The Prosecutor General’s Monopoly Over MP Cases

A parliamentarian should be protected from pressure for their political position, voting, statements, and general representative activities. Without such protection, an MP could become dependent on executive power. However, Article 482-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code “protects” MPs from a far broader range of situations. It applies not only to politically motivated prosecution for parliamentary activity but extends to corruption offenses that have nothing to do with protecting the parliamentary mandate.

As far back as 2017, GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) recommended implementing clear and effective measures to ensure that the removal of immunity from parliamentarians would not prevent criminal prosecution of those suspected of committing corruption offenses. In particular, it proposed adopting clarifications on this matter with clear and objective criteria.

Interestingly, in 2020, after immunity was removed, GRECO concluded that this recommendation had been implemented only “satisfactory.” According to the Council of Europe’s monitoring body, this assessment was apparently linked to the fact that the new law can only be effectively implemented in the absence of abuses and political bias. And this is something Ukraine cannot yet hope for—even the Prosecutor General remains a politically interested party. He is appointed by the President of Ukraine with the consent of MPs, without formalized competitive procedures assessing competence and integrity.

From nearly the beginning, the expert community noted that such a construction effectively creates a modified form of immunity from criminal prosecution. Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide analogous special procedures for initiating criminal proceedings against judges, who also enjoy certain immunity. 

During the discussion of the relevant draft laws themselves, some MPs emphasized that making investigations dependent on the will of a single person—the Prosecutor General—creates corruption risks and may result in the impossibility of prosecuting an MP criminally.

The practice already demonstrates the problem 

One of the first prominent examples involving an MP was the case of Oleksandr Yurchenko. In September 2020, the NABU publicly announced that it had submitted materials and a draft suspicion notice to Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova for registering proceedings and notifying the MP of suspicion. However, the Prosecutor General’s Office replied that it saw insufficient grounds for registering proceedings. 

The NABU was effectively forced to publicly call on the Prosecutor General to sign the suspicion notice. Eventually this did happen, but the episode itself demonstrated the key point: a corruption case against an MP can be stalled in this manner.

We observed numerous examples where journalists uncovered suspected corruption by MPs, yet the Prosecutor General refused to open proceedings. And the most recent and telling such case is the matter against Iryna Kormyshkina. In early 2025, she and her husband admitted guilt and, based on a plea agreement, received a sentence for illicit enrichment and money laundering. However, as far back as 2022, the Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin had stalled the initiation of the case, first refusing to register the crime report, before a court eventually ordered him to launch an investigation. 

These cases are not isolated, and from time to time they become a genuine obstacle to NABU and SAPO investigations of high-profile corruption within parliament.

Why comparison with other countries works against the Ukrainian model

In democratic states, parliamentary immunities typically follow a different logic, designed to protect the parliamentary function rather than create a blanket barrier to criminal process. The Venice Commission has drawn attention to this dangerous paradox: in young democracies, immunity can simultaneously protect MPs from state abuse and become an obstacle to fighting corruption.

This is deeply important for Ukraine. We are not an established democracy with a substantial legacy of political traditions and unconditional confidence in the prosecution service, law enforcement agencies, and political institutions—Ukrainian institutions are still earning such trust from society. For this very reason, a model in which corruption proceedings against an MP depend on one politically appointed official cannot be considered optimal.

Moreover, even developed democracies, while granting their parliamentarians immunity similar to what we abandoned in 2019, do not erect barriers to initiating pre-trial investigations. And certainly, do not afford protection to MPs from all categories of criminal offenses, including corruption—the Venice Commission considers this unacceptable.

In many European approaches, immunity often applies only to arrest, detention, or prosecution (formal suspicion)—as in Belgium, France, Italy, and Portugal. 

Several of these countries conducted constitutional reforms as far back as the 1990s, whereby opening an investigation against a parliamentarian requires no separate authorization. In France, for example, following constitutional reform, Chamber consent to opening criminal proceedings is not mandatory—it is required only for detention, arrest, and other judicial control measures. In Italy, Constitutional Law No. 3 of October 29, 1993 removed the requirement for prior Chamber consent to open proceedings against MPs.

The Ukrainian model moved in the opposite direction, placing even the submission of information to the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPI) under special control.

Why the SAPO head should receive such powers

Ukraine deliberately created a separate anti-corruption system in which the NABU investigates high-profile corruption, the SAPO provides prosecutorial supervision, and the HACC ensures judicial control and adjudication of such cases. This model was meant to reduce the dependence of investigations on any political influences. Yet the Criminal Procedure Code has long recognized the special role of the SAPO head regarding MPs, giving him the authority to independently sign notices of suspicion to them. 

However, that same Article 482-2 does not grant the SAPO head an analogous role regarding submission of information to the URPI or approval of key investigative applications during pre-trial investigation. This creates a contradiction: the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office can notify an MP of suspicion, but lacks direct authority to independently launch proceedings or approve a search or other investigative measure. And this is all the more significant because ultimate control over searches, arrests, interception of communications, and preventive measures must still be exercised by an investigating judge.

Furthermore, when addressing the legislative removal of parliamentary immunity, an alternative draft law had proposed authorizing the SAPO head to perform the same functions regarding prosecution of MPs as the Prosecutor General. In its explanatory memorandum, the authors specifically noted that concentrating powers solely in the Prosecutor General creates risks that material evidence and traces of crime could be destroyed, and that it may become impossible to conduct investigative measures swiftly.

