SSU Pressure on Judges and Investigators

The SAPO head explained that the SSU is systematically pressuring judges through threats to their relatives, the revocation of reserved status, and mobilization — all to secure the rulings it wants in cases involving NABU detectives.

So, the problem of pressure on the anti-corruption law enforcement bodies, which came to a head on the eve of the cardboard protests, has not gone away; and although it is discussed less now, it still gets in the way.

An Attempt to Take Control of SAPO Through the Deputy Selection

Klymenko claims that one scenario for establishing control over SAPO is to win the competitive selection for deputy head — the stage that is currently accepting applications. That process is already mired in a few scandals. After that, according to Klymenko, interested parties would be in no hurry to hold the selection for the head. Part of the SAPO head’s powers would then rest with the Prosecutor General.

This is a real risk. We have already lived through a period when SAPO went almost two years without a full-fledged head, while the then-Prosecutor General, Iryna Venediktova, stalled certain cases and all but sank the Tatarov case entirely. And on the tapes in the Forrest Gump case, Iryna Mudra, a subject of that case, also mentioned this selection.

A Lack of Political Will

Asked whether the state has the political will to fight corruption, the SAPO head answered directly and without reservation: it does not. Given the pace of delivery on anti-corruption commitments under the Kachka-Kos plan and the European Commission’s recommendations, these statements are, unfortunately, borne out by reality.

SAPO’s Institutional Dependence on the Prosecutor General

Despite SAPO’s procedural independence, investigating MPs still requires the Prosecutor General’s approval — and Klymenko admits this substantially limits what the anti-corruption prosecution can do.

It is worth mentioning here that expanding the powers of the SAPO head is yet another of Ukraine’s European integration commitments — one on which, nearly a year after the European Commission’s latest report, we have still seen no movement.

This material is funded by Norway. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Government. 

 

How do things stand now?

Currently, the application of the CPC of Ukraine in investigating and trying top corruption cases has revealed opportunities for abuse and delay, creating unjustified obstacles to holding people criminally liable.

On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:

1. at present, under Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, criminal proceedings may be closed simply because the case was sent to court after the pre-trial investigation period had lapsed — even by just one to three days;
2. the CPC of Ukraine provides no separate mechanism allowing a victim or the defense to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation once the relevant deadline has passed; it does, however, require the prosecutor under Article 308 to respond to any failure to observe reasonable investigation timeframes;
3. the maximum period of pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion is 12 months;
4. the head of a prosecutor’s office may extend the pre-trial investigation period up to 3 months, while extensions to 6 and 12 months may be granted only by an investigating judge.

On preventing abuse of procedural rights:

1. the systematic failure of defense counsel to appear when summoned — including for court hearings — is not clearly established as a standalone ground for bringing in defense counsel from the free legal aid (FLA) system. Nor does the law expressly prohibit filing and considering certain motions, applications, and complaints that have been submitted repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;
2. courts are often forced to adjourn hearings because some participants in the proceedings fail to appear, even without valid reasons. Formally, the law does not establish that the presence of at least one of the defendant’s defense lawyers is sufficient to realize the right to a defense. And bringing in a new defense counsel or prosecutor — even when the previous ones are still taking part in the proceedings — is often used as grounds for adjournment;
3. suspending court proceedings due to the mobilization of the defendant is possible only in cases involving grave and especially grave corruption offenses, and only if it is proven that the defendant cannot take part directly because of their involvement in Ukraine’s defense efforts;
4. where a trial is being dragged out, the law does not expressly empower the presiding judge to limit the parties’ speaking time during closing arguments and the final statement.

On extending the duration of obligations as part of preventive measures: current law allows a court to impose on the suspect or the defendant any of the procedural obligations listed in Article 194(5) of the CPC of Ukraine in connection with a preventive measure for a maximum of two months, with the possibility of extension.

On NABU’s investigative jurisdiction and its powers in international cooperation:

1. NABU’s jurisdiction based on the category of official does not expressly extend to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the Economic Security Bureau and the State Bureau of Investigation; or by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises. And the mechanism for transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction is not regulated in any way;
2. the Head of SAPO cannot, without the Prosecutor General, independently set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation, nor send extradition requests on their own.

What the draft laws propose

Draft Law No. 15333 proposes three blocks of changes.

1. On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:

• remove the expiry of the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion from the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine);
• introduce a mechanism whereby, if the pre-trial investigation deadline expires, the victim or the defense would have the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation;
• increase the maximum pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion to 18 months;
• provide that the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion is extended to 6 and 12 months by the head of the prosecutor’s office, and to 18 months by an investigating judge.

1. On preventing abuse of procedural rights:

• allow defense counsel from the FLA system to be brought in where the suspect’s or the defendant’s own lawyers systematically (twice or more) fail to appear when summoned by the investigator, prosecutor, or court;
• allow the court to decline to consider motions to apply measures to secure the proceedings, motions during the trial, and appeals, cassation appeals, and applications to review decisions on the basis of newly discovered or exceptional circumstances, where such applications, complaints, and motions have been filed repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;
• allow the trial to continue in the absence of certain participants who were duly notified but failed to appear when summoned, while giving them the opportunity to set out their position in writing and present it at the next hearing;
• formally establish that, to ensure the right to a defense, the participation of all of the defendant’s lawyers in a hearing is not mandatory — the presence of at least one is enough;
• provide that a hearing will not be adjourned to allow new prosecutors or defense counsel to familiarize themselves with the case file, so long as the previous prosecutors or defense counsel continue to take part in the hearing;
• enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC the court’s right to suspend proceedings on a charge of any criminal offense where the defendant is performing military service and is unable to take part in the trial;
• give the court the ability, where it finds that a participant is abusing their procedural rights, to limit the length of any of that participant’s addresses.

1. To streamline the process of extending the duration of obligations, it is proposed to give the court the ability, for up to 6 months, to prohibit a suspect (or the defendant) subject to a preventive measure from leaving the country, from leaving certain localities (districts, regions), and from visiting certain areas; to prohibit them from communicating with specific individuals; and to require them to appear when summoned and to report any change of residence or workplace.

Draft Law No. 15334 proposes to expand NABU’s investigative jurisdiction and to resolve the questions around the powers of the Head of SAPO as follows:

• extend NABU’s jurisdiction to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI; and by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises;
• regulate the transfer of cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction by setting a deadline for handing over the materials and for the prosecutor’s decision determining such jurisdiction;
• empower the Head of SAPO to set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation and to send extradition requests independently.

The advantages of the proposed changes

The registered draft laws can be seen as a logical response to the problems that stand in the way of effectively investigating and trying criminal proceedings. They almost entirely remove the risk of proceedings being closed over investigation deadlines and the problem of procedural rights being used to the detriment of the process, and they fill some of the procedural gaps.

Removing the option to close a case over an expired investigation period

Pre-trial investigation deadlines were introduced by the “Lozovyi amendments,” passed in 2017. They were supposedly meant to guard against unjustifiably long criminal prosecution, yet the problem of pressure on business does not appear to have been solved. Their partial repeal in 2023 did not fully fix the issue, because the law retained the rule in Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, which still allows criminal proceedings to be closed over a purely formal expiry of the pre-trial investigation deadline — even by just one to three days.

The most recent telling example is the Dubnevych case concerning the misappropriation of Ukrzaliznytsia’s funds. On May 26, 2026, the HACC granted a defense motion and, on this ground, closed the criminal proceedings against former MP Yaroslav Dubnevych and his accomplices over the misappropriation of UAH 93 million from Ukrzaliznytsia. This is not the first time the case has been closed — back in September 2022, the HACC had already closed it on the same ground.

In its monitoring of the HACC, TI Ukraine has stressed that closing criminal proceedings is a disproportionate response and an opening for manipulation and abuse. The European Commission stated directly that the provision on the automatic closure of criminal proceedings over expired pre-trial investigation deadlines must be removed from the CPC of Ukraine — that is, the element of the “Lozovyi amendments” still in force must finally be scrapped.

 In this context, an equally important innovation could be the introduction of a maximum 18-month pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion, where the investigation requires a significant volume of investigative (search) and procedural actions, as well as international cooperation. Even longer investigation periods are permitted under the laws of European countries such as Latvia and Italy.

Building safeguards against abuse and delay

Until now, Ukraine’s criminal justice system has lacked adequate tools for responding to abuse, which can seriously stall investigations and trials — and some bad-faith participants make active use of this.

In its latest report monitoring HACC cases, the TI Ukraine team found that it is most often the defense that resorts to abuse during hearings, doing everything to drag them out through unfounded recusals, the non-appearance of participants, unreasonably long addresses, and the filing of identical applications and motions.

