Why the Strategy must be adopted without delay

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is the highest-level policy document setting state anti-corruption priorities for five years. On its basis, the government must, within six months of the law taking effect, approve the State Anti-Corruption Program (SAP) — an operational plan with specific measures, deadlines, and responsible parties.

This is Ukraine’s third Strategy. The first covered 2014–2017 and focused on building anti-corruption institutions. After it expired, Ukraine spent five years without a strategic document; the next was adopted only in June 2022, effectively under EU pressure ahead of candidate status. That strategy was largely declarative and did not reflect the realities of the full-scale invasion. The new 2026–2030 Strategy is far more detailed, covers more areas, and for the first time includes a separate section on recovery. It must also reflect Ukraine’s international commitments across all relevant areas.

Adopting the Strategy is itself an international commitment — required by the Ukraine Facility plan, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos plan. The Ukraine Facility deadline for adopting the relevant law is the end of June 2026.

TI Ukraine took part in preparing the Strategy: our DOZORRO experts worked directly on the public procurement subsection and joined discussions on the others, providing written comments. We previously published a detailed analysis of the NACP Strategy text following public consultations.

That said, some of our comments on criminal justice in that analysis were also incorporated by the Agency into the version sent to the government for approval in early April and registered as a draft law by Anastasiia Radina. Notably, this version also provides for repealing the Lozovyi amendments.

What changed in the government’s version

Neither competing draft law is perfect, and several provisions in both could be refined. Still, the bill registered by the Committee Chair is currently the most ambitious version. The government, by contrast, dropped a number of important reforms, weakening the Strategy. Let us examine the government’s cuts in detail.

Competitive appointment of the Prosecutor General. The most significant difference is in the Prosecution Service subsection (2.2). The Committee Chair’s version lists eight problems; the government’s, seven. The government removed Problem 2.2.2, which provided for:

• appointing the Prosecutor General through a selection commission that recommends candidates to the President; 
• defining in law the grounds for a vote of no confidence in, and dismissal of, the Prosecutor General.

The Kachka-Kos plan envisages a comprehensive overhaul of the Prosecutor General’s selection and dismissal procedure to align it with best European practice, with input from the Venice Commission. This reform scored 0 out of 10 in the expert coalition’s monitoring, as no steps have been taken since December 2025. In the government’s draft law, the problem is not merely deferred to the SAP but removed entirely.

Reform of the SBI Director selection. In the Committee Chair’s version, Problem 2.2.7 covers the selection of the heads of the National Police and the State Bureau of Investigation — with a specific outcome on improving the SBI Director selection procedure in line with European Commission recommendations. 

In the government’s version, Problem 2.2.6 covers only the selection of the National Police leadership; a competition for the SBI head is absent. Yet SBI reform is also part of the Kachka-Kos plan and scored 1 out of 10 in the expert coalition’s monitoring.

Narrowing the SAPO Head’s powers. In the Committee Chair’s Strategy, point 1.10.3.1 granted the SAPO Head four categories of powers:

1. a) entering information on MPs into the URPTI and approving motions heard by an investigating judge; b) independently sending extradition requests and forming joint investigation teams; c) extending pre-trial investigation deadlines; d) carrying out any investigative and procedural actions in NABU proceedings without involving the Prosecutor General.

The government’s version keeps only (b) and (c). The removed points — (a) and (d) — are precisely those that most reduce SAPO’s dependence on the Prosecutor General and limit political influence over investigations. Requiring SAPO to clear procedural actions with the Prosecutor General is a structural vulnerability that allows investigations to be blocked or slowed through administrative tools.

Detail on NACP salaries. In the Committee Chair’s version, point 1.10.1.1 contains specific wording: to define in law the size and structure of salaries for all categories of NACP staff to ensure transparency and minimize the variable component. The government’s version retains only the general “proper legal regulation of financial provision,” without detail on pay structure. This change is not critical, since the requirement to set NACP staff salaries in the dedicated law is better placed in the SAP. 

What remained unchanged

Most of the Strategy’s text is identical in both versions. Both retain: autonomous wiretapping for the NABU, abolition of the automatic closure of criminal cases upon expiry of the statute of limitations, selection to the HQCJ and HCJ with international experts holding a decisive vote, and whistleblower protection under EU Directive 2019/1937.

Yet one of the weakest sections in both Strategies is the subsection on asset declaration, which omits most of Ukraine’s international commitments in this area — in particular, on the ineffectiveness of automated checks and the need to revisit the risk-based approach. The current financial control system cannot effectively prevent top-level corruption specifically, and this must be fixed.

Conclusions and recommendations

The comparative analysis shows that the government used the month-long delay not to improve the document but to weaken three provisions directly tied to the Kachka-Kos plan priorities.

These and other shortcomings must be corrected when the relevant law is adopted.

• The version developed by the NACP and registered by the Anti-Corruption Committee Chair is more ambitious and more fully reflects Ukraine’s international commitments. In any case, between the first and second readings the committee will be able to consider amendments from all entities with the right of legislative initiative, including the government.
• Removing points (a) and (d) from point 1.10.3.1 on the SAPO Head’s powers directly affects the operational independence of the anti-corruption prosecution. These provisions must appear in the final text of the Strategy.
• Regardless of which version parliament adopts as the basis, several provisions should be strengthened between readings — above all, the effectiveness of countering money laundering and the approaches to assessing e-declaration. Here, the NACP should focus on the quality of full checks, not merely the number of automated ones.