Beyond this, granting such powers to the SAPO head benefits not only the efficiency of anti-corruption investigations, but the MPs themselves. In cases involving parliamentarians, there is always a risk that any decision by the Prosecutor General will be perceived as political pressure, especially when it concerns opposition cases. Involving the SAPO head in NABU cases reduces this risk by shifting decisions to a more specialized and institutionally removed plane—recall that our Prosecutor General is appointed by specific officials. 

For honest MPs, such powers in the SAPO head mean greater protection from selective political prosecution; for society, it means less reason to believe that anti-corruption cases are blocked or initiated based on political expediency.

***

The cancellation of parliamentary immunity in Ukraine was an important political decision, but it did not resolve the problem of MP privileges in criminal procedure. Ukraine should not have replaced old parliamentary immunity with new prosecutorial immunity.

As practice has shown, such an approach is especially dangerous in corruption cases against MPs, as it creates a risk that investigations may be delayed or blocked not through weakness of evidence, but through the lack of political will of a single official—the Prosecutor General.

Granting such powers to the SAPO head in proceedings within NABU’s investigative jurisdiction will strengthen guarantees for parliamentarians and make it impossible to use such cases as a hidden form of immunity. And this benefits both MPs and anti-corruption law enforcement agencies.

Status of Key EU Recommendations Implementation  

Ukraine has implemented several of the EU’s key recommendations and aligned its public procurement sector with European standards:

• The ARMA reform entered the implementation phase following Law No. 4503-IX.
• The NABU and the SAPO continued expanding their track record; both the SAPO and the HACC adopted institutional development strategies.

• The HACC substantially increased the pace of case completion, reducing average case-processing time from 618 to 405 days.
• The new Law on Public Procurement (draft law No. 11520) has been adopted.
• The State Audit Service received broader powers to oversee the use of international partners’ funds.
• The Roadmap for Strengthening Public Procurement Oversight for 2025–2027 has been approved.

However, a number of other substantial recommendations remain outstanding:

• Expanding the NABU’s jurisdiction to all high-risk public positions.
• Strengthening safeguards against circumvention of the NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction by the SBI, SSU, National Police, and ESBU.
• Empowering the SAPO to investigate MPs without prior approval of the Prosecutor General.
• Amending the CPC to remove automatic closure of criminal proceedings upon expiry of pre-trial investigation deadlines, and extending the statute of limitations for corruption offences in line with European standards — both specified in the Kachka-Kos plan.
• Improving the declaration verification system, including introduction of a risk-based approach focused on high-ranking officials as required by the February 2026 IMF Memorandum and European Commission.
• Adopting a new Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme.
• Carrying out the selection procedure for Accounting Chamber members.
• Bringing into line the legislation on public-private partnerships and concessions with the EU acquis. 
• Continuing the defense procurement legislation update.
• Ensuring the comprehensive reform of the State Audit Service.  

Overall, the progress is mixed: meaningful advances, including the ARMA reform, continued growth in the NABU, SAPO, and HACC track record, and the adoption of the new Law on Public Procurement, are contrasted with growing risks to the independence of anti-corruption institutions, a widening gap between declared commitments and legislative action, persistent deficiencies in the criminal-law and asset-recovery framework, and stalled reform of the Accounting Chamber.

Goal 1. Criminal justice (2.5/20 — up 0.5)

• Government track: The draft law developed by the Ministry of Justice to deliver on elements of this point of the plan was sent back for revision following a meeting of the government committee. It is currently being refined together with the NABU and the NACP, but the document has still not been published for public consultation or registered in parliament.
• MP initiatives: Two draft laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada — No. 15333 (on improving the efficiency of proceedings after the expiry of pre-trial investigation deadlines) and No. 15334 (on improving investigative jurisdiction and international cooperation).

Goal 2. Ensure that NABU has effective access to impartial, timely and high-quality forensic examinations (2/10 — up 1.5)

Providing the NABU with effective access to impartial and timely examinations is still stalled by the lack of a shared vision among the agencies.

• The Ministry of Justice has begun work on amendments to the Law on Forensic Examination to strengthen safeguards for forensic examination activities.
• The NABU has submitted its comments, but significant disagreements remain between the ministry and the Bureau over the concept for establishing such an expert institution.

Goal 7. International experts in the HQCJ selection (1.5/10 — up 0.5)

The issue of expanding international experts’ participation in the Selection Commission for members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) remains frozen.

• Draft Law No. 13382, intended to restore international experts’ participation in selecting HQCJ members, has been stalled in the Verkhovna Rada since June 2025.
• According to the Cabinet of Ministers, another legislative initiative has now been drafted and is undergoing consultations with the European Commission. This document has not yet been officially registered or published.

Goal 9. Adopt the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the SAP by the end of June 2026 (1.5/5 — up 1)

The plan required the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Program (SAP) to be adopted by Q2 2026, but the deadlines have already been missed.

• Blocked in parliament: Three competing draft laws are awaiting consideration in the relevant parliamentary committee. The most ambitious, and the one consistent with EU integration requirements, is Draft Law No. 15230 from the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee.
• SAP delay: The State Anti-Corruption Program was developed in parallel, but the NACP will release its draft for public consultation only after parliament finally votes on the Strategy.