Because of these abuses, a significant share of HACC cases were, or still are, at risk of closure. Perhaps the loudest example is the gas embezzlement episode in the “Onyshchenko case” involving Roman Nasirov, where unreasonably long addresses, the mobilization of the defendant, non-appearance of defense counsel, and the like were all used. As a result, the case ended in a verdict only a few days before the statute of limitations for holding Nasirov liable expired.

Draft Law No. 15333 offers real tools to combat such tactics, including the ability to halt unreasonably long addresses and set time limits on them; to continue a hearing in the absence of certain participants and bring in new defense counsel or prosecutors; to bring in FLA defense counsel where a retained lawyer fails to appear twice in a row; to have the court decline to consider repetitive and offensive motions; and to permanently enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine the rule that a trial cannot be automatically suspended solely because the defendant has been mobilized.

International experience likewise confirms that the proposed changes are entirely workable and effective.

Extending NABU’s jurisdiction to more top officials

Alongside the package of procedural changes, in Draft Law No. 15334 the MPs propose extending NABU’s jurisdiction to:

• the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol;
• senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI;
• deputy heads and members of the supervisory boards and executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises.

Tellingly, two years ago NABU exposed suspected corruption by former Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andrii Smyrnov. And the defense tried to exploit the imperfections of Ukraine’s Criminal Code and CPC to convince the investigating judge that NABU had no right to investigate the case against him — in particular because Smyrnov’s position does not appear in the list of cases falling under NABU’s jurisdiction set out in Article 216(5) of the CPC of Ukraine. The European Commission, too, insisted on extending jurisdiction to cover all top positions.

At the same time, the MPs are refining the mechanism and time limits for requesting and transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction.

What should be improved

Although both draft laws resolve a large share of the pressing problems, certain provisions should, in our view, be refined so that they can be applied effectively in practice in the future.

Do not hand prosecutors judicial oversight over the extension of deadlines

Returning to the heads of prosecutor’s offices the power to extend pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6 and 12 months creates a risk of weaker judicial oversight over compliance with reasonable pre-trial investigation time. After all, the proposed approach means such a decision would be taken by a representative of the prosecution — a party with a procedural interest in prolonging the investigation.

This weakens the principle of adversarial proceedings. Judicial oversight in such matters is a guarantee that any extension will be justified, proportionate, and necessary.

The Constitutional Court has not expressed a position on the need for judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines. But its position on such oversight generally comes down to this: the rule of law makes judicial oversight over any interference with a person’s right to liberty mandatory. Criminal proceedings are themselves a precondition for applying the harshest restrictions on human rights and freedoms compared to any other legal process. Judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines — on which the duration of such restrictions depends — is therefore no less important a guarantee of respect for human rights and freedoms during criminal prosecution.

Such proposals may also raise doubts in light of the constitutional prohibition on narrowing the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms when adopting new laws or amending existing ones. The extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and 18 months should therefore remain within the competence of the investigating judge.

Improve the existing mechanism for overseeing reasonable investigation time

Along with removing the automatic closure of cases over expired investigation deadlines (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine), the authors of the draft law propose giving participants in criminal proceedings the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation.

A similar provision appeared in government Draft Law No. 12367. At the time, TI Ukraine pointed out that this could place a substantial additional burden on the court system. To reduce that burden and to improve the legislation systematically, the changes should be made not to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine, which governs the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings, but to Article 308, which governs the procedure for challenging an investigator’s or prosecutor’s failure to observe reasonable time limits. Specifically, if a higher-level prosecutor rejects the complaint, the interested party could then turn to an investigating judge, who should be able to issue the very decisions that the MPs propose adding to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine.

In addition, the law could expressly provide that evidence whose gathering was initiated outside the pre-trial investigation period (with certain exceptions) is inadmissible. This could serve both as a safeguard against abuse and as a proper incentive in investigations. 

It is therefore more sensible not to create a new mechanism, but to improve the tools that already exist.

Regulate more clearly the suspension of court proceedings due to military service

In 2025, after Nasirov’s “sudden” mobilization, Parliament limited the ability to suspend the hearing of grave and especially grave corruption cases based solely on the defendant’s formal status as someone performing military service. In such proceedings, the court must establish that the defendant is objectively unable to take part in the proceedings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine.

Draft Law No. 15333 proposes moving this logic to Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine and extending it beyond grave and especially grave corruption offenses to other criminal proceedings as well. On the whole, this is the right approach.

However, the proposed wording remains too broad. It could allow proceedings to be suspended even where the defendant is in a location from which remote participation in a hearing is realistic and does not interfere with the performance of their military duties.

It would therefore be advisable to provide that a trial may be suspended only where the defendant have no objective possibility of taking part in hearings because of their genuine involvement in Ukraine’s defense efforts directly in the areas where those efforts are carried out — on temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, or in the zone between the positions of the defense forces and those of the aggressor state’s troops — during the period of those efforts, and where they are carrying out combat (special) tasks. 

Allow the court to impose monetary penalties for non-appearance without valid reasons

Countering the abuse of procedural rights could be reinforced by a monetary penalty for defense lawyers who fail to appear when summoned to court without valid reasons. The statistics of the HACC alone show that the second most common reason for adjourning hearings is the non-appearance of defense counsel — over five years of the court’s work, 588 hearings were adjourned for this reason.

In monitoring HACC cases, TI Ukraine has repeatedly observed how the non-appearance of defense counsel at hearings seriously affects the reasonable timeframes for hearing a case. Striking examples of this were the hearings in the case against the former Minister of Justice under Yanukovych and the case against the judges of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv.

So, in addition to the suspect, the defendant, witnesses, victims, and other participants, it makes sense to also allow the court to fine defense lawyers who fail to appear at hearings without valid reasons.

Allow the Head of SAPO to open investigations against MPs

Along with the changes to the Head of SAPO’s powers regarding international legal assistance, it is logical to remove an obstacle to investigating cases involving Members of Parliament. The point is that only the Prosecutor General can open an investigation against MPs.

Such changes are one of the EU’s key requirements. We have also repeatedly seen how this can stall an investigation and, with it, diminish the quality and quantity of the evidence gathered. One of the first notable examples of a case against an MP was the investigation into Oleksandr Yurchenko. In September 2020, the NABU publicly reported that it had sent Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova the materials and a draft suspicion for registering the proceedings and serving the notification of suspicion. However, the Prosecutor General’s Office replied that it saw insufficient grounds for registering proceedings.

To avoid such situations, the Head of the SAPO should be empowered to open investigations against Members of Parliament independently, without the Prosecutor General.

Conclusions

Overall, Draft Laws No. 15333 and No. 15334 are a systematic and long-overdue response to a set of problems that for years have hampered the effective investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases — from the automatic closure of proceedings over a formal expiry of deadlines to procedural abuse and gaps in NABU’s jurisdiction. Of course, resolving all of them will require far more changes.

TI Ukraine supports the adoption of both draft laws, as they bring Ukraine closer to meeting the requirements of the Ukraine Facility, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos Plan. At the same time, several points are worth improving during committee review and consideration in the session hall.

In Draft Law No. 15333:

• retain judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and — should this draft law pass — 18 months;
• strengthen the existing mechanisms for responding to violations of reasonable time limits, in particular by improving Article 308 of the CPC of Ukraine, which sets out the procedure for challenging an investigator’s or prosecutor’s failure to observe reasonable time limits, by establishing clear consequences where a prosecutor takes no action once deadlines have expired;
• set out a rule under which court proceedings could be suspended due to military service only where the defendant is objectively unable to take part in hearings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine;
• allow monetary penalties to be imposed on defense counsel for non-appearance.

In Draft Law No. 15334, add a provision allowing the Head of the SAPO to open criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament.

Fine-tuning these provisions will preserve the balance between the effectiveness of criminal prosecution and the guarantees of the rights of those involved in the process.

This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.

How do things stand now?

The current Criminal Code provides that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended only where a person has evaded pre-trial investigation or trial. Meanwhile, a defendant’s military service — which may lead to the suspension of the court proceedings against them — does not, for instance, suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

Referring a case to court likewise does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. What is more, these periods continue to run right up until the verdict enters into legal force — until the 30-day window for appeal expires, or until appellate review is completed.

What are the advantages of the proposed changes?

Draft Law No. 15354 responds to the fact that in a number of NABU cases the statute of limitations expires — something we have noted more than once as part of our multi-year project monitoring cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court. This often happens because of the considerable time taken by international legal assistance, lengthy expert examinations, the late transfer of a case to the NABU, or the abuse of procedural rights by participants in court proceedings.

