a second composition of the Selection Commission with the participation of international experts. It reiterated that the involvement of international experts, as an exceptional temporary measure, should continue until the intended result is achieved. The opinion also criticized the mandatory quota for a Ukrainian citizen and the lack of an option to engage assistants.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, the participation of international experts should be extended for another six years, at least for the second composition of the Ethics Council. Likewise, the participation of members nominated by international and foreign organizations should be extended not only to the second but also to at least the third composition of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, without introducing a quota for Ukrainian citizens and while preserving the Commission’s ability to engage assistants.</b></p>
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			            	The draft law’s greatest flaw is that it waters down the role of international experts in the competitive selection of HQCJ and HCJ members.
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<h4><b>2. The votes of international experts in the selection of HQCJ members should remain decisive</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law proposes to neutralize the special role of international experts on the Selection Commission for HQCJ members. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, to decide that a candidate meets the criteria of integrity and professional competence, the Selection Commission must vote with four votes, at least two of which come from international experts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes to abolish this advantage of international experts’ votes entirely, so that the Selection Commission for HQCJ members would decide by a simple majority.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Cabinet of Ministers’ proposals in the alternative draft law also weakened the role of international members’ votes by setting separate voting rules for the integrity criterion and the professional competence criterion:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to find that a candidate meets the integrity criterion, four votes would be required, </span><b>at least two of them from international members</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to find that a candidate meets the professional competence criterion, four votes would be required, </span><b>at least one of them from international members.</b></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, both draft laws remove the special mechanism for breaking a tie. As a result, a 3–3 vote could block a decision, whereas under the current model for the first composition of the Selection Commission, the decision supported by at least two international members prevails in such a case.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like us, the Venice Commission recommends not changing the weight of the votes and retaining the decisive vote of international experts in assessing both criteria: integrity and professional competence.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Weakening the decisive vote of international members will only increase the risk of interference with the selection results. </span><b>Therefore, the current voting procedure of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, with the decisive vote of international experts, should remain unchanged.</b></p>
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			            	Weakening the decisive vote of international members will only increase the risk of interference with the selection results. Therefore, the current voting procedure of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, with the decisive vote of international experts, should remain unchanged.
			            </p>
</p></div>
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<h4><b>3. Integrity interviews for HQCJ candidates should be mandatory</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Main Draft Law No. 16018, supported by the parliamentary committee, proposes a dangerous provision that would allow candidates for HQCJ membership who lack integrity to pass the integrity filter without proper verification and assessment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law provides that an integrity interview will be held only if there are reasonable doubts about the candidate’s integrity, and that even where such reasonable doubts exist, the Commission may limit itself to sending requests asking the candidate to explain the suspicious circumstances.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This approach to vetting candidates’ integrity is extremely risky, as it will become much harder to screen all candidates properly. Consequently, the risk that members lacking integrity will join the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine will grow.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a similar </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/how-the-22-prospective-hacc-judges-were-selected/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">selection</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of judges for the High Anti-Corruption Court, the Public Council of International Experts, despite having the same option to hold interviews selectively, decided to invite all candidates to interviews. As a result, 68% of the participants failed to convince the experts of their integrity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, the alternative government draft law contains this very proposal to hold integrity interviews with all HQCJ candidates under any circumstances. We hope that, when revising the main draft law for the second reading, the committee will incorporate this positive proposal from the alternative draft.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, the Selection Commission for HQCJ members should be required to hold integrity interviews with every candidate, without exception.</b></p>
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			            	The Selection Commission for HQCJ members should be required to hold integrity interviews with every candidate, without exception.
			            </p>
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<h4><b>4. A standardized assessment of professional knowledge should precede the integrity check</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The proposal to assess candidates in an order where integrity is checked first and professionalism only afterwards remains unexplained.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Selection Commission spends far more time, effort, and resources on checking a candidate’s integrity, since this requires reviewing a vast amount of public and non-public data, analyzing it, and assessing every suspicious fact.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To save resources, the first stage should consist of standardized testing of professional knowledge and analytical skills and/or a practical assignment. This would make it possible to determine the pool of candidates who will undergo the resource-intensive integrity check. Other components of professional competence that the standardized assignment does not cover should be assessed during a structured interview.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Venice Commission takes the same approach: if the interview is retained as the sole tool for assessing professional competence, it must be conducted consistently, on the basis of criteria and a structure published in advance, while a written or practical component would increase objectivity.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, the first stage should provide for a standardized assessment of professional knowledge and analytical skills through testing and/or a practical assignment, and the other components of professional competence should be assessed during a structured interview. The integrity check should be conducted for candidates who have passed the first stage.</b></p>
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			            	The first stage should provide for a standardized assessment of professional knowledge and analytical skills through testing and/or a practical assignment, and the other components of professional competence should be assessed during a structured interview. The integrity check should be conducted for candidates who have passed the first stage.
			            </p>
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<h4><b>5. Assessing the professional competence of HCJ candidates requires consistent rules</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Today, in the competitive selection of HCJ members, compliance with the criteria of ethics and integrity is determined by the Ethics Council, which includes international experts. Professional competence, in turn, is formally checked by the body that nominated the candidate.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law proposes to explicitly grant the body that convenes the relevant congress or conference the power to hold a full-fledged interview with candidates to assess their professional competence. The relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada receives a similar function with respect to candidates from Parliament.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the text of the draft law does not set out common criteria, indicators, or a methodology for this assessment. As a result, each of the bodies that form the HCJ may apply the same statutory requirement of professional competence differently. Furthermore, unlike the HQCJ competition, where the decision on professional competence is expressly required to be reasoned, the draft law does not explicitly establish a similar requirement for the bodies that assess HCJ candidates.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Venice Commission expressly recommends that Parliament not transfer the assessment of professional competence to these bodies. However, if the interviews are nonetheless retained, the law should clearly state that they are not eliminatory.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, consistent rules for assessing candidates’ professional competence should be established for congresses, conferences, and parliamentary committees: common criteria, indicators, and a requirement to give reasons for decisions</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	Consistent rules for assessing candidates’ professional competence should be established for congresses, conferences, and parliamentary committees: common criteria, indicators, and a requirement to give reasons for decisions.
			            </p>
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<h4><b>6. The procedure for admitting HCJ candidates needs to be unified</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law proposes to change the body that admits candidates to the competition for HCJ membership. Currently, the High Council of Justice itself is responsible for accepting the documents of such candidates and admitting them, whereas the draft law proposes to transfer these powers to the bodies that convene congresses or conferences and to the parliamentary committee.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This means that different bodies will decide on admission to the same competition, which creates a risk of inconsistent practice and of different approaches to assessing whether candidates’ documents meet statutory requirements.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law also sets different methods of submitting documents depending on the body to which the candidate intends to submit them. For example, a person wishing to take part in the selection who submits documents to the body that convenes the relevant congress or conference may do so in person, by mail, or by electronic means of communication. If, however, the documents are submitted to the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada, the candidate may do so only in person or by mail.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law itself does not explain why candidates for the same position should have different options for submitting documents, and different chances of being admitted, depending on the electing body. Unless there are objective technical or security obstacles, electronic submission should also be available in the parliamentary procedure, and the admission criteria should be uniform for all bodies.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While generally supporting the digitalization of document submission, the Venice Commission adds requirements that refusals of admission be reasoned, communicated to the candidate, and subject to appeal.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, HCJ candidates should be able to submit documents to the parliamentary committee electronically, and the admission criteria should be uniform for all bodies. </b></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	HCJ candidates should be able to submit documents to the parliamentary committee electronically, and the admission criteria should be uniform for all bodies. 
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusion and recommendations</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its current form, Draft Law No. 16018 could do more harm than good. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Therefore, Transparency International Ukraine supports its adoption at first reading as a basis, with mandatory revision before the second reading in accordance with Article 116 of the Law of Ukraine on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, only on the condition that the revision is based on our recommendations:</span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend the participation of members nominated by international and foreign organizations not only to the second but also to at least the third composition of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, refrain from introducing a quota for Ukrainian citizens in it, and preserve its ability to engage assistants;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">leave unchanged the current voting procedure of the Selection Commission for HQCJ members, with the decisive vote of international experts;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide for a first stage consisting of a standardized assessment of professional knowledge and analytical skills through testing and/or a practical assignment; assess the other components of professional competence during a structured interview, and conduct the integrity check only for candidates who have passed the first stage;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">require the Selection Commission for HQCJ members to hold integrity interviews with every candidate;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend the participation of international experts to at least the second composition of the Ethics Council;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish uniform rules for assessing the professional competence of HCJ candidates for congresses, conferences, and parliamentary committees: common criteria, indicators, and a requirement to give reasons for decisions;</span></li>
<li><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow HCJ candidates to submit documents to the parliamentary committee electronically, and make the admission criteria uniform for all bodies. </span></li>
</ul>
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			            	In its current form, Draft Law No. 16018 could do more harm than good. Therefore, Transparency International Ukraine supports its adoption at first reading as a basis, with mandatory revision before the second reading.
			            </p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/new-rules-for-selecting-members-of-the-hqcj-and-the-hcj-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16018/">New Rules for Selecting Members of the HQCJ and the HCJ: Analysis of Draft Law No. 16018</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Draft Law on Community Self-Organization Bodies: Analysis of a European Integration Initiative</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/legal-analysis-of-draft-law-of-ukraine-no-15165-on-amendments-to-certain-laws-of-ukraine-on-improving-legal-conditions-for-the-activities-of-community-self-organization-bodies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 12:27:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34044</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On April 10, 2026, Draft Law No. 15165 on improving the legal conditions for the activities of community self-organization bodies was registered in Parliament.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/legal-analysis-of-draft-law-of-ukraine-no-15165-on-amendments-to-certain-laws-of-ukraine-on-improving-legal-conditions-for-the-activities-of-community-self-organization-bodies/">Draft Law on Community Self-Organization Bodies: Analysis of a European Integration Initiative</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">On April 10, 2026, Draft Law </span></i><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/69800"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15165</span></i></a><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on improving the legal conditions for the activities of community self-organization bodies was registered in Parliament. </span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law, submitted by members of Parliament, proposes to set out the Law of Ukraine on Community Self-Organization Bodies in a new version. On May 15, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on the Organization of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning recommended adopting the draft law as a basis. At the same time, the Main Scientific and Expert Directorate of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat issued an opinion stating that certain provisions of the draft law are inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine.</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The initiative’s main purpose is to implement paragraph 6.1 of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, approved by </span></i><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cabinet of Ministers Order No. 475-r of May 14, 2025</span></i></a><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Certain Issues of Ensuring the Negotiation Process for Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union under Cluster 1 Fundamentals. Under these requirements, the </span></i><b>amendments to the Law of Ukraine on Community Self-Organization Bodies were due as early as the fourth quarter of 2025. </b></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">On March 11, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada failed to support </span></i><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/28346"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 6319</span></i></a><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on amendments to the Law of Ukraine on Community Self-Organization Bodies. Only 205 MPs voted in favor, which was not enough for adoption.</span></i></p>
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<h3><b>Key takeaways</b></h3>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law is timely and aims at a conceptual overhaul of Ukrainian legislation: modernizing approaches to the organization, operation, and termination of community self-organization bodies, creating more effective mechanisms for their functioning within the local self-government system, and implementing paragraph 6.1 of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law proposes to simplify the establishment of self-organization bodies and to set out an exhaustive list of procedural grounds for refusing permission to establish one.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is also necessary to: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">align the territorial levels of self-organization bodies with the administrative reform carried out in Ukraine, regulate the procedure for holding general meetings (conferences) of residents, and introduce a flexible procedure for electing the membership of self-organization bodies;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish a contractual mechanism for interaction and for endowing self-organization bodies with the self-governing powers of the executive bodies of local councils, and make these bodies more public and open.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the draft law has significant shortcomings that require further work, such as bringing a number of its provisions into line with the Constitution of Ukraine.</span></li>
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<h3><b>What is the current situation?</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The current model of community self-organization bodies is outdated and has remained virtually unchanged since 2001. Over this period, approaches to citizen participation in addressing issues of local importance, as well as the needs of territorial communities, have changed significantly. In practice, establishing a self-organization body is a complex and lengthy process, and a number of issues related to their activities are either insufficiently regulated or not regulated at all. This is why legislation in this area needs a comprehensive update aimed at simplifying the establishment procedure, properly regulating the principles of interaction with local self-government bodies and other self-organization bodies, and setting out the basis for internal financial control and the grounds for terminating both the activities of a self-organization body itself and the powers of its individual members.</span></p>
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<h3><b>Amendments proposed in the draft law</b></h3>
<p><b>Simplified establishment and more detailed operating procedures</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The mechanisms for establishing self-organization bodies will become simpler, which should give impetus to their development. The draft law introduces the relative majority principle and the right to choose between open and secret voting; clarifies the criteria for exercising the right to elect and be elected to the membership of a self-organization body; and sets a maximum term of office for that membership, the expiry of which does not terminate the body’s activities.</span></p>
<p><b>Territorial scope of powers</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Self-organization bodies may be established at the following territorial levels: village(s) and/or settlement(s), city, or city district; micro-district, residential complex, or block; street or buildings.</span></p>
<p><b>Stronger role for self-organization bodies</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Residents will have greater opportunities to influence the decisions of local authorities. Within its competence, a self-organization body may make organizational and administrative decisions. Decisions of a self-organization body adopted within the powers defined in Article 15(2) of this Law are binding on all residents of the territory in which the body operates. A village, settlement, or city mayor may suspend a decision of a self-organization body while simultaneously applying to court to have it revoked. Decisions of self-organization bodies that are administrative acts are adopted, enter into force, are enforced, and cease to have effect in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on Administrative Procedure.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Members of self-organization bodies have the right to participate, with an advisory vote, in meetings of the relevant local council and its executive body when these consider matters directly related to the activities or exercise of powers of the self-organization body, as well as matters initiated by that body. </span></p>
<p><b>Transparency </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A self-organization body reports on its activities, implemented projects, and use of funds and property to the general meeting (conference) of residents at least once a year. The reporting procedure is set out in the body’s Regulations.</span></p>
<p><b>Contract-based powers</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A local council will be able to endow a self-organization body with part of its powers under a contract, transferring the relevant property and resources. Such a contract is concluded on behalf of the council by the village, settlement, or city mayor and approved by a council decision.</span></p>
<p><b>Financial basis</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law establishes that the financial basis for the activities of self-organization bodies consists of local budget funds, charitable donations, other forms of non-repayable financial assistance, and other revenues not prohibited by law. A self-organization body uses the financial resources received from the local budget independently, for the purposes and within the limits set by the relevant council.</span></p>
<p><b>Participation in urban planning and local affairs</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Self-organization bodies will be formally involved in discussions on land development, making these processes more transparent. In particular, they will have the right to participate in public consultations on local urban planning documentation affecting the interests of residents living within their territory, and to initiate public hearings and other forms of territorial community participation in addressing issues of local importance in accordance with the procedure set out in the territorial community charter.</span></p>
<p><b>Oversight of self-organization bodies</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Oversight of the financial activities of a self-organization body and its use of property is exercised, within their respective powers, by: the village, settlement, or city council that permitted its establishment (or an executive body designated by the council, with respect to transferred community property and allocated local budget funds); the general meeting (conference) of residents; the body’s audit commission; and state authorities.</span></p>
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<h3><b>Identified problems and recommendations for improving the draft law</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite its generally positive direction, an analysis of the text of draft law No. 15165 reveals certain risks:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Inconsistency of the procedure for establishing self-organization bodies with the Constitution of Ukraine</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Establishing these bodies falls within the competence of the local council, and the law cannot restrict the council or deprive it of the ability to decide, at its own will, whether or not to permit the establishment of a self-organization body. Under the draft, however, the council would effectively be required to accept the residents’ initiative.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Inconsistency with the Basic Law of the amended legal formulation “powers granted to a self-organization body in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, as well as transferred to it by the village, settlement, or city council within its competence to address issues of local importance in the relevant territory.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Constitution does not provide for granting or transferring the powers of local councils to self-organization bodies; it only provides for councils to endow them with powers by the councils’ own decisions.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Diminished role of the local council in determining the scope of a self-organization body’s powers</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This is not fully consistent with the constitutional nature of these bodies as entities endowed with part of the competence of local self-government bodies and requires further justification. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Delimitation of self-organization bodies’ powers and the local council’s discretion</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Combining the own and delegated powers of self-organization bodies under the single term </span><b>“</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">powers of a self-organization body” runs counter to the principle that it is the council that must determine the scope of these bodies’ powers — the very powers for which they are essentially established (and which depend on the relevant council’s willingness to endow the body with part of its own competence, finances, and property).</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Delineation of powers. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">There is a risk that the functions of self-organization bodies will duplicate the powers of village heads, which may lead to conflicts of competence within a single territorial community. The draft should therefore clearly delineate where the responsibility of a self-organization body ends and that of the village head begins, so as not to create “dual power” on the same street.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Risk of formalism. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Stronger accountability and publicity requirements call for additional digital tools; otherwise, self-organization bodies in villages or settlements will be technically unable to comply with these rules.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Vague financial guarantees and integrity requirements.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The draft obliges councils to assist self-organization bodies but sets no clear minimum standards for financial support. Transparency requirements for spending the funds these bodies will receive from local budgets should be strengthened by introducing mandatory public reporting.</span></li>
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			            	TI Ukraine generally welcomes the progress of draft law No. 15165 as a necessary step toward strengthening local democracy.