Goal 10. Strengthen internal control and whistleblower protection (1/10 — up 0.5)

There are already initial practical steps in building up internal control and efforts to adapt the Ukrainian system to European standards, although the core legislative framework is still awaiting final approval. 

• The State Audit Service has stepped up its checks, Internal Audit Standards in line with the European GIAS requirements have entered into force, and a whistleblower portal is operating, though it still needs technical improvements.
• Several strategic goals have been incorporated into Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1, and No. 15230-2, On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030, which are currently awaiting consideration in the relevant committee.

Other goals of the plan: the overall picture according to experts

In the other reform areas reviewed, the situation also remains unsatisfactory:

• Selection of the Prosecutor General (0.5/10 — up 0.5): there has been virtually no progress in revising the competitive selection procedures, with only one MP draft law registered.
• Selection for senior positions in the prosecution service (0.5/10 — no change): transparent competitive appointments have still not been restored, and new government initiatives risk dragging out the process through lengthy consultations.
• SBI reform (1/10 — no change): the relevant draft laws have not been presented for broad discussion, creating the risk that new leadership will be selected under the old procedures.
• New CCU judges and HCJ members (1/5 — no change): the competitive procedures are continuing with delays, and key vacancies under certain quotas remain unfilled.
• Judicial integrity and enforcement proceedings (3.5/10 — up 1.5): the legislation adopted does not take into account the EU’s recommendations on checks of the integrity declarations of Supreme Court judges, although there is some positive movement on digitalizing enforcement procedures.

This baseline evaluation covers the “Kachka-Kos plan” — a set of equivalent reforms defined in December 2025. Alongside Transparency International Ukraine, which focused on key anti-corruption areas, the study involved the MEZHA Anti-Corruption Center, European Pravda, the ANTS National Interests Advocacy Network, DEJURE Foundation, New Europe Center, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, and the Anti-Corruption Action Centre.

What was Kniaziev’s role in the case, and why does this agreement matter so much? 

For a time, Kniaziev was charged with creating an organized group, but in the indictment and the verdict his actions were classified as those of a principal — an official who had accepted an unlawful benefit for himself and others. According to investigators, the scheme was built by the intermediaries, Horetskyi and Horburov, while Kniaziev secured the outcome in court. 

A key condition of the agreement was incriminating testimony against the other participants in the scheme. On its basis, notices of suspicion were served on four Grand Chamber judges: Zhanna Yelenina, Iryna Hryhorieva, Ihor Zhelieznyi, and retired judge Oleksandr Prokopenko. Kniaziev confirmed that he had coordinated the payment of the “reward” between the intermediaries and the judges. In particular, after the ruling was adopted, he personally handed Prokopenko a black folder containing $50,000 — even though Prokopenko had prepared a dissenting opinion, ostensibly disagreeing with the decision. Kniaziev explained the money simply: “people are grateful to all the judges” who had delivered the result. 

As the verdict notes, a corruption crime committed by the chairman of the country’s highest judicial body undermined trust in the justice system and damaged Ukraine’s international standing. An important argument in favor of the agreement was the public interest in swift justice. Over the course of more than 50 hearings, the HACC had not even examined all of the prosecution’s evidence; the agreement made it possible to avoid a years-long trial. Kniaziev’s testimony opened an investigation into the other Grand Chamber judges — without his cooperation, proving their involvement would have been extremely difficult.

For international partners, the EU in particular, the verdict is a signal that the inevitability of punishment has worked even at the highest level of the judicial system. Five years of actual imprisonment with confiscation of property will, in the court’s view, also serve as a warning to others.

Kniaziev’s return to the bench: is it even possible, and if so, when?

Kniaziev had lost his judgeship even before the verdict, and not because of the criminal case. In 2023, he was found guilty of a corruption-related administrative offense: during a search, investigators found a lease for a four-room Kyiv apartment at a symbolic UAH 1,000. The UAH 906,000 by which the rent fell short of the market value was deemed by the court an unlawful gift and confiscated, and Kniaziev was additionally fined UAH 2,550. The NACP then applied to the High Council of Justice, which opened disciplinary proceedings and removed Kniaziev from office. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court subsequently upheld that decision.

Now comes the verdict in the criminal case. The three-year ban on holding positions in judicial and law enforcement bodies takes effect only after the principal sentence has been served. Taking into account time spent in custody, the actual term of imprisonment will be about 4.3 years. This means a return to the judicial system is impossible for at least seven years.

But even after that, the path back into the justice system is effectively closed. A criminal record for a particularly grave crime is expunged only eight years after the sentence has been served. And a conviction for a corruption crime, together with dismissal from judicial office, will remain weighty considerations in any judicial selection competition — the HQCJ and the Public Council of Integrity are unlikely to overlook this episode in his biography.

***

This case has become one of the most high-profile in the HACC’s practice — the first time in Ukraine that a sitting chairman of the Supreme Court was caught taking a bribe. And the verdict, with its actual imprisonment and confiscation, has become the subject of active debate. Although it may still be appealed within 30 days, the grounds for doing so are limited.

Like any convicted person, Kniaziev has the right to petition the President of Ukraine for a pardon, but here too there are very few grounds. And if he fails to comply with the agreement, the prosecutor may move to have the verdict overturned.

Detection and tracing: more requests, fewer assets found

In 2025, ARMA received 9,468 requests to detect and trace assets — a 20% increase over 2024 (7,865). 