For example, in October 2025 the HACC closed the criminal proceedings against former Minister of Infrastructure Andrii Pyvovarskyi due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In July this year, the HACC closed — again on statute-of-limitations grounds — the case of Liudmyla Solotva, who was accused of aiding and abetting Nasirov. The case of Roman Nasirov himself was also on the verge of being closed. It was heard across two instances for 6.5 years and was accompanied by numerous delays on the part of the defense, so that Nasirov received his verdict just a few days before the ten-year statute of limitations set by the Criminal Code expired.

A similar problem appears in other high-profile proceedings — for instance, in the UMCC case, where one of the defendants mobilized, which almost completely paralyzed the normal course of the trial. And while no proper trial on the merits takes place, the statute of limitations in the case keeps running.

This is why the very idea behind the draft law is correct: the statute of limitations should not stand in the way of holding to account persons who are performing military service. Nor should the completion of appellate review become the point at which the counting of these periods stops.

If a case has already been referred to court, the state should not lose the chance to obtain a decision on the merits merely because the trial is taking a long time, or because participants in the process are dragging it out. This is especially important for corruption cases.

What should be improved

Interrupting, rather than suspending, the statute of limitations could offer more guarantees to participants in court proceedings 

The authors of the draft law propose that the statute of limitations be suspended upon the referral of the indictment to court only in cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses. And there is only one ground for resuming the periods — a court ruling returning the indictment. 

However, the Criminal Code provides that the special, undifferentiated limitation period — after which a person who has committed a crime of any gravity is released from criminal liability, even if they evaded justice — is 15 years. This conclusion was also confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in 2023. The same period is set for especially grave criminal offenses, while for grave ones it is 10 years. It therefore follows from the proposed changes that, compared with the current rules, only 5 additional years would be “gained” for grave corruption crimes.

At the same time, we should point out the not-entirely-successful drafting of the amendments. Under the proposed version of Article 49(2) of the Criminal Code, the sentence “In these cases, the running of the limitation period resumes from the day the person surrenders with a confession or is detained, and from the time a criminal misdemeanor was committed — after five years” is placed immediately after the description of the new ground for suspension — mobilization or acceptance for military service under contract. As a result, in light of the amendments, this wording — “the person surrenders with a confession” and “is detained” — will apply to the person’s mobilization, rather than (as the authors presumably intended) to the person’s evasion of pre-trial investigation or trial. 

This drafting inaccuracy creates a real risk that the new rule will be interpreted ambiguously.

Beyond this, the very approach of suspending the statute of limitations upon the referral of the indictment to court creates additional problems:

• there is no substantive rule on the grounds for resuming the running of the limitation period, since the return of an indictment does not happen all that often in NABU and SAPO practice;
• extending this rule only to cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses is an inaccurate and unjustified narrowing. In that case, the legislator’s response leaves out the less grave corruption and corruption-related crimes provided for in Articles 366-2 and 366-3, Article 369-2(1) and (2), Article 369(1), Article 364(1), and Article 191(2).

In view of this, a more balanced solution would be not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but to interrupt its running. Alternatively, it could be provided that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict.

Such an approach would preserve the incentive for the parties and the court to hear a case without unjustified delays, while at the same time preventing situations in which a case has already been heard on the merits and a verdict delivered, yet the person is released from liability solely because the statute of limitations expired at the appellate-review stage. That said, if the limitation period is to run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict, the court should be given robust tools to counter the abuse of procedural rights

Changes to the statute-of-limitations rules should cover all corruption and corruption-related offenses

The authors of the draft law propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor.

The problem is that corruption and top-level corruption cases are sometimes investigated not only by NABU, but also by the SBI, the National Police, and the ESBU. According to the statistics, most corruption verdicts are handed down by local courts on the basis of materials from these bodies; and although such cases are generally less complex, there are far more of them. According to the latest data for 2025, local courts convicted 3,268 persons of corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.

Since the Criminal Code already contains a list of such criminal offenses, it would be more systematic, in terms of legal regulation, to suspend the running of the statute of limitations on account of a suspect’s/defendant’s mobilization not only in NABU and SAPO cases, but in all cases concerning the criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.

In addition, Draft Law No. 15333 proposes to improve the grounds for suspending a trial by extending them not only to persons accused of a grave or especially grave corruption criminal offense, but to all criminal proceedings. It is therefore hard to trace any clear logic in why the running of the statute of limitations should be suspended in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor. 

Accordingly, the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant’s mobilization should be extended to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.

The statute-of-limitations rules require comprehensive changes 

Given that the authors of the draft law acknowledge the problems with regulating the statute of limitations, a comprehensive overhaul of this institution should be ensured.

As part of its monitoring of HACC cases, TI Ukraine has systematically examined the question of the statute of limitations in corruption cases and concluded that the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability needs to be improved in several directions: 

• proportionately strengthening criminal liability for certain criminal offenses, which would in turn lengthen the corresponding limitation periods; 
• establishing additional grounds for suspending the running of the limitation period — for example, mutual legal assistance in criminal proceedings; 
• changing the end point for calculating the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability (to the delivery of the first-instance verdict, rather than the entry of the verdict into legal force).

Comparing the statute of limitations for bringing offenders to criminal liability for various corruption crimes in EU member states and in Ukraine, we can conclude that for certain acts our limitation periods are unjustifiably short. This is most pronounced for obstruction of justice, but also for bribery in the public sector (Articles 368 and 369 of the Criminal Code), bribery in the private sector (Article 354 of the Criminal Code), trading in influence (Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code), and abuse of office (Article 364 of the Criminal Code).

Moreover, the legislation of foreign states and international recommendations point to a much broader list of grounds for suspending the statute of limitations. In particular, the 2007 UN Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters provides for suspending the running of the limitation period for the time a mutual legal assistance request is being executed. The criminal legislation of EU member states additionally singles out, as grounds for suspension, the existence of immunity and other legally established obstacles to prosecution, the minority or illness of the alleged offender, and the referral of a case for additional investigation. Among the grounds for interrupting the periods, a number of jurisdictions include the initiation of a criminal prosecution, the issuance of an international or European Arrest Warrant, the official recognition of a person as a suspect, as well as any procedural notification to the person — a summons, a call to appear, or the holding of a confrontation.

In light of the above, consideration should be given to expanding the list of grounds for suspending the limitation period, at least as regards the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation. Such an expansion should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards against abuse by pre-trial investigation bodies — in particular, by empowering the court that will decide on release from criminal liability to verify that the relevant procedural actions within international cooperation were justified and genuine.

Therefore, to improve the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability, the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses should be proportionately increased, and the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation should be added as a ground for suspending their running.

Conclusions

Overall, Draft Law No. 15354 is something of a response to problems that have already arisen repeatedly during the hearing of corruption cases. We recommend that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 15354 as a basis, subject to revision. 

Ahead of the second reading, the text of the draft law should be refined on the following points:

1. not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but instead either to interrupt its running — that is, to start counting it anew — or to provide that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict;
2. to extend the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant’s mobilization to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code;
3. to proportionately increase the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses, and to add the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation as a ground for suspending their running.

This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.

How do things stand now?

Most articles in the CPC section devoted to international cooperation have not been amended since the Code was adopted in 2012. At that time, digitalization was not a global priority, and the practice of international cooperation had not become widespread enough to reveal the weaknesses in its legal regulation. 

As a result, the provisions currently in force lag in many respects behind technological progress and the new legal approaches to mutual legal assistance — particularly when it comes to confiscating assets located in foreign states and dealing with participants in criminal proceedings who are abroad.

The exchange of materials in international cooperation. Current legislation permits requests and case materials to be exchanged in paper form during international cooperation. This significantly slows down Ukraine’s interaction with partner states in the fight against crime, since it requires a considerable amount of time.

The protection of information in international cooperation. Information processed within such cooperation currently has no clear safeguards against disclosure — especially where the cooperation does not require opening criminal proceedings in Ukraine.

The international wanted list. The CPC does not expressly define the moment from which a person is considered to be on the international wanted list.

The enforcement of HACC judgments. Although the HACC hears high-level corruption cases as a specialized court, certain matters arising in the enforcement of its judgments — such as a convicted person’s parole or the replacement of the unserved part of a sentence with a more lenient one — still go before local courts under the rules of Article 539 of the CPC, rather than before the HACC.

The confiscation and special confiscation of property abroad. The CPC does not contain a sufficiently detailed mechanism for establishing the location abroad of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation. The engagement of ARMA to trace and seize property abroad when enforcing confiscation decisions is also currently unregulated.