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<h3><b>Conclusion</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law is part of Ukraine’s European integration, in particular as regards ensuring transparency and citizen participation in the implementation of public policy. Its adoption is in line with the European Commission’s recommendations on strengthening local self-government and making governance processes more inclusive.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine generally welcomes the progress of draft law No. 15165 as a necessary step toward strengthening local democracy. At the same time, to prevent legal chaos and abuse on the ground, it is necessary to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clearly delineate the powers of self-organization bodies and village heads;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish transparent criteria for funding the activities of self-organization bodies;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure the digitalization of these bodies’ reporting processes.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><b>We recommend amending the draft law, in particular to bring its provisions into line with the Constitution of Ukraine, and adopting it.</b></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/legal-analysis-of-draft-law-of-ukraine-no-15165-on-amendments-to-certain-laws-of-ukraine-on-improving-legal-conditions-for-the-activities-of-community-self-organization-bodies/">Draft Law on Community Self-Organization Bodies: Analysis of a European Integration Initiative</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>What the Updated Localization Rules Require and Which New Exemptions Apply: A Legal Analysis of the September Amendments to Resolution No. 1178</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-the-updated-localization-rules-require-and-which-new-exemptions-apply-a-legal-analysis-of-the-september-amendments-to-resolution-no-1178/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 11:39:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34042</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>How localization requirements will apply at every stage of all procedures, and which new exemptions contracting authorities will be able to use.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-the-updated-localization-rules-require-and-which-new-exemptions-apply-a-legal-analysis-of-the-september-amendments-to-resolution-no-1178/">What the Updated Localization Rules Require and Which New Exemptions Apply: A Legal Analysis of the September Amendments to Resolution No. 1178</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 28, 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers </span><a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-vnesennia-zmin-do-osoblyvostei-zdiisnennia-publichnykh-zakupivel-tovariv-robit-i-s1181280926?fbclid=IwY2xjawUoVA1leHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMTE5bG9EZng2RDV3b1B6c3BzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeTTNbJWA2u7fLvncd2cL9VqcicoY66eMOPFbFRUXJ4Xe_cgpATUdZ1j0oYjE_aem_w9FqQ8Rj3k-K2eAhutz_cA"><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Resolution No. 1181, which once again amended the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1178-2022-%D0%BF/ed20260901#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement Specifics approved by Resolution No. 1178</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Most of the changes this time concern localization requirements, but the amendments also add new exemptions from competitive procedures. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The localization requirements needed updating mainly because a large part of them is set out in the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4888-20#n1873:~:text=%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B8%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%83%D1%94%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8F.-,5.,-%D0%A2%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%2C%20%D0%B4%D0%BE%2031"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Final and Transitional Provisions of the new Law of Ukraine No. 4888-IX on Public Procurement</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The government therefore detailed these requirements in the Specifics and aligned them with the Law to make them clearer and workable in practice. The government was constrained to some extent by the wording of the new Law when drafting the amendments. In this article, we examine what has changed regarding localization, at which stages of procurement these changes must be taken into account, and which exemptions will be available. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h2>
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<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Aligned the requirements for production localization of certain goods worth UAH 1 million or more between the Specifics and Law No. 4888-IX.  Overall, the detailed rules appear to be of higher quality than the localization provisions in Law No. 4888-IX itself. </span><b>However, some provisions conflict with Procedure No. 822 with respect to procurement through the e-catalog, and many of them require technical implementation in Prozorro.</b></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Expanded the list of grounds for direct contracts</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Expanded the grounds for the negotiated procedure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Most of the new exemptions appear justified, except the one for building shelters: this need can now be planned and anticipated. Going forward, it is worth considering procurement methods that would combine open competition with keeping technical specifications hidden from the general public.</span></li>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Updated localization requirements in procurement terms</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, the amendments require contracting authorities to include localization requirements in the procurement terms and to reflect compliance with them in their reporting. Participants, and subsequently contractors, must provide the relevant supporting documents.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The requirements apply to procurements whose subject includes goods subject to localization requirements with a value of </span><b>UAH 1 million or more</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Since the exact value of the goods is not yet known when the procurement is announced, the estimated value should evidently serve as the reference point. It is important to remember that this covers not only procurement of goods as such but also procurement of services and works under which the contracting authority acquires goods.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The updates apply to open tendering, procurement in Prozorro Market, negotiated procedures, and direct contracts. In summary, the </span><b>tender documentation, the request for suppliers’ proposals</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (RFP), and the </span><b>notice of intent to conclude a contract under the negotiated procedure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> must now state that the procurement is specifically for localized goods and include the following requirements:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Requirements for the degree of production localization</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> under the Law (30% in 2026);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Requirements for the participant (at the bid submission stage) </span><b>and</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the supplier of goods/service provider/works contractor (at the contract performance stage) </span><b>to provide a reference to the relevant product included</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the </span><a href="https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/search/products?yearCreated=2026"><span style="font-weight: 400;">list of localized products</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, or a document confirming that the goods originate from a “relevant country.” The latter refers to states party to international treaties (paragraph 3 of the Specifics) whose goods are exempt from localization requirements. </span></li>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The </span><b>report on the performance of the procurement contract must contain the same information and documents. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">This requirement also applies to the supplier of goods/works contractor/service provider when submitting a proposal for a direct contract, and the same reference or document must be included in the </span><b>report on a procurement contract concluded without using</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the electronic procurement system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the government clarified, a </span><b>reference to a product</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is the means by which information on the degree of its production localization (including for goods procured as part of works or services) and documents confirming that degree are published in Prozorro and/or provided by the participant/supplier.</span></p>
<p><b>A document confirming the country of origin of the goods</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> may be a certificate of origin, a certified declaration of origin, a declaration of origin, or a certificate of regional name of goods. The amendments emphasize that origin must be confirmed by documents; the fact of origin alone is not sufficient.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">3. Requirements for a participant/supplier/contractor that is </span><b>not the manufacturer</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the goods to provide the contracting authority with documents confirming the degree of production localization. Such documents must include</span><b> information on all business entities involved in the supply chain</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> between the manufacturer and the participant. If the business entities in the chain change, the supplier must notify the contracting authority before delivery and provide updated information and documents on them.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Specifics separately set out what the</span><b> information on business entities in the supply chain must include:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the name, including the short name (if any), or the full name of the business entity; its USREOU identification code or individual taxpayer registration number (RNOKPP) (or passport number if it has no RNOKPP); and documents confirming its involvement in supplying the relevant goods (contracts, acceptance certificates, delivery notes, certificates, etc.).  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The statement that the procurement is specifically for localized goods must also be included in the open tendering announcement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As we can see, the requirement to provide a reference to a localized product or a document of origin applies to both the </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">participant and the contractor</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The requirement to confirm who is in the supply chain may initially seem to apply to one or the other (“participant/supplier/contractor”). Judging by the grounds for rejecting tender proposals, however, it should be interpreted as applying to </span><b>both</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the participant </span><b>and</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the contractor under the procurement contract: if a participant fails to provide this information, that is a ground for rejecting its tender proposal. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Rejection of proposals and cancellation of open tendering and RFPs </span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At present, the list of grounds for rejecting tender proposals does not explicitly mention violations of localization requirements. In such cases, the logical course would be to reject a proposal because it </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“does not meet the requirements set out in the tender documentation pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 22(3) of the Law.”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> For that, however, the contracting authority must actually have stated such requirements in the tender documentation, and the obligation to state them has only now been introduced. Nevertheless, the lawmaker evidently decided to play it safe and add </span><b>violations of localization requirements</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as separate, standalone </span><b>grounds for rejecting a tender proposal.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> New grounds have also been introduced for rejecting proposals submitted in response to RFPs. The list of </span><b>grounds for rejection has thus been supplemented with several new ones: </b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the participant indicated in its tender proposal a degree of localization that does not comply with the Law (or, in the case of an RFP, the degree of localization of the goods offered by the supplier does not comply with the Law);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the participant failed to provide a reference to the relevant product included in the list of localized products, or a document confirming that the goods originate from a relevant country;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a participant that is not the manufacturer of the goods failed to provide information on all business entities that will be involved in the supply chain between the manufacturer and the participant;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the proposal lacks information on a product included in the list of localized products, or a document confirming that the goods originate from a relevant country;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the proposal contains information on a localized product, but the product was included in the list of localized products based on an application filed not by the manufacturer named in the proposal but by another business entity.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A new ground for </span><b>canceling special open tendering and RFPs</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> arises where the State Audit Service has found that the contracting authority did not set requirements in the tender documentation/RFP for the degree of localization of goods that are subject to these requirements under the Law. For open tendering, this applies only before the contract is concluded. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, this approach appears too radical, since the State Audit Service may detect this violation as early as the bid submission stage. In that case, it would make more sense to require the contracting authority to amend the tender documentation rather than cancel the procurement. However, this is precisely how the requirement is worded in Law No. 4888, and the Specifics did not depart from it. The government also clarified that the State Audit Service must monitor procurement with due regard to localization requirements. In our view, this clarification adds no value, since monitoring already involves analyzing compliance with all requirements of procurement legislation.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">A few words on localization in Prozorro Market</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Prozorro Market currently serves as an alternative to open tendering for above-threshold procurement of goods. Predictably, therefore, additional localization requirements were also set for RFPs. However, unlike in open tendering, a proposal submitted under an RFP does not involve a package of documents. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The electronic catalog is built on the premise that the participant’s qualifications have already been confirmed, the product is already registered in the catalog, and the supplier is not required to submit additional documents to take part in the selection. Thus, under paragraph 57 of Procedure No. 822, an </span><b>RFP may not contain</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> requirements for the supplier or the winner of the selection, or for </span><b>other documents, that are not provided for by the Procedure.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In other words, by requiring localization documents from suppliers, contracting authorities will automatically breach this restriction. Moreover, neither the Law nor the Specifics explicitly state in what form this information and these documents must be provided, whether through Prozorro or otherwise (except for the product reference, which will certainly be published in Prozorro). </span><b>This approach departs somewhat from established practice for RFPs and requires, at a minimum, clarity on how it will work in practice, including a technical implementation that ensures adequate transparency</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In essence, the Specifics </span><b>introduced additional requirement</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">s for the content of RFPs and suppliers’ proposals and additional grounds for rejecting them, </span><b>alongside those already set out</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/822-2020-%D0%BF#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procedure No. 822</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Given that localization requirements are not specific to individual contracting authorities, an alternative would have been to build this check into the process by which the administrator adds products to Prozorro Market, rather than requiring contracting authorities to verify compliance in each RFP. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Localization at the contract conclusion and performance stages</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To track compliance with localization requirements at different stages of procurement, the drafters added requirements for, among other things, the contract performance stage and reporting on it.  </span></p>
<p><b>At the contract performance stage, the contractor must provide</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> information and documents confirming that the goods actually supplied or used match the information on the goods that the participant provided when submitting its proposal/tender proposal, and that it complied with the production localization requirements with respect to those goods.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It follows that the </span><b>draft procurement contract and any directly concluded contract must list among the contractor’s obligations the above requirements and the deadlines for meeting them</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, although this is explicitly stated only in part, regarding the draft contract in an RFP. The same applies to the requirement that the contractor </span><b>provide a reference to the relevant product included in the list</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of localized products, or a document confirming that the goods originate from a “relevant country,” as well as the requirement to provide documents on the degree of localization, including </span><b>information on all business entities involved in the supply chain</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> between the manufacturer and the participant. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Furthermore, a contracting authority’s conclusion of a procurement contract in breach of localization requirements is now one of the grounds for the </span><b>contract’s nullity</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If a procurement is subject to localization requirements, performance reports will be required even for direct contracts concluded under paragraphs 9, 9-2, and 9-3 of the Specifics.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Exemptions from competitive procedures</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition to detailing the localization requirements extensively, the September amendments to the Specifics introduced several new exemptions from competitive procedures, namely new grounds for direct contracts and new grounds for the negotiated procedure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The following were added to the grounds for </span><b>direct contracts</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the natural gas supply, energy, rail, and sports sectors:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement of </span><b>natural gas by contracting authorities from an entity on which the Cabinet of Ministers has imposed special obligations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to ensure general public interest in this market, as well as procurement of natural gas by that entity itself to fulfill these special obligations. To use this exemption, contracting authorities must have consumer status under Article 12-1 of the Law of Ukraine on the Natural Gas Market.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This exemption appears logical: there is no room for competition when purchasing natural gas from such a supplier, and since the timely supply of natural gas depends on it, it is important to conclude a contract with this supplier without bureaucratic obstacles. The ground is framed as permissive, meaning that contracting authorities may choose to use it.</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement by JSC Ukrzaliznytsia, until March 24, 2027, of </span><b>railway traction rolling stock</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, including used rolling stock, as well as rolling stock lease services and services related to its acquisition, maintenance, transportation, delivery, and customs clearance.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It should be noted that the second exemption establishes not merely a right but a mandatory waiver of procedures (an obligation to conclude a direct contract). This makes it impossible to hold a procedure even when doing so would objectively be feasible. The exemption is evidently driven by Russian attacks on rolling stock and the company’s plans to purchase it abroad. At the same time, it does not distinguish procurement from foreign suppliers from procurement from domestic ones. </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The temporary above-threshold direct contracts (until the end of 2026) now include procurement of goods, works, and services needed to restore, reconstruct, or overhaul </span><b>facilities of legal entities of the electric power sector destroyed or damaged</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation,</span><b> to ensure the reliable and uninterrupted operation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the integrated power system. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The exemption includes a safeguard against abuse: before concluding the contract, </span><b>the contracting authority must confirm the damage to or destruction of the facility, the need for the procurement, and its volume with documents</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> drawn up following an inspection and/or survey of the facility.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amendments to such contracts will be published only after martial law ends, except where the contracts fall under the rules on publishing information on material resources in construction. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It should be noted that the exact term “legal entity of the electric power sector” is not defined in current Ukrainian legislation. In defining the range of facility owners, the drafters should therefore have relied on existing terminology, in particular from the Law of Ukraine on the Electricity Market. It would also have been useful to specify the functions of the facilities so that the exemption does not cover just any facility. However, the restrictions on purpose and the requirement for documentary confirmation should serve as safeguards against abuse of this ambiguity. </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Procurement of services needed to hold sports events</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and for Ukraine’s national teams to take part in international events and competitions. These procurements will also be conducted exclusively through direct contracts. The </span><b>estimated value</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the procurement for a single event may not exceed the equivalent of </span><b>EUR 30,000</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> excluding VAT. The Specifics also set out rules for reporting on such procurements, requirements for publishing the contract and its annexes, for justifying the ground and having it approved, and for publishing information on the ultimate beneficial owner. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, the exemption appears justified, since holding tenders to purchase services for sports events, especially abroad, is considerably more difficult and sometimes impossible. However, this issue is part of a broader one: the need for direct procurement for sports events abroad will always remain, while harmonization with EU directives does not allow for such an exemption. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition to direct contracts</span><b>, new grounds have been added for the negotiated procedure, namely:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement by </span><b>natural gas</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> market participants of compressor, gas piston, and/or gas turbine gas pumping </span><b>units</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, as well as services required to assess them. This provision may be applied only if the procurement is needed to restore the stable operation of facilities damaged or destroyed, and of technological processes disrupted, as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The safeguard against abuse in procuring used units is that the price may not exceed the amount set in the expert opinion (expert examination) or property valuation report. </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement of goods, works, and services needed to </span><b>protect critical infrastructure facilities</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, as well as to construct, create, and fit out facilities of the </span><b>civil protection shelter stock</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The negotiated procedure may be used provided that the procurement contract price does not exceed </span><b>UAH 10 million</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the contract performance period does not exceed </span><b>90 days</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from the date of its conclusion.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In our opinion, while the negotiated procedure may still be somewhat justified for protecting critical infrastructure, the ground appears unfounded for shelters. In the fifth year of the full-scale war, no one is building shelters that were needed yesterday; this can be planned, and even if an urgent need arises, there is already a separate ground for the negotiated procedure: urgent need. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If the reason for adding the new grounds is the confidentiality of sensitive information, the negotiated procedure does not solve this problem, </span><b>since the contract and its annexes must still be published after the procedure. No exceptions on this point are provided for the newly added grounds.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In general, taking procurement out of the competitive arena can no longer serve as a way to procure urgently or prevent information leaks. In the fifth year of the full-scale war, it is time to consider regulating competitive procedures that keep sensitive information from the public and disclose it only to procedure participants on equal terms. </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement of goods, works, and services financed from the state budget reserve fund </span><b>to ensure the creation and operation of a recovery reserve for an informatization asset of category I or II by impact</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of disruption of its functioning, as determined under legislation on digital development and digitalization, in order to ensure the continuous operation of the informatization asset and compliance with its backup and recovery requirements. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In simpler terms, this refers to procurement needed to preserve our state registers in cloud services and backup data storage sites. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government also clarified that procurement for critical infrastructure covers, among other things, transportation, relocation, and storage of equipment needed to restore facilities destroyed or damaged as a result of Russia’s armed aggression.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the government clarified that during negotiations, participants need not be required to provide confirmations regarding the offering of remuneration and the relatedness of persons.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Contract amendments based on international price agency indicators</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The ground for amending essential contract terms linked to international price agency indicators has undergone a minor change. Instead of being tied to Platts and ARGUS indicators, essential contract terms may now be amended when indicators change at international price agencies included in a list determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. On the one hand, this increases flexibility in responding to market realities; on the other, it effectively empowers the Cabinet of Ministers to determine the list through its own resolution.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The September amendments to Resolution No. 1178</span><b> aligned the production localization requirements between the Specifics and Law No. 4888-IX. Additional requirements were introduced for open tendering, procurement in Prozorro Market, negotiated procedures, and direct contracts, </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">as well as for procurement contracts in general.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In essence, the rules mostly require the contracting authority to demand that the participant and the contractor: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">comply with the degree of production localization required by the Law;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide a reference to a localized product or a document confirming that the goods originate from a country exempt from localization requirements;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide information and documents on the business entities involved in the supply chain between the manufacturer and the supplier. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The rules also provide for rejecting tender proposals and RFP proposals that violate these requirements, nullity of contracts concluded in breach of localization requirements, and cancellation of the procurement if these requirements are missing from the tender documentation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, the detailed rules have proved to be of higher quality than the localization provisions in Law No. 4888-IX. However, some provisions conflict with Procedure No. 822 with respect to procurement through the electronic catalog, many require technical implementation in Prozorro, and some of the additions add no value because they duplicate existing rules. </span></p>
<p><b>The list of grounds for direct contracts has been expanded to include</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> procurement of natural gas from the supplier of last resort; procurements by JSC Ukrzaliznytsia, until March 24, 2027, of railway traction rolling stock and related services; procurements, until the end of 2026, to restore, reconstruct, or overhaul electric power facilities; and procurements of services needed to hold sports events and take part in them at the international level. </span></p>