The number of assets actually found, however, fell across several categories. ARMA located 29,049 land plots, down from 107,066 in 2024 — a figure we flagged at the time as an anomaly. Other categories rose: detected funds reached UAH 36.5 billion against UAH 8.3 billion, corporate rights UAH 58.5 billion against UAH 35.9 billion, and virtual assets stood out most of all — 1.29 million USDT against 2,400 USDT, a roughly 530-fold increase.

One section is genuinely new: ARMA publicly acknowledges the structural gap between assets traced and assets seized. Only 2% of the property ARMA traces is later seized. The report explains, among other things, that the information ARMA compiles on traced assets cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceedings.

The Agency separately notes that some tracing requests come in proceedings where confiscation — or even the option of special confiscation — is not envisaged at all. The information on traced assets is then used by the prosecution under Article 93 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which governs the rules for gathering evidence and nothing more. In other words, in certain cases ARMA functions as a property-records service for law enforcement.

ARMA also sent 639 international requests in 2025, against 383 in 2024 (up 66%). The numbers are striking, but they raise questions about the quality of each request and the effectiveness of the institution’s foreign track as a whole. The report does detail what was found abroad: 366 properties, 88 vehicles, $5.9 million, and corporate rights worth the equivalent of UAH 924.86 million. How much of this was seized, and which of these decisions foreign competent authorities recognized, remains unknown. 

Such decisions by foreign actors do not depend on ARMA alone, of course. But to analyze the state of asset recovery — a function the Agency does hold — the missing piece is information on whether those assets were actually seized abroad.

Asset management: more new agreements, but the revenue still comes from the old ones

Last year we noted that ARMA had concluded only 7 management agreements against 33 announced competitions. In 2025, there are already 40 management agreements under 38 rulings. On paper this is a breakthrough — yet 27 agreements carried over from previous years remain the main source of revenue for the state budget.

A single agreement — with Ukrnafta over the assets of Ukrnaftoburinnia, signed back in June 2023 — brought UAH 1.074 billion to the budget out of UAH 1.54 billion from management agreements overall. That is roughly 70% of the year’s revenue from one asset. All 38 new agreements signed in 2025, by contrast, account for just 2.5% of revenue (UAH 38.7 million).

The figures on asset sales in 2025 are also contradictory. The Agency organized 184 auctions, of which only 41 succeeded (about 22%). Nearly four out of five auctions produced no result. This calls for a separate explanation — on how the lots were assembled, and on starting prices and the appeal of the assets. 

The key thing left out of the report: as of its publication, the new mechanisms for selecting managers through Prozorro still had not been launched, even though they were supposed to be operating by January 30, 2026. This means that, overall, the transfer of assets to managers under the new rules is significantly delayed.

Oversight of managers: more activity, but the quality questions remain

In 2024, ARMA carried out only 10 on-site inspections of managers — one of the key figures we criticized. In 2025, there are already 38 on-site inspections and 348 desk reviews, for 386 oversight actions in total. These produced 27 orders to managers and 5 established instances of mismanagement.

In terms of trend, this is a marked improvement. In absolute terms, though, 38 on-site inspections against the 34,062 assets ARMA has placed under management, worth UAH 10.7 billion, is still a modest figure. 

The report also fails to show how the inspection results were interpreted: how many orders led to an actual change in a manager’s conduct, and how many agreements were terminated for ineffectiveness. And the scandalous case of KAMparytet, which subleased shopping centers at prices three times higher than its declared income, is not mentioned in the report at all, even though the case was discussed separately at the parliamentary Anti-Corruption Committee, and in 2026 the Agency confirmed the violations and announced its intention to terminate the agreements with the company. 

Inventory: ARMA finally has a definitive count of the assets it manages 

The transitional provisions of the new ARMA law required the body to identify, within six months, all assets placed under its management before the law took effect. The Agency reports that, following a full inventory, its records now cover 60,274 assets, of which 20,753 have high management potential. This figure also includes assets being prepared for competitive procedures or already identified as attractive for management and sale.

Even so, the Agency still does not use the term “asset pool,” which would make it possible to see how many units of property actually form part of an operating business that can be grouped under that concept. In practice, this makes it quite hard to tell from the report how many economically attractive businesses lie behind the figure of 20,753 assets. 

In 2025, 1,703 assets were handed to managers under agreements, while across all years ARMA has transferred 34,062 assets in total. These 1,703 assets are valued at UAH 5,354.31 million, against UAH 10,737.53 million for all assets combined. So nearly 5% of the assets placed under management in 2025 account for roughly 50% of the total value. One hypothesis here is that in earlier years the assets transferred for management were largely low-value.

In all, the body of assets ARMA is empowered to act on amounts to 94,336 units. Of these, 34,062 have already been transferred to managers under agreements (1,703 in 2025), and 60,274 have not (20,753 of them with high management potential). 

Handling “complicated” assets proved a separate problem: of 100 appeals ARMA made to prosecutors about its inability to manage such assets effectively, only 32 received a reply, and just 5 of those were resolved favorably. In other words, 95% of the cases where ARMA has already deemed an asset problematic to manage remain unresolved once the prosecution is brought in. And this problem should be resolved by amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, as we have stressed before.

***

Over the past year, the volume of activity inside ARMA has grown substantially. The Agency is drafting secondary legislation, running asset inventories, tracing assets, and shaping recovery policy. Not every task has been completed, but the progress is visible. 