Questioning from abroad. Witnesses or victims located abroad can be questioned only from the premises of a court at their place of residence, which means that a corresponding request must be sent each time to the competent authorities of the foreign state through mutual legal assistance. Only for the duration of martial law or a state of emergency has it become possible to question a witness or victim directly by videoconference from any location.

What does the draft law propose?

Draft Law No. 14292 proposes a fairly broad package of changes. Among the key positive updates:

• permission to make wider use of electronic communications for international cooperation requests;
• regulation of the protection of information and materials in international cooperation;
• a more detailed set of grounds for refusing or postponing mutual legal assistance requests, and of the procedure for executing them;
• improvement of the procedure for recognizing and enforcing judgments, as well as for confiscating property abroad;
• the introduction of the ability to question persons located abroad by videoconference or from the premises of a Ukrainian diplomatic mission, regardless of whether martial law or a state of emergency has been declared in the country.

Which provisions need refining?

Despite its generally positive thrust, the document contains a number of procedural gaps, legal ambiguities, and risks that could negate the intended effect in practice.

For the mechanisms it establishes to work smoothly, the document should be refined in the respects described below.

Confiscation of property abroad: the right direction, but a weak procedural design

The amendments to Articles 535 and 568 of the CPC are intended to ensure the enforcement of judgments insofar as they concern the confiscation or special confiscation of property located abroad. This is an important step, particularly in countering organized crime, and corruption in particular. There are two problematic points whose resolution could improve this process.

In the proposed wording of Article 535(7) of the CPC, the drafters would require the court to draw up a petition for the recognition and enforcement, in a foreign state, of a Ukrainian court’s conviction insofar as it concerns the confiscation or special confiscation of property. However, the drafters failed to take into account that special confiscation may be imposed not only by a court’s verdict but also, under Article 96-1(2) and (3) of the CC, by rulings on release from criminal liability, on the closure of criminal proceedings, on extended confiscation, on the imposition of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, and on the imposition of criminal-law measures on a legal entity. The aforementioned provision of Article 535(7) of the CPC should therefore also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.

In addition, the draft law would require those enforcing the judgment (chiefly the State Enforcement Service) to notify the court of any property discovered abroad that is subject to confiscation or special confiscation.

This innovation is consistent with EU Directive 2024/1260, under which the tracing and identification of property subject to freezing and confiscation must be possible even after a final court decision. Yet, although the draft law offers such an option, the point at which criminal property — or property subject to confiscation — is discovered should not be deferred all the way until the court’s final decision. 

The reason is that state enforcement officers cannot match law enforcement agencies or ARMA in detecting and tracing property, especially abroad — they lack sufficient powers and resources for this. 

As noted earlier, it is law enforcement agencies during the pre-trial investigation, and ARMA, that have the most tools for tracing and identifying assets subject to confiscation. Even they, however, do so fairly rarely, and the reason is that Article 91 of the current CPC in no way requires the location of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation to be proved within criminal proceedings. Largely because of this, in most cases such property ultimately goes unnoticed by the enforcement service.

Therefore, to adapt the provisions of EU Directive 2024/1260 to Ukrainian realities, it would be sensible, first, to supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. Second, to establish that, when enforcing court decisions on confiscation for the laundering of criminal property or for corruption, ARMA may be engaged to identify property that may be confiscated. Article 535(7) of the CPC should also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.

2. The international wanted list, the digitalization of summonses, and the removal of procedural obstacles for persons abroad

One of the draft law’s provisions concerns placing a suspect on the international wanted list. In Article 291 of the CPC, the drafters propose to draw a clear distinction between a domestic search within Ukraine and an international one, and to establish that a suspect is deemed wanted precisely from the moment the investigator or prosecutor issues a decision to that effect.

This will help settle long-standing debates about the moment from which a person is considered placed on the international wanted list and will allow courts to follow a single line of application. 

At the same time, the amendments to this article will not resolve another, more acute problem. It concerns cases where suspects or the defendants are abroad and the defense, invoking Article 135(7) of the CPC, argues that they may be reached solely through the diplomatic-channel procedure. Currently, under this provision, a summons for a person residing abroad is served through international cooperation mechanisms.

HACC case law reasonably explains that a person’s mere presence abroad does not require summoning them through diplomatic channels, since such channels should be used only if the person has formally arranged permanent residence, registered with a consulate, deregistered their residence, and the like. If no such facts are established during the criminal proceedings, the person is summoned in the ordinary manner.

 Even so, the debate over this issue continues, owing to lawyers’ inconsistent reading of the said Article 135(7) of the CPC. This is precisely why the measure under the State Anti-Corruption Program to simplify the procedure for summoning, in criminal proceedings, persons who reside abroad and are citizens of Ukraine has not yet been implemented.

It would therefore be best to specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person’s use of them is documented).

3. Matters concerning the enforcement of HACC judgments should remain within that court’s jurisdiction 

The draft law also proposes amendments to Article 539 of the CPC. In this article, the drafters seek to clarify that the question of parole, or of replacing the unserved part of the sentence of a convicted person who has been transferred to serve their sentence abroad, is decided by the Ukrainian court that delivered the verdict. 

This provision carries no risks; however, while amending this article of the CPC, the legislator could also resolve the problem of matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments being decided by courts other than the HACC. Thus, by amending Article 539 of the CPC, the legislator could solve two problems at once.

The HACC has special subject-matter jurisdiction over corruption-related criminal proceedings. Yet most matters relating to the enforcement of its judgments are decided by local courts — in particular, at the person’s place of serving the sentence or place of residence. 

Local courts are entitled to grant parole to persons convicted by HACC judgments, to substitute their punishment, and to release them from it altogether. Such situations are not uncommon. For example, in 2024 the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv granted parole to a person convicted by the HACC — an accomplice in the bribery case involving the director of the Rzhyshchiv Military Forestry State Enterprise — so that he could serve in the military. And in 2025 the Voznesensk City-District Court released from punishment the head of a private company who had been convicted of misappropriating UAH 787 million of an NBU loan and of participating in the Yanukovych–Kurchenko criminal organization.

Matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments should be decided by that very court, since they can substantially affect the actual extent of the punishment imposed on those convicted of corruption-related criminal offenses — and therefore its deterrent, punitive, and rehabilitative effect.

Article 539 of the CPC should therefore be supplemented with a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. 

4. Eliminating the risks associated with the extradition procedure 

The draft law’s amendments also touch on extradition. The drafters spell out the procedure for submitting extradition requests, the handling of situations where several states request a person’s extradition, the application of preventive measures to such persons, and so on. Some of the proposed innovations require clarification.

The draft law adds to Article 575 of the CPC a mechanism for confirming that an extradition request remains valid. Under it, the court must respond to the Ministry of Justice on whether the request remains valid, and a failure to provide such a response becomes grounds for withdrawing it. Yet the drafters set no deadline at all for providing this response.

This creates a risk that, because the response deadline is undefined, the Ministry of Justice may mistakenly treat such an extradition request as withdrawn — even though the court has provided no response at all.

It is therefore important to add to the new Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for the court’s response, and to provide that it is a negative response from the court — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing such a request.

In addition, to align the rules on simultaneous requests for a person’s surrender, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with a further ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Thus it is necessary, first, to add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and to provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. Second, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Conclusions

Transparency International Ukraine recommends adopting Draft Law No. 14292 in the first reading as a basis, with refinement ahead of the second reading, since adopting it in its current wording would leave gaps that would diminish the effect of the changes made.

In our view, the following recommendations should be taken into account during this refinement:

• Supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. 
• Establish that state enforcement officers may engage ARMA to identify property that may be confiscated when enforcing judgments or rulings for the laundering of criminal property (Article 209 of the CC) or for corruption (Note 1 to Article 45 of the CC). 
• Add to Article 535(7) of the CPC a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.
• Specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person’s use of them is documented).
• Add to Article 539 of the CPC a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. 
• Add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that will constitute grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. 
• Supplement the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.

Background

It should be noted at the outset that the brief plan described here is not the beginning of the Dynasty story but an intermediate stage in it. 

According to data made public in the court register, the acquisition of the land plot for the cottage development in 2019 became the subject of a separate NABU investigation — due to indications of probable corrupt actions by local officials. The Kozyn territorial community sold the land — with cadastral number 3223155400:04:006:0028 and an area of 4.2491 hectares — for UAH 9,008,092, based on an expert appraisal of UAH 8,758,275. Yet the investigation estimates the land’s minimum market value at the time at UAH 43,246,120 (i.e., five times higher), and its maximum at UAH 180,193,690 (twenty times higher). 