<p><b>The grounds for the negotiated procedure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> now include procurement of natural gas equipment to restore the sector after Russian attacks, procurement to protect critical infrastructure facilities, and procurement to create civil protection shelters and to back up state databases and registers in cloud resources. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most of the new exemptions appear justified; however, we consider the exemption for building shelters unfounded in the fifth year of the full-scale war, as this need can now be planned and anticipated. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, the overarching question of how to balance the protection of sensitive information with competitive procedures remains open. In the fifth year of the full-scale war, the state is still trying to solve the problems of urgent and sensitive procurement by taking it out of competition. In some cases, this step appears illogical. For example, the requirements to publish the contract and its annexes remain in place, even for building shelters and protecting infrastructure under the new negotiated procedure grounds.  It may be worth devising procurement methods in which open competition could be combined with keeping technical specifications hidden from the general public.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This material is funded by the European Union. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.</span></i></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-the-updated-localization-rules-require-and-which-new-exemptions-apply-a-legal-analysis-of-the-september-amendments-to-resolution-no-1178/">What the Updated Localization Rules Require and Which New Exemptions Apply: A Legal Analysis of the September Amendments to Resolution No. 1178</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Analysis of the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/analysis-of-the-roadmap-for-strengthening-public-procurement-oversight-for-2025-2027/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33973</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>How public procurement oversight is planned to be reformed.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/analysis-of-the-roadmap-for-strengthening-public-procurement-oversight-for-2025-2027/">Analysis of the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In December 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1390-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">approved</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight and the action plan for its implementation for 2025–2027 (the Roadmap). The government intends this document to serve as a framework for improving procurement control, with an emphasis on approximation to European Union standards.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The effectiveness of public procurement control has for several years remained a focus of the European Commission&#8217;s assessment of Ukraine in the EU accession process. The </span><a href="https://dozorro.org/blog/yaki-zmini-v-publichnih-zakupivlyah-ochikuye-vid-nas-yes"><span style="font-weight: 400;">2023</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><a href="https://dozorro.org/blog/novij-zvit-yevrokomisiyi-shodo-ukrayini-yak-vona-ocinila-nashi-publichni-zakupivli"><span style="font-weight: 400;">2024</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> enlargement reports assessed procurement control in Ukraine as weak and largely ineffective, and the </span><a href="https://dozorro.org/blog/novij-zvit-yes-pro-ukrayinu-progres-publichnih-zakupivel-ocinili-yak-obmezhenij"><span style="font-weight: 400;">2025 report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as having limited effectiveness. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the Commission&#8217;s key recommendations in 2024 was precisely to draw up a roadmap for enhancing public procurement control by the State Audit Service of Ukraine, in line with the Ukraine Facility Plan. So the adoption of this document is not only an internal management step but also part of Ukraine&#8217;s broader commitment under its European integration agenda.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Let us look at which steps for strengthening public procurement control the government has made a priority, whether they address the real problems, and whether they can make control in this area more effective.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Summary</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The adoption of the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027 is a positive and important step. Many of its measures fully or partly coincide with TI Ukraine&#8217;s recommendations on making control in this area more effective.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap&#8217;s key measures include:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>improving procurement monitoring</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in particular by introducing a mechanism for suspending a procurement while monitoring is underway, updating the classification of violations by significance, and defining proportionate ways of remedying them;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>shortening the judicial appeal procedure for the State Audit Service&#8217;s monitoring conclusions</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>optimizing the time between the triggering of automatic risk indicators and the actual start of procurement monitoring</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>improving the mechanism of liability for procurement violations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in particular by updating Article 164-14 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses to reflect the updated procurement methods and the significance of violations, and by ensuring access to the personal data of those who committed such violations;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>digitalizing procurement monitoring in the </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">e-Auditor system</span><b>.</b></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some Roadmap measures, however, need their content clarified and a careful approach to implementation:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>the effectiveness of the suspension mechanism</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> will depend on the model chosen, in particular on the procurement stages and the violations to which it will apply;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>enshrining the regulation of monitoring in legislation on state financial control</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> does not clearly answer which aspects should be regulated by law and which by secondary legislation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>the proposed changes to the procurement inspection mechanism </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">give no clear idea of how it will work in practice, and the transparency of inspections receives too little attention;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>new approaches to selecting procurements for control based on identifying bidders that pose financial and/or other risks </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">may create conditions for excessive discretion and need to be carefully worked through to prevent abuse</span><b>.</b></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, the Roadmap sets the right direction for reforming public procurement control. Yet its real impact will depend not on the number of measures implemented but on whether the control mechanisms are improved in substance and made more preventive, risk-based, proportionate, and transparent.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement monitoring</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A large share of the Roadmap&#8217;s measures concerns improving procurement monitoring. The first is to </span><b>establish the procedure for procurement monitoring in the legal regulations governing the State Audit Service&#8217;s activities. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, monitoring is regulated by Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine on Public Procurement. According to the Roadmap, this creates an imbalance in the legal system, since a state financial control instrument is regulated by the sectoral procurement law rather than by the main law governing the state financial control body.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The key question, however, is not so much where in legislation the monitoring mechanism is set out as how effective it is in practice. Moving the relevant provisions to other legal regulations does not in itself guarantee the quality of control. </span><b>The priority should be to improve the monitoring instrument in substance, in particular by implementing other Roadmap measures.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is why Draft Law No. 11520 left Article 8 of the Law on Public Procurement virtually unrevised: monitoring was deliberately postponed to the next legislative iteration as an issue requiring separate, comprehensive work. What is needed is not targeted but systemic changes, which should, among other things, strengthen the preventive function of monitoring, differentiate violations by significance, provide mechanisms for remedying violations, and guarantee compliance with conclusions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If the Roadmap does envisage enshrining the regulation of monitoring in the Law on the Basic Principles of State Financial Control in Ukraine, the question will arise of how to separate the provisions that must be set at the level of law from those that can be detailed in secondary legislation. The chosen approach will largely determine whether monitoring stays in its current form or undergoes the necessary substantive changes, how predictable the procedure will be for contracting authorities, and how much room the State Audit Service will have to change its approaches to conducting it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One shortcoming of the procurement monitoring mechanism is that a contracting authority can continue the procurement procedure, effectively ignoring both the monitoring and its results. A procurement can thus move to the next stage, including contract conclusion, before monitoring is completed, creating a risk that the violations found can no longer be remedied in a timely and effective manner. So the mechanism the Roadmap </span><b>envisages for suspending a procurement during monitoring</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> may help make preventive procurement control more effective, but it needs broad discussion and agreement. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The final assessment of this step will depend on the exact suspension mechanism introduced. It calls for a balanced approach to avoid excessive interference in the procurement process and potential abuse. TI Ukraine therefore proposes allowing a procurement procedure to be suspended upon the start of monitoring only until the contract is concluded and only where there are signs of significant violations, the list of which should be separately defined by law. An alternative is to further extend the period between determining the winner and concluding the contract so that auditors have time to conduct monitoring within it. This option is not ideal either, as it lengthens the procedure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap also provides for </span><b>updating the classification of violations detected through monitoring, taking into account their significance, and the obligations to remedy them</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In our </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/how-to-improve-procurement-monitoring/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">earlier study</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, we pointed to the shift in monitoring&#8217;s focus toward detecting formal violations that neither harmed the budget nor affected the competitiveness of the procurement, and to remedies disproportionate to the significance and consequences of the violations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The solution lies in updating the list of violations of public procurement legislation and classifying them by significance, for example, using the criteria of economic harm and procurement transparency. It is also worth considering focusing monitoring primarily on the most critical violations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The next step should be to define a list of possible remedies for each type of violation, depending on its significance. This would prevent state financial control bodies from taking divergent approaches to setting obligations in monitoring conclusions and ensure that such obligations are proportionate to the violations established.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another Roadmap measure </span><b>grants contracting authorities the right to unilaterally terminate procurement contracts to remedy violations stated in a monitoring conclusion. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">It stems from the difficulties that arise when monitoring results oblige a contracting authority to terminate a contract but the contract itself contains no such ground for termination. Here, it would be more appropriate to provide for an obligation, not a discretionary right, of the contracting authority to terminate the contract — provided that the conclusion contains such a requirement and has not been appealed, or the court has dismissed the claim. Still, an obligation to terminate a contract can be justified only in a narrow range of cases, primarily for direct contracts concluded without grounds or where significant violations are found, such as procurement from Russian companies. In general, the focus should be on monitoring taking place before the contract is concluded.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap measures on judicial appeal of monitoring conclusions appear sound. Contracting authorities sometimes use it not only to buy time and keep performing contracts concluded with violations, but also to evade liability, since lengthy court proceedings can cause the time limits for administrative liability to expire.</span></p>
<p><b>The shortened judicial appeal procedure for the State Audit Service&#8217;s monitoring conclusions planned in the Roadmap</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> could therefore ensure that such conclusions are promptly confirmed or refuted. That, in turn, would safeguard against situations where contracting authorities use litigation to avoid complying with a monitoring conclusion and continue performing the contract.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, the relevant draft law has already been developed and is being approved by the bodies concerned.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap&#8217;s planned review of </span><b>case law on appeals against procurement monitoring conclusions deserves separate attention.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> This review should not be limited to cases where contracting authorities challenge the conclusions themselves. Equally important is an analysis of case law on administrative offenses under public procurement legislation (Article 164-14 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses), where courts assess whether a violation occurred, its nature and significance, and decide whether to impose a fine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is in this category of cases that a systemic problem is visible: courts often disagree with the State Audit Service&#8217;s position on whether a violation occurred or find it minor, releasing individuals from liability or limiting themselves to a verbal reprimand. As a result, much of the State Audit Service&#8217;s work produces no real legal consequences.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Updating risk indicators</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The key tool of the risk-based approach to selecting procurements for monitoring is the automatic risk indicators on Prozorro — metrics that the system records automatically and that point to procurements with a higher probability of violations. The </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1475-24#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">list</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> comprises 13 risk indicators, differentiated by risk level and aimed at detecting specific signs of violations, except for the last one, which can cover any signs and allows other indicators to be added to the system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the </span><a href="https://dasu.gov.ua/ua/plugins/userPages/3931"><span style="font-weight: 400;">State Audit Service&#8217;s 2025 report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, of the 10,828 monitoring cases conducted during the reporting period, 2,913 (26.9%) were based on automatic risk indicator data.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to monthly statistics from the BI Prozorro analytics module, the share of monitoring cases the State Audit Service launched on the basis of risk indicators gradually fell from 61.35% in December 2024 to 15–20%. In some months, auditors used this ground more often, notably in almost 35% of cases in December 2025. This is probably also because more indicators are triggered at the end of the year. But the absence of a steady trend toward wider use of this ground shows that its potential is not yet fully tapped.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine sets the methodology for determining automatic risk indicators, the procedure for applying them, and their list. The Roadmap, however, notes several challenges that state auditors face with this mechanism:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the difficulty of promptly updating risk indicators because of the lengthy procedure;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">unscrupulous contracting authorities evading state financial control by artificially avoiding the triggering of risk indicators — possible because the indicators are public, so contracting authorities know their algorithms.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both points are somewhat debatable, since the 13th indicator on the list currently allows any signs of violations to be used as an indicator, and hence indicators to be updated promptly without amending regulations. And the openness of risk indicators should have a preventive effect and limit unnecessary discretion. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">If some contracting authorities do manage to commit violations while avoiding the risk indicators designed to detect them, the indicator&#8217;s content may need revisiting and its algorithm refining.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap provides for </span><b>optimizing approaches to a flexible mechanism for updating risk indicators</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in particular by revising the procedure for approving automatic risk indicators and giving the State Audit Service the right to develop the relevant algorithms on its own. In this context, the planned </span><b>optimization of the time between the triggering of automatic risk indicators and the actual start of procurement monitoring</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> also looks positive, as delays at this stage can make information outdated and reduce the effectiveness of response measures and the overall preventive effect of the procurement monitoring system.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, these changes have already been partly implemented: late last year, the Methodological Recommendations on State Financial Control in Public Procurement were amended, which, among other things, improved the monitoring procedure and shortened the time between the triggering of automatic risk indicators and the actual start of procurement monitoring.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Concerns arise, however, over the </span><b>new approaches to selecting procurements for control that take into account the identification of bidders posing financial and/or other risks</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This wording gives the impression that the very participation of certain entities in a procurement will be treated as a risk factor. Such an approach looks questionable, as it may pave the way for de facto “blacklists” of bidders. The measure therefore needs clarification to avoid excessive discretion and potential abuse.</span></p>
<p><b>Note that the risk-based approach to selecting procurements for monitoring is not limited to risk indicators.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> It should account for the potential negative consequences of violating procurement legislation, whose magnitude depends, among other things, on the value of the procurement item. Yet in 2025, more than a quarter of the monitoring cases launched by state financial control bodies on their own initiative concerned procurements with an estimated value below UAH 1 million. Given limited time and staff, and the fact that among competitive and direct above-threshold procurements in 2025 the State Audit Service&#8217;s monitoring covered less than 2% of lots by number and 15.8% by value, this allocation of resources looks unjustified. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The resources spent on analyzing such procurements could be used more effectively to detect significant violations that can still be remedied and that affect the efficiency of public spending on the largest scale. Yet the Roadmap&#8217;s measures do not include mandatory monitoring for certain categories of procurement, such as those with high-value procurement items.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement inspections </span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Besides monitoring, the Roadmap provides for</span><b> improving another control measure — procurement inspections.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">This involves</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> updating terminology, aligning procurement inspection procedures with the new approaches to financial inspections, and setting clear procedures, time limits, rights, and obligations in the inspection process. The measure is worded rather generally and gives no clear idea of what the updated mechanism will look like in practice. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem of ensuring inevitable liability for violations found through such inspections is further complicated by their non-public nature</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Information on procurement inspections is not published, which limits the transparency of this control measure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When the State Audit Service finds signs of criminal offenses during procurement inspections, the materials are handed over to law enforcement agencies. Although some of these measures are carried out not within a criminal proceeding but before it, they may become entirely non-public once the materials are handed over. By contrast, procurement monitoring results remain open in the Prozorro system even </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">when later used in pre-trial investigations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The fact that similar control measures in some EU countries are not public should not in itself be an argument against greater transparency of inspections in Ukraine. Ukraine&#8217;s system of financial control in procurement already has its own instruments that do not exist in this form in other countries, such as procurement monitoring. So approaches to the publicity of inspections should be defined with the Ukrainian context and the practical problems of conducting them in mind. In particular, greater transparency can serve as an extra safeguard where auditors are denied access to an inspection, refused the necessary information, or otherwise obstructed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The opacity of procurement inspections can </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">lead to their unjustified suspension or delay</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and prevents analysts and the public from examining them. In implementing this area, the government and the State Audit Service should therefore pay particular attention to making procurement inspections more transparent — at least in the part that poses no risk to pre-trial investigation but ensures a proper level of public scrutiny and the ability to assess this instrument&#8217;s effectiveness.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Liability for public procurement violations</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To strengthen liability for public procurement violations, the Roadmap provides for</span><b> amending Article 164-14, Violation of Procurement Legislation, of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses after the adoption of Draft Law No. 11520, to reflect the procurement methods and the significance of the violation and to introduce liability for failure to comply with the State Audit Service&#8217;s requirements</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In practice, the mechanism of liability under this article does not ensure that liability is inevitable — both because the time limits for imposing administrative penalties are too short and because its list of administrative offenses in procurement is outdated. Moreover, the problem may worsen considerably once the new Law of Ukraine on Public Procurement enters into force, as it substantially updates procurement methods and introduces new procedures not covered by the existing offense definitions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another part of the problem that hampered administrative liability in previous years was the State Audit Service&#8217;s lack of full access to the personal data of those who committed an administrative offense. Because of gaps in legislation, contracting authorities could avoid giving the body the information needed to draw up an administrative offense report, hear the case in court, or issue a decision imposing liability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In February last year, parliament adopted Law No. 4240-IX, which was meant to strengthen liability and give the State Audit Service access to the personal data of those against whom an administrative offense report is drawn up. It is to implement this law that the Roadmap provides for </span><b>access to the personal data of procurement violators</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> through the State Audit Service&#8217;s access to information from the Unified State Demographic Register. The State Audit Service can already obtain such data for drawing up reports based on procurement monitoring results upon request to the State Migration Service. It is also working to automate the data transfer.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, it has concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Migration Service on access to the Unified State Demographic Register and improved the procedures by which auditors obtain the personal data of those who committed procurement violations, as required by Law of Ukraine No. 4240-IX.</span></i></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Meeting Ukraine Facility requirements and testing internal control systems</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the Roadmap&#8217;s measures for improving the mechanisms of control over compliance with procurement legislation is </span><b>meeting the requirements of the Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on the implementation of the Ukraine Facility. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">State financial control over the implementation of the Ukraine Facility is entrusted to the State Audit Service, and control over the use of funds under the program is largely focused on public procurement. The Ukraine Facility also sets a number of additional requirements, compliance with which auditors will check during procurement monitoring, in particular whether bidders are subject to EU sanctions and whether the bidders themselves or their goods originate from countries the European Commission recognizes as eligible. This probably explains the need, set out in the Roadmap, </span><b>to improve methodological approaches to procurement control as part of meeting the Framework Agreement&#8217;s requirements.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, to implement the Framework Agreement, late last year it issued a number of orders updating the methodological recommendations on procurement inspections, state financial audits, and monitoring of procurement procedures.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another task aimed at improving the mechanisms of control over compliance with procurement legislation under the Roadmap is </span><b>introducing testing of contracting authorities&#8217; internal control systems for the procurement process</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The expected results include:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">an assessment of how effectively the contracting authority&#8217;s internal control system for the procurement process functions;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">identification of potentially non-transparent procedures in the procurement process or an insufficient level of internal accountability;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">an assessment of the effectiveness of procurement planning, monitoring of procurement contract performance, and correction of deficiencies identified in procurement;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">greater integrity and transparency, in particular as a result of analyzing the contracting authority&#8217;s internal control system;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">greater accountability of contracting authorities, in particular through external control.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Effective internal control can certainly become an additional tool for preventing violations and abuse in procurement. But the Roadmap&#8217;s text does not make entirely clear what the content and specifics of testing internal control systems are, since checking and analyzing how such systems function is already part of the state financial audit conducted by the State Audit Service.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, as part of updating the methodological recommendations on procurement inspections, it introduced checklists for testing contracting authorities&#8217; internal control systems in the procurement process, drawing on relevant international experience.</span></i></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Digitalization of control </span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap contains at least two measures to expand the digitalization of control over compliance with procurement legislation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The first concerns </span><b>digitalizing procurement monitoring in the integrated automated system e-Auditor. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The idea is to move monitoring procedures into a single digital environment to automate routine actions, introduce consistent standards and decision-making algorithms for monitoring, make officials&#8217; actions more transparent, reduce operational risks, and strengthen the analytical component of this instrument. This is intended to improve the quality of control and streamline the monitoring process.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the State Audit Service, to make procurement monitoring in the e-Auditor system technically possible, a public procurement analytical workspace, functionality for processing requests and complaints, and a module for working with sanctioned entities have been put into pilot operation. </span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet the potential benefit of this measure will largely depend on whether digitalization becomes a tool for substantive improvement rather than a mere technical transfer of existing processes to a new digital environment. In other words, e-Auditor can be a useful tool for making control more effective, but only if its rollout is accompanied by a revision of the very approaches to procurement monitoring.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap has not passed over the trend of using artificial intelligence either: by June of this year, the State Audit Service planned</span><b> to develop a solution for applying generative artificial intelligence models, or language models, to process large volumes of data when addressing matters of control over compliance with procurement legislation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although the wording of this measure&#8217;s performance indicator (“when addressing matters of control”) gives no clear idea of the stage of control at which artificial intelligence may be applied, the Roadmap highlights the problem of the growing volume of information to be processed precisely during control measures.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Artificial intelligence could speed up the initial analysis of information and partly ease auditors&#8217; workload when processing large volumes of it. But such a tool must not be used to fully automate control or to establish violations without proper verification by officials. The key is therefore to clearly define the role of language models solely as auxiliary analytical tools and to introduce rules for their use, in particular on mandatory verification of results and regular assessment of the models&#8217; quality and accuracy.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As with the digitalization of procurement monitoring, though, this measure seems premature given the need to first improve the existing procurement control mechanisms, which the Roadmap itself provides for. It is important that the introduction of new technological solutions does not divert attention and resources from the main goals the Roadmap pursues. </span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Professional development and communication</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The last block of Roadmap measures is devoted to introducing best international practices and tools for control over compliance with procurement legislation, as well as to professional development and the State Audit Service&#8217;s openness in communication and transparency. In particular, it provides for </span><b>experience exchange and training for those responsible for such control</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><b>a communication campaign to build a positive image of the State Audit Service</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and </span><b>greater publicity and transparency of state financial control measures</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. To accomplish the last task, the plan is, among other things, to introduce an interactive information and analytical tool that will present data on completed control measures on the State Audit Service&#8217;s website. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is essential that data publication under this measure cover not only procurement monitoring results but also other forms of control, information about which is currently far less accessible.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The wording of the measure and of its performance indicator is not fully consistent, though. While the measure&#8217;s description refers specifically to an interactive information and analytical tool, the performance indicator comes down to posting data on the State Audit Service&#8217;s website and the Unified State Open Data Web Portal. These approaches are not identical: publishing datasets or information on a website does not amount to creating a full-fledged interactive tool. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So when implementing this measure, it is important not to stop at formally meeting the indicator by publishing data but to create a truly convenient, structured, and integrated digital solution that makes it possible to track planned control measures, the procurements or budget programs they cover, contracting authorities, documents, and results. This could raise the transparency of control, strengthen the impact of civic monitoring, and create additional safeguards against abuse.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusion</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, the adoption of the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027 is a </span><b>positive and important step. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The document will serve as a reference point for further improving procurement control, which is also in line with Ukraine&#8217;s European integration commitments. Moreover, </span><b>many of its measures fully or partly coincide with TI Ukraine&#8217;s recommendations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on making control in this area more effective, which indicates the right direction.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Roadmap contains a number of measures that can genuinely make control more effective, for example:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">updating the classification of violations detected through procurement monitoring to reflect their significance and defining ways of remedying them;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">introducing a shortened judicial appeal procedure for the State Audit Service&#8217;s conclusions;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">optimizing approaches to a flexible (continuous) mechanism for updating the list of automatic risk indicators;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensuring access to the personal data of those who committed procurement violations;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">increasing the publicity and transparency of state financial control measures.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some Roadmap measures, however, appear secondary or need clarification during implementation. These include enshrining the regulation of monitoring in legislation on state financial control without a clear rationale for which aspects should be regulated by law and which by secondary legislation; using artificial intelligence without clearly defined limits and rules of application; introducing new approaches to selecting procurements for control based on identifying bidders “that pose financial and/or other risks”; and testing contracting authorities&#8217; internal control systems.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We believe that in implementing the Roadmap, the focus must stay on the key task:</span><b> improving the forms of control in substance</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, ensuring their preventive function, and increasing transparency, particularly of procurement inspections. Unless these pressing problems are solved, ambitious digital or communication solutions will not genuinely strengthen procurement control.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine supports the implementation of the Roadmap as a necessary framework document for strengthening public procurement control and is ready to provide expert support in implementing its measures to make procurement control more effective.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This material was made possible with the support of the MATRA program of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. Responsibility for the content lies with the author and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Embassy.</span></i></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/analysis-of-the-roadmap-for-strengthening-public-procurement-oversight-for-2025-2027/">Analysis of the Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Draft Law to Keep Local Councils Functional During the War: Legal Analysis</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-to-keep-local-councils-functional-during-the-war-legal-analysis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 13:08:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33880</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The bill introduces a special mechanism that would allow such councils to keep working if no more than half, but no fewer than one-third, of their total membership remains.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-to-keep-local-councils-functional-during-the-war-legal-analysis/">Draft Law to Keep Local Councils Functional During the War: Legal Analysis</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 16, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted as a basis Draft Law No. 14405 on Ensuring the Authority of Local Councils under Martial Law. </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The </span><b>draft law</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is designed to address a problem that small communities in particular may face during the full-scale war. As council members&#8217; powers are terminated early, councils gradually shrink, yet elections to fill the vacant seats cannot be held under martial law. As a result, a council may no longer be able to reach a quorum and make the decisions its community needs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The bill introduces a special mechanism that would allow such councils to keep working if no more than half, but</span><b> no fewer than one-third, of their total membership remains</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. During revisions, the provision that would have automatically triggered the establishment of a military administration solely because a council&#8217;s membership had shrunk was removed from the text.</span></p>
<h3><b>Why a separate law is needed</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/69537"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 14405</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was registered in the Verkhovna Rada on </span><b>January 27, 2026</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Its initiators include MP Oleksandr Korniienko and a group of other lawmakers. On September 1, the bill was placed on the parliamentary agenda, and on September 10, the relevant committee reconsidered it and recommended adopting it as a basis and as a whole in a single vote.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem the bill seeks to solve stems directly from the war and the impossibility of holding local elections under martial law. When a council member&#8217;s powers are terminated early in a community with 10,000 or more voters, the vacant seat may, under certain conditions, pass to the next candidate on the party list. However, for members of village, settlement, and city councils in communities with fewer than 10,000 voters who were elected in multi-member constituencies, the Electoral Code requires by-elections. Elections are prohibited under martial law.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the CEC&#8217;s Local Elections information and analytical system, as of November 23, 2025, </span><b>9,106 local council members</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> had had their powers terminated early or had never assumed office — 21.1% of all seats won in the 2020 local elections. For small communities, any further decline in the number of council members creates a risk of failing to reach a quorum both at plenary meetings and in standing committees.</span></p>
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			            	The bill introduces a special mechanism that would allow such councils to keep working if no more than half, but no fewer than one-third, of their total membership remains.