Even so, in watching ARMA’s performance, we would like to see real results in the effectiveness of asset recovery. That can be traced, in particular, by comparing the outcomes of tracing, seizure, effective management, and confiscation. Beyond that, the data available in the report does not make clear how the new system for selecting managers actually works, since not a single auction of that kind has taken place since the law was adopted. And in any case, the management agreements covered in the report were all concluded under the old procedures. 

That is why we see the key task for ARMA today as changing the very logic of how it traces and manages property. In our opinion, the next report should demonstrate not just the volume of work done, but concrete achievements across the system as a whole. All the more so since invoking the old rules will no longer make any sense. 

How do things stand now?

Most articles in the CPC section devoted to international cooperation have not been amended since the Code was adopted in 2012. At that time, digitalization was not a global priority, and the practice of international cooperation had not become widespread enough to reveal the weaknesses in its legal regulation. 

As a result, the provisions currently in force lag in many respects behind technological progress and the new legal approaches to mutual legal assistance — particularly when it comes to confiscating assets located in foreign states and dealing with participants in criminal proceedings who are abroad.

The exchange of materials in international cooperation. Current legislation permits requests and case materials to be exchanged in paper form during international cooperation. This significantly slows down Ukraine’s interaction with partner states in the fight against crime, since it requires a considerable amount of time.

The protection of information in international cooperation. Information processed within such cooperation currently has no clear safeguards against disclosure — especially where the cooperation does not require opening criminal proceedings in Ukraine.

The international wanted list. The CPC does not expressly define the moment from which a person is considered to be on the international wanted list.

The enforcement of HACC judgments. Although the HACC hears high-level corruption cases as a specialized court, certain matters arising in the enforcement of its judgments — such as a convicted person’s parole or the replacement of the unserved part of a sentence with a more lenient one — still go before local courts under the rules of Article 539 of the CPC, rather than before the HACC.

The confiscation and special confiscation of property abroad. The CPC does not contain a sufficiently detailed mechanism for establishing the location abroad of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation. The engagement of ARMA to trace and seize property abroad when enforcing confiscation decisions is also currently unregulated.

Questioning from abroad. Witnesses or victims located abroad can be questioned only from the premises of a court at their place of residence, which means that a corresponding request must be sent each time to the competent authorities of the foreign state through mutual legal assistance. Only for the duration of martial law or a state of emergency has it become possible to question a witness or victim directly by videoconference from any location.

What does the draft law propose?

Draft Law No. 14292 proposes a fairly broad package of changes. Among the key positive updates:

• permission to make wider use of electronic communications for international cooperation requests;
• regulation of the protection of information and materials in international cooperation;
• a more detailed set of grounds for refusing or postponing mutual legal assistance requests, and of the procedure for executing them;
• improvement of the procedure for recognizing and enforcing judgments, as well as for confiscating property abroad;
• the introduction of the ability to question persons located abroad by videoconference or from the premises of a Ukrainian diplomatic mission, regardless of whether martial law or a state of emergency has been declared in the country.

Which provisions need refining?

Despite its generally positive thrust, the document contains a number of procedural gaps, legal ambiguities, and risks that could negate the intended effect in practice.

For the mechanisms it establishes to work smoothly, the document should be refined in the respects described below.

Confiscation of property abroad: the right direction, but a weak procedural design

The amendments to Articles 535 and 568 of the CPC are intended to ensure the enforcement of judgments insofar as they concern the confiscation or special confiscation of property located abroad. This is an important step, particularly in countering organized crime, and corruption in particular. There are two problematic points whose resolution could improve this process.

In the proposed wording of Article 535(7) of the CPC, the drafters would require the court to draw up a petition for the recognition and enforcement, in a foreign state, of a Ukrainian court’s conviction insofar as it concerns the confiscation or special confiscation of property. However, the drafters failed to take into account that special confiscation may be imposed not only by a court’s verdict but also, under Article 96-1(2) and (3) of the CC, by rulings on release from criminal liability, on the closure of criminal proceedings, on extended confiscation, on the imposition of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, and on the imposition of criminal-law measures on a legal entity. The aforementioned provision of Article 535(7) of the CPC should therefore also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.

In addition, the draft law would require those enforcing the judgment (chiefly the State Enforcement Service) to notify the court of any property discovered abroad that is subject to confiscation or special confiscation.

This innovation is consistent with EU Directive 2024/1260, under which the tracing and identification of property subject to freezing and confiscation must be possible even after a final court decision. Yet, although the draft law offers such an option, the point at which criminal property — or property subject to confiscation — is discovered should not be deferred all the way until the court’s final decision. 

The reason is that state enforcement officers cannot match law enforcement agencies or ARMA in detecting and tracing property, especially abroad — they lack sufficient powers and resources for this. 

As noted earlier, it is law enforcement agencies during the pre-trial investigation, and ARMA, that have the most tools for tracing and identifying assets subject to confiscation. Even they, however, do so fairly rarely, and the reason is that Article 91 of the current CPC in no way requires the location of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation to be proved within criminal proceedings. Largely because of this, in most cases such property ultimately goes unnoticed by the enforcement service.

Therefore, to adapt the provisions of EU Directive 2024/1260 to Ukrainian realities, it would be sensible, first, to supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. Second, to establish that, when enforcing court decisions on confiscation for the laundering of criminal property or for corruption, ARMA may be engaged to identify property that may be confiscated. Article 535(7) of the CPC should also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.