On the level of hypotheses, then, the Dynasty scheme can be traced through three sequential stages:

1. the corrupt acquisition of the land plot in 2018–2019 at an undervalued appraisal 
2. the laundering of criminally obtained funds through real estate construction in 2019–2025
3. an attempt in 2025 to “cleanse” the asset of the risk of seizure and confiscation through a series of transactions with unrelated legal entities. 

This resembles a complete cycle of obtaining proceeds from crime and removing them beyond the state’s reach. It is precisely this that the modernization of confiscation mechanisms — required by Directive (EU) 2024/1260 — is meant to prevent. As noted in another document important for EU integration — the Rule of Law Roadmap — Ukraine is required to integrate its provisions into national legislation by Q2 2027. 

What happened with the assets

Imagine that you own a house worth $2 million. Formally, however, it isn’t yours — it’s registered to a chain of individuals and companies that, on the surface, appear independent of one another. Something similar was happening with Dynasty, as we can see from materials in the court register. 

• 2012. The Sunny recreation facility in Kozyn is purchased through Bloom Development LLC for UAH 2.47 million. The land under the facility is leased from the village council.
• 2018. The Sunny Shore Housing Cooperative is established, ostensibly for the construction of housing. There are three founders: two nominees, with the third becoming chair. Oleksii Chernyshov — recently served with another notice of suspicion by the NABU, which regards him as the organizer of this scheme — does not appear among them. The cooperative obtains the land on sublease.
• 2019. Oleksii Chernyshov briefly appears in documents as a co-founder of Bloom Development LLC, but quickly “exits” — transferring his share to his wife. That same year, the land is purchased outright from the village council by Bloom Development for UAH 9 million.
• 2019. Chernyshov personally extends a loan of UAH 3.6 million to the cooperative (as recorded in an HACC ruling). Formally, then, he is not the owner, but in reality he is financing the project.
• 2020-2025. Active construction of Dynasty. Chernyshov’s wife is effectively running the process. Through nominees and six powers of attorney issued, Chernyshov retains control.
• August 29, 2023. His wife also “exits” the list of Bloom Development’s participants. The sole owner remaining is a nominee.

Accordingly, by the time the NABU starts taking an interest in Oleksii Chernyshov personally, the houses and the land belonged to a company whose registered owner was an individual with no connection to him. Between the actual beneficiary and the asset were a number of legal “layers.”

What the “asset cleansing” plan proposes

Owning the unfinished mansions through a chain of legal entities turned out to be insufficient. After the publicity generated by the Bihus.info investigation and the start of the NABU probe, the real owners faced the task of protecting the asset from seizure and subsequent confiscation. The action plan — proposed by specialists who remain unknown — even bears a title that leaves no doubt as to its purpose.

And here is how the plan was to be carried out.

Step 1: “Sell the land to insiders through a loan”

The authors of the brief proposed creating a new company. It is provisionally designated as the “Investor” and is to appear entirely unconnected to Chernyshov (in contrast to the already exposed Bloom Development LLC). This “Investor” buys the land from Bloom Development LLC, but not with its own money — with a loan extended to it by another “friendly” company or bank. And the land is immediately encumbered by a mortgage in favor of the lender.

This structure serves several purposes: 

• the purchase for money looks like an ordinary commercial transaction rather than an attempt to conceal property
• the mortgage creates additional obstacles to recovering the asset: if the prosecutor seeks to challenge the sale and reclaim the land, the state will face a “competitor” in the person of the lender. 

Step 2: Understate the value of the houses

The plan’s authors do not even hide the fact that there are problems with the real value of the unfinished estate. The document states outright: “bring the real value of the unfinished construction facility closer to the documented financing.” For the actual value of a single house, according to the NABU and the SAPO, is nearly $2 million, while what officially passed through the Sunny Shore Housing Cooperative was far less — approximately 10% of the real costs. 

If an independent appraiser writes the real value in the report, the obvious question arises: where did the money come from? That is why a “right” appraiser is needed — one who will record the official value of the house at roughly the level of the documented financing.

Then, if in a year or two someone tries to challenge the sale, they will see contracts in which the price matches the appraisal. Legally, everything is clean.

Step 3: Sell the houses as a pile of materials

If a house is registered in the real estate register, it can be placed under seizure. But if it physically exists yet has not been registered, it is legally almost “invisible” for purposes of reflection in the encumbrance register. The plan envisages this: at the time of the transactions, the Kozyn houses are not formally registered as completed real estate — they exist as construction in progress. This means they can be sold to the “Investor” simply as a set of construction materials — at the reduced value from Step 2 — and the transaction will leave no trace in the state registers.

So, by the time the NABU finally obtains a seizure ruling against the previous owner, there will be nothing left to seize. The houses are not in the register, and the materials have already been recorded in the “Investor’s” books. Additional steps would then be required to locate and identify the new owner and seize their property — which would take additional time.

Step 4: Register the property to the “Investor” as its own

The “Investor” now registers the same houses in its own name in the State Register of Real Property Rights — as a new real estate object. As a legitimate owner who purchased the land under a contract, it has now “built” a house on the land using the purchased materials. Legally, then, this is a different asset from the one that could have been seized earlier, because it was registered after these transactions were carried out. The owner is a company with no connection to Chernyshov. Its origin is documented through a chain of contracts.

Step 5: Sell again — this time openly

The final step: the “Investor” sells the entire complex (the land and the registered real estate) through an electronic trading platform (such as SETAM) to yet another company, provisionally named the “Developer.” This company, too, has no connection to Chernyshov.

Why an auction? Because it creates a presumption of market price and of good-faith acquisition. Bought at an open auction through a transparent procedure — therefore, a bona fide acquirer. And under the requirements of Article 96-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, special confiscation does not apply to a bona fide acquirer. Period.

From there, the “Developer” calmly finishes the mansions, commissions them, and sells them to end buyers. The end buyers will hold completely clean title. Even if, several years later, a verdict is reached against the suspects in the case, there will be nothing left to confiscate.

In lieu of conclusions: which vulnerabilities of the confiscation regime this plan exploits

As we can see, the “asset cleansing” plan is built on a detailed knowledge of current legislation, and each of its steps targets a specific loophole. A mortgage in favor of a “friendly” lender, an undervalued appraisal, the sale of the mansions as construction materials, the resale through an electronic auction — together, all of this aims to create a legal status in which confiscation becomes impossible even when a verdict exists. Article 96-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine permits the confiscation of property from a third party only when it is proven that the party “knew or could have known” about its criminal origin. Yet the plan is specifically constructed so that this awareness cannot be proven.

It is precisely against such a model that Directive (EU) 2024/1260, mentioned at the outset, is directed. It permits courts to confiscate property based on its disproportion to lawful income and the absence of a plausible lawful source. Consequently, there is no longer a need to prove a third party’s subjective awareness in every case. Protection for the bona fide acquirer is preserved through procedural safeguards — the right to counsel, access to case materials, the right to be heard in court, and the right to appeal the confiscation decision, as provided in Article 24 of the Directive.

In the Rule of Law Roadmap, Ukraine has committed to implementing the Directive by Q2 2027. The case of the Dynasty mansions is the best illustration of why this commitment must be fulfilled in substance, not just in form.

As for the fate of these mansions, if it can be proven that they were built with funds of criminal origin, that will be decided by the courts. But without legislative improvements, there remain many ways to shield assets from the “line of fire.”

How do sanctions work?

Yurii Ivaniushchenko, also known as “Yura from Yenakiieve,” is a former Party of Regions MP of the 6th and 7th convocations and one of Viktor Yanukovych’s closest associates. After the Revolution of Dignity, he fled the country and has since lived primarily in Monaco. But despite all the cases opened against him, Ivaniushchenko is still not under sanctions.

A reminder here: sanctions in Ukraine are governed by the dedicated Law on Sanctions. Under this law, proposals to apply such restrictions to a specific individual, company, or state can be submitted to the NSDC by parliament, the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank, or the Security Service. And although the SSU is not the only body that can propose sanctions against someone, it is entirely logical that the NABU turned to it as a law enforcement agency.

The grounds for applying sanctions, while described fairly broadly in the law, form an exhaustive list, and all of them relate to protecting the state’s national interests or the rights of its citizens. That said, we cannot know for certain why sanctions are imposed on any specific person, since such reasoning is not made public.

By way of example, we can recall the rapid imposition of NSDC sanctions on Timur Mindich and Oleksandr Tsukerman following NABU’s release of materials from the Midas case.