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<h3><b>What the bill proposes</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The special rules will apply to </span><b>village, settlement, and city councils in communities with fewer than 10,000 voters</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> whose members were elected in the 2020 local elections under the plurality system in multi-member constituencies, and whose membership has fallen below the level required for a council to function normally.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The key change is that a council will retain its authority if, after the early termination of some members&#8217; powers, between</span><b> one-third and one-half of its members, inclusive</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, remain in office. If one-third of the total membership is not a whole number, the required number of members will be rounded up to the next whole number.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law also sets out specific rules for convening sessions and making decisions in such councils. The special regime will remain in effect for the duration of martial law and, after martial law is terminated or lifted, </span><b>until the first session of the council elected at the next local elections</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another set of changes concerns council members serving in the military. The revised text provides that requirements for participating in council work, and the consequences of missing meetings, </span><b>will not apply to members of village, settlement, and city councils who are performing military service during mobilization, under contract, or following the call-up of reservists</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Military service in itself will not terminate a member&#8217;s powers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law also allows the procedures for council members&#8217; reporting to be adapted to security conditions. In particular, a council will be able to determine how members report and how their reports are published if complying with the standard requirements poses risks to physical safety.</span></p>
<h3><b>What changed in response to comments on the draft law</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the most contentious parts of the bill concerned how many members must remain on a council for it to continue working.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Main Research and Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat pointed out that the original approach needed to be reconciled with the principle of collegiality in local self-government. Following revisions, the Committee proposed defining the limits of the exceptional mechanism more precisely: it will apply when </span><b>no more than half, but no fewer than one-third, of the council&#8217;s members</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> remain.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, it was proposed to remove the provision under which a council&#8217;s membership falling below half would automatically serve as grounds for establishing a military administration in the locality.</span></p>
<p><b>Losing some council members as a result of the war should not in itself mean that a community automatically loses a functioning local self-government body, </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">as long as the council retains the minimum necessary representation and the ability to make decisions collegially</span><b>.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For communities, it is critical that the war and the unavoidable decline in council membership do not lead to a situation where a council exists on paper but in practice cannot make budget, social, land, recovery, and other decisions on which the community&#8217;s life depends.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the exceptional rules needed under martial law must remain </span><b>strictly limited in scope and duration</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Lowering the threshold at which a council retains its authority must not become a general rule beyond the circumstances for which this mechanism is being created.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Likewise, adapting the requirements for council members&#8217; reporting to security risks must not mean abandoning accountability itself. If a public event, advance notice of its venue, or another traditional format poses risks, the community should use safe alternatives that still allow voters to learn about their representatives&#8217; work.</span></p>
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			            	The key change is that a council will retain its authority if, after the early termination of some members&#8217; powers, between one-third and one-half of its members, inclusive, remain in office.
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<h3><b>Our recommendations</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparent Cities considers it advisable to </span><b>support Draft Law No. 14405 as revised</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. However, when it is finally adopted and put into practice, it is important to preserve several fundamental safeguards:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the special procedure should apply only to local councils that meet the criteria set out in the law and cannot fill vacant seats because elections cannot be held under martial law;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the lower threshold of one-third of the council&#8217;s total membership should remain in place as a safeguard ensuring that the council stays capable of making decisions;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">council members performing military service should be protected from the negative consequences of failing to perform duties they are physically unable to fulfill because of their service;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">security-related exceptions for reporting should change its </span><b>form</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, not abolish the principle of council members&#8217; accountability to voters.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because of the war, the early termination of council members&#8217; powers, and the impossibility of holding elections, some small communities risk being left with councils that cannot function properly. The proposed mechanism should allow these communities to </span><b>maintain functioning local self-government</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, ensure continuity in decision-making, protect the rights of council members serving in the Defense Forces, and adapt certain council procedures to wartime conditions. </span></p>
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			            	Transparent Cities considers it advisable to support Draft Law No. 14405 as revised. However, when it is finally adopted and put into practice, it is important to preserve several fundamental safeguards.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-to-keep-local-councils-functional-during-the-war-legal-analysis/">Draft Law to Keep Local Councils Functional During the War: Legal Analysis</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Single-Judge Hearings in Civil Forfeiture and Sanctions Confiscation Cases: Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 16043</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/single-judge-hearings-in-civil-forfeiture-and-sanctions-confiscation-cases-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16043/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 09:34:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33873</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>It replaces Draft Law No. 14033, which we analyzed earlier and which was withdrawn following the government's resignation.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/single-judge-hearings-in-civil-forfeiture-and-sanctions-confiscation-cases-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16043/">Single-Judge Hearings in Civil Forfeiture and Sanctions Confiscation Cases: Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 16043</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 4, 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70700"><span style="font-weight: 400;">registered</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Draft Law No. 16043 in the Verkhovna Rada, titled “On Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine to Improve the Procedure for the Consideration of Cases by the High Anti-Corruption Court.” It replaces Draft Law No. 14033, which we </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/single-judge-trial-in-civil-and-sanction-confiscation-cases-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-14033/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">analyzed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> earlier and which was withdrawn following the government&#8217;s resignation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like its predecessor, the new Draft Law introduces single-judge consideration of civil forfeiture cases, which are heard under the Civil Procedure Code, and of sanctions cases, which are heard under the Code of Administrative Procedure. Notably, the new text already takes into account some of the comments we made on the previous version.</span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft law No. 16043 addresses the main shortcoming of the previous version: it now clearly sets out at whose initiative, at what stage, and in what form the question of a panel hearing in civil forfeiture cases will be decided.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the new version does not take up our recommendation to extend the procedural deadlines for filing a statement of defense and an appeal in sanctions cases from 5 to 15 days.</span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Our recommendations:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Extend the deadlines for filing a statement of defense and an appeal in sanctions cases to 15 days through a separate draft law.</span></li>
</ul>
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			            	Notably, the new text already takes into account some of the comments we made on the previous version.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">How it is now</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Under the current law governing civil procedure, cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state revenue are heard by a panel of three judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Similarly, the Administrative Procedure Code stipulates that cases on applying the sanction provided for in Article 4(1)(1-1) of the Law of Ukraine on Sanctions are to be considered by a panel of three HACC judges within 30 days from the date the statement of claim is received by the court.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Proposed amendments</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft law No. 16043 provides that cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state revenue will be heard by a single HACC judge. A panel hearing (by three judges) will be possible only upon a motion by a defendant who holds one of the positions on an exhaustive list: a President of Ukraine whose powers have been terminated, member of parliament, Prime Minister, member of the Cabinet of Ministers, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Prosecutor General, Deputy Prosecutor General – Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor&#8217;s Office, Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Director of the State Bureau of Investigation, Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, Head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Head of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, Head of the Accounting Chamber, Head of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, Head of the Central Election Commission, Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Chair and judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Chair of the Supreme Court, heads of the high specialized courts, and Head of the High Council of Justice.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law also sets out a mechanism for exercising this right. In its ruling on opening proceedings, the court will be required to explain to a defendant on the list their right to file a motion for a panel hearing. Such a motion may be filed only before the case is scheduled for trial on the merits; if it is submitted later, it will be left without consideration. The court will decide on a panel hearing at the preparatory hearing.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As for sanctions cases, the words “by a panel of three judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court” will simply be deleted from the Code of Administrative Procedure. Such cases will be heard by a single judge, with no exceptions and no list of parties entitled to request a panel hearing.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As in the previous version, the Final and Transitional Provisions retain the rule that the previous procedure (panel hearings) applies to both categories of cases in which proceedings were opened before the law enters into force.</span></p>
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			            	As for sanctions cases, the words “by a panel of three judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court” will simply be deleted from the Code of Administrative Procedure. Such cases will be heard by a single judge, with no exceptions and no list of parties entitled to request a panel hearing.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What needs improvement</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Our main criticism of Draft Law No. 14033 was that it did not specify at what stage, at whose initiative, and in what form the question of a panel hearing in a civil forfeiture case would be decided, relying instead on a vague “complexity” criterion. This concern closely mirrors a problem that the seventh HACC monitoring report has already identified with a similar mechanism in criminal proceedings (in effect since May 16, 2024): the lack of a consistent approach to when a defendant may exercise the right to a panel hearing. The defense has at times exploited this to delay proceedings, notably in the Rotterdam+ case.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The new draft law removes this uncertainty for civil cases, and it does so in precisely the way we suggested as a benchmark. This approach is consistent with the Venice Commission&#8217;s position that the allocation of cases, and any exceptions to it, should be based on objective, transparent criteria established in advance by law. It also reduces the risk of decisions being challenged on the grounds that the case was not heard by a “tribunal established by law.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, two issues from our previous analysis remain unresolved. The deadlines for appeals in sanctions cases have still not been extended and remain at 5 days. </span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine recommends adopting Draft Law No. 16043 at first reading and as a whole. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The extension of the procedural deadlines for filing a statement of defense and an appeal in sanctions cases to 15 days should be addressed through a separate draft law.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i>This material is funded by Norway. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Government. </i></p>
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			            	At the same time, two issues from our previous analysis remain unresolved. The deadlines for appeals in sanctions cases have still not been extended and remain at 5 days.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/single-judge-hearings-in-civil-forfeiture-and-sanctions-confiscation-cases-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-16043/">Single-Judge Hearings in Civil Forfeiture and Sanctions Confiscation Cases: Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 16043</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>From Three Draft Laws to One: A Legal Analysis of the Revised Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/from-three-draft-laws-to-one-a-legal-analysis-of-the-revised-anti-corruption-strategy-for-2026-2030/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 06:02:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33700</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This analysis focuses on the changes made in the final version compared with the earlier government draft.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/from-three-draft-laws-to-one-a-legal-analysis-of-the-revised-anti-corruption-strategy-for-2026-2030/">From Three Draft Laws to One: A Legal Analysis of the Revised Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On July 15, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy endorsed the revised version of the draft Law on Approving the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 (</span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70379"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15230-d</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">). It was prepared by merging three earlier texts: the draft law by MP Anastasiia Radina (</span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70026"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15230</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">), the alternative draft by the Cabinet of Ministers (</span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70050"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15230-1</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, withdrawn from consideration after the government&#8217;s resignation), and the alternative draft by MP Petro Poroshenko and others (</span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70070"><span style="font-weight: 400;">No. 15230-2</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We have previously </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/comparative-analysis-of-the-draft-laws-on-the-anti-corruption-strategy-for-2026-2030/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">analyzed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the first two draft laws with respect to the subsections that fall within TI Ukraine&#8217;s area of expertise. This analysis focuses on the changes made in the final version compared with the earlier government draft. It covers provisions on both the anti-corruption segment of criminal justice and corruption prevention.</span></p>
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			            	This analysis focuses on the changes made in the final version compared with the earlier government draft.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The comparison shows that the revised version is stronger than the government&#8217;s and takes on board some of the comments we had raised regarding all three earlier versions. Among the most important points:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the range of potential powers granted to the Head of SAPO has been expanded — to initiate criminal proceedings against MPs and to approve motions for investigative actions against them (1.10.3.1); a separate problem has been added on the mismanagement of seized assets (1.10.4), along with a comprehensive block on the selection of SBI leadership (2.2.9); and the risks of informal or political influence over the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General are now acknowledged;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a separate block has appeared on the effectiveness of financial control measures and the internal procedures of NACP (1.6.8) — this partially closes the gap regarding the ineffectiveness of the e-declaration verification mechanism, which we had flagged in our analysis of earlier versions, and is a significant improvement;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">another positive change is the expansion of the list of declarants in line with EU recommendations; once the Strategy is adopted, the range of officials required to file declarations despite the low corruption risks in their work will be reviewed;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a detailed provision has been included on statutorily defining the level and structure of salaries for all categories of NACP staff (1.10.1.1), which had been cut back in the government&#8217;s version;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">however, the provision on the participation of independent experts delegated by international partners in selecting members of the HQCJ and the HCJ does not make their involvement mandatory, which is a negative change;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the draft law has also removed the provision allowing NACP to issue binding orders to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement the measures of the State Anti-Corruption Program, which significantly weakens the Strategy;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the gap concerning the minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures remains unaddressed — contrary to OECD recommendations.</span></li>
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			            	The comparison shows that the revised version is stronger than the government&#8217;s and takes on board some of the comments we had raised regarding all three earlier versions.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What the new draft law strengthened</span></h2>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Criminal justice</span></h3>
<p><b>Stronger powers for the Head of SAPO (1.10.3.1). </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Under Draft Law No. 15230-1 (the government version), the Head of SAPO was granted only the powers to independently send extradition requests, set up joint investigation teams, and extend the time limits for pre-trial investigation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 15230-d this has been substantially expanded: the Head of SAPO is now given the right to independently enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding MPs and to approve motions concerning them before the investigating judge, without involving the Prosecutor General. In our view, adopting these provisions is </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2026/06/27/747672_chomu_koruptsiynih_spravah.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extremely important</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, especially in light of the upcoming expiry of the current Head of SAPO&#8217;s term. </span></p>
<p><b>Measures to implement changes in ARMA&#8217;s work have been set out. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 15230-d, a new problem 1.10.4 appeared, concerning the mismanagement of assets transferred to ARMA. The expected results of solving this problem include introducing transparent and cost-effective asset management mechanisms, modernizing the Unified State Register of Assets to enable end-to-end tracking of the status of each seized asset, and establishing effective mechanisms for identifying assets so they can be transferred to the ARMA. It should be borne in mind here that the legislative framework already adopted allows some of these measures to be carried out, but amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code are also needed — ones that would require the prosecution to obtain an opinion from ARMA before filing a motion to transfer assets into management. </span></p>
<p><b>NABU&#8217;s independence</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (1.10.2.1). 15230-d adds two points that were absent from 15230-1: staffing NABU through maximally open competitions, and strengthening communication with the public via the Public Oversight Council.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Corruption prevention</span></h3>
<p><b>The effectiveness of financial control: new Problem 1.6.8.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> None of the earlier versions of the Strategy addressed the ineffectiveness of NACP&#8217;s e-declaration checks. Now a separate block has appeared, providing for the full and substantive implementation of the recommendations of the external independent assessment of the NACP, refinement of the risk-based approach with priority coverage of senior officials, and the simplification, consistency, and greater effectiveness of the internal procedures for analyzing declarations. These expected strategic results are fully in line with Ukraine&#8217;s European integration commitments, in particular the latest EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine. This is the main positive change in the new draft law as regards corruption prevention.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That said, the new draft law retains the provision on the “insufficient rollout of automated tools” (1.6.4), which could potentially affect how well the above provisions are implemented. After all, the main and most critical problem with NACP&#8217;s financial control today is the automation of declaration checks, which can end up replacing full checks by the Agency&#8217;s staff. As a result, we get </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-the-nacp-missed-in-halushchenko-s-asset-declarations/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cases</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> like the automated check of Herman Halushchenko&#8217;s declarations, where the former minister&#8217;s declarations twice passed such a check without any violations being detected — violations that investigative journalists later uncovered.</span></p>
<p><b>The range of declarants has been expanded (1.6.1, 1.6.7).</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The new draft law proposes extending financial control requirements to officials of state-owned companies (more than 50% state-held charter capital), staff of the patronage services of political office-holders, advisers to the leadership of the President&#8217;s Office, and members of the executive committees of local councils. This is a more ambitious provision than in the government&#8217;s version and, again, fully in line with EU recommendations. However, the government&#8217;s provisions are retained that narrow the list of persons holding responsible and especially responsible positions, and interim notifications are abolished.</span></p>
<p><b>Authorized units (1.3.2.5 and 1.3.2.6).</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Unlike the government&#8217;s version, Draft Law 15230-d provides for the mandatory definition of approaches to — and the introduction of — integrity checks for candidates applying to work in authorized units (as authorized persons) for corruption prevention and detection, before they are appointed. It also provides for effective mechanisms to respond to corruption risk assessments and to the systematic failure to implement anti-corruption measures.</span></p>
<p><b>Salaries of NACP staff (1.10.1.1).</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The government&#8217;s draft law provided only for a general “proper legal regulation of the financial provision” of NACP staff. In 15230-d this point is spelled out in more detail: amendments to the Law on Corruption Prevention are to define the level and structure of salaries for all categories of the Agency&#8217;s staff, to ensure transparency and minimize the variable component.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Competitions for leadership positions in other law enforcement bodies and the prosecution service</span></h3>
<p><b>National Police. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both the government&#8217;s and the revised draft laws provide for a shift to appointing the leadership of the central and territorial bodies of the National Police exclusively through open competition. At the same time, 15230-d contains an important clarification: the competition must be held </span><b>“with the involvement of independent experts.”</b></p>
<p><b>State Bureau of Investigation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. When it comes to the competition for the SBI, the difference is most striking. In 15230-d, a separate problem 2.2.9 has appeared, with a comprehensive set of results: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">improving the procedure for selecting the SBI Director, with substantial participation of independent experts delegated by international partners (with reference to benchmark 24.3.1 of the Cluster 1 interim benchmarks);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">holding an open competition for the position of Director under this improved procedure; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">mandatory regular attestation of all SBI staff for integrity and professional fitness, with the involvement of civil society and international partners; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">introducing a system of periodic external independent audit, a negative conclusion of which would be grounds for the early dismissal of the leadership.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><b>The Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office and regional prosecutor&#8217;s offices.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Both the government&#8217;s and the revised draft laws proposed reinstating competitions for prosecutor posts in the Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office and the regional prosecutor&#8217;s offices. However, 15230-1 justifies this reinstatement with a general reference to “the recommendations of the European Commission,” whereas 15230-d ties the provision to a specific interim benchmark — 23.6 (Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” of the EU Accession Process). In addition, the wording on </span><b>selecting the Prosecutor General</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is tied to benchmark 23.2 of the Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” interim benchmarks — namely, that this procedure should become “more transparent and merit-based.”</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What has been weakened or left unresolved in Draft Law 15230-d</span></h3>
<p><b>The High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The provisions on involving international experts in forming the judicial governance bodies have been partly weakened (2.1.1.2). Instead of a clear obligation to involve independent international experts with a decisive vote, the document provides only for the possibility of their temporary involvement “where necessary” in the process of selecting HCJ and HQCJ members, in line with benchmark 23.2.1 of the Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” interim benchmarks. Such wording leaves room for discretion as to whether the selection procedure is improved at all.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Meanwhile, the events of the past two years show that the need for such improvement is beyond dispute. In the summer of 2025, the participation of international experts in the selection commission for HQCJ members ended when their terms expired, prompting a sharp </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2025/08/12/7525641/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reaction</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from 90 civil society organizations. And on August 5, 2026, at the hearing to set a preventive measure for former Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna, a SAPO prosecutor read out correspondence that </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/international-experts-must-retain-a-decisive-vote-on-selection-panels/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">may point</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to her possible influence over the composition of the selection commission for the Head of NACP, through government-delegated members. Similar dealings were mentioned in connection with the selection of the heads of the ESBU and the NABU. This case is yet another argument that abandoning the participation of international experts with a decisive vote is premature.</span></p>
<p><b>The procedure for bringing administrative liability has been partly weakened (1.9.3.3). </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government&#8217;s draft law contained two additional safeguards, absent from 15230-d, aimed at improving the system for holding people liable for administrative offenses:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a ban on releasing offenders from liability on grounds of insignificance (with an exhaustive list of exceptions);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the possibility of cassation review of decisions in cases involving a substantial fine, deprivation of a right, or administrative arrest.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This weakening is not critical, but it also seems ill-advised given the systemic problem with administrative proceedings based on NACP protocols.</span></p>
<p><b>The new draft law has also dropped the provision allowing NACP to issue binding orders</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement SAP measures (3.1.4 in 15230-1). This is a critical change that could severely undermine the quality and level of SAP implementation.</span></p>
<p><b>There is no provision on establishing effective cooperation between NACP and the State Financial Monitoring Service and the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet the similar provision for NABU (1.10.2.4) has been retained. Although the NACP, unlike the NABU, is not a body with pre-trial investigation functions, better cooperation with these bodies would meaningfully improve both the Agency&#8217;s financial control work and those bodies&#8217; work in detecting financial violations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Chapter III describes in detail the monitoring mechanism (quarterly) and the effectiveness assessment (ongoing annual and final), and point 3.4.6 contains an extensive list of baseline and target indicators. However, no minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures has been set — contrary to OECD recommendations.</span></p>
<p><b>Another unresolved problem is that civil forfeiture mechanisms do not cover situations where a person is acquitted by a court under the illicit enrichment article. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">This creates a legal gap, because an acquittal and the closure of proceedings are different procedural instruments. In the former, the court considers the case on the merits and finds the person not guilty, whereas in the latter no assessment of guilt is made, for procedural reasons. Without a clear indication that civil forfeiture can be applied after an acquittal, the state risks losing this tool in cases where individuals are acquitted because of weaknesses in the evidentiary base in criminal proceedings — which carry a higher standard of proof — despite the obvious mismatch between their wealth and their legal income.</span></p>