2. The international wanted list, the digitalization of summonses, and the removal of procedural obstacles for persons abroad

One of the draft law’s provisions concerns placing a suspect on the international wanted list. In Article 291 of the CPC, the drafters propose to draw a clear distinction between a domestic search within Ukraine and an international one, and to establish that a suspect is deemed wanted precisely from the moment the investigator or prosecutor issues a decision to that effect.

This will help settle long-standing debates about the moment from which a person is considered placed on the international wanted list and will allow courts to follow a single line of application. 

At the same time, the amendments to this article will not resolve another, more acute problem. It concerns cases where suspects or the defendants are abroad and the defense, invoking Article 135(7) of the CPC, argues that they may be reached solely through the diplomatic-channel procedure. Currently, under this provision, a summons for a person residing abroad is served through international cooperation mechanisms.

HACC case law reasonably explains that a person’s mere presence abroad does not require summoning them through diplomatic channels, since such channels should be used only if the person has formally arranged permanent residence, registered with a consulate, deregistered their residence, and the like. If no such facts are established during the criminal proceedings, the person is summoned in the ordinary manner.

 Even so, the debate over this issue continues, owing to lawyers’ inconsistent reading of the said Article 135(7) of the CPC. This is precisely why the measure under the State Anti-Corruption Program to simplify the procedure for summoning, in criminal proceedings, persons who reside abroad and are citizens of Ukraine has not yet been implemented.

It would therefore be best to specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person’s use of them is documented).

3. Matters concerning the enforcement of HACC judgments should remain within that court’s jurisdiction 

The draft law also proposes amendments to Article 539 of the CPC. In this article, the drafters seek to clarify that the question of parole, or of replacing the unserved part of the sentence of a convicted person who has been transferred to serve their sentence abroad, is decided by the Ukrainian court that delivered the verdict. 

This provision carries no risks; however, while amending this article of the CPC, the legislator could also resolve the problem of matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments being decided by courts other than the HACC. Thus, by amending Article 539 of the CPC, the legislator could solve two problems at once.

The HACC has special subject-matter jurisdiction over corruption-related criminal proceedings. Yet most matters relating to the enforcement of its judgments are decided by local courts — in particular, at the person’s place of serving the sentence or place of residence. 

Local courts are entitled to grant parole to persons convicted by HACC judgments, to substitute their punishment, and to release them from it altogether. Such situations are not uncommon. For example, in 2024 the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv granted parole to a person convicted by the HACC — an accomplice in the bribery case involving the director of the Rzhyshchiv Military Forestry State Enterprise — so that he could serve in the military. And in 2025 the Voznesensk City-District Court released from punishment the head of a private company who had been convicted of misappropriating UAH 787 million of an NBU loan and of participating in the Yanukovych–Kurchenko criminal organization.

Matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments should be decided by that very court, since they can substantially affect the actual extent of the punishment imposed on those convicted of corruption-related criminal offenses — and therefore its deterrent, punitive, and rehabilitative effect.

Article 539 of the CPC should therefore be supplemented with a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. 

4. Eliminating the risks associated with the extradition procedure 

The draft law’s amendments also touch on extradition. The drafters spell out the procedure for submitting extradition requests, the handling of situations where several states request a person’s extradition, the application of preventive measures to such persons, and so on. Some of the proposed innovations require clarification.

The draft law adds to Article 575 of the CPC a mechanism for confirming that an extradition request remains valid. Under it, the court must respond to the Ministry of Justice on whether the request remains valid, and a failure to provide such a response becomes grounds for withdrawing it. Yet the drafters set no deadline at all for providing this response.

This creates a risk that, because the response deadline is undefined, the Ministry of Justice may mistakenly treat such an extradition request as withdrawn — even though the court has provided no response at all.

It is therefore important to add to the new Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for the court’s response, and to provide that it is a negative response from the court — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing such a request.

In addition, to align the rules on simultaneous requests for a person’s surrender, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with a further ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Thus it is necessary, first, to add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and to provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. Second, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Conclusions

Transparency International Ukraine recommends adopting Draft Law No. 14292 in the first reading as a basis, with refinement ahead of the second reading, since adopting it in its current wording would leave gaps that would diminish the effect of the changes made.

In our view, the following recommendations should be taken into account during this refinement:

• Supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. 
• Establish that state enforcement officers may engage ARMA to identify property that may be confiscated when enforcing judgments or rulings for the laundering of criminal property (Article 209 of the CC) or for corruption (Note 1 to Article 45 of the CC). 
• Add to Article 535(7) of the CPC a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.
• Specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person’s use of them is documented).
• Add to Article 539 of the CPC a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. 
• Add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that will constitute grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. 
• Supplement the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Why Fundamentals is not a technical annex but the basis of the negotiations

Cluster 1 — Fundamentals of the Accession Process — brings together, among others, the chapters that matter most to us: the rule of law, the fight against corruption, public procurement, and financial control. This is no random set of topics, because it is precisely these areas that determine whether a state is governed by the rule of law, whether it can be trusted as a partner, and whether the rights of its citizens and businesses are protected.

The EU’s logic is simple: Cluster 1 is the first to open and the last to close, because it lays the foundation for legal certainty within the country and, ultimately, shapes the trust that other partners place in it. In other words, it determines whether a country is ready to join the European family.