At the time, the tapes published by NABU referred, among other things, to “two [million] to Moscow.” And although we cannot assert that this was precisely what underpinned the sanctions, it is clear that, unlike in the Ivaniushchenko case, there was enough evidence of activity threatening national security to impose on Mindich and Tsukerman more than half of all available restrictions. The package even included deprivation of state awards — which Mindich and Tsukerman do not hold — and a ban on foreign non-military vessels and warships entering Ukraine’s territorial waters, although that sanction also has little bearing on these particular figures in NABU’s case.

At the same time, we do not know the reasoning behind the sanctions imposed on Mindich, Tsukerman, or other figures on such sanctions lists. The general problem with Ukrainian sanctions is that we cannot find out which specific actions and supporting evidence underpin the application of such measures to any given person. This is because sanctions are often based on the materials of criminal cases in which the sanctioned individuals are involved, and that information cannot be disclosed. That said, under the EU standard, the NSDC’s decision should at least include a general statement of reasons for sanctioning a person.

In Ivaniushchenko’s case, once again, we can rely on the materials the NABU has published, the contents of court rulings, and the SSU’s own public statement — all of which refer to his ties to Russia. Despite this, it is impossible to understand why the NSDC applied sanctions against Mindich and Tsukerman but the SSU refused to take the same approach with Ivaniushchenko, because the law does not require the reasoning behind such decisions to be made public.

How does Ivaniushchenko’s citizenship affect the application of sanctions?

There is one more contested aspect to the “Yura from Yenakiieve” case — his Ukrainian citizenship. The practice of states imposing sanctions on their own citizens is generally very rare, since it runs counter to the very logic of such measures. For its own citizens, the state has internal means of influence — chief among them criminal liability for offenses against national security and the like.

Under the law, all sanctions other than deprivation of state awards may be applied to Ukrainian citizens only if those individuals engage in terrorist activity. But there is room for maneuver when it comes to people who hold dual citizenship, have been stripped of Ukrainian citizenship, or hold only a residence permit. In particular, the Law on Citizenship of Ukraine sets out, as a ground for termination of citizenship, the voluntary acquisition by a person of citizenship of a state recognized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor state or occupying state.

The European Convention on Nationality likewise allows a state to deprive a person of citizenship if they have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country or if their conduct seriously harms the state’s interests.

 

Many sanctioned Ukrainian citizens have also held Russian citizenship — Viktor Yanukovych, for example. As for other cases, Ihor Kolomoiskyi was stripped of Ukrainian citizenship by a presidential decree, and Hennadii Boholiubov holds only a permanent residence permit in Ukraine (although the sanctions register lists him as a Ukrainian citizen). 

In the cases of Petro Poroshenko, Kostiantyn Zhevaho, and, more recently, Andrii Bohdan, however, the NSDC must have evidence of their terrorist activity, since these individuals do not hold any citizenship other than Ukrainian and have not been stripped of it.

As for Yurii Ivaniushchenko, according to Radio Liberty, back in 2004 he obtained a passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation in Rostov-on-Don. In the same investigation, journalists indicate that the former MP held at least two Russian international passports and used them to travel to Russia. In particular, since the start of the full-scale invasion, he has flown there at least ten times. 

Thus, Ivaniushchenko’s citizenship should not stand in the way of applying NSDC sanctions against him — given the now-established practice of sanctioning even Ukrainian citizens who hold no other passport.

*** 

The Ivaniushchenko story is yet another piece of evidence that Ukraine’s sanctions policy has shifted from confronting Russia to using such measures as a substitute for justice or a tool of selective political pressure.

A situation in which the SSU itself publicly labels someone an “FSB resident in the ‘DPR’” and then does not find sufficient grounds to impose sanctions on that person amounts, at the very least, to institutional inconsistency that requires a better explanation than the one NABU received in response to its petition.

As long as the reasoning behind sanctions remains opaque and their application remains situational and reactive, this instrument will continue to be perceived not as part of the national security system, but as a lever whose use depends on the political climate.

1. New evidence of improper influence over the government 

The tapes document specific instances where Timur Mindich gave direct instructions to then-Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. In particular, he asks Umerov to “sign off on the acceptance” of body armor that the state had refused to accept, and lobbies for the appointment of certain people to positions. The tapes also reference potential “summoning” of NBU Governor Andrii Pyshnyi to resolve matters required by those under NABU investigation.

All this points to preferential treatment for certain businesses because they have powerful patrons. It has limited the potential growth and development of Ukraine’s defense sector and once again exposed an institutional gap in which state bodies remain vulnerable to interference by outside actors. 

2. The tapes indicate Mindich’s direct involvement in defense company Fire Point

The released materials show that former Defense Minister Umerov considers Timur Mindich to be the actual owner of Fire Point — and Mindich is evidently one of the firm’s beneficiaries. 

As the Public Anti-Corruption Council under the Ministry of Defense has stated, if this fact is confirmed, Fire Point will completely lose the ability to supply its products to Ukraine’s Defense Forces, because Mindich is under sanctions. It can therefore be assumed that Fire Point disclosed knowingly false information about its beneficiaries, and so, in the PACC’s view, may face a fine and be classified as a risky supplier.

This creates additional difficulties for Ukraine’s defense capabilities during wartime.

3. Questions raised again about the Dynasty cooperative and the President’s inner circle 

The released recordings have given us still more detail about the cottage complex being built in Kozyn, previously reported on by investigative journalists. It is now known that mansions in this complex were being prepared for, among others, former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov, “Vova,” “Andrii,” and Timur Mindich. These facts have once again revived discussion of the Dynasty cooperative and renewed questions about the origin of funds for its construction.

These challenges reveal a deep distortion of the governance system and demand an immediate change of approach to prevent abuses. Despite the President’s public support for the investigation into the “Mindich case” and the dismissal of the Head of the Office of the President, the new data point to the suspect’s likely influence over NSDC Secretary Rustem Umerov. 

Transparency International Ukraine calls on the President to remove from office all those involved in the scheme and to ensure transparency of decisions. The Office of the President’s selective reactions to the investigation not only strike at the state’s reputation but also undermine Ukraine’s internal capacity in wartime.

How does register access work?

The USRCD operates under two access tiers. 

General access is open to the public via the official web portal. All published decisions are depersonalized — names, addresses, and other sensitive data are stripped out. 

Full access is a restricted, service-use instrument available exclusively to judges, court staff, and authorized personnel of law enforcement and state bodies (NABU, SAPO, SSU, SBI, ARMA, etc.). This tier displays unredacted documents in their entirety. Authorization requires login through the Electronic Court system using personal digital keys or tokens.

Under the USRCD Maintenance Procedure, the administrator — state enterprise Judicial Information Systems — is required to track and log all actions by authorized users. In other words: there’s a paper trail for who searched what, and when.

What’s the problem?

Debate over the unauthorized dissemination of information obtained through full register access intensified following several NABU cases, most notably the Borzykh case. More recently, the Midas operation disclosure revealed officials from multiple agencies browsing sealed rulings without legitimate cause. And during HACC judicial selection interviews, it emerged that candidates — themselves authorized registry users — had conducted searches impossible to justify on professional grounds. 

As we can see, last year alone saw no shortage of unjustified searches in the USRCD. The mechanisms enabling these leaks fall into three categories.

Use of others’ credentials. Various authorities have confirmed cases where third parties (typically lawyers) accessed the sealed register using judges’ login credentials. In one case from the Kyiv Region, a lawyer allegedly logged in under a judge’s credentials to retrieve rulings concerning his clients (operators of fraudulent call centers) and tipped them off about planned investigative actions. This was prosecuted as unauthorized interference with automated systems under Article 361(5) of the Criminal Code.

Court staff acting as insiders. Schemes have also been uncovered where court employees systematically supply information to outside clients. In Dnipro, a judge’s assistant allegedly conducted targeted searches twice a week on behalf of criminal actors and lawyers, printed search warrants (including those in money-laundering cases) and handed them over for payment.

Unjustified searches under full access. Log analysis during HACC selection interviews revealed widespread misuse of service-level credentials for personal purposes. It was established that candidates (sitting judges) had run hundreds of queries on former family members, their businesses, or their own cases. One candidate’s login was linked to 240 queries unrelated to their caseload, including 75 searches on their sister’s ex-husband, who was under investigation. System logs show recurring searches by name on prominent figures in anti-corruption investigations (Alperin, for example), conducted by individuals with no procedural connection to those cases whatsoever. Candidates routinely explain this away as “general professional curiosity,” but for investigators it creates a real risk of prematurely exposing prosecutorial strategy.

Technical logging can trace activity tied to a specific digital key over years. Yet users frequently claim no knowledge of the individuals searched or simply can’t explain the queries — strongly suggesting either credential-sharing or deliberate concealment.

What’s the current legal framework?

The Law of Ukraine on Access to Court Decisions, the primary statute governing the USRCD, specifies when general access may be restricted — but says nothing about restricting full access to particular categories of decisions. 