<p><b>The draft law proposes expanding the grounds for the disciplinary liability of public servants for breaches of anti-corruption legislation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — in particular, where a court decision holding them administratively liable for a corruption-related offense takes effect. Such changes will not be effective, because the main reason disciplinary liability is enforced so poorly is that managers fail to apply the existing provisions of the Law on Corruption Prevention, together with the inconsistency between disciplinary and anti-corruption legislation. It would seem more sensible to focus precisely on these strategic results.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions and recommendations</span></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The comparative analysis shows that the Committee used the merger of the three versions of the Strategy not to find the “lowest common denominator,” but to strengthen the document. On key aspects — the powers of the Head of SAPO, the selection of SBI leadership, competitions in the prosecution service, and the effectiveness of NACP&#8217;s financial control — Draft Law 15230-d has in places even surpassed the earlier versions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the revised version is not without losses, and some of them have no obvious explanation. These and other shortcomings must be corrected when the relevant law is adopted. Between the first and second readings, it would be worth:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">framing the involvement of international experts in selecting HCJ and HQCJ members in categorical terms;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">restoring NACP&#8217;s power to issue binding orders to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement SAP measures (3.1.4 in version 15230-1);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reinstating the provision on cooperation between NACP and the State Financial Monitoring Service and the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">restoring the two safeguards removed from 1.9.3.3 — the ban on releasing offenders from liability on grounds of insignificance, and the possibility of cassation review of decisions in cases involving a substantial penalty. Given the systemic problem with hearing cases based on NACP protocols, these provisions carry practical weight;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clarifying the wording of Problem 1.6.4 so that the development of automated tools complements full checks rather than replacing them. Otherwise, the Strategy&#8217;s strongest innovation in corruption prevention (the new block 1.6.8) risks being implemented only as a formality;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">setting a minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures in line with OECD recommendations, and providing for consequences if it is not met;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">supplementing the provision on civil forfeiture so that it is available not only after the closure of proceedings but also after a person is acquitted by a court;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">refining the provisions on disciplinary liability to align anti-corruption and disciplinary legislation.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is crucial that Parliament move to vote on the Strategy — with the above refinements taken into account — as quickly as possible, given Ukraine&#8217;s international commitments and the need to keep the document relevant. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The experience of the previous anti-corruption policy cycle showed that adopting the Strategy and the SAP too late strips part of their content of relevance before implementation even begins. TI Ukraine will continue to monitor the Strategy&#8217;s adoption in Parliament.</span></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/from-three-draft-laws-to-one-a-legal-analysis-of-the-revised-anti-corruption-strategy-for-2026-2030/">From Three Draft Laws to One: A Legal Analysis of the Revised Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Experimental Project for Comprehensive Restoration of Settlements Fell Short of Its Goals: Accounting Chamber Audit</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/experimental-project-for-comprehensive-restoration-of-settlements-fell-short-of-its-goals-accounting-chamber-audit/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:08:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33553</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>What the Accounting Chamber's audit established in the third year of the government's experiment.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/experimental-project-for-comprehensive-restoration-of-settlements-fell-short-of-its-goals-accounting-chamber-audit/">Experimental Project for Comprehensive Restoration of Settlements Fell Short of Its Goals: Accounting Chamber Audit</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In April 2023, the government launched an experimental project to restore a number of settlements damaged by the war. Its defining feature was meant to be a comprehensive approach — not merely rebuilding individual buildings or infrastructure, but planning and transforming the affected settlements, or parts of them, as a whole.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine has been analyzing the project, taking stock of its implementation each year. Our </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/experiment-on-comprehensive-restoration-of-settlements-achievements-in-a-year/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">study</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the first year concluded that the poor start stemmed from regulatory gaps, an opaque and politicized selection of objects, funding delays, and problems with transferring the rights of the construction contracting authority; at that point, only one of the more than 300 planned objects had been fully completed. Last year, we </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/no-significant-progress-and-unclear-prospects-the-experiment-in-comprehensive-restoration-of-localities/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recorded</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> no meaningful progress: the list of objects and the estimated value of restoring them both grew, yet only about 8% of the total number were completed. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In early April, the Accounting Chamber approved a report on its compliance audit </span><a href="https://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Collegium/2026/12-1_2026/Zvit_12-1_2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Restoration of Settlements Damaged by the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation.”</span> </a><span style="font-weight: 400;">The audit set out to assess whether restoration in the settlements covered by the experimental project complied with the legislation governing it. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The report covers the </span><b>period from the project&#8217;s launch through September 2025</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and is, in effect, the first official public document to record the results of the experimental project for comprehensive restoration of settlements. It confirmed that the project has not achieved its stated goals. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, it should be noted that the </span><b>audit had limitations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">: facilities in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts were not included in the sample because they are located in areas of potential hostilities. The audit therefore covered the Ministry for Development, the Agency for Restoration, the restoration services in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts, and the Department for Regional Development of the Kyiv Oblast State Administration. For this reason, the Accounting Chamber’s report should be viewed as a snapshot of the experimental model for managing the comprehensive restoration of settlements rather than a full assessment of the project’s implementation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So let us look at what the audit established and how its findings square with the problems TI Ukraine has identified. </span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Summary</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Positive aspects of the audit:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">It was the first official public audit of the experimental comprehensive restoration project.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">It documented systemic problems previously highlighted by TI Ukraine, including the lack of strategic planning, the non-transparent selection of participating settlements and restoration facilities, and funding delays.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">It went beyond documenting individual violations and identified systemic shortcomings in the project management model itself.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Limitations of the audit:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The audit covered only the central level of the experimental project’s management—the implementation of restoration measures in three of the five settlements participating in the experiment was not included in the sample.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The procurement findings are incomplete because they were based on incomplete source data and did not consider additional indicators relevant to assessing the respective aspects of procurement.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The assessment of the actual state of restoration of facilities under the project could have been more detailed. To provide a more comprehensive account of the results, it would have been appropriate to present not only the minimum and maximum levels of construction readiness but also the distribution of facilities by readiness level.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Recommendations</span></p>
<p><b>After the experimental project is completed, it is important that the comprehensive restoration of settlements remain a priority for the state and that the experience gained and problems identified be taken into account in future recovery policy.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> To enable a more comprehensive assessment of the project’s results in the future, it would be advisable to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">assess not only compliance with established procedures but also the actual achievement of the planned results, the quality of project management, and whether the decisions made meet the needs of communities;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure that the largest possible number of restoration facilities under the experimental project is covered, including through the remote analysis of documents and data where on-site control measures in the relevant settlements are not possible;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">apply a comprehensive approach to procurement analysis, taking into account the full range of indicators relevant to assessing competitiveness, transparency, and efficiency;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">regulate approaches to implementing experimental projects at the legislative level, including by requiring the authorities responsible for their implementation to assess the results achieved and by establishing a mechanism for independent/external assessment by a higher-level authority.</span></li>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Selection of restoration objects </span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The audit&#8217;s key finding on the selection of objects is that the experimental project was launched </span><b>without a proper system of strategic planning</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which left the declared comprehensiveness of restoration largely on paper. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories failed to submit the draft plan for the restoration and development of the regions on time, and comprehensive restoration measures began without a clear strategic and planning foundation. The ministry submitted the detailed schedule of pilot projects for six settlements seven months late. As a result,</span><b> there was no clear system of priorities, no criteria for selecting objects, no sequencing of restoration, and no division of responsibility among those involved</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Looking at the outcomes of selection, the audit found that the lists drawn up by RMAs lacked any transparent logic of prioritization and often failed to reflect what communities had actually proposed. The Accounting Chamber established that proposals from three communities covering 126 objects — including 108 in Moshchun — were disregarded, while 332 objects made it onto the lists without any proposal from local self-government bodies; 95% of these came from the Kherson and Kharkiv RMAs. The </span><b>selection mechanism</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was thus not merely vague: it effectively </span><b>allowed decisions to bypass the real needs and proposals of communities</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Equally revealing is the finding that </span><b>two different approaches—the comprehensive and the facility-by-facility approaches—were applied in parallel</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the same settlements. In Borodianka and Trostianets, some facilities were selected according to the experimental project’s comprehensive restoration approach, while others were selected under separate government decisions as part of facility-by-facility reconstruction. This contradicted the very idea of the experiment: instead of ensuring the comprehensive restoration of the territories, the project’s implementation was effectively reduced to a collection of fragmented construction projects.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another fundamental problem the Accounting Chamber pointed to was the </span><b>systemic failure to observe basic requirements for compiling the lists of objects to be restored.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The lists included property that had not even been entered in the Register of Damaged and Destroyed Property: 118 such objects in 2023 and another 41 in 2024. The RMAs submitted lists without key information about the objects. Not one administration provided full descriptions, justifications for restoring them, or an assessment of whether they could be financed from sources other than the state budget. The </span><b>absence of financial calculations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> made matters worse: information on the estimated value of works was supplied for only 40 of 627 objects. The project effectively started without proper preparation, which greatly complicated the launch of restoration works and led to delays across the experiment. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moshchun in Kyiv Region is a telling illustration — the village ultimately dropped out of the experimental project altogether. As the Accounting Chamber established, of the 108 objects submitted for the list in May 2023, 21 were excluded at first and later all the rest, with no alternative restoration mechanism offered. Only from 2024 was the restoration of the village&#8217;s private housing stock shifted to the compensation mechanism. </span></p>
<p><b>The Accounting Chamber&#8217;s findings on the selection of objects under the experimental project largely confirm the problems TI Ukraine has highlighted in earlier studies.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> We noted that the mechanism for including settlements in the experiment was opaque and inconsistent: some communities entered the project on an RMA submission, others effectively after intervention by the country&#8217;s top political leadership. Approving the objects dragged on for more than three months, prioritization criteria remained unclear, and selection approaches were uneven — the same types of objects were included in the lists in some communities but not in others. Moshchun became a telling example, dropping out of the experiment precisely because there was no single, consistent approach to selecting objects. </span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Funding </span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The financial part of the audit exposed one of the key systemic problems in the project: the </span><b>inability to use the funds earmarked for restoration effectively</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because approvals dragged on between the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economy, decisions on allocating funding were made with considerable delay. In 2023, nearly UAH 3 billion, or 88.3% of the annual funding, was allocated only on December 4. The picture repeated in 2024, when the Agency for Restoration distributed UAH 1.65 billion, or 74.3% of annual appropriations, only on December 2. Spending such sums before the end of the budget period was effectively impossible, and unused funds were returned to the state budget. Over the two years, more than UAH 4.5 billion went back: UAH 2.8 billion in 2023 and UAH 1.7 billion in 2024. Trostianets is a case in point: of the UAH 284.8 million earmarked, UAH 154.6 million was never used. As of the end of September 2025, almost UAH 1.7 billion remained undistributed and unused. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Here the Accounting Chamber draws attention to the </span><b>problem of dividing powers and responsibility in the management of budget funds.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> After amendments to the relevant government resolution in August 2024, the Agency for Restoration remained the chief spending unit yet effectively lost any influence over how expenditures were shaped. The Ministry for Development, in turn, gained the power to determine funding volumes but exercised no direct control over how the money was used or whether the project delivered results. This model severed the link between planning expenditures and answering for their implementation.</span></p>
<p><b>Protracted approvals of government decisions</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on project lists and funding volumes compounded the problem: roughly two months in 2023 and six in 2024. Funds reached implementers with substantial delay, which directly affected when works could start and how they proceeded. In October–November 2024, for instance, the restoration services had only 3.8% to 28.4% of their approved appropriations available. Much of the funding arrived when the scope for using it fully and effectively within the budget year was already sharply limited.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine has also flagged problems with the release of funding. Although the state formally financed the experimental project to the tune of UAH 10.82 billion, or 93% of its estimated value, only UAH 2.23 billion — roughly 20% of the </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">project&#8217;s estimated value</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — had actually been used as of May 2025. By our calculations, over almost two years the contracting authorities had a real opportunity to pay for works during only about six months. We linked this not only to procedural delays, in particular the drawn-out selection of restoration objects, but also to political instability and changes in the leadership of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and the Agency for Restoration. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Against this backdrop, the audit&#8217;s finding that </span><b>the project&#8217;s planned performance indicators were not met because the budget process was organized without regard to the real timelines of restoration projects is an important one</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regarding irregularities in the use of funds for the experimental project, the Accounting Chamber also identified isolated cases in which budget resources were used for purposes not permitted by law, although these cases are not a determining factor in the overall structure of the project’s problems. In 2023–2024, UAH 106.2 million from the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression went toward developing design documentation, even though such spending was not among the permitted uses of the fund. In Yahidne, a further UAH 2.1 million was spent on technical inspection of residential buildings, which likewise fell outside the funding purposes set by law. </span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Procurement</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the context of procurement conducted under the experimental project, the Accounting Chamber assessed exclusively whether contracting authorities complied with the statutory principles of openness and transparency when procuring works and services. Among the key problems, the auditors identified </span><b>a low level of competition and a significant share of procurement conducted outside the electronic procurement system.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In their view, this created risks of market monopolization and limited opportunities for budgetary savings.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The audit found that the Restoration Service in Kyiv Region conducted more than 70% of its procurement (27 of 37) without using the electronic system. Although this formally complied with the law, the Accounting Chamber points to the attendant risks to the competitive environment. In 5 of the 9 audited Kyiv RSA objects, open tenders drew a single bidder, which likewise limited potential savings. In all five cases the bidders did offer a price below the estimated value, though the reduction was slight — between 0.1% and 1%.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These findings, however, </span><b>need more context and do not fully reflect the overall structure of procurement under the experimental project.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine&#8217;s analysis shows that, of the 610 procurements conducted by all contracting authorities under the project, 404, or 66%, were indeed non-competitive. But these were mostly procurements of services for developing design documentation and for technical and designer supervision of construction — services for which direct contracts are common practice in urgent restoration.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In value terms, the share of such procurement was relatively small — around UAH 350 million, or just 2.75% of the total estimated value of procurement under the project. The bulk of the funding — almost UAH 8.11 billion, or 97% — went through special open tenders. The key construction contracts were therefore awarded through competitive procedures, so the conclusion that non-competitive approaches dominated calls for a more balanced assessment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On competition, TI Ukraine&#8217;s analysis likewise does not bear out the claim that it was critically low. In the first year of the experimental project, special open tenders attracted an average of 3.6 bidders. In the second year the figure fell to 2.25 per procurement, but even so it was nearly double the average level of competition in construction tenders across Prozorro.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Competition was highest in the procurement of the Restoration Service in Kyiv Region, which averaged more than three bidders per lot. The lowest figure was in Sumy Region, at roughly two bidders per procurement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Competition also delivered an economic effect. Over the two years of the project, notional savings — the difference between the estimated value of a procurement and the price of the contract signed — averaged 14.25%. The highest figure was at the Restoration Service in Sumy Region, where savings on competitive procurement reached 22.6% of the estimated value.</span></p>
<p><b>This underscores the key shortcoming of the Accounting Chamber&#8217;s audit.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Security constraints kept it away from objects in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kherson Regions — three of the experimental project&#8217;s settlements at once — which accounted for roughly UAH 2 billion in funding. That substantially narrows the representativeness of the audit&#8217;s conclusions, particularly on procurement, competition, and the efficiency of spending across the experimental project as a whole. </span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Construction</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Accounting Chamber&#8217;s report confirmed the absence of meaningful progress in the experimental project: most objects whose restoration began in 2023–2024 were not completed within the set deadlines. From the project&#8217;s launch through September 2025, only three objects in Borodianka, Kyiv Region, and Yahidne, Chernihiv Region, were completed and commissioned.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the actual number of facilities completed under the experimental project is higher than reflected in the audit, which may be explained by the fact that not all participating settlements were covered. According to data available to TI Ukraine and taking into account the audit findings, after more than two years of the experimental project’s implementation, construction and repair works had been fully completed at no fewer than 58 facilities across the five settlements, representing approximately 8% of their total number. Meanwhile, the project’s implementation in Tsyrkuny, Kharkiv Oblast, was effectively suspended due to the security situation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Accounting Chamber separately recorded a number of problems at the contract performance and construction stage. Auditors identified breaches of contract terms and of urban planning legislation, including:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">contractors&#8217; late return of advance payments under terminated contracts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">insufficient effort to pursue claims for penalties;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> overstatement of the cost and volume of completed works, in particular by including unperformed works or surplus materials in acceptance certificates, or paying for fictitious use of construction machinery;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">construction works carried out without the requisite permits.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The irregularities identified by the Accounting Chamber were neither systemic nor widespread. At the same time, due to the sample of facilities covered by the audit, the report’s findings may not fully reflect the overall state of the project’s implementation.</span></p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusion</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The compliance audit of the experimental project for the comprehensive restoration of settlements found that the project had failed to achieve its stated objectives. At the same time, its significance lies primarily in the fact that it </span><b>was the first official public audit of the experiment</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><b>confirmed</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> what civil society has been saying since at least 2024: </span><b>the experiment never became an effective model for comprehensive restoration.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The audit&#8217;s value is in </span><b>documenting systemic problems</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> TI Ukraine had already flagged: the absence of strategic planning, the opaque and inconsistent selection of objects, problems with budget planning and the allocation of funds, and funding delays. It is also important that the audit did not stop at individual violations but </span><b>exposed systemic flaws</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the project&#8217;s management model.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, despite its generally relevant and timely findings, the audit of the experimental project had certain limitations. Due to security factors, it </span><b>did not cover facilities in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">—that is, three settlements participating in the experimental project, whose restoration accounted for approximately one-third of the funding actually used, or around UAH 2 billion. This reduced the representativeness of the audit findings, particularly with regard to the assessment of procurement processes and actual restoration results.</span></p>
<p><b>Moreover, some findings were based on incomplete source data and did not take into account indicators relevant to assessing the respective aspects of the experiment.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In particular, a low level of competition and a high share of procurement conducted outside the electronic procurement system were identified as key problems. However, this finding was based exclusively on quantitative indicators—the number of procedures. In terms of value, by contrast, approximately 97% of the total funding—almost UAH 8.11 billion—was used through open tender procedures with special conditions. Given that the audit assessed procurement based on contracting authorities’ compliance with the statutory principles of openness and transparency, the failure to consider that the vast majority of the allocated funding was used through competitive procedures makes it impossible to form a complete and objective view of procurement under the experimental project.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the questions addressed by the audit was whether the measures applied had ensured the restoration of facilities in the settlements covered by the experimental project. However, the use of broad ranges of construction readiness in the report—from 3% to 100%, or from 1.2% to 64.8%—makes it difficult to assess the actual state of implementation of the facilities. These ranges reflect only the extreme values and do not provide a complete picture of how facilities are distributed by readiness level, including the number of facilities that are nearly completed or have only recently entered the construction stage.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite the shortcomings identified in the experimental project, its implementation may provide the state with valuable practical experience by highlighting key problems in the planning, budgeting, coordination, and organization of restoration processes. Taking these lessons into account is an important prerequisite for developing effective state policy and implementing future post-war reconstruction programs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In our view, </span><b>the next audit of the project,</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> which will be implemented as a public investment program over the next four years, </span><b>should be comprehensive and should:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cover the largest possible number of restoration facilities under the experimental project;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">apply remote analysis of documents and data where the physical presence of auditors is not possible;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">separately assess not only compliance with procedures but also the achievement of results, the quality of management, and the impact of decisions on community needs.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This would make it possible to formulate comprehensive practical recommendations for improving the state restoration policy.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Importantly, in addition to the problems directly related to the implementation of the experimental project for the comprehensive restoration of settlements, the audit also highlighted </span><b>a broader systemic need—to regulate by law the approaches to implementing experimental projects in general</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In particular, it would be advisable to require the authorities responsible for implementing such projects to assess the results achieved and to establish a mechanism for higher-level authorities to conduct an external assessment of experimental project implementation. A corresponding measure is already included in the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030, which is currently under consideration by Parliament.</span></p>
<p><em>This material is being implemented within the project ‘Reinforcing the European Dimension of the Ukrainian Civil Service in Law-Making, Judiciary, Finances’, implemented by ALI with the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/experimental-project-for-comprehensive-restoration-of-settlements-fell-short-of-its-goals-accounting-chamber-audit/">Experimental Project for Comprehensive Restoration of Settlements Fell Short of Its Goals: Accounting Chamber Audit</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:18:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33643</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On June 16, Members of Parliament registered two draft laws at once, both intended to improve Ukraine's Criminal Procedure Code as it applies to the investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/">Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On June 16, Members of Parliament registered two draft laws at once, both intended to improve Ukraine&#8217;s Criminal Procedure Code as it applies to the investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These are Draft Laws No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70211"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15333</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70210"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15334</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, authored by MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, and others. The first proposes a package of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) concerning the time limits for pre-trial investigation and countering the abuse of procedural rights. The second concerns improving the rules for determining investigative jurisdiction and the procedural framework for international cooperation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both are designed to fulfill the requirements of the “Kachka-Kos Plan” for </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/15-out-of-100-limited-progress-on-the-kachka-kos-plan/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European integration</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and to bring Ukraine closer to EU membership by delivering on specific measures set out in the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Rule of Law Roadmap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Laws No. 15333 and No. 15334 would resolve the problems of unjustified case closures once investigation deadlines expire, the dragging-out of trials, the unlawful investigation of NABU cases by other agencies, and the limited powers of the Head of SAPO in matters of international legal assistance;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">these acts are aimed at meeting the requirements of the Rule of Law Roadmap and the Kachka-Kos list;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">some of the legislative proposals should nonetheless be refined to achieve the best effect in practice. </span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15333:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">retain judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and — should this draft law pass — 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen the mechanisms for responding to violations of reasonable time limits in pre-trial investigation, in particular by improving Article 308 of the CPC of Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clarify the conditions for suspending court proceedings due to the mobilization of the defendant;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow monetary penalties to be imposed on defense counsel for failing to appear when summoned without valid reasons.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15334, a provision should be added to allow the Head of SAPO to open criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament.</span></p>
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			            	The first proposes a package of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) concerning the time limits for pre-trial investigation and countering the abuse of procedural rights. The second concerns improving the rules for determining investigative jurisdiction and the procedural framework for international cooperation.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">How do things stand now?</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, the application of the CPC of Ukraine in investigating and trying top corruption cases has revealed opportunities for abuse and delay, creating unjustified obstacles to holding people criminally liable.</span></p>
<p><b>On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">at present, under Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, criminal proceedings may be closed simply because the case was sent to court after the pre-trial investigation period had lapsed — even by just one to three days;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the CPC of Ukraine provides no separate mechanism allowing a victim or the defense to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation once the relevant deadline has passed; it does, however, require the prosecutor under Article 308 to respond to any failure to observe reasonable investigation timeframes;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the maximum period of pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion is 12 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the head of a prosecutor&#8217;s office may extend the pre-trial investigation period up to 3 months, while extensions to 6 and 12 months may be granted only by an investigating judge.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>On preventing abuse of procedural rights:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the systematic failure of defense counsel to appear when summoned — including for court hearings — is not clearly established as a standalone ground for bringing in defense counsel from the free legal aid (FLA) system. Nor does the law expressly prohibit filing and considering certain motions, applications, and complaints that have been submitted repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">courts are often forced to adjourn hearings because some participants in the proceedings fail to appear, even without valid reasons. Formally, the law does not establish that the presence of at least one of the defendant&#8217;s defense lawyers is sufficient to realize the right to a defense. And bringing in a new defense counsel or prosecutor — even when the previous ones are still taking part in the proceedings — is often used as grounds for adjournment;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">suspending court proceedings due to the mobilization of the defendant is possible only in cases involving grave and especially grave corruption offenses, and only if it is proven that the defendant cannot take part directly because of their involvement in Ukraine&#8217;s defense efforts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">where a trial is being dragged out, the law does not expressly empower the presiding judge to limit the parties&#8217; speaking time during closing arguments and the final statement.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>On extending the duration of obligations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as part of preventive measures: current law allows a court to impose on the suspect or the defendant any of the procedural obligations listed in Article 194(5) of the CPC of Ukraine in connection with a preventive measure for a maximum of two months, with the possibility of extension.</span></p>
<p><b>On NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction and its powers in international cooperation:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction based on the category of official does not expressly extend to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the Economic Security Bureau and the State Bureau of Investigation; or by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises. And the mechanism for transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction is not regulated in any way;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Head of SAPO cannot, without the Prosecutor General, independently set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation, nor send extradition requests on their own.</span></li>
</ol>
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			            	Currently, the application of the CPC of Ukraine in investigating and trying top corruption cases has revealed opportunities for abuse and delay, creating unjustified obstacles to holding people criminally liable.