Even if Ukraine meets all the requirements in the other five clusters — on energy, transport, agriculture — membership in the EU is impossible without closing the commitments under Fundamentals. 

For us at TI Ukraine, this means one thing: rule-of-law reform and anti-corruption reform are no longer a “parallel track.” They are the main road to the EU.

What Ukraine has actually done to fight corruption over the past year

Critics like to record failures — and there are grounds for that. But an honest analysis requires acknowledging real achievements as well. And however difficult it is right now to pass new reforms, let alone implement them, there have indeed been concrete gains.

The most recent: in late May, the Verkhovna Rada passed the new Law on Public Procurement. This is a step the European Commission had been awaiting for several years, since the new law is intended to align our procurement rules with European ones. 

Beyond that, a notable anti-corruption achievement is that the NABU, the SAPO, and the HACC continue to markedly improve their performance. The number of verdicts is rising, as is the number of cases involving ministers, heads of central executive bodies, members of parliament, and representatives of the judiciary. 

Moreover, after the new law took effect, the ARMA completed a large-scale inventory of assets for 2017–2025, so it is finally clear how much property is under the Agency’s control. And by the end of 2025 alone, the body concluded more asset management agreements than in the previous two years combined. Following a drawn-out selection process for its new head, the Economic Security Bureau has entered an active phase of reform now that a director has been appointed. And finally, the NACP has drafted a new Anti-Corruption Strategy 2026–2030 — so there are now three draft laws before the Verkhovna Rada that should set this crucial document in motion.

Each of these steps is the result of long-running cooperation between civil society, the government, MPs, international partners, and the anti-corruption institutions themselves. But the key is for each of these examples to see the full cycle of change completed. 

Where the risks remain — and why NABU’s investigations change the rules of the game

But I have to be candid — many systemic problems remain. Let us consider them through examples.

The average time to hear a case at the HACC has reached a record 618 days. The mandatory external assessment of the NACP has not been carried out for more than four years. For several years now, the Accounting Chamber has operated with six of its eleven positions vacant — the competition has still not been fully launched, even though the relevant item kept appearing and disappearing from parliament’s agenda throughout last year and half of this one. The current State Anti-Corruption Program has been only half implemented.

And all of this against the backdrop of a latent political crisis triggered by last year’s attempts to neutralize the independence of the NABU and the SAPO. Those attempts failed, which ultimately gave rise to high-profile anti-corruption investigations such as Operation Midas and the Dynasty mansions case. 

This genuinely effective work by the anti-corruption bodies unexpectedly, for many, set off a different narrative in the socio-political space: that high-profile anti-corruption cases supposedly undermine the state’s capacity and damage its international image. But this, of course, is an utterly manipulative claim. 

First, because all of NABU’s and SAPO’s actions took place within the legal framework: the notices of suspicion were authorized by prosecutors after the evidence base had been gathered, those facing charges were able to mount a defense, and the process was open to the public. Second, removing from office those involved in corruption schemes in energy and defense during the war cleanses the public administration system rather than weakening it. So such investigations should clearly work in favor of the state’s internal capacity.

And given Ukraine’s European integration potential, it is worth recalling that in all our key commitments to our partners, strengthening the anti-corruption institutions is written in as a mandatory condition of support. Because our European partners view the fight against corruption as an investment in the country’s security, not an obstacle to it. 

At a meeting in Kyiv, Marta Kos said plainly that our officials must avoid any thought of rolling back reforms — especially in the areas of anti-corruption, judicial reform, and the independence of key institutions. What is that, if not confirmation of support for our anti-corruption bodies?

Quality work by the NABU and the SAPO is a signal of the system’s institutional maturity, clear to everyone who follows Ukraine. And that should be remembered on Bankova, Hrushevskoho, and the other capital streets where Ukrainian politics is made. 

What comes next, and how realistic membership is

Here I will recall that, as of now, there are no official timelines for Ukraine’s accession to the EU. And this is an honest position: the speed of our progress depends not on dates on the calendar but on the consistency of reforms. As Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos noted, the reforms Ukraine has already carried out — including under the Ukraine Facility — must come together into a single negotiating process. But for that, they must be real, not declarative.

For us at TI Ukraine, the opening of Cluster 1 is not a cause for celebration but the start of a new stage of responsibility. Negotiations with the European Union create an external framework, but only internal political will can fill it with substance. And the consistency of that will is perhaps the most important indicator by which the EU will assess Ukraine in the coming years. The European Union has opened the first doors for us — and now the question is whether we can walk through them. 

This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of [grant recipient’s name] and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.

Where is Ukraine stalling on reforms?

We can identify five critical points in the fight against corruption that need to be fixed right now:

1. Case-hearing timelines at the HACC. The hearing of cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court sometimes reaches a record 1,885 days (five years and two months). The reason: the Rada has still not passed a law that would stop lawyers and defendants from deliberately dragging out proceedings.
2. NACP verification of asset declarations. The automated check launched in late 2023 has effectively exempted senior officials from thorough manual review. The IMF requires this to be fixed by the end of June 2026, but there has been no movement. In addition, the NACP does not publish its logical and arithmetic control (LAC) rules, and the mandatory external audit of the agency has not been carried out for more than four years.
3. Limited autonomy of the SAPO. The head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office still cannot independently open cases against MPs or fully initiate extraditions — that is the exclusive prerogative of the Prosecutor General. The government even removed the first of these provisions from the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy.
4. Crisis at the Accounting Chamber. The country’s principal audit body is operating at half capacity: 6 of its 11 positions are vacant. Parliament missed the deadline (April 2026) for forming the Advisory Group of Experts for the selection competition. As a result, Ukraine risks not receiving part of its tranches from the EU and the IMF this year.
5. Procurement and public-private partnership. The law on public-private partnership (PPP) has still not been aligned with EU rules. And by the end of 2026, Ukraine must develop a concept for reforming defense procurement — EU funding also depends on this.