The assumption, apparently, was that all authorized users would handle the information responsibly. The record shows otherwise.

In response, the High Council of Justice adopted amendments in July 2023, at NABU’s request, permitting investigators and prosecutors to restrict (or delay) general access to certain rulings. The Supreme Court struck those amendments down.

On top of all preventive measures, criminal liability applies to unauthorized actions involving register data. The relevant offenses include: unauthorized interference with the operation of information and communication systems and networks (Article 361 of the Criminal Code); illegal sale or distribution of restricted-access information stored in computer systems (Article 361-2); deliberate entry of false information or failure to timely enter data into judicial automated systems (the UJITC, etc.), as well as unauthorized actions involving data in such systems — whether committed by authorized users or outsiders (Article 376-1).

But criminal liability is reactive — it responds to leaks that have already occurred. It does not deter effectively, nor does it protect ongoing investigations.

The USRCD Maintenance Procedure does authorize Judicial Information Systems to revoke full access from users who violate the law, including by disclosing register information. 

Tellingly, the gaps in USRCD access regulation are acknowledged by the expert community as well. The draft Anti-Corruption Strategy 2026–2030 lists as an expected result the establishment of effective mechanisms to prevent, detect, and respond to abuse in automated case distribution and register access — including audit and automated monitoring of full-access user activity (para. 2.1.5.4). It also requires that any restriction on access to court decisions be justified, proportionate, and based on legally established procedures (para. 2.1.5.5). The message is clear: the current framework is inadequate and the need for changes is already overdue.

What needs to change?

One step has already been taken: as of March 1, 2025, USRCD authorization requires tokens through the Electronic Court system, eliminating simple username-and-password logins. This makes it possible to establish that full access was obtained from a specific judge — not as a result of negligence.

Legislative reform is the other piece of the puzzle. Earlier attempts to amend the law on access to court decisions, including to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information available under full access, have already been made. Last year, MPs actively pushed Draft Law No. 7033-d, which drew public criticism for proposals that would have restricted general access to the USRCD as well — a disproportionate and unacceptable overreach. A revised version is now back before the relevant committee. 

There have also been calls to close off all pre-trial decisions from the register entirely. But it bears repeating: unauthorized dissemination occurs precisely through full access — the tier that is, by design, limited to a narrow circle of users. Moreover, many pre-trial rulings are issued in open hearings, some of which are even broadcast. Blanket restriction on general access to such rulings would undermine public oversight — and that is unacceptable.

It is also worth acknowledging that full access to the register can, in certain cases, be a genuinely effective tool. Quick access to information helps resolve conflicts of interest, prevent attempts to resell assets after a freeze, and address other operational needs. But calibrating the scope of accessible rulings to the actual mandate of the official holding full access would go a long way toward eliminating the risks of unauthorized disclosure.

To protect particularly sensitive pre-trial information, we support legislative proposals to restrict full access as well, so that officials would be unable to retrieve information on search warrants, covert investigative measures, asset freezes, and temporary access orders. Critically, these restrictions should apply specifically to decisions issued in closed hearings. 

The closed-hearing mechanism under Article 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows for the publication of rulings with targeted redaction of information whose disclosure could harm either individual rights or the interests of the pre-trial investigation. Blanket restriction on general access to decisions issued in open proceedings, such as pre-trial detention rulings or extensions of investigation periods, would erode accountability and public monitoring, including the ability to track the progress of corruption investigations. Post-indictment asset freeze decisions, reviewed with the participation of property owners, allow the public to monitor whether confiscation actually follows conviction. That oversight function must be preserved.

Even now, a troubling pattern is visible: access to certain plea agreement verdicts is being restricted from general view, despite judges having the tools to redact only the sensitive portions. However important the interests of an investigation may be, the mechanisms of accountability and transparency must not be sacrificed — they are among Ukraine’s hard-won achievements on the road to democratic law enforcement.

Finally, having reviewed the recordings of joint PCIE and HJCJ qualification sessions on HACC judicial selection, we can confirm that the technical capacity to monitor USRCD activity already exists. What is now needed is a legal obligation to use it: regular audits of search activity, with clear and enforceable consequences — disciplinary action for unjustified queries, and criminal liability where the elements of an offense are present.

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Unauthorized access to the court register has become a systemic problem — and criminal liability alone will not solve it. Addressing it requires a comprehensive approach combining technical, legislative, and organizational measures.

First, the scope of full register access must be reviewed against the actual mandate of each official who holds it. Where clear criteria can be established, that access should be narrowed accordingly.

Second, legislation must restrict full access to specific categories of decisions: search warrants, asset freezes, and other rulings issued in closed hearings. These should be unavailable in full mode for a defined period, or until a specified trigger — such as the delivery of a verdict in the case.

The closed-hearing mechanism under Article 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code should in turn be applied consistently — with targeted redaction of sensitive information, not wholesale closure of entire decisions.

Third, the existing technical logging capacity must become the foundation for regular audits of search activity, with clear consequences for unjustified queries — disciplinary or criminal, depending on whether the elements of an offense are present.

Throughout all of this, any restrictions must leave the principle of open justice intact. Unjustifiably closing off access to plea agreement verdicts or pre-trial rulings, such as detention decisions, would undermine the democratic oversight of law enforcement that Ukraine has been building.

How quickly NABU investigates cases and SAPO sends indictments to court

The data presented in February point to a certain decline in the number of people notified of suspicion in corruption cases in 2025, but overall, they indicate intensified work targeting top officials. 

While in 2024 notices of suspicion were served on 231 people in total, in 2025 that number was 218. 

So how did these figures change across categories of officials?

• The number of the highest-ranking officials notified of suspicion (ministers, heads of central executive authorities, and their deputies) doubled, from 6 people in 2024 to 12 in 2025.

For example, in 2024 former Minister of Agrarian Policy Mykola Solskyi was notified of suspicion in a land seizure case in Sumy region; former Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andrii Smyrnov was notified of suspicion for laundering illicitly obtained funds and accepting an offer of a bribe; and former Deputy Energy Minister Oleksandr Kheilo was notified of suspicion for offering a bribe. In 2025, those notified of suspicion included Antimonopoly Committee Head Pavlo Kyrylenko in a new episode of failure to declare assets and illicit enrichment; former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unity of Ukraine Oleksii Chernyshov for alleged abuse of office and accepting an undue benefit; and former Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Volodymyr Topchii for alleged abuse of office.

• Representatives of the judiciary: 10 people received notices of suspicion in 2025, compared with 5 in 2024.

Among the NABU-SAPO proceedings in 2024, notable cases included the bribery case involving economic court judges in Lviv region and the case involving judges of the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi court in Odesa region, who allegedly accepted bribes for rulings that became grounds for draft deferments. In 2025, suspects in NABU bribery cases included a judge of a city district court in Dnipropetrovsk region, a judge of one of Odesa’s district courts, and a judge of the Volovets district court.

• Members of Parliament and local councils, as well as other local senior officials: the figure remained at roughly the same level—21 people in 2025 versus 22 in 2024. 

In this category, those notified of suspicion in 2024 included MP Mykola Zadorozhnii, who, according to the prosecution, together with accomplices solicited a bribe from the head of a village council in Sumy region and organized its transfer. Notices of suspicion were also served on Iryna Kormyshkina in a case involving illicit enrichment and false declarations, and on Mukachevo Mayor Andrii Baloha for allegedly ensuring the adoption of a decision to sell a municipally owned land plot at an understated price. In 2025, NABU and SAPO notified MP Viktor Bondar of suspicion for organizing a scheme to supply products to Ukrzaliznytsia at inflated prices. In another case, as many as four sitting MPs—Yevhen Pyvovarov, Ihor Nehulevskyi, Olha Savchenko, and Yurii Kisiel—were named as suspects for, according to the investigation, systematically receiving undue benefits in exchange for voting in Parliament.

• The number of suspected officials of state agencies and state-owned companies decreased: there were 23 such individuals in 2025, compared with 37 in 2024.

This can be explained, among other things, by the implementation of a policy of prioritizing investigations into high-level corruption.

The process of sending cases to court has also changed. The number of people in respect of whom indictments were prepared increased. In 2024, indictments were drawn up against 243 people (131 in the first half of the year and 112 in the second half), while in 2025 that number rose to 280 (154 in the first half and 126 in the second half).