Further delay in voting on the Strategy is not an option. The previous cycle showed that late adoption of the Strategy and the SAP renders part of their content obsolete before implementation even begins. It is essential to preserve the document’s ambition and to strengthen it further.

What happened and what the Cabinet should do

In early April 2026, the NACP completed inter-agency clearance of the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy and submitted it for the Cabinet’s consideration. The Agency had developed the Strategy with the help of expert working groups that conducted sectoral studies, which then formed the basis of the document. The NACP has published all the relevant materials on its website — the draft of the final document and a table showing which public comments had been incorporated and which had not.

Although the Law on Corruption Prevention does not require the Cabinet to process the anti-corruption strategy and register it in parliament as a government draft law, this has been the established practice in Ukraine, and it was the expectation of everyone involved — government officials, international partners, and experts alike. And indeed, anti-corruption strategic documents have always been adopted through government legislative initiative in the past.

Moreover, the law provides that the next step after the anti-corruption strategy is adopted is the approval of a State Anti-Corruption Program to implement it. These next steps will have to be carried out by the government — so it would be logical for it to be involved in shaping the first document as well.

However, because the strategy sat with the Cabinet for over a month without being adopted, and there emerged a real threat that deadlines would be missed (along with potential financial losses for Ukraine — more on that below), Anastasiia Radina, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, decided on May 13, 2026 to break with tradition and register the draft law on the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030 herself.

This is not “Radina’s own draft,” though. Its content has been agreed upon — it simply lacks the government’s “sign-off.”

The version of the draft law that has been registered matches the version the NACP sent to the Cabinet in April, after coordination with the relevant stakeholders.

The urgency on the part of the anti-corruption committee’s chair is entirely justified. Adoption of the anti-corruption strategy is one of Ukraine’s international commitments. It is required, in particular, by the Ukraine Facility plan (an EU initiative in which each reform Ukraine carries out or each decision it adopts unlocks specific financial assistance), the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the so-called “Kachka-Kos 10-point plan,” which gathers together the most important reforms in the areas of rule of law and anti-corruption.

Under the Ukraine Facility plan, the deadline for adopting the strategy and the anti-corruption program to implement it is the end of June 2026 — and given parliamentary procedure, there is already very little time left.

But the registration of the draft law by Anastasiia Radina does not mean the government can now forget about this document — quite the opposite. If the Cabinet of Ministers has views of its own on the document, it should still review the NACP’s version of the anti-corruption strategy as quickly as possible and convey its position to parliament. The Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy will then be able to take the government’s comments on board and, where it agrees with them, introduce “government” changes to the draft law that has already been registered.

The Verkhovna Rada’s Rules of Procedure do allow subjects of legislative initiative — including the government — to submit amendments and proposals to draft laws during preparation for the second reading (Articles 89 and 116 of the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).

If the government ignores this opportunity, it will deprive itself of any say in the content of the strategy — and end up in a situation where it has to develop the SAP on the basis of a document finalized without it.

What the new strategy is about

The current strategy will be Ukraine’s third.

The first covered 2014–2017 and was primarily aimed at setting up new anti-corruption institutions. After it expired, Ukraine went five years without an anti-corruption strategy. A new one was adopted with considerable delay only in June 2022 — and even then not really by choice, but to fulfill EU requirements: Kyiv needed this step in order to obtain candidate-country status. But that strategy, which covered 2022–2025, had largely declarative goals. And — most importantly — it did not take into account the problems associated with Russia’s full-scale invasion at all, since it had been drafted before 2022.

The new document is fundamentally different.

The Strategy for 2026–2030 is considerably more detailed and covers a broader range of areas than its predecessor, in line with the challenges of the moment. In particular, for the first time, a document of this kind includes a dedicated section on recovery.

Structurally, the document the NACP sent to the Cabinet in early April consists of three sections. The first covers the general system of corruption prevention and counteraction. The second covers corruption prevention in priority sectors. The third, added after public consultations, governs the procedural aspects of implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the Strategy and the SAP.

The NACP approached the preparation of the new strategy more inclusively than it had during the previous cycle. External expert groups conducting thematic studies were brought in to work on individual subsections, public consultations were held on each subsection, and the recordings, presentations, and tables showing how comments had been incorporated were made public. This is good practice and improves the document’s transparency and quality.

Transparency International Ukraine was also involved in developing the strategy at several levels. Our DOZORRO experts worked directly on the public procurement section, and we also took part in public consultations on other subsections and submitted written comments on them to the NACP.

The strategy covers most of the key problems in the relevant areas and shows substantial progress in how thoroughly the strategic outcomes have been worked out, compared with the previous cycle.

In particular, several important additions emerged between the first public draft and the text sent to the government. One of the key changes concerns an indicator that now provides for revising pre-trial investigation timeframes and abolishing the automatic closure of criminal proceedings when those timeframes expire. TI Ukraine has long flagged this issue as one of the most acute practical problems.

Other gains include a “strategic pause” between anti-corruption policy cycles, a mechanism to incentivize those who implement the SAP, and the NACP’s right to issue prescriptions to government bodies. The whistleblower protection subsection is better prepared and provides for bringing legislation in line with EU Directive 2019/1937, standardizing the definition of “whistleblower,” and modernizing the Unified Whistleblower Portal.

In the anti-corruption segment of criminal justice (interaction among NABU, SAPO, and HACC), the document matches the European Commission’s technical recommendations — in particular on autonomous wiretapping authority for the NABU, expanded powers for the SAPO Head, and Prosecutor General appointment procedures.

However, the document does have its shortcomings.

We hope to see some of them corrected during parliamentary consideration.