			            </p>
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What the draft laws propose</span></h3>
<p><b>Draft Law No. 15333</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proposes three blocks of changes.</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:</span></li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remove the expiry of the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion from the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">introduce a mechanism whereby, if the pre-trial investigation deadline expires, the victim or the defense would have the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">increase the maximum pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion to 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion is extended to 6 and 12 months by the head of the prosecutor&#8217;s office, and to 18 months by an investigating judge.</span></li>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">On preventing abuse of procedural rights:</span></li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow defense counsel from the FLA system to be brought in where the suspect&#8217;s or the defendant&#8217;s own lawyers systematically (twice or more) fail to appear when summoned by the investigator, prosecutor, or court;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the court to decline to consider motions to apply measures to secure the proceedings, motions during the trial, and appeals, cassation appeals, and applications to review decisions on the basis of newly discovered or exceptional circumstances, where such applications, complaints, and motions have been filed repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the trial to continue in the absence of certain participants who were duly notified but failed to appear when summoned, while giving them the opportunity to set out their position in writing and present it at the next hearing;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">formally establish that, to ensure the right to a defense, the participation of all of the defendant&#8217;s lawyers in a hearing is not mandatory — the presence of at least one is enough;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that a hearing will not be adjourned to allow new prosecutors or defense counsel to familiarize themselves with the case file, so long as the previous prosecutors or defense counsel continue to take part in the hearing;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC the court&#8217;s right to suspend proceedings on a charge of any criminal offense where the defendant is performing military service and is unable to take part in the trial;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">give the court the ability, where it finds that a participant is abusing their procedural rights, to limit the length of any of that participant&#8217;s addresses.</span></li>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To streamline the process of extending the duration of obligations, it is proposed to give the court the ability, for </span><b>up to 6 months</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, to prohibit a suspect (or the defendant) subject to a preventive measure from leaving the country, from leaving certain localities (districts, regions), and from visiting certain areas; to prohibit them from communicating with specific individuals; and to require them to appear when summoned and to report any change of residence or workplace.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>Draft Law No. 15334</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proposes to expand NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction and to resolve the questions around the powers of the Head of SAPO as follows:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI; and by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">regulate the transfer of cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction by setting a deadline for handing over the materials and for the prosecutor&#8217;s decision determining such jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">empower the Head of SAPO to set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation and to send extradition requests independently.</span></li>
</ul>
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			            	The registered draft laws can be seen as a logical response to the problems that stand in the way of effectively investigating and trying criminal proceedings.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">The advantages of the proposed changes</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The registered draft laws can be seen as a logical response to the problems that stand in the way of effectively investigating and trying criminal proceedings. They almost entirely remove the risk of proceedings being closed over investigation deadlines and the problem of procedural rights being used to the detriment of the process, and they fill some of the procedural gaps.</span></p>
<p><b>Removing the option to close a case over an expired investigation period</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pre-trial investigation deadlines were introduced by the “Lozovyi amendments,” passed in 2017. They were supposedly meant to guard against unjustifiably long criminal prosecution, yet the problem of pressure on business does not </span><a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/news/onovlena-rada-z-pitan-pidtrimki-pidpriyemnictva-zbilshit-pre-98705"><span style="font-weight: 400;">appear</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to have been solved. Their partial repeal in 2023 did not fully fix the issue, because the law retained the rule in Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, which still allows criminal proceedings to be closed over a purely formal expiry of the pre-trial investigation deadline — even by just one to three days.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The most recent telling example is the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52017000000000365"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Dubnevych case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> concerning the misappropriation of Ukrzaliznytsia&#8217;s funds. On May 26, 2026, the HACC granted a defense motion and, on this ground, </span><a href="https://t.me/fightcorruptor/5251"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the criminal proceedings against former MP Yaroslav Dubnevych and his accomplices over the misappropriation of UAH 93 million from Ukrzaliznytsia. This is not the first time the case has been closed — back in September 2022, the HACC had already </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/5-questions-about-lozovyi-s-amendments-what-is-the-essence-of-the-problem/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed it</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the same ground.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its monitoring of the HACC, TI Ukraine</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/hacc-turns-six-analysis-of-achievements-challenges-and-recommendations/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stressed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that closing criminal proceedings is a disproportionate response and an opening for manipulation and abuse. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/limited-progress-in-the-fight-against-corruption-what-the-2025-european-commission-report-recommends-for-ukraine/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stated directly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the provision on the automatic closure of criminal proceedings over expired pre-trial investigation deadlines must be removed from the CPC of Ukraine — that is, the element of the “Lozovyi amendments” still in force must finally be scrapped.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In this context, an equally important innovation</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> could be the introduction of a maximum 18-month pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion, where the investigation requires a significant volume of investigative (search) and procedural actions, as well as international cooperation. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even longer investigation periods are permitted under the laws of European countries such as</span> <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/id/107820-kriminalprocesa-likums"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Latvia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and</span><a href="https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:1988-09-22;447"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Italy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><b>Building safeguards against abuse and delay</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Until now, Ukraine&#8217;s criminal justice system has lacked adequate tools for responding to abuse, which can seriously stall investigations and trials — and some bad-faith participants make active use of this.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its latest </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/hacc-turns-six-analysis-of-achievements-challenges-and-recommendations/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">report monitoring HACC cases</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the TI Ukraine team found that it is most often the defense that resorts to abuse during hearings, doing everything to drag them out through unfounded recusals, the non-appearance of participants, unreasonably long addresses, and the filing of identical applications and motions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because of these abuses, a significant share of HACC cases were, or </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/shelf-life-of-high-level-corruption-cases/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">still are</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, at risk of closure. Perhaps the loudest example is the gas embezzlement episode in the “Onyshchenko case” involving Roman Nasirov, where unreasonably long addresses, the mobilization of the defendant, non-appearance of defense counsel, and the like were all used. As a result, the case </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52017000000000218"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ended in a verdict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> only a few days before the statute of limitations for holding Nasirov liable expired.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15333 offers real tools to combat such tactics, including the ability to halt unreasonably long addresses and set time limits on them; to continue a hearing in the absence of certain participants and bring in new defense counsel or prosecutors; to bring in FLA defense counsel where a retained lawyer fails to appear twice in a row; to have the court decline to consider repetitive and offensive motions; and to permanently enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine the rule that a trial cannot be automatically suspended solely because the defendant has been mobilized.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">International experience likewise </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/analytics/zapobigati-zlovzivannyam-ne-zlovzivayuci-yak-rozvyazati-problemu-zatrimok-rozglyadu-sprav-pro-topkorupciyu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">confirms</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the proposed changes are entirely workable and effective.</span></p>
<p><b>Extending NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to more top officials</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alongside the package of procedural changes, in Draft Law No. 15334 the MPs propose extending NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">deputy heads and members of the supervisory boards and executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Tellingly, two years ago NABU </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/42023000000000436"><span style="font-weight: 400;">exposed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> suspected corruption by former Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andrii Smyrnov. And the defense tried to exploit the imperfections of Ukraine&#8217;s Criminal Code and CPC to convince the investigating judge that NABU had no right to investigate the case against him — in particular because Smyrnov&#8217;s position does not appear in the list of cases falling under NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction set out in Article 216(5) of the CPC of Ukraine. The European Commission, too, insisted on </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/17115494-8122-4d10-8a06-2cf275eecde7_en?filename=ukraine-report-2025.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extending</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> jurisdiction to cover all top positions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the MPs are refining the mechanism and time limits for requesting and transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction. </span></p>
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			            	The registered draft laws almost entirely remove the risk of proceedings being closed over investigation deadlines and the problem of procedural rights being used to the detriment of the process, and they fill some of the procedural gaps.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be improved</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although both draft laws resolve a large share of the pressing problems, certain provisions should, in our view, be refined so that they can be applied effectively in practice in the future.</span></p>
<p><b>Do not hand prosecutors judicial oversight over the extension of deadlines</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Returning to the heads of prosecutor&#8217;s offices the power to extend pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6 and 12 months </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-government-proposes-to-partially-cancel-the-lozovyi-s-amendments-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-12367/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">creates</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a risk of weaker judicial oversight over compliance with reasonable pre-trial investigation time. After all, the proposed approach means such a decision would be taken by a representative of the prosecution — a party with a procedural interest in prolonging the investigation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This </span><b>weakens the principle of adversarial proceedings</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Judicial oversight in such matters is a guarantee that any extension will be justified, proportionate, and necessary.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Constitutional Court has not expressed a position on the need for judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines. But its </span><a href="https://ccu.gov.ua/storinka-knygy/211-kryminalne-procesualne-pravo-ta-provadzhennya-u-spravah-pro-administratyvni"><span style="font-weight: 400;">position</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on such oversight generally comes down to this: the rule of law makes judicial oversight over any interference with a person&#8217;s right to liberty mandatory. Criminal proceedings are themselves a precondition for applying the harshest restrictions on human rights and freedoms compared to any other legal process. Judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines — on which the duration of such restrictions depends — is therefore no less important a guarantee of respect for human rights and freedoms during criminal prosecution.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such proposals may also raise doubts in light of the constitutional prohibition on narrowing the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms when adopting new laws or amending existing ones. The extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and 18 months should therefore remain within the competence of the investigating judge.</span></p>
<p><b>Improve the existing mechanism for overseeing reasonable investigation time</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Along with removing the automatic closure of cases over expired investigation deadlines (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine), the authors of the draft law propose giving participants in criminal proceedings the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A similar provision appeared in government Draft Law No. 12367. At the time, TI Ukraine</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-government-proposes-to-partially-cancel-the-lozovyi-s-amendments-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-12367/"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> pointed out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that this could place a </span><b>substantial additional burden</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the court system. To reduce that burden and to improve the legislation systematically, the changes should be made not to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine, which governs the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings, but to Article 308, which governs the procedure for challenging an investigator&#8217;s or prosecutor&#8217;s failure to observe reasonable time limits. Specifically, if a higher-level prosecutor rejects the complaint, the interested party could then turn to an investigating judge, who should be able to issue the very decisions that the MPs propose adding to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the law could expressly provide that evidence whose gathering was initiated outside the pre-trial investigation period (with certain exceptions) is inadmissible. This could serve both as a safeguard against abuse and as a proper incentive in investigations. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is therefore more sensible not to create a new mechanism, but to improve the tools that already exist.</span></p>
<p><b>Regulate more clearly the suspension of court proceedings due to military service</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 2025, after Nasirov&#8217;s </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/ekskerivnik-dfs-nasirov-dobrovilno-mobilizuvavsya-do-zsu-na-etapi-sudovix-debativ-zaxist-prosit-zupiniti-spravu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“sudden” mobilization</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Parliament </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4496-20#n25"><span style="font-weight: 400;">limited</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the ability to suspend the hearing of grave and especially grave corruption cases based solely on the defendant&#8217;s formal status as someone performing military service. In such proceedings, the court must establish that the defendant is objectively unable to take part in the proceedings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15333 proposes moving this logic to Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine and extending it beyond grave and especially grave corruption offenses to other criminal proceedings as well. On the whole, this is the right approach.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the proposed wording </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/mobilization-and-justice-what-draft-law-no-13284-changes/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> too broad. It could allow proceedings to be suspended even where the defendant is in a location from which remote participation in a hearing is realistic and does not interfere with the performance of their military duties.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It would therefore be advisable to provide that a trial may be suspended only where the defendant have no objective possibility of taking part in hearings because of their genuine involvement in Ukraine&#8217;s defense efforts directly in the areas where those efforts are carried out — on temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, or in the zone between the positions of the defense forces and those of the aggressor state&#8217;s troops — during the period of those efforts, and where they are carrying out combat (special) tasks. </span></p>
<p><b>Allow the court to impose monetary penalties for non-appearance without valid reasons</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Countering the abuse of procedural rights could be reinforced by a monetary penalty for defense lawyers who fail to appear when summoned to court without valid reasons. The </span><a href="https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/gromadyanam/reports/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">statistics</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the HACC alone show that the second most common reason for adjourning hearings is the non-appearance of defense counsel — over five years of the court&#8217;s work, 588 hearings were adjourned for this reason.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LYCElJIODlfLt-w7X8HKvtn8t1ubqjB/view"><span style="font-weight: 400;">monitoring HACC cases</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, TI Ukraine has repeatedly observed how the non-appearance of defense counsel at hearings seriously affects the reasonable timeframes for hearing a case. Striking examples of this were the</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> hearings in the</span> <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/lukash-case-in-hacc-first-hearing/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against the former Minister of Justice under Yanukovych and the </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/32-non-appearances-and-almost-20-recusals-how-defense-delays-kdac-case-consideration/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against the judges of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So, in addition to the suspect, the defendant, witnesses, victims, and other participants, it makes sense to also allow the court to fine defense lawyers who fail to appear at hearings without valid reasons.</span></p>
<p><b>Allow the Head of SAPO to open investigations against MPs</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Along with the changes to the Head of SAPO&#8217;s powers regarding international legal assistance, it is logical to remove an </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2026/06/27/747672_chomu_koruptsiynih_spravah.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">obstacle to investigating</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> cases involving Members of Parliament. The point is that only the Prosecutor General can open an investigation against MPs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such changes are one of the EU&#8217;s </span><a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-18-2026-INIT/en/pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">key requirements</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. We have also repeatedly seen how this can stall an investigation and, with it, diminish the quality and quantity of the evidence gathered. One of the first notable examples of a case against an MP was the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sprava-nardepa-yurcenka-pro-plyuski-vaks-rozpocav-dopit-iogo-pomicnika"><span style="font-weight: 400;">investigation into</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Oleksandr Yurchenko. In September 2020, the NABU publicly reported that it had sent Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova the materials and a draft suspicion for registering the proceedings and serving the notification of suspicion. However, the Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2020/09/15/465982_nabu_provodilo_spetsoperatsiyu_z.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">replied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that it saw insufficient grounds for registering proceedings.</span></p>
<p><b>To avoid such situations, the Head of the SAPO should be empowered to open investigations against Members of Parliament independently, without the Prosecutor General.</b></p>
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			            	Although both draft laws resolve a large share of the pressing problems, certain provisions should, in our view, be refined so that they can be applied effectively in practice in the future.
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<h1><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, Draft Laws No. 15333 and No. 15334 are a systematic and long-overdue response to a set of problems that for years have hampered the effective investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases — from the automatic closure of proceedings over a formal expiry of deadlines to procedural abuse and gaps in NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction. Of course, resolving all of them will require far </span><a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2026/02/12/7231031/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">more changes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine supports the adoption of both draft laws, as they bring Ukraine closer to meeting the requirements of the Ukraine Facility, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos Plan. At the same time, several points are worth improving during committee review and consideration in the session hall.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15333:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">retain judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and — should this draft law pass — 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen the existing mechanisms for responding to violations of reasonable time limits, in particular by improving Article 308 of the CPC of Ukraine, which sets out the procedure for challenging an investigator&#8217;s or prosecutor&#8217;s failure to observe reasonable time limits, by establishing clear consequences where a prosecutor takes no action once deadlines have expired;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">set out a rule under which court proceedings could be suspended due to military service only where the defendant is objectively unable to take part in hearings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow monetary penalties to be imposed on defense counsel for non-appearance.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15334, add a provision allowing the Head of the SAPO to open criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fine-tuning these provisions will preserve the balance between the effectiveness of criminal prosecution and the guarantees of the rights of those involved in the process.</span></p>
<p><em>This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.</em></p>
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			            	TI Ukraine supports the adoption of both draft laws, as they bring Ukraine closer to meeting the requirements of the Ukraine Facility, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos Plan.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/">Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:57:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33642</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The need to improve the regulation of the statute of limitations has long been recognized in state policy documents and forms part of international recommendations.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/">Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On June 26, 2026, MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, Iryna Herashchenko, and others registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70243"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, amending Article 49 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (the Criminal Code), which is meant to improve the rules for calculating the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the authors&#8217; explanatory note, this draft law will help ensure the inevitability of criminal punishment for intentional criminal offenses, increase the effectiveness of court proceedings, and close the legislative gaps that allow offenders to evade liability by artificially dragging out the trial.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The need to improve the regulation of the statute of limitations has long been recognized in state policy documents and forms part of international recommendations. It is set out, in particular, in the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roadmap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the Rule of Law, as well as in the joint </span><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/statement_25_3030"><span style="font-weight: 400;">statement</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Marta Kos and Taras Kachka. We at TI Ukraine have </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">long drawn attention</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to this problem and proposed ways to solve it.</span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 addresses the right questions — in particular, it aims to improve the rules that let defendants in corruption cases avoid criminal liability once the statute of limitations expires;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">however, the effectiveness of the proposed provisions may not be as high as declared, for a number of reasons, including the absence of comprehensive amendments and flaws in the drafting of the proposed rule.</span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but instead either to interrupt its running — that is, to start counting it anew — or to provide that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to extend the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to proportionately increase the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses, and to add the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation as a ground for suspending their running.</span></li>
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			            	According to the authors&#8217; explanatory note, this draft law will help ensure the inevitability of criminal punishment for intentional criminal offenses, increase the effectiveness of court proceedings, and close the legislative gaps that allow offenders to evade liability by artificially dragging out the trial.
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<h2><b>How do things stand now?</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The current Criminal Code provides that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended only where a person has evaded pre-trial investigation or trial. Meanwhile, a defendant&#8217;s military service — which may lead to the suspension of the court proceedings against them — does not, for instance, suspend the running of the statute of limitations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Referring a case to court likewise does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. What is more, these periods continue to run right up until the verdict enters into legal force — until the 30-day window for appeal expires, or until appellate review is completed.</span></p>
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			            	The current Criminal Code provides that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended only where a person has evaded pre-trial investigation or trial.