In 2025, the largest number of SAPO indictments concerned:

• heads of other state agencies and state-owned companies—56 people. Among them were four defendants in the case about the embezzlement of funds from Ukrzaliznytsia; officials and their accomplices in the case concerning abuse at the Odesa Portside Plant; and officials charged in connection with laundering funds belonging to state-owned enterprises that were part of the Ukroboronprom concern.
• Members of Parliament and local councils, as well as other local senior officials—23 people. In 2025, cases sent to court included those against two former members of the Odesa Regional Council, who together with other accomplices seized 32 vessels, converted them into 12 barges, and unlawfully appropriated them. Also sent to court with an indictment was the case against MP Zadorozhnii, who, with the assistance of National Police officials, demanded a bribe in exchange for not obstructing infrastructure repair works in Sumy region. A former member of the Kharkiv Regional Council also became a defendant after allegedly organizing a criminal group whose actions in electricity sales during wartime caused losses of more than UAH 58 million to Ukrenergo.
• Law enforcement officials—26 people. Defendants in NABU and SAPO cases in this category included an ex-detective of the central office of the Bureau of Economic Security and a senior investigator of the Main Department of the National Police in Kyiv region for demanding an undue benefit of $150,000; the head of a sector within the SSU Department for the Protection of National Statehood and two other individuals exposed for demanding an undue benefit of $300,000; and a former head of a department of the Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor’s Office and a civilian who were exposed while receiving $41,000.

This trend shows that NABU and SAPO are not only opening more proceedings but are also more effectively bringing pretrial investigations to completion. This dispels the myth that NABU merely announces suspicions while the number of indictments remains low. Of course, once a person has been notified of suspicion, completing the pretrial investigation takes time, especially where mutual legal assistance measures are involved or suspects are being sought. 

Even so, for analytical purposes it would be appropriate for the statistics to include the average duration of pretrial investigations of criminal offenses, with a breakdown of the number of criminal proceedings in which the investigation has been suspended and an indication of the reasons for that, as well as the duration of the defense’s review of the case materials under Article 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. At present, these aggregate indicators, which significantly affect the understanding of the timeline of top-level corruption cases, are unfortunately unavailable.

In addition, NABU’s statistics do not publish information on terminated criminal proceedings, including a breakdown showing whether these are cases with identified suspects or cases without suspects. That would make it possible to take a broader view of the pretrial investigation body’s work, including whether criminal proceedings remain pending there for long periods without notices of suspicion being issued.

It is also worth noting that Parliament still has not passed the changes that would strengthen NABU’s work and that international auditors have stressed are necessary. These include, in particular, abolishing the automatic closure of cases once investigation time limits expire, as well as resolving jurisdiction-related issues. This would allow the NABU and the SAPO to demonstrate an even higher level of effectiveness in investigating cases. In addition, unresolved issues remain with access to wiretapping without SSU involvement, as well as other matters affecting the efficient handling of state secrets and access to independent forensic examination.

The HACC’s effectiveness in court proceedings

The HACC’s annual report shows that its performance in court proceedings improved markedly across key indicators in 2024–2025: from the volume of cases reviewed to the speed of decision-making and the value of confiscated assets.

The HACC significantly increased the pace at which it completed criminal cases. In 2025, the court reviewed 114 cases (concerning 180 individuals), compared with 88 cases involving 137 individuals in 2024.

The number of judgments also rose, from 77 in 2024 (including 38 plea-based judgments) to 109 in 2025 (including 72 plea-based judgments). Overall, 154 individuals were convicted last year, substantially more than in 2024, when the figure was 112. We also see a decline in the number of acquittals, from 10 in 2024 to 8 in 2025. This, too, shows that most of the cases SAPO sends to court are built on a solid evidentiary foundation.

For example, in 2024 the HACC Appeals Chamber sentenced ex-MP Ruslan Solvar to three years in prison for unlawfully receiving compensation for housing rent. The HACC sentenced former SSU investigator Serhii Hlivinskyi to nine years in prison for soliciting and accepting a bribe, and MP Andrii Odarchenko also received his sentence—eight years in prison for attempting to bribe the former head of the State Agency for Recovery with bitcoin. 

Then, in 2025, the HACC sentenced ex-MP Dmytro Kriuchkov in absentia to 15 years in prison for embezzling more than UAH 1.5 billion from the companies Cherkasyoblenergo and Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo; former head of the State Judicial Administration Salnikov to three years for abuse of influence; and, finally, former head of the State Fiscal Service Roman Nasirov received his sentence—six years of imprisonment for abuse of office.

We also see a rise in the number of plea-based judgments. For example, in 2025, based on plea agreements, the HACC sentenced former head of the Western Economic Court of Appeal Borys Plotnytskyi to eight years of imprisonment, barred him from holding senior civil service positions for three years, and imposed a fine of UAH 85,000. Former Prosecutor General’s Office prosecutor Volodymyr Derhunov was sentenced to one year of actual imprisonment; in addition, he was banned from holding office for three years, and his residential house, together with a KIA Sportage, was confiscated. A plea agreement was also concluded with businessman Tyshchenko, a defendant in the case involving the embezzlement of the “Kurchenko oil products.” At the same time, for example, the texts of the judgments in the Plotnytskyi and Tyshchenko cases are sealed, and public communication on these cases does not make it possible to determine what exactly the state received in exchange for mitigating their punishment.

So although the increase in the number of cases reviewed is positive in itself, the growing number of plea-based judgments—especially when access to them is limited—may undermine trust in both the HACC and SAPO. In this regard, it would be advisable to use classification only for specific parts of a judgment and to improve SAPO’s communication regarding its policies on plea agreements in high-level corruption cases.

Despite the increase in the number of cases, the HACC managed to improve the efficiency of its use of time in court proceedings. While in 2024 one criminal case took an average of 618 days from receipt to final judgment, in 2025 that average fell to 405 days. This may have been aided, among other things, by the introduction of single-judge proceedings, as well as by the increased number of plea-based judgments, since such cases take significantly less time to review.

Even so, the number of unresolved proceedings is growing. While there were 287 such proceedings in 2024, involving 749 individuals, in 2025 there were already 327, involving 862 individuals. This shows the need for both legislative and organizational measures aimed at improving the efficiency of criminal case review. 

For example, in the course of monitoring HACC cases, we recorded instances of abuse and delay, including in the case involving the criminal organization at the District Administrative Court of Kyiv, in former State Fiscal Service head Roman Nasirov’s case within Onyshchenko’s “gas scheme,” and in the case of the so-called “king of smuggling,” Vadym Alperin. All of this could be addressed through amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine aimed at countering abuse of procedural rights.

Cassation review of HACC and HACC Appeals Chamber decisions by the Supreme Court also shows positive trends. In 2025, the cassation court reviewed a larger number of appeals filed by parties—164 in total, including 41 reviewed on the merits. By comparison, in 2024 there were 150 such appeals, and only 28 were reviewed on the merits. Overall, the number of HACC decisions left unchanged upon review also increased: in 2025, there were 27 such decisions, or 65.9% of those reviewed on the merits, whereas in 2024 there were 16, or 57%.

It is also encouraging that the court’s effectiveness in asset recovery improved in 2025. Last year, the total value of assets subject to special confiscation exceeded UAH 673 million across 13 proceedings. By comparison, in 2024 this figure stood at UAH 158.8 million in 11 proceedings. Meanwhile, the value of confiscated assets in money laundering cases increased almost tenfold—from UAH 50.6 million in 2024 across 4 judgments to UAH 470.3 million in 2025 across 7 judgments.

Even so, the HACC’s and NABU’s reports contain no information on the enforcement of asset confiscation decisions, which means it is impossible to track how much of this money has actually reached the state budget. Still, if provided by other state bodies, this information could be highly illustrative from the standpoint of public communication quality.

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The effectiveness of NABU, SAPO, and the HACC is no longer just about the figures in their reports. These are already indicators that stakeholders in Ukraine and abroad look to. 

Indeed, the visible uptick in these institutions’ work was the main reason Ukraine’s score in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index improved by 1 point. In that study, the Bertelsmann Foundation gave Ukraine 5 points, primarily taking into account the extent to which officials who abuse their office are held accountable or punished. And the figures above speak directly to that. The Corruption Perceptions Index is an international study that takes into account a whole range of factors affecting the state of anti-corruption efforts.

So the increase in the number of notices of suspicion issued to top officials, indictments, and judgments is a positive trend not only for the work of NABU, SAPO, and the HACC, but for the entire field overall. At the same time, real trust in the anti-corruption system requires more than just bigger numbers. It also requires transparency: publishing more aggregated information, opening up plea-based judgments to the extent possible, and reporting on the actual enforcement of confiscation decisions. 

We have no doubt that NABU, SAPO, and the HACC are indeed working, but systemic work also means addressing the shortcomings that still exist. That is what will determine whether quantitative growth in the indicators turns into a qualitative result.