In particular, the effectiveness of the mechanism for verifying e-declarations and for combating money laundering still needs to be addressed — areas whose continued relevance is confirmed by the European Commission’s recommendations as well.

That said, it is already known that some important aspects of the strategy — such as the competitive selection of the Prosecutor General — were ones the government had planned to remove from the document. But because of the Cabinet’s delay, the most ambitious version of the document is the one that has gone to parliament.

Going forward, the important thing is not to weaken the strategy in parliament, but to strengthen it further still.

What’s next?

It is now critical that the government quickly process the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy submitted by the NACP, and that parliament quickly review the comments of the government and the public and — once the document has been refined — vote as soon as possible on the new Law on the Principles of Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030. Above all, this is an international commitment, and failure to meet it directly affects the European integration process.

Parliament’s overall pace of voting on draft laws has slowed considerably as of late, but Ukraine cannot afford to find itself once again in a situation where the state goes for several years without an up-to-date anti-corruption policy cycle.

All the more so given that we have already been in this situation before — and back in 2022, the strategy still had to be adopted in order to meet EU criteria. And by including this document in the “Kachka-Kos plan,” the European Commission has once again reminded us that, for the European Union, this document matters.

What is more, the previous cycle’s experience showed that the belated adoption of the anti-corruption strategy and SAP rendered part of their content outdated, which directly affected the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. This time around, then, the government and parliament should do everything they can to avoid delaying the adoption of these strategic documents any further than has already happened.

Introduction

In January 2026, the NACP published the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 (hereinafter — the AS, or the Strategy), which the Agency submitted for approval to stakeholder bodies. The new strategic document contains three chapters, rather than the four found in the current Strategy. 

In this iteration, Chapter I covers the general system of corruption prevention and counteraction, while Chapter II addresses corruption prevention in priority sectors. Also, a new final chapter has been introduced, dealing with the regulation of key procedural aspects of implementation, reporting, monitoring, coordination, and effectiveness assessment of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Program (SAP) for 2026–2030. This chapter was added after the round of public discussions had concluded and was presented only in the finalized draft, meaning that civil society organizations had no opportunity to comment on it. 

It is also worth noting that, in drafting the new Anti-Corruption Strategy, the NACP engaged external expert groups — an approach that is positive in terms of inclusivity and the overall quality of individual sections. This was likely a contributing factor to the insufficient uniformity across sections, particularly in terms of the level of detail provided. 

TI Ukraine was involved both in drafting certain sections and in discussions of drafts already published by the NACP. In particular, our experts worked directly on the public procurement section, and the analysis below reflects this.

With respect to sections 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 of Chapter I, and sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.3.2, and 2.5 of Chapter II of the Strategy, TI Ukraine’s experts participated in public discussions of these parts and submitted written comments to the NACP.

It is also important to note that NACP published the relevant supporting materials for all sections, as well as tables indicating whether comments were accepted or rejected. This is a good practice that the Agency applied when preparing the previous Strategy as well. 

We now turn to the sections reviewed by TI Ukraine. 

State Anti-Corruption Policy

Section 1.1, on state anti-corruption policy, addresses the regulation of the preparation and implementation of the AS and SAP for future periods. Compared to the anti-corruption policy section of the current Strategy, the new draft covers a narrower set of problems and strategic results, drawing directly on the experience of preparing and implementing the current anti-corruption policy cycle.

The section’s focus on the development and implementation of the anti-corruption policy cycle is entirely justified. The previous Anti-Corruption Strategy was the first document of its kind and contained, in its anti-corruption policy chapter, broadly framed problems and declaratory expected results — such as a reduction in the general level of public tolerance for corruption in Ukraine. The corresponding section of the new draft AS is free of such superfluous provisions.

That said, the draft has its weaknesses. Section 1.1 frequently proposes that the NACP and other responsible bodies carry out a range of activities that these institutions already perform on a regular basis. Despite this, our comment — that the Strategy should not duplicate activities already required by law — was not accepted. The Agency explained that the Strategy must be aligned with existing legislation to ensure proper implementation by the relevant bodies, and that the document should contain all possible measures for addressing the problems it identifies. This rationale is difficult to accept, since the AS is itself adopted at the level of a law, and its provisions are equally binding as those of sector-specific legislation. There is therefore no need for duplication. 

On the positive side, the NACP accepted our proposal to introduce a “strategic pause” between the end of the 2026–2030 Strategy and SAP and the preparation of the next anti-corruption policy cycle. The Agency also agreed on the need to introduce incentive mechanisms for SAP implementers and to grant the NACP the right to issue binding instructions — both of which should significantly improve the implementation discipline of government bodies.

However, our comment proposing that an acceptable rate of SAP implementation be set at 90% of completed measures — with the remaining 10% either having justifiably lost relevance or being unimplemented for financial reasons — was not reflected in the final draft. This threshold corresponds to OECD requirements. The question of implementation rates is not addressed at all in the current draft AS.

Some of our comments aimed at improving the coordination of AS and SAP implementation were accepted, which is also a positive development. For example, the final draft provides for the possibility of including representatives of the business community, academic community, non-governmental organizations, international technical assistance projects, and international organizations in the Coordination Working Group on Anti-Corruption Policy.

Corruption risk analysis and conflicts of interest

Sections 1.3 through 1.5 of the Strategy — covering anti-corruption programs, authorized units and officers, corruption risk analysis, and conflict of interest monitoring — broadly address most of the relevant issues in these areas. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 attracted fewer critical comments from us than the conflict of interest section, which is also one of the most detailed in Chapter I of the AS. 