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<h2><b>What Draft Law No. 15354 proposes</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 proposes the following changes:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">automatically suspending the running of the statute of limitations in NABU and SAPO cases if the defendant is performing military service and the court proceedings against them are suspended;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">moving the point at which the statute of limitations is suspended in cases involving grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses from the moment the verdict enters into legal force to the moment the indictment is referred to court.</span></li>
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<h2><b>What are the advantages of the proposed changes?</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 responds to the fact that in a number of NABU cases the statute of limitations expires — something we have noted more than once as part of our multi-year project monitoring cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court. This often </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">happens</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> because of the considerable time taken by international legal assistance, lengthy expert examinations, the late transfer of a case to the NABU, or the abuse of procedural rights by participants in court proceedings.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For example, in October 2025 the HACC </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/vaks-zakriv-spravu-pivovarskogo-za-strokami-davnosti"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the criminal proceedings against former Minister of Infrastructure Andrii Pyvovarskyi due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In July this year, the HACC closed — again on statute-of-limitations grounds — the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/vaks-zakriv-spravu-posobnici-nasirova-za-strokami-davnosti"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case of Liudmyla Solotva</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, who was accused of aiding and abetting Nasirov. The case of </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nasirov-otrimav-realnii-termin-uvyaznennya-apelyaciya-zminila-virok-eksposadovcyu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roman Nasirov</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> himself was also on the verge of being closed. It was heard across two instances for 6.5 years and was accompanied by numerous delays on the part of the defense, so that Nasirov received his verdict just a few days before the ten-year statute of limitations set by the Criminal Code expired.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A similar problem appears in other high-profile proceedings — for instance, in the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sprava-ogxk-vaks-viznav-pricini-neyavki-zaxisnici-nepovaznimi"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UMCC case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, where one of the defendants mobilized, which almost completely paralyzed the normal course of the trial. And while no proper trial on the merits takes place, the statute of limitations in the case keeps running.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is why the very idea behind the draft law is correct: the statute of limitations should not stand in the way of holding to account persons who are performing military service. Nor should the completion of appellate review become the point at which the counting of these periods stops.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If a case has already been referred to court, the state should not lose the chance to obtain a decision on the merits merely because the trial is taking a long time, or because participants in the process are dragging it out. This is especially important for corruption cases.</span></p>
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			            	Draft Law No. 15354 responds to the fact that in a number of NABU cases the statute of limitations expires — something we have noted more than once as part of our multi-year project monitoring cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court.
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<h2><b>What should be improved</b></h2>
<h3><b>Interrupting, rather than suspending, the statute of limitations could offer more guarantees to participants in court proceedings </b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The authors of the draft law propose that the statute of limitations be suspended upon the referral of the indictment to court only in cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses. And there is only one ground for resuming the periods — a court ruling returning the indictment. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the Criminal Code provides that the special, undifferentiated limitation period — after which a person who has committed a crime of any gravity is released from criminal liability, even if they evaded justice — is 15 years. This conclusion was also </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/108960086"><span style="font-weight: 400;">confirmed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in 2023. The same period is set for especially grave criminal offenses, while for grave ones it is 10 years. It therefore follows from the proposed changes that, compared with the current rules, only 5 additional years would be “gained” for grave corruption crimes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, we should point out the not-entirely-successful drafting of the amendments. Under the proposed version of Article 49(2) of the Criminal Code, the sentence “In these cases, the running of the limitation period resumes from the day the person surrenders with a confession or is detained, and from the time a criminal misdemeanor was committed — after five years” is placed immediately after the description of the new ground for suspension — mobilization or acceptance for military service under contract. As a result, in light of the amendments, this wording — “the person surrenders with a confession” and “is detained” — will apply to the person&#8217;s mobilization, rather than (as the authors presumably intended) to the person&#8217;s evasion of pre-trial investigation or trial. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This drafting inaccuracy creates a real risk that the new rule will be interpreted ambiguously.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond this, the very approach of suspending the statute of limitations upon the referral of the indictment to court creates additional problems:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">there is no substantive rule on the grounds for resuming the running of the limitation period, since the return of an indictment does not happen all that often in NABU and SAPO practice;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extending this rule only to cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses is an inaccurate and unjustified narrowing. In that case, the legislator&#8217;s response leaves out the less grave corruption and corruption-related crimes provided for in Articles 366-2 and 366-3, Article 369-2(1) and (2), Article 369(1), Article 364(1), and Article 191(2).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In view of this, a more balanced solution would be not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but to interrupt its running. Alternatively, it could be provided that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such an approach would preserve the incentive for the parties and the court to hear a case without unjustified delays, while at the same time preventing situations in which a case has already been heard on the merits and a verdict delivered, yet the person is released from liability solely because the statute of limitations expired at the appellate-review stage. That said, if the limitation period is to run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict, the court should be given robust tools to counter the abuse of procedural rights</span></p>
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			            	The authors of the draft law propose that the statute of limitations be suspended upon the referral of the indictment to court only in cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses. And there is only one ground for resuming the periods — a court ruling returning the indictment. 
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<h3><b>Changes to the statute-of-limitations rules should cover all corruption and corruption-related offenses</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The authors of the draft law propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem is that corruption and top-level corruption cases are sometimes investigated not only by NABU, but also by the SBI, the National Police, and the ESBU. According to the statistics, most corruption verdicts are handed down by local courts on the basis of materials from these bodies; and although such cases are generally less complex, there are far more of them. According to the </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/inshe/sudova_statystyka/zvit_dsau_prot_kor_2025"><span style="font-weight: 400;">latest data for 2025</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, local courts convicted 3,268 persons of corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since the Criminal Code already contains a list of such criminal offenses, it would be more </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/mobilization-and-justice-what-draft-law-no-13284-changes/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">systematic</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in terms of legal regulation, to suspend the running of the statute of limitations on account of a suspect&#8217;s/defendant&#8217;s mobilization not only in NABU and SAPO cases, but in all cases concerning the criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, Draft Law No. 15333 proposes to improve the grounds for suspending a trial by extending them not only to persons accused of a grave or especially grave corruption criminal offense, but to all criminal proceedings. It is therefore hard to trace any clear logic in why the running of the statute of limitations should be suspended in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor. </span></p>
<p><b>Accordingly, the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization should be extended to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</b></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	The authors of the draft law propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor.
			            </p>
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<h3><b>The statute-of-limitations rules require comprehensive changes </b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Given that the authors of the draft law acknowledge the problems with regulating the statute of limitations, a comprehensive overhaul of this institution should be ensured.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As part of its monitoring of HACC cases, TI Ukraine has </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">systematically examined</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the question of the statute of limitations in corruption cases and concluded that the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability needs to be improved in several directions: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">proportionately strengthening criminal liability for certain criminal offenses, which would in turn lengthen the corresponding limitation periods; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establishing additional grounds for suspending the running of the limitation period — for example, mutual legal assistance in criminal proceedings; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">changing the end point for calculating the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability (to the delivery of the first-instance verdict, rather than the entry of the verdict into legal force).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/the-hacc-during-the-war-key-trends-challenges-and-recommendations-for-improvement/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Comparing the statute of limitations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for bringing offenders to criminal liability for various corruption crimes in EU member states and in Ukraine, we can conclude that for certain acts our limitation periods are unjustifiably short. This is most pronounced for obstruction of justice, but also for bribery in the public sector (Articles 368 and 369 of the Criminal Code), bribery in the private sector (Article 354 of the Criminal Code), trading in influence (Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code), and abuse of office (Article 364 of the Criminal Code).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, the legislation of foreign states and international recommendations point to a much broader list of grounds for suspending the statute of limitations. In particular, the 2007 </span><a href="https://www.unodc.org/pdf/legal_advisory/Model%20Law%20on%20MLA%202007.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UN Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> provides for suspending the running of the limitation period for the time a mutual legal assistance request is being executed. The criminal </span><a href="https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/Statutes-of-Limitation_web.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">legislation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of EU member states additionally singles out, as grounds for suspension, the existence of immunity and other legally established obstacles to prosecution, the minority or illness of the alleged offender, and the referral of a case for additional investigation. Among the grounds for interrupting the periods, a number of jurisdictions include the initiation of a criminal prosecution, the issuance of an international or European Arrest Warrant, the official recognition of a person as a suspect, as well as any procedural notification to the person — a summons, a call to appear, or the holding of a confrontation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In light of the above, consideration should be given to expanding the list of grounds for suspending the limitation period, at least as regards the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation. Such an expansion should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards against abuse by pre-trial investigation bodies — in particular, by empowering the court that will decide on release from criminal liability to verify that the relevant procedural actions within international cooperation were justified and genuine.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, to improve the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability, the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses should be proportionately increased, and the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation should be added as a ground for suspending their running.</b></p>
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<p class="quote">
			            	Given that the authors of the draft law acknowledge the problems with regulating the statute of limitations, a comprehensive overhaul of this institution should be ensured.
			            </p>
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<h2><b>Conclusions</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, Draft Law No. 15354 is something of a response to problems that have already arisen repeatedly during the hearing of corruption cases. We recommend that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 15354 as a basis, subject to revision. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ahead of the second reading, the text of the draft law should be refined on the following points:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but instead either to interrupt its running — that is, to start counting it anew — or to provide that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to extend the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to proportionately increase the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses, and to add the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation as a ground for suspending their running.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><em>This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.</em></p>
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			            	We recommend that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 15354 as a basis, subject to revision. 
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/">Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>A Major Package of Changes to Public Procurement Rules: An Analysis of the Resolution</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/a-major-package-of-changes-to-public-procurement-rules-an-analysis-of-the-resolution/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 06:45:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33415</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The return of the negotiated procedure, publication of completion certificates, an optional catalogue, and other long-awaited amendments to Resolution No. 1178.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/a-major-package-of-changes-to-public-procurement-rules-an-analysis-of-the-resolution/">A Major Package of Changes to Public Procurement Rules: An Analysis of the Resolution</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amendments to Resolution No. 1178 are not always good news for the procurement community, but this time the government has taken several important and long-anticipated steps — including some that TI Ukraine has been advocating for a long time. On July 15, through </span><a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-vnesennia-zmin-do-postanov-kabinetu-ministriv-ukrainy-vid-12-zhovtnia-2022-r-1178-i-vid-t150726"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Resolution No. 957</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, it reinstated the mandatory use of the negotiated procedure, borrowed the value thresholds from the current version of Law No. 922-VIII, extended the deadlines for submitting bids, and even abolished the mandatory use of the electronic catalogue for food procurement. In addition, some of the exceptions are being reduced or reserved solely for defense-sector contracting authorities. On top of that, the Cabinet of Ministers introduced an obligation to publish certificates of completed works in the Prozorro system. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Resolution No. 957 </span><b>enters into force on September 1, 2026</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, except for the changes concerning localization, which take effect immediately upon the resolution&#8217;s publication. It does more than make technical adjustments — it substantially rethinks the approaches to selecting a procurement method. The changes will therefore affect contracting authorities, bidders, and public monitoring alike. Most of them will facilitate the gradual transition to the </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/verkhovna-rada-adopts-new-public-procurement-law/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">new version of the Law on Public Procurement</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which will take effect in spring 2027. In this analysis, we break down what will change in procurement in the near future. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Cabinet of Ministers has adopted amendments to the resolution that governs public procurement rules under martial law. Most of the changes will support the gradual transition to the new version of the Law on Public Procurement, which takes effect in spring 2027 — meaning they are needed for European integration. The changes are also expected to have a largely positive effect on the transparency and competitiveness of procurement:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the return of the mandatory negotiated procedure in place of direct contracts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a reduction in the number of exceptions to competitive procedures under martial law, in line with the recommendations of the </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European Commission</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the </span><a href="https://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Collegium/2026/19-3_2026/Zvit_19-3_2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Accounting Chamber</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the introduction of a requirement to publish certificates of completed works for construction procurement exceeding UAH 10 million;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the removal of the mandatory use of Prozorro Market for food procurement;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the extension of the minimum period for submitting bids in open tendering to 15 days — for works as well as for goods and services;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a distinction between ordinary contracting authorities and those in special sectors, and the return of the thresholds from the current Law.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine has long advocated for most of these changes.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Recommendation</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Balance the approaches to construction procurement in the energy sector. At present, such procurement partly falls simultaneously under both the option to run a negotiated procedure and the option to conclude a direct contract and, importantly, is subject to differing reporting rules and disclosure timelines. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thresholds and contracting authorities — as in the Law</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the first months after the Specifics took effect, the lowering of thresholds proved a challenge for many contracting authorities in special sectors. Whereas these entities had previously operated under thresholds of UAH 1 million for goods and services and UAH 5 million for works, back in 2022 they were effectively equated with ordinary contracting authorities, and the thresholds for procuring goods and services fell as low as UAH 100,000. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Now, in 2026, the government </span><b>is restoring the distinction between ordinary contracting authorities and those in special sectors</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and is also</span><b> bringing back the value thresholds set out in the current version of the Law</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For ordinary contracting authorities: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UAH 200,000 — for the procurement of goods and services;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UAH 1.5 million — for the procurement of works. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For contracting authorities in special sectors:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UAH 1 million — for goods and services; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UAH 5 million — for works. </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While this change will remove some lower-value procurement from the competitive field, it will at least bring the threshold limits back into line with the Law and should make contracting authorities&#8217; work easier. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Prozorro Market for food is now optional</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From spring 2024 until now, contracting authorities have been required to conduct above-threshold procurement of most food products through the electronic catalogue. At the time, DOZORRO </span><a href="https://dozorro.org/blog/kupivlya-produktiv-cherez-e-katalog-i-ban-iranu-zakupivelni-zmini-lyutogo"><span style="font-weight: 400;">called</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> this move risky — imposing such a no-alternatives obligation on contracting authorities. Practice has shown that the absence of challenges to the AMCU and of State Audit Service monitoring in Prozorro Market procurement is a critical flaw in this mechanism, one that leads to numerous abuses. In particular, a TI Ukraine </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/discrimination-in-coal-procurement-on-prozorro-market-how-widespread-is-it/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">study</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> found that more than half (55%) of coal procurements made through Prozorro Market contained unlawful requirements to submit additional documents and set extremely short deadlines for their submission — potentially discriminatory conditions. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, the mandatory nature of the catalogue artificially narrows the range of lawful conduct available to contracting authorities and creates a restricted market segment — one where access for businesses and their products depends heavily on the actions, decisions, or inaction of the state-appointed administrator, all against a backdrop of insufficiently detailed legal regulation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government is now </span><b>abolishing the mandatory use of the electronic catalogue for food procurement.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The annex listing these products is also being removed from the resolution. So contracting authorities will now be able to choose whichever path they consider more effective: continuing to procure food through the catalogue, or running a tender — including concluding a framework agreement. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">The return of the negotiated procedure: grounds </span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the most significant changes is the </span><b>return of the negotiated procedure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. TI Ukraine advocated for this step, in particular on the basis of its </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/billions-outside-prozorro-an-analysis-of-the-grounds-for-applying-above-threshold-direct-awards/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">study</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of above-threshold direct procurement. That study found that roughly 70% of the value of above-threshold direct contracts consisted of procurement on grounds that had previously required a negotiated procedure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead of the familiar list of grounds for above-threshold procurement without using the electronic system, clause 13 of the Specifics will now contain a list of grounds for the negotiated procedure. Overall, these are similar to the current list but substantially shortened. The following grounds remain for the negotiated procedure:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b><i>Cancellation of open tendering</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> after no bids were submitted. </span></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For this ground, the drafters retained everything developed under the Specifics: unlike the Law, a single cancelled open tender is enough to justify a negotiated procedure. This approach, incidentally, is consistent with </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Directive 2014/24/EU</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In a negotiated procedure following open tendering, the draft contract and the maximum value excluding VAT must remain unchanged. In addition, a new requirement has appeared: the justification for the negotiated procedure must </span><b><i>specify the announcement number</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the open tender that was cancelled.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">2. The provision on works, goods, or services that </span><b><i>can be performed, supplied, or provided exclusively by a particular business entity</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has not undergone any substantive changes compared with the current version of the Specifics and simply becomes a ground for the negotiated procedure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">3. The conditions for procurement based on </span><b><i>urgent need</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have been revised. First of all, the government clarified what constitutes an urgent need by adding a description of this situation that was absent from the Law: </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">“</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">there is an objective, documented need to carry out the procurement, driven by circumstances unforeseeable for the contracting authority and independent of its decisions, actions, or inaction, which make it impossible to observe the deadlines for open tendering or to use the electronic catalogue where goods are being procured.”</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the Specifics currently provide, an urgent need must, in terms of timing, </span><b><i>make it impossible to hold open tendering or use the electronic catalogue</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In addition, the government clarified that the circumstances of an urgent need must specifically be </span><b><i>unforeseeable and independent of the contracting authority&#8217;s decisions, actions, or inaction</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This is worth bearing in mind when planning procurement. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The drafters of the resolution also borrowed from the Law a somewhat modified list of cases in which an urgent procurement need may arise. But, unlike the Law, they kept the list </span><b><i>non-exhaustive</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. It will therefore not constrain contracting authorities and will allow a negotiated procedure in all cases where a corresponding urgent need exists. Among these, the resolution expressly provides for the immediate mitigation of the consequences of emergencies or of Russia&#8217;s armed aggression against Ukraine, humanitarian aid to other states, termination of a procurement contract through the bidder&#8217;s fault, and challenges filed in open tendering. The last of these, admittedly, may to some extent depend on the contracting authority&#8217;s own decisions, since it is the challenge to them that gives rise to the need. Nevertheless, this type of urgent-need situation is expressly provided for.</span></p>