What comes next?

The authorities must eliminate all these risks as quickly as possible, because what is at stake is financial stability and the speed of our accession to the EU.

Andrii Borovyk, Executive Director of TI Ukraine: “We are already seeing that some commitments are being met late. And some — particularly those concerning the autonomy of the SAPO and the Accounting Chamber — show signs of systemic stalling rather than technical delays. By opening this cluster, our European partners are telling us: your EU membership is in your hands — take it.”

The European Commission will deliver its first official verdict on how Ukraine is handling the new conditions in late autumn 2026, in its annual Enlargement Report. Transparency International Ukraine continues to monitor the situation and will set out the results of this analysis in its third Shadow Report for the European Commission.

This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of [grant recipient’s name] and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.

Even where news about reports is published on city council websites, it does not always function as a tool of accountability. The materials are hard to find, written in bureaucratic language, and lack a short summary for residents or an explanation of how the authorities’ decisions affect community life in practice. The messaging often boils down to “the report has taken place” and fails to answer the questions residents actually care about: what was accomplished, what problems remain unresolved, how much money was spent, and what the authorities plan to do next.

The analysis of city council communications on official websites and social media also showed that on their own platforms, local authorities tend to report more on “everyday” matters, while systemic change goes unmentioned. The largest share of posts concerned repairs, improvements, or crisis response — for example, the aftermath of attacks. The most active reporting of this kind was in Zaporizhzhia and Khmelnytskyi. This approach helps residents stay informed about the city’s day-to-day affairs, but it does not give a full picture of what the authorities have achieved. Alongside coverage of current events, local self-government bodies should pay more attention to communicating strategic decisions, long-term projects, and how these shape the community’s development. 

City councils also rarely include direct quotes from officials in their own communications (apart from the mayor’s major annual reports). For example, of more than 80 posts about the work of municipal enterprises across all cities in the sample, only two contained direct quotes. As a result, reporting often comes across as impersonal — residents cannot see who makes decisions and who is accountable for the results.

Among the good practices in how city councils communicate reports, analysts noted Lviv and Zaporizhzhia, where the mayors’ major annual reports were broken down by topic and published by area — culture, education, international cooperation, healthcare, and so on — as well as Khmelnytskyi, where posts about the substance of the report outnumbered those simply noting that it had happened.

Overall, mayors’ reports to their communities have considerable untapped potential. Also, local self-government bodies should broaden their pool of in-house spokespeople responsible for specific areas — people who can regularly and substantively explain their decisions and results to the community. This applies not only to the heads of departments, divisions, and municipal enterprises, but also to the council members to whom residents have delegated their votes.

Public discussion of reports took place mainly in local media, on Telegram channels, and in Facebook groups. Media outlets were generally more active in covering reporting than the local authorities were in communicating it, and a significant share of communication was passive. The fewest mentions of reporting by local self-government bodies in local media were recorded in Khmelnytskyi and Kropyvnytskyi. In those two cities, however, the authorities did initiate coverage in the media — whereas in Odesa, every mention of reporting identified was passive: information appeared not through the city council’s efforts, but through discussion by residents and journalists. 

On social media, the most active discussion of reporting was in Lviv. There, of more than 260 posts analyzed, nearly 90% related to Andrii Sadovyi’s report. In this case, however, there were certain signs of artificially boosted negative messaging. Reporting by Odesa’s authorities, by contrast, generated only three social media posts — two of which were questions from engaged residents about whether the Mobilization Training Department had reported, or planned to report, on its work. 

“The impression is that city councils treat reporting as a formality and have no systematic approach to communicating with the community. But a public report is an opportunity to win support: to explain to the community what has been done, what resources were used, which decisions were difficult, what didn’t work, and how the authorities plan to fix it. Trust isn’t built by a single report — it is earned through systematic, honest, and clear communication,” notes Olesia Koval, Transparent Cities Program Manager at Transparency International Ukraine.

The Transparent Cities program recommends that city councils introduce an internal standard for communicating reports — so that every important report comes not just with documents, but with short explanations for residents.

City councils should also make reporting easy to find on their websites, with dedicated pages for the reports of the mayor, departments, divisions, municipal enterprises, council members, and budget and program reports. Documents should be available for download, search, and reuse.

Reporting should not end the moment the mayor stops speaking. It should be supported by quality communication before, during, and after the event: announcements, live broadcasts, clear summaries, visualization of key results, answers to residents’ questions, engagement with the media, and explanation of the authorities’ next decisions.

Particular attention should go to difficult topics. If a report includes unfinished tasks, criticism, delays, or hard decisions, it is better to explain them openly. Silence creates space for distrust and negative interpretation.

Accountability in a European city means publishing reports, holding meetings with the community, and proactively communicating the results delivered by city officials and structural divisions. Above all, it is the best way to show the community that the authorities remember: decisions are made on behalf of the people, with public money, and with direct effect on the life of the city.