The NACP accepted our proposal to review approaches to the remuneration of authorized officers in light of the complexity of their functions, as well as the proposal to explicitly designate the failure to incorporate the results of a previous anti-corruption program as grounds for the NACP to reject a new program.

However, although the section addresses the strengthening of the institutional independence of authorized officers, TI Ukraine’s comments regarding sanctions for the absence of authorized units or officers, as well as for the absence of anti-corruption programs, were not reflected in the Strategy’s expected results. The Agency explained that heads of organizations should themselves be motivated to maintain effective internal anti-corruption policies, and that sanctions would therefore not be effective. 

In our opinion, the existence of sanctions for failing to adopt an anti-corruption program or for not having an authorized anti-corruption officer would nonetheless serve as an additional incentive to comply with legal requirements, since sanctions are designed precisely to motivate those who would not act on their own initiative.

The NACP also did not provide for a more systematic involvement of civil society expert organizations in corruption risk assessments and the preparation of anti-corruption programs.

With respect to the quality of NACP’s and the Ministry of Justice’s anti-corruption assessments, the comment-response table indicates that the Agency intends to implement some of TI Ukraine’s comments at the SAP development stage. However, NACP’s intention to reconsider its discretion in selecting draft regulatory acts for expert review was not clearly reflected. The Agency may yet revise its position during the SAP development stage and incorporate this measure into that document.

On the conflict of interest section, the NACP still has not addressed the most critical comment — namely, that the Agency does not yet apply automated assignment of monitoring cases among its authorized officers, despite this approach having been criticized in the external independent assessment report of NACP’s performance for 2020–2021. The Agency explained that introducing automated assignment for proactive monitoring would artificially limit NACP’s ability to respond independently and swiftly to information appearing in the public domain and would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the proactive oversight mechanism. 

We cannot agree that the effectiveness of monitoring is contingent on the absence of automated assignment. Full declaration reviews can also be triggered by notifications from individuals and legal entities or information from media — and this does not prevent automated assignment from being applied in far more complex verification procedures. 

Moreover, the logic of prioritizing oversight effectiveness over oversight transparency is simply untenable in the context of NACP’s anti-corruption work.

Likewise, despite TI Ukraine’s comment, the NACP retained provision 1.5.3.2, which introduces exceptions to the general prohibition on officials receiving gifts in cases of “difficult life circumstances” (medical treatment, damaged housing). In our view, this creates identifiable risks of abuse. Issues of financial support for officials should instead be resolved through improvements to the social protection system for such persons or through the creation of charitable public fundraising mechanisms.

The NACP also declined to accept TI Ukraine’s position that the introduction of the concept of “perceived conflict of interest” into legislation would be premature, given that problems persist with the interpretation of existing terms. Specifically, despite the definitions of real and potential conflicts of interest established by law, courts have still been unable to develop consistent case law in matters involving violations in this area.

The remaining provisions of the conflict-of-interest section — regarding restrictions related to gifts, corporate ownership, and the combination or concurrent holding of official positions — were, in our opinion, developed to a high standard. The section successfully addresses the issue of disproportionate requirements concerning the mandatory transfer of corporate rights, the need to revisit the prohibition on receiving gifts, and the insufficient regulatory clarity surrounding the rules on combining and concurrently holding positions.

Financial control

Section 1.6 on financial control captures the problem of incomplete coverage of declaration subjects (staff of patronage services, members of local council executive committees, etc.), the excessive burden of completing declarations, ineffective oversight of timely declaration submission, and the insufficient effectiveness of the financial control mechanism as a whole. All of these issues are important for strengthening this mechanism and are consistent with the European Commission’s requirements.

Despite this, Section 1.6 attracted our sharpest criticism. While the NACP does acknowledge the insufficient effectiveness of financial disclosure, it attributes this primarily to inadequate automation and interoperability of registries, as well as legislative shortcomings — whereas civil society and international experts have consistently argued that it is the Agency itself that has built a financial disclosure system that fails to deliver results.

For example, the EU’s latest Enlargement Report on Ukraine calls for a stronger e-declaration system to genuinely and effectively prevent and detect unexplained assets. The Commission stated that the system has practical and legal shortcomings, primarily relating to the automated verification process.

What the NACP needs is not more automation of verifications, but a focus on enhancing the capacity of its authorized officers to conduct full verifications — only a human investigator can carry out a quality investigation of circumstances that appear suspicious. TI Ukraine has on numerous occasions provided the NACP with detailed recommendations for overhauling the financial disclosure system. 

Despite significant resources invested in developing and operating the electronic asset declaration registries, the financial control tools are mostly used to hold officials accountable for fairly minor instances of concealment or inaccurate declarations. Rarely does an e-declaration review escalate into a serious top-level corruption investigation.

Among our proposals, we suggested that the section include a problem statement to the effect that the existing financial disclosure mechanisms at the NACP are ineffective due to the Agency’s limited resources, their suboptimal use, the existence of duplicative functions, and other underperforming elements of the system. Addressing this problem would require a series of legislative amendments, updates to internal regulations, and changes to NACP’s implementation practices. 

The NACP did not agree with our proposals and even signaled an intention to enshrine in law the automation of verifications as a substitute for manual full-review procedures.

Among the comments that were accepted: the abolition of the obligation to submit certain interim disclosures already covered by the annual declaration, and the extension of oversight to officials of state-owned enterprises (with a shareholding above 50%) and members of executive committees.