<p><b><i>4.Procurement of additional volumes of goods, works, or services</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from a supplier under an existing contract. These provisions have become grounds for the negotiated procedure almost unchanged; the only important clarification is that the main contract for procuring works or services must have been concluded specifically as a result of </span><b><i>open tendering</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, rather than of procurement in general as is currently the case. It is that contract which must set out the option and the terms for performing the additional works or services. And the 50% ceiling that the value of the additional procurement must not exceed will be calculated </span><b><i>excluding VAT</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">5. Another ground for the negotiated procedure is borrowed from the Law — </span><b><i>the procurement of goods under the procedure for restoring a debtor&#8217;s solvency</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">6. The procurement of legal services to settle disputes heard by foreign jurisdictional bodies is set out in the wording taken from the Law and must therefore be based on a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers or the National Security and Defense Council. Procurement related to the contracting authority&#8217;s participation in international exhibition events is added here as well.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">7. From the Specifics, the list of grounds for the negotiated procedure additionally includes </span><b><i>procurement of</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">goods, works, and services needed to support the </span><b><i>construction of military engineering and fortification structures, for the urgent needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, other military formations, law enforcement bodies, the State Emergency Service, and higher military educational institutions at their request, with the subsequent transfer of the procurement item onto the requester&#8217;s books (formerly subclause 21 of clause 13);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">items needed for the protection, restoration, reconstruction, maintenance, siting, and construction of destroyed or damaged </span><b><i>critical infrastructure facilities</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (a consolidation of various subclauses of clause 13);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">procurement in cases where the contracting authority or its separate subdivision is located in an </span><b><i>area of active hostilities</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that have not ceased as of the date the procurement contract is concluded (formerly subclause 2 of clause 13).</span></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this way, the grounds for the negotiated procedure now take the place of the former exceptions to competitive procedures in clause 13 of the Specifics. This step is likely to be welcomed by the European Commission and, we hope, will be taken into account in the further assessment of Ukraine&#8217;s progress in harmonizing its procurement legislation with the European directives. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">How the negotiated procedure is changing</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond the grounds for it, the Specifics now regulate how the negotiated procedure is conducted, how information about it is published, and the specifics of challenging and reporting on it. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Importantly for the choice of counterparty, the </span><b><i>requirement for a bidder to confirm the absence of grounds for refusing its participation in the negotiated procedure under clause 47 of the Specifics has been extended to all grounds for the procedure</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — including a negotiated procedure due to a lack of competition and one for additional volumes. Thus, even in such no-alternative negotiated procedures, bidders will be refused participation where grounds for refusal exist. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The notice of intent to conclude a contract under the negotiated procedure will generally match the rules of the current Law, but with several additions:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">If the negotiated procedure is conducted because open tendering that received no bids was cancelled, the contracting authority must state in its </span><b><i>justification whether the winner of the negotiated procedure meets the qualification criteria set out in the tender documentation for the open tender (if any were specified there).</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> A description of those criteria must also be attached. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">By analogy with other procurement, the notice of intent to conclude a contract under the negotiated procedure will state </span><b><i>information about the ultimate beneficial owners of the bidder</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with which the contract is intended to be concluded. This information will be generated automatically by the Prozorro system. Alternatively, where this is not technically possible or where the bidder is a non-resident, the contracting authority will add the information itself. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">For negotiated procedures carried out to build fortifications, at the request of military units, or to protect infrastructure, special disclosure rules have been added for the Prozorro system: the contracts and any amendments to them will be published 90 days after martial law ends. </span></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A negotiated procedure </span><b><i>may be challenged</i></b> <b><i>within five days</i></b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (three days for a negotiated procedure based on urgent need and for one used to procure certain energy-sector and utility-sector goods) from the day the complainant learned, or should have learned, of the violation of its rights resulting from the contracting authority&#8217;s decision, action, or inaction, but before the day the contract is concluded. Complaints in a negotiated procedure based on urgent need will have a shortened review period — three business days. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For all complaints, not only those concerning the negotiated procedure, the government clarified that where it is not technically possible to upload information, documents, and materials on the procurement procedure to Prozorro, the parties are to submit them by another accessible means designated by the review body.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If the negotiated procedure is not challenged, then once these five (or three) days have elapsed, the contracting authority is entitled to conclude the contract. This period is half as long as the one provided for in the Law, so it should not significantly delay meeting the contracting authority&#8217;s need. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Specifics also slightly clarify the cancellation of a negotiated procedure: if a contracting authority cancels it because violations cannot be remedied, it must describe those violations. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reducing the exceptions to competitive procedures</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Among the former grounds for concluding a direct contract that existed in clause 13 of the Specifics, the option to conclude one is retained only </span><b>until December 31, 2026</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and only for the following exceptions:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the procurement of goods, works, and services relating to the construction, repair, and other engineering measures to protect critical infrastructure facilities in the fuel and energy sector (formerly subclause 13 of clause 13); </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">experimental procurement to protect the life-support systems of critical infrastructure under </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/142-2025-%D0%BF#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 142 of February 7, 2025</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (formerly subclause 13 of clause 13);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the procurement of a range of types of energy equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of, or to prevent, an emergency, as well as works and services relating to their construction, restoration, reconstruction, siting, and capital repairs at the relevant facilities and to their protection, as part of the measures envisaged by the Comprehensive Resilience Plans for regions and individual cities approved by the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of March 3, 2026, and brought into effect by Presidential Decree No. 239 of March 14, 2026 (formerly subclause 28 of clause 13). </span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For such procurement, contracting authorities will publish a report on the procurement contract concluded without using the electronic system, together with the justification of the grounds for such procurement. The requirements to have the justification approved by the head of the contracting authority or a person designated by them, as well as the requirements to publish information about beneficial owners, remain in place. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Likewise, a separate set of requirements to report the prices of materials will continue to apply to procurement contracts for current repairs and for new construction, reconstruction, restoration, and capital repair works. Once such contracts are concluded, contracting authorities will have to upload not only the report and the justification but also the contract and its annexes, along with information on the prices of materials in machine-readable format.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the remaining contracts, the requirement to upload the contract and its annexes will also apply, but the system will make them public 90 days after martial law ends. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition to this wholesale rethink of the approach to direct procurement in clause 13, the government </span><b>removed a number of exceptions</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the requirements to apply procurement procedures or simplified procurement that existed in clause 9 of the Specifics, namely procurement: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">for measures to search for persons missing under special circumstances and for the repatriation and return of missing persons (military and civilian) carried out by the Ministry for Reintegration and the state-owned enterprises within its remit;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">for unity centers operating under Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 841 of July 14, 2025;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">for the servicing of state-owned property of a maritime oil terminal by a business company wholly owned (100% of shares) by another fully state-owned business company — this exception expired in 2025 and was therefore removed as a technical matter;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">of goods, works, and services by defense-industrial complex enterprises to mitigate the consequences of hostilities under martial law, in accordance with Cabinet of Ministers acts on the allocation of funds from the reserve fund of the state budget.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reviewing and reducing the number of exceptions to competitive procedures is the right step, one that aligns with the European Commission&#8217;s recommendations in its </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, as well as with the </span><a href="https://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Collegium/2026/19-3_2026/Zvit_19-3_2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recommendations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine issued following its analysis of the Ministry of Economy&#8217;s annual report. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">A separate list of grounds for defense direct procurement</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Previously, </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1275-2022-%D0%BF#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Resolution No. 1275</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which governs defense procurement under martial law, referred — alongside its own grounds for direct contracts — to the grounds set out in clause 13 of the Specifics. That reference has now been removed and, in its place, those grounds relevant to defense procurement have been added directly to Resolution No. 1275. These include:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cancellation of open tendering due to no bids being submitted;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the contracting authority or its separate subdivision being located in an area of active hostilities that have not ceased as of the date the state contract is concluded;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the ability to perform the contract exclusively by a particular business entity owing to a lack of competition for technical reasons or the need to protect intellectual property rights, or the conclusion of a state contract with a supplier of last resort or a universal service provider for the supply of electricity or natural gas;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">urgent need;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the need to supply an additional volume of goods or to perform additional works or services by the existing performer of the state contract;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the procurement of attorney (bar) services.</span></li>
</ul>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fifteen days to submit bids across the board</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Welcome news for businesses is the </span><b>extension of the deadlines for submitting bids in open tendering</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for </span><b>goods and services</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">: as with the procurement of works, they will now run from </span><b>15 days</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> after the announcement is published. </span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">An improvement for public oversight — publishing completion certificates</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A long-awaited step for the civil society organizations that monitor construction procurement is the publication of completion certificates. TI Ukraine&#8217;s DOZORRO program has been </span><a href="https://dozorro.org/blog/propoziciyi-dozorro-ta-kse-do-proyektu-novogo-zakonu-pro-publichni-zakupivli"><span style="font-weight: 400;">advocating for this step for several years for high-value procurement of construction works</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, since it is the certificates that record the actual prices of the materials used. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government has added to the Specifics a </span><b>requirement to publish acceptance certificates for completed construction works and the certificate(s) of the value of completed construction works</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and costs. The requirement will apply to contracts of UAH 10 million or more including VAT under which current-repair services or works for new construction (including the development of design documentation), reconstruction, restoration, or capital repairs were procured. These documents must be published within five business days of being signed.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Extending and broadening the localization exemptions for energy</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the procurement of a range of types of </span><b>energy equipment</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><b>the government extended the exemption from localization requirements to the end of 2026</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, clarifying that it applies to procurement not only to mitigate the consequences of, but also to prevent, an emergency in power systems — at both the national and the regional level. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This concerns the procurement of steam turbines, gas-piston units, cogeneration units, power-generation units, gas generators, gas-turbine units and modular boiler houses, heat pumps, steam boilers, mobile boiler houses, and diesel generators, including the components and parts of such equipment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This same exemption from localization requirements was extended until March 25, 2028, for procurement under the experimental project for the construction and installation of independent backup power supply systems in apartment buildings in the city of Kyiv (under </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/353-2026-%D0%BF"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 353 of March 20, 2026</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">). </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, both exemptions were expanded to </span><b>allow the procurement — regardless of the degree of localization — not only of the goods themselves but also of works or services</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> relating to the construction, restoration, reconstruction, siting, or capital repair of the relevant facilities and to their protection, provided that performing such works or providing such services entails the contracting authority acquiring ownership of the relevant listed goods.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To sum up, Resolution No. 957 </span><b>introduces a number of positive changes</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the regulation of procurement that should make it more competitive and transparent. Transparency International Ukraine has long advocated for some of them. Moreover, while the changes were being drafted, the organization provided proposals for technical and legal edits, including to unblock the option of running a negotiated procedure.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We support the return of the negotiated procedure, the longer deadlines for submitting bids in tenders for goods and services, the introduction of requirements to publish certificates of completed works, and the removal of the mandatory use of the electronic catalogue for food procurement. Most of the changes will aid the gradual preparation for the new version of the Law on Public Procurement, which will take effect in spring 2027. Beyond the higher thresholds and longer submission deadlines, contracting authorities will be able to adapt to the return of the negotiated procedure and to choose the optimal method for procuring food.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reducing the number of exceptions to competitive procedures</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> aligns with the European Commission&#8217;s recommendations in its </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and with the </span><a href="https://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Collegium/2026/19-3_2026/Zvit_19-3_2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recommendations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine and, we hope, will be taken into account in the further assessment of the legislation and the sector as a whole.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Extending and broadening the localization exemptions will likely help contracting authorities cope more easily with the challenges arising from Russia&#8217;s strikes on energy facilities. </span></p>
<p><b>Among the resolution&#8217;s shortcomings</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, one can single out a degree of </span><b>duplication in the approaches to procurement in the energy sector.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The ground for the negotiated procedure related to ensuring the protection, restoration, reconstruction, maintenance, siting, and construction of critical infrastructure facilities destroyed or damaged as a result of Russia&#8217;s armed aggression partly overlaps with a similar ground for concluding a direct contract. The resolution&#8217;s provisions apply </span><b>different approaches to reporting</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on works contracts and current-repair contracts in the energy sector concluded directly versus through the negotiated procedure. Thus, where a works contract is concluded directly under clause 9-2 of the Specifics, the contract and its annexes — including the prices of materials — will be made public immediately. By contrast, where a negotiated procedure is carried out under subclauses 8 or 9 of clause 13 of the Specifics, the system will make such information public only after martial law ends. This difference in approach appears unbalanced and will likely require further attention and refinement.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This material is funded by the European Union. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. </span></i></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/a-major-package-of-changes-to-public-procurement-rules-an-analysis-of-the-resolution/">A Major Package of Changes to Public Procurement Rules: An Analysis of the Resolution</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The Sale of Seized Assets by ARMA: a Legal Analysis of the New Procedure</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sale-of-seized-assets-by-arma-a-legal-analysis-of-the-new-procedure/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 11:37:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33383</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On July 1, the government adopted a resolution approving the Procedure for the Sale of Seized Assets at Electronic Auctions.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sale-of-seized-assets-by-arma-a-legal-analysis-of-the-new-procedure/">The Sale of Seized Assets by ARMA: a Legal Analysis of the New Procedure</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On July 1, the government </span><a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennia-poriadku-s846010726"><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopted a resolution</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> approving the Procedure for the Sale of Seized Assets at Electronic Auctions. Until then, this matter had been governed by several separate pieces of secondary legislation at once.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The new act sets out how the provisions of Article 21-6 of the updated ARMA Law — which establishes the key parameters for the sale of seized assets — are to be implemented. </span></p>
<h5><b>Key takeaways:</b></h5>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The resolution consolidates the rules on the sale of seized assets into a single act and introduces a new anti-corruption rule — a ban on the purchase of assets by persons related to the asset&#8217;s owner or to a suspect or accused in the relevant proceedings.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The basic mechanics of the electronic auctions (three consecutive auctions, the rules for lowering the starting price, the bidding increments) have not changed in substance — only the terminology and the level of detail for certain parameters have been revised.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The auction preparation period has been shortened to a maximum of 15 business days. The sale of assets abroad has been referred for regulation under the general rules on the disposal of assets in comparable situations.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">It remains unresolved what rules the organizer is to follow when dividing one or more assets into lots.</span></li>
</ul>
<h5><b>Key recommendations:</b></h5>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers — respond to the constitutional petition concerning the right to appeal rulings on the transfer of property for sale by making the corresponding amendments to the CPC of Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To ARMA — enshrine in internal acts a methodology for forming lots, so as to prevent a recurrence of situations in which assets lose value. </span></li>
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			            	The resolution consolidates the rules on the sale of seized assets into a single act and introduces a new anti-corruption rule — a ban on the purchase of assets by persons related to the asset&#8217;s owner or to a suspect or accused in the relevant proceedings.
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<h3><b>How the sale of seized assets was previously regulated</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Before July 1 of this year, the sale of seized assets was governed not by a single act but by several government resolutions at once. A significant </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/news/zminy-v-realizatsiyi-areshtovanyh-aktyviv-yurydychnyj-analiz/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">update</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the process took place in November 2023, when auctions became possible on the Prozorro.Sale marketplaces.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The central figure in the process was not ARMA itself but a separate auction organizer — a legal entity that ARMA selected on a competitive basis under a dedicated procedure (Resolution No. 558). The organizer received a fee of 1% of the sale price for assets in Ukraine and up to 15% for assets abroad, and it was the organizer that was responsible for preparing the lot, valuing it, storing it, and supporting the auction. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The auction had three consecutive stages: the first involved three rounds of real-time price increases; the second (a “repeat” auction) started at 50% of the first auction&#8217;s price; and the third (a “repeat” auction using the step-by-step price-reduction method, that is, a Dutch auction) likewise started at 50% of the initial price. The number of price-reduction steps at the third stage was not separately fixed in the Procedure — it was set by the operating regulations of the electronic trading system, meaning the administrator could change it without amending the resolution.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The auction preparation period was framed as a minimum — no fewer than 15 calendar days for real estate and no fewer than 10 days for perishable movable property.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The set of persons barred from purchasing assets was based on the official FATF list of states, the threshold of “10% or more of the shares of a resident of the aggressor state,” and a standard list of sanctions- and offshore-related restrictions. The Procedure contained no express ban on persons related to the asset&#8217;s owner or to a suspect or accused in the case — meaning a party to the proceedings could, in theory, buy back their own asset through a front person.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The sale of assets abroad required the competitive selection of a foreign organizer, and ARMA was obliged to inform the Cabinet of Ministers of the winner of that competition, whereupon the Cabinet adopted a separate decision recorded in its minutes.</span></p>
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			            	Before July 1 of this year, the sale of seized assets was governed not by a single act but by several government resolutions at once.
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<h3><b>What has changed in the sale of seized assets</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The ARMA is now the auction organizer itself, and the separate, competitively selected organizer legal entity no longer exists.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A new anti-corruption rule has appeared — a ban on the purchase of an asset by persons related to the asset&#8217;s owner or to a suspect or accused, with a detailed list of indicators of relatedness (drawn from the Tax Code, the Law on Corruption Prevention, and the Law on Joint-Stock Companies. This closes a </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/arma-s-sale-of-borzhava-lands-three-questions-about-the-process/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">loophole</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the old regulation had left open.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A maximum auction preparation period has been set — no more than 15 days for immovable property and 10 for movable property — which may speed up the turnover of assets.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The number of Dutch-auction steps at the third stage is now fixed directly in the Procedure — 99 steps — rather than left to the discretion of the administrator&#8217;s regulations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The sale of assets abroad has been simplified — instead of the competitive selection of a foreign organizer and a mandatory minuted decision by the Cabinet of Ministers, there are now three clear methods of sale with no additional approval procedure: sale by the competent authorities of the foreign state, transfer of the asset to Ukraine, or another method provided for by an international treaty.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the list of ineligible buyers, the aggressor state is now supplemented by an express reference to the Republic of Belarus, and the ownership criterion has been changed from “10% of shares” to “holders of a significant participation.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The auction process itself has accordingly been simplified, and can be represented schematically as follows:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Valuation and decision</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — the ARMA values the asset and decides to sell it.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Announcement </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">— published at least 7 days before the auction.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Registration</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — participants submit applications and pay a registration fee and a security deposit.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>First auction</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — ascending price, three rounds of 3 minutes each, 1% increment.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>If unsold, a second auction</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — the starting price is halved, again ascending.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>If unsold, a third auction</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — Dutch format, with the price reduced automatically (99 steps).</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Signing of the auction record and payment</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — the winner pays within 5 days.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><b>Transfer of ownership</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — after payment; the seizure must additionally be lifted through the investigating judge.</span></li>
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			            	A new anti-corruption rule has appeared — a ban on the purchase of an asset by persons related to the asset&#8217;s owner or to a suspect or accused, with a detailed list of indicators of relatedness.
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<h3><b>Areas for improvement and points of risk</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although the adopted Procedure regulates the procedural aspects of the sale of seized assets reasonably well, certain points still call for attention. Some of them fall outside the Procedure itself and relate to adjacent provisions of the law. Others are matters that cannot be conclusively settled at the rule-making stage and only surface in the course of practical application, and therefore require further refinement as experience accumulates.</span></p>
<h4><b>No notification of the owner and no right to appeal the sale decision</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">International </span><a href="https://www.fazuoi.gov.ba/images/Dokumenti/Smjernice_za_upravljanje_oduzetom_imovinom_Vije%C4%87e_evrope_2023.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">standards</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the sale of seized assets recommend that the owner and interested third parties be notified of the sale decision and have the right to challenge it in court. Current legislation contains no such mechanism: ARMA&#8217;s decision to sell an asset is published on ARMA&#8217;s official website, but this is more a matter of informing the general public than a personal notification.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The situation is complicated by the fact that the legal basis for the sale itself — the investigating judge&#8217;s ruling on the transfer of property for sale, issued under Article 100(6)(2) of the CPC of Ukraine — is currently not subject to appeal at all. By Resolution No. 17 of September 12, 2025, the Plenum of the Supreme Court has already </span><a href="https://ccu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/4_376_2025.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">applied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the Constitutional Court with a petition on the unconstitutionality of Articles 309 and 392 of the CPC of Ukraine, specifically in the part that makes such a ruling impossible to appeal.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It would therefore be advisable to address this problem proactively and provide for the possibility of appealing rulings on the transfer of property for sale.</span></p>
<h4><b>No methodology for forming lots</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The adopted act assigns the division of an asset into lots to the organizer (now ARMA itself) without setting any criteria or methodology for such division. Yet the </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/arma-s-sale-of-borzhava-lands-three-questions-about-the-process/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">sale of land</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the Borzhava polonyna (460 hectares and ski-lift stations, an asset in the State Investment Project case) shows what unregulated discretion leads to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the asset was put up for auction three times through three different organizers, with the valuation falling successively from more than UAH 1.067 billion to UAH 347.9 million;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the lots (245 + 208 + 41 land plots) were formed on the basis of a letter from SAPO, and ARMA&#8217;s justification amounted to a general assertion of “maximum commercial appeal,” with no public methodology or criteria;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">despite the repeat auctions, buyer interest remained low right up to the final successful sale — the asset was ultimately bought by persons related to the parties in the original case, though ARMA did not sign the sale record.</span></li>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because the structure and number of lots directly affect the range of potential buyers, market appeal, and the final price, the absence of a standardized approach to forming them is a systemic risk — the matter is left entirely to ARMA&#8217;s discretion, without any procedural safeguards or requirements to give reasons.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It would therefore be desirable for ARMA&#8217;s internal acts to define the procedure for dividing an asset or assets into lots, including criteria for combining or splitting property, requirements for justifying the chosen lot configuration, and the recording of that justification in the materials accompanying the sale decision.</span></p>
<h4><b>The need for active monitoring of asset sales</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Borzhava case also shows the value of systematic rather than reactive oversight of how auctions unfold. The Prozorro.Sale </span><a href="https://bi.prozorro.sale/#/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">analytics</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> module makes it possible to track in real time precisely the indicators that in this case became problematic only after the fact: the number of failed auction attempts for the same asset, the pace at which the appraised value dropped between attempts, changes of organizers, and the intervals elapsing between them.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This also matters given that in 2025 the Prozorro.Sale system </span><a href="https://zn.ua/ukr/reforms/rik-reformi-arma-rozshukali-aktiviv-na-miljardi-ale-areshtuvali-lishe-2.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">hosted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> 184 electronic auctions for the sale of seized assets, of which only 41 were successful. In that same year, ARMA received 33 rulings on the sale of assets, of which only 4 were carried out. In total, sales were completed under 20 rulings over the past year.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These results may be linked both to the complexity of the previous sale procedure (a legal entity had first to be selected on a competitive basis to act as auction organizer) and to the fact that not all of the assets transferred for sale were attractive to buyers — in part because of the lots in which they were offered.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Regular tracking of asset sales should therefore be ensured, so that potentially problematic cases can be addressed before a sale is completed rather than afterwards, when recovery is more difficult.</span></p>
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			            	International standards on the sale of seized assets recommend that the owner and interested third parties be notified of the sale decision and have the right to challenge it in court. Current legislation contains no such mechanism.
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<h3><b>Conclusions and recommendations</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The adopted resolution is a sound step in reforming the mechanism for selling seized assets. It also incorporates a substantial body of established international standards on auction transparency and conflict-of-interest prevention. The basic auction mechanics have remained stable throughout, which reduces the risks of the transition period.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That said, the adoption of this act is the beginning, not the end, of work on the asset-sale process. Some of the problems identified fall outside the secondary legislation itself and require changes at the level of primary law. Others — the division of assets into lots, and the quality and speed of sales in practice — cannot be exhaustively regulated in advance and emerge only in specific cases.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To strengthen these processes, we can recommend the following:</span></p>
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<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers — respond to the constitutional petition concerning the right to appeal rulings on the transfer of property for sale by making the corresponding amendments to the CPC of Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To ARMA — regulate, through internal acts, the methodology for forming lots, so as to prevent a recurrence of situations in which assets lose value.</span></li>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At this stage, then, what matters is not only targeted legislative fine-tuning but also the need for systematic monitoring of how the new Procedure is applied in practice. </span></p>
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			            	The adopted resolution is a sound step in reforming the mechanism for selling seized assets. It also incorporates a substantial body of established international standards on auction transparency and conflict-of-interest prevention.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sale-of-seized-assets-by-arma-a-legal-analysis-of-the-new-procedure/">The Sale of Seized Assets by ARMA: a Legal Analysis of the New Procedure</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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