With this approach — ignoring genuinely important problems in the corruption prevention system in the new AS — we will continue to fail to see any real effect from the Agency’s work for a long time to come, and will instead witness, once again, corruption scandals that could not be prevented. 

Whistleblower protection

The whistleblower protection section attracted almost no critical comments from us. The NACP developed it to a high standard, with an appropriate level of detail for a document of the Anti-Corruption Strategy’s standing. 

This section covers both the need to bring legislation and practice on whistleblower protection into conformity with European standards, and the need to improve the operation of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal and the responsible bodies, as well as to foster a culture of whistleblowing.

To achieve these objectives, the Strategy proposes a set of interrelated measures: bringing national legislation into line with EU Directive 2019/1937 and harmonizing the definition of “whistleblower”; establishing an institutional framework with a designated coordinating body and a network of responsible units within public and private organizations; promoting a culture of whistleblowing and raising employees’ awareness of their rights; modernizing the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal through integration with state systems and the introduction of a mobile application; and other critically important steps to improve how the whistleblower institution functions.

The only substantive proposal from TI Ukraine was to clarify the relationship between the statuses of “whistleblower” and “confidential informant” so as to avoid legal confusion. However, given its specific nature, this point is likely to be addressed at the SAP stage.

Comments from another expert organization were also well-taken concerning the absence of adequate tracking of complaints about violations of whistleblowers’ rights and the low number of cases in which rights are actually restored. The number of whistleblowers effectively protected is the real measure of the Agency’s performance in this area, so it is important to keep the focus here. The NACP did not fully incorporate these comments but did take them into account. We hope these observations will be reflected, if not in the final text of the AS, then in the SAP. 

Anti-corruption segment of criminal justice

Sections 1.9 (“Counteracting corruption and corruption-related offenses”) and 1.10 (“Independence, institutional resilience and effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions”) of the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy cover the system of legal liability for corruption and the capacity of anti-corruption bodies to enforce it. Section 1.9 systematically covers the types of liability — from disciplinary measures through civil law instruments to criminal liability. Section 1.10 is structured around four anti-corruption institutions: NACP, NABU, SAPO, and HACC.

Overall, the draft AS in this part demonstrates a high degree of alignment with the European Commission’s technical recommendations: it includes autonomous wiretapping powers for NABU, expanded authority for the SAPO Director, measures to counter the abuse of procedural rights in HACC, and strengthened internal oversight within NABU. The recommendation on the statistical data system (1.9.4.3) was fully incorporated, while the “fugitives” issue (1.9.4.4) was addressed partially.

That said, the draft Strategy provides for granting NACP the right to independently file civil confiscation claims (Result 1.9.2.2). During public discussions, we recommended against this, citing the Agency’s already heavy workload and the advisability of limiting the measure to granting NACP procedural powers to collect evidence following amendments to Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine. Instead, the NACP would be better served by gaining the ability to independently represent its own protocols in court, rather than relying on prosecutors — a measure already envisaged in the State Anti-Corruption Program for 2023–2025 but not yet implemented.

The draft’s wording also fails to cover the scenario of filing a civil confiscation claim following an acquittal, addressing only cases where proceedings have been closed. This creates a legal gap, since an acquittal and the closure of proceedings are distinct procedural institutions. In the absence of a clear provision allowing for civil confiscation following an acquittal, the state risks losing this tool in cases where individuals are acquitted due to evidentiary shortcomings and the higher standard of proof in criminal proceedings compared to civil ones. The problem of SAPO prosecutors lacking the right to obtain restricted-access information for the purpose of building an evidence base in unjustified assets cases also goes unaddressed.

TI Ukraine proposed conditioning the referral of cases based on NACP protocols to the HACC on a prior strengthening of the court’s capacity, citing the court’s heavy caseload and shortage of judges. The draft retains provision 1.9.3.3 on the adjudication of cases by HACC without any such caveat, although Section 1.10.4 provides for measures to improve the court’s efficiency. The logical connection between these provisions is not apparent, and the temporal sequencing of their implementation is not defined.

We emphasized the need to specify the provisions on special confiscation and statutes of limitations in the Criminal Code of Ukraine (modifying the point at which the limitation period begins and expanding the grounds for suspension). The draft operates with general language about bringing legislation into conformity with EU and OECD standards, which could theoretically encompass these issues.

The most problematic gap is the absence of any provision on abolishing the automatic closure of cases upon the expiry of pre-trial investigation deadlines. This is one of the most acute problems in practice and is already included on the list of priority reforms on Ukraine’s EU accession path and in the Rule of Law Roadmap — yet the anti-corruption strategy, as the highest-level anti-corruption policy document, makes no mention of it.

Compared to the previous Anti-Corruption Strategy, the draft contains no provisions on the effectiveness of anti-money laundering efforts. This is a cause for concern given the circumstances of the Midas case, which point to insufficient financial monitoring effectiveness, and the European Commission’s warning that the freezing and confiscation of criminal assets remain very limited in scope.

However, in the section on the judicial system and the status of judges, our proposal was accepted: selection to the High Qualifications Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice should continue to be based on an improved selection process with the participation of independent experts nominated by international partners and holding a decisive vote. And in the section on the prosecution service, public order, and countering criminal offenses, a positive development is the proposal to establish robust procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General to mitigate risks of informal or political influence, as well as to reinstate competitive selection for positions of prosecutors in the Prosecutor General’s Office and regional prosecution offices, in line with European Commission recommendations.

At the same time, it is critically important that ambitious strategic outcomes do not remain merely declaratory. The experience of the previous Strategy shows that even progressive provisions can be nullified by a lack of political will. The Strategy could also have established mechanisms to protect the independence of anti-corruption bodies from harmful legislative initiatives, as occurred in the summer of 2025 with the law that sought to curtail the independence of the NABU and the SAPO.

Recovery

Recovery has for the first time been designated as a standalone chapter of the draft AS, as one of the priority areas of state policy. Given its cross-cutting nature, some of the related problems are also reflected in the chapters on construction and public procurement. The dedicated recovery chapter focuses on strategic planning, regulatory framework, and the selection of recovery projects.

The absence of a comprehensive state recovery strategy is the first problem the Strategy aims to address. Despite the existence of individual planning documents at the local and regional levels, no holistic state-level strategy for eliminating the consequences of the armed aggression and for post-war recovery has been approved, notwithstanding the regulatory prerequisites for one and prior attempts to develop such a document.

The existence of a document that would conceptually define the nature, objectives, and priorities of recovery — and provide for mechanisms of coordination, monitoring, and accountability — is a critically necessary precondition for effective planning, adequate financing, and the implementation of recovery projects. At the same time, approving a comprehensive and actionable recovery strategy will be no simple task, for several reasons.

Recovery is a complex area that intersects with many areas of state policy. Certain aspects of recovery have already been addressed in a range of sector-specific policies and strategic documents. Under these conditions, formulating a coherent recovery strategy requires careful alignment of its key provisions with a broad range of stakeholders and proper coordination among different priorities.

Moreover, there is no shared understanding of the very concept of “recovery” — its scope, priorities, and components. For some, it means returning to the pre-war state; for others, modernization and “building back better”; for others still, a mixed model dependent on sector and territory. The Strategy risks being either too general or failing to secure the support of key stakeholders.

Second, the data on which the strategy would need to be based (the scale of destruction, losses, needs, and their prioritization) is constantly changing. Furthermore, management decisions in the recovery sphere are not always grounded in complete, reliable, and systematized data. Under these conditions, it is difficult to enshrine in a strategic document objectives and priorities that will not have lost their relevance by the time of implementation. The draft AS rightly identifies this as a distinct critical challenge requiring resolution.

Third, in wartime conditions, the logic of recovery is largely subordinated to the priority of rapid response in specific areas or sectors, which complicates the alignment of such decisions with long-term planning.

Among the other problems identified in the draft Strategy’s recovery section, it is worth noting the government’s active use of pilot projects as an alternative to applying the provisions of permanent legislation. This mechanism effectively allows for departures from general permitting procedures, funding rules, and oversight mechanisms.

Since the start of the full-scale war, the use of pilot projects has taken on a systemic character — driven, on the one hand, by the need for swift decision-making, and giving rise, on the other hand, to risks of legislative fragmentation, reduced procedural predictability, weakened transparency and accountability, and inefficient use of public funds.

TI Ukraine previously researched the pilot project on the comprehensive recovery of settlements affected by Russian aggression. The findings showed that, due to gaps in the conditions governing the experiment, the reconstruction of one of the planned settlements was effectively dropped from the program. Moreover, over two years of implementation, only approximately 8% of the planned number of facilities had been restored.

The draft Anti-Corruption Strategy proposes to regulate the mechanism for launching government pilot projects, by providing for a clear definition of their legal nature, a mandatory justification for departures from standard procedures, the publication of information on their implementation and results, and the exercise of state financial oversight with respect to such projects. The proposed approach would create the preconditions for a more transparent and clearly defined use of pilot projects and for reducing corruption risks in the recovery sphere. 

At the same time, the requirement to justify departures from standard procedures risks becoming a formality in the absence of clear criteria for the permissibility of such departures. Furthermore, failure to achieve the declared objective of a pilot project, or the absence of a substantiated report on its results, should be treated as grounds for its termination. These aspects should be taken into account in the preparation of the State Anti-Corruption Program.

The final two problems in the recovery — the absence of a single approved mechanism for prioritizing recovery projects, and the absence of a Unified Public Investment Project Management Information System — are closely interrelated.

The public investment management reform envisages the creation of a Unified Public Investment Project Management Information System (the Unified Information System), which is meant to be used for the prioritization and selection of public investment projects and programs — including those in the recovery sector — and to contain information on their implementation. However, the Unified Information System is not yet operational, and the formation of the Unified Project Portfolio for 2026 was carried out using the DREAM system, which only partially captures information on project implementation, readiness status, level of financing, and so forth.

Prioritization at the state level is currently applied to individual investment projects and investment programs, which may combine several such projects. However, legislation does not provide for a clear mechanism for prioritizing the projects included within investment programs. This gap creates risks of non-transparent selection, the inclusion of questionable projects in investment programs, and their subsequent entry into the Unified Project Portfolio.

The implementation of the measures set out in the draft Strategy will be of key importance for preventing non-transparent allocation of funds, duplication of financing, and their inefficient use. This includes ensuring the prioritization of all investment programs and projects — including those forming part of investment programs — as well as the introduction and proper functioning of the Unified Public Investment Project Management Information System, of which the DREAM system is an integral component. 

Public procurement

Last year, experts from the DOZORRO TI Ukraine project participated in drafting the Anti-Corruption Strategy’s public procurement section, conducting the necessary research and continuing to develop proposals for the corresponding expected results and measures. 

Based on the outcomes of a public expert survey, five problems were identified as the most significant in this area, the first of which is the abuse of the ability to modify essential terms of a procurement contract. Such practices occur both at the contract execution stage — when parties diverge from the draft contract published in the tender — and at the implementation stage. 

To minimize such abuses, we proposed the following: 

• defining a minimum list of procurement contract terms that are essential and may not be arbitrarily modified, taking into account how specific terms affect competition and the interests of the contracting parties,
• improving the legal regulation of the conditions for modifying procurement contracts, clarifying the rules governing price amendments, and expanding the volume of information published on contract modifications,
• developing the Prozorro system to a level that allows a procurement contract to be concluded automatically on the basis of its machine-readable draft form and introducing a full-text search function across contracts and supplementary agreements to facilitate oversight of their legality. 

The second problem the future Anti-Corruption Strategy will seek to address in the procurement sector is discriminatory and excessive requirements in procurement. This refers not only to overt discrimination in the classical sense, but also to excessive requirements that make procurement unattractive to participate in yet cannot be challenged — for example, excessively long payment terms and minimum timeframes for the submission of tender proposals. 

To improve the situation, we proposed introducing an appeal mechanism before the Antimonopoly Committee for purchases conducted through electronic catalogs; researching the factors that prevent businesses from challenging discriminatory conditions; defining requirements for permissible payment terms under procurement contracts; and extending the timeframes for the submission of tender proposals. It would also be appropriate to digitize procurement conditions and raise the professional level of contracting entities.

The third problem is the abuse of direct procurement, particularly under martial law. To address it, the list of grounds for conducting non-competitive above-threshold procurements needs to be revised and reduced, and the conditions and methods for conducting them optimized — including by reinstating the negotiated procedure where possible. In addition, it is important to regulate how the value of a procurement subject is determined when conducted directly, without a tender. 

The final two problems relate to proper oversight and accountability for intentional procurement violations. The procurement monitoring mechanism requires further development and improvement — in particular, a preventive and risk-based approach to monitoring is needed, primarily through pre-contract monitoring. It is equally important to ensure the effective implementation of the obligations identified in monitoring conclusions. A standardized list of remedial measures depending on the severity of violations, as well as an expedited court review procedure for monitoring conclusions, should help here. 

With respect to accountability for violations, the focus of proposals is primarily on ensuring that such accountability is inevitable. This requires updating the composition of administrative offenses and eliminating the factors that lead courts to frequently classify identified violations as minor or to dispute their existence altogether. 

The problems outlined may in some cases manifest not only as corrupt practices but also in situations where there is no corrupt intent. Nonetheless, each of them facilitates such practices or reduces the preventive effect on corruption in the work of contracting authorities.

Most of the expected strategic results will require legislative amendments, technical changes in the Prozorro system, and additional research. The adoption of Draft Law No. 11520 should facilitate the implementation of some of the steps outlined. 

The author team has traveled a long road of research and development of the Anti-Corruption Strategy draft, which began in January 2025 and continues to this day. We hope that, following the necessary approvals and revisions, the key ideas and intentions embedded in our proposals will be preserved. 

Conclusions

The draft new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 is fairly uneven in terms of both coverage of the necessary issues and NACP’s responsiveness to TI Ukraine’s comments. Certain sections of the Strategy are well prepared, reflecting both the positions of civil society and international partners, including the EU. However, on other matters our assessments were more critical and were not taken on board.

Among the key issues, we highlight the following.

1. Duplication of existing norms. Certain sections (for example, the section on state anti-corruption policy) repeat provisions of existing legislation without adding regulatory value. 
2. Insufficient specificity of certain strategic results. This applies, for example, to the protection of anti-corruption bodies’ independence from harmful legislative initiatives.
3. Failure to incorporate critical comments in the draft Strategy. The current version of the document leaves unaddressed the concerns regarding the ineffectiveness of the e-declaration verification mechanism, the absence of automated assignment of monitoring cases at the NACP, and the need to abolish the automatic closure of cases upon the expiry of pre-trial investigation deadlines. 
4. Incomplete coverage of problems identified but unresolved under the previous Strategy. The document contains no provisions on the effectiveness of anti-money laundering efforts, despite evident problems in this area. 

A recurring issue is the uneven level of detail across sections of the Strategy — a problem likely attributable to the involvement of different author groups without sufficiently rigorous editorial processing of the final document. This uneven structure creates the risk of uneven implementation of the Strategy in practice. 

We hope that some of these problems will still be addressed through the approval process with the relevant authorities — though the prospects for this currently appear uncertain.

On the Agency’s insistence on using the term “automated verification,” which is absent from the law

The concept of “automated verification” was added by the NACP to the current Procedure for Conducting a Full Verification of the Declaration of a Person Authorized to Perform the Functions of the State or Local Self-Government back in December 2023 (the Procedure). This Procedure is the document that “sets forth the procedure by which the National Agency on Corruption Prevention conducts a full verification of the declaration of a person authorized to perform the functions of the state or local self-government.”

Under Section V, Part 1, clause 1 of the Procedure, a full verification is conducted in order of priority based on risk assessment, including where “the declaration is filed by an official holding a responsible or especially responsible position, by a declarant holding a position associated with a high level of corruption risks, the list of which is approved by the National Agency, except for a declaration for which there is a report on the results of an automated verification of the declaration.”

Yes, Herman Halushchenko, who held the positions of Minister of Justice and Minister of Energy, was an official in a “responsible or especially responsible position.”

Halushchenko’s declarations for 2021 and 2024 were precisely the ones that underwent the automated verifications referred to in the provision above from the Procedure for Conducting a Full Verification. We include a screenshot from the NACP website below.

That is exactly why, under the Procedure, they were not selected for a manual full verification that is envisaged by the Law of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention. At the same time, the law does not provide any definition of “automated verification of declarations,” because such a verification should not have existed at all. By insisting that “automated” and “full” verification are two entirely different instruments, the NACP raises even more questions about its free interpretation of the law. The result is that the Agency does not act “within the limits of authority and in the manner” prescribed by the Constitution of Ukraine. Instead, it exercises financial control over declarants under a procedure that does not exist in legislation, while publicly rejecting any connection to the legal norms established by the legislator.

The NACP introduced the artificial concept of automated verification into the Procedure for Conducting a Full Verification, providing that if it is successfully completed, a declaration, under certain conditions, may never be subject to a full verification by an Agency employee.

Moreover, the Procedure also provides that declarations marked as high-risk based on the results of logical and arithmetic control (LAC) will also not be selected for a full manual verification if such declarations have passed an automated full verification. This further weakens the LAC mechanism as well, the rules of which, it should be recalled, remain closed to external observers—just like the rules of automated full verification.

It is precisely this approach to selecting declarations for manual full verification that TI Ukraine criticizes in the article on Herman Halushchenko’s declarations, as well as in earlier publications. In particular, we suggest reviewing the analysis TI Ukraine published immediately after amendments were introduced to the Procedure regarding automated verifications—here.

The term “automated full verification” is used in the article to highlight the problem of the NACP’s increasing move away from conducting full verifications manually. In addition, a similar term is also used in reports by international organizations, for example, in the latest OECD report.

On the article’s references to NABU materials concerning the activities of certain legal entities located outside Ukraine

The article clearly describes the tools the NACP could have used to verify Halushchenko’s assets and those of his family members more thoroughly in the course of a manual full verification, including by submitting additional inquiries both to the declarant and to national and international bodies.

The need to strengthen cooperation with foreign states to exchange information as part of the Agency’s financial control is objective. This is also stated in the Independent External Assessment Report on the NACP’s Activity for 2020–2021: “The NACP’s cooperation with the competent bodies of other countries should be intensified, in particular in the area of exchange of data for the purposes of administrative verifications within the NACP’s mandate, for example, on the basis of Art. 43 of the UN Convention against Corruption or on the basis of other provisions of existing international treaties). The NACP should increase its interaction with international organisations and non-governmental organizations from foreign countries.”

Verification of declarations is an administrative procedure that precedes criminal proceedings. It is precisely within administrative and civil procedures that the NACP is not limited in international cooperation. This is also provided for by law, which states that the Agency’s powers include cooperation with state bodies, civil society organizations of foreign states, and international organizations within its competence, as well as exchange of information with competent authorities of foreign states and international organizations. To date, the NACP has also not fully leveraged the potential of regional instruments such as the Regional Data Exchange on Asset Disclosure and Conflict of Interest, which our neighbor Moldova recently joined.

In addition, the NACP should deepen cooperation with national authorities as well. In this context, it is also worth considering whether the Agency could cooperate with NABU on obtaining information in response to requests for international legal assistance in criminal jurisdiction while carrying out financial control.

TI Ukraine does not compare the NACP to law enforcement bodies. Rather, we propose that it use and develop the instruments at the Agency’s disposal to ensure effective manual full verifications of declarations. The fact that the NACP previously obtained access to Europol’s SIENA platform can be assessed positively, as it opened new opportunities for information exchange with law enforcement bodies of EU member states, even though the NACP is not a law enforcement body.

On the NACP’s assessment of TI Ukraine’s expertise 

Finally, I would like to comment on the Agency’s claim that TI Ukraine “misinterprets” financial control measures, which “creates a distorted perception of the NACP’s work and undermines trust in the anti-corruption system as a whole.” It should be noted that, in addition to TI Ukraine analysts, the NACP’s activities are assessed by a number of international organizations, including the IMF, the European Commission, and the OECD, among others. In their most recent reports, these organizations are fairly aligned in criticizing the Agency’s approaches to financial control, particularly with respect to full verifications.

For example, the latest European Commission Enlargement Report on Ukraine points to the need to strengthen the e-declaration system so that it can truly prevent and detect unjustified assets effectively. The Commission stated that the system has practical and legal shortcomings, primarily relating to the automated verification process.

And here is what the OECD wrote in its 2025 report regarding the NACP’s automated full verifications: “Statistics from the Register suggest that as of December 2024, there are ca. half a million high risk declarations, of which only 13 600 passed the automatic control, which is an approach to full verification of the declarations that fall within the lower risk range. Even if the NACP increases the proportion of the automated full verifications to 75%, as initially planned, this will not cover the entire range of high-risk declarations. This significant gap between legislation and practice indicates the need to reassess the appropriateness and potentially undesirable consequences of maintaining such a broad list of persons required to file declarations.”

It is also worth mentioning the most recent  Independent External Assessment Report of the NACP’s Activity for 2020–2021, in which the commission members stated directly: “The NACP informed the Commission that the issue of the possibility of conducting full verification in an automated mode using the software tools of the Register is being studied. The Commission would like to express doubts that the full verification of the AD could be automated, as under the current mandate of the NACP the procedure was designed for manual checking by authorized persons of the National Agency.”

Therefore, it appears that it is not only TI Ukraine that underscores the need to reconsider the Agency’s approach to automated full verifications and make them more effective. 

P.S. From this entire situation, I am glad that Herman Halushchenko’s declarations will, at last, be subject to a full manual verification by the NACP, as they should have been from the very beginning. 

The offshore scheme

NABU detectives established that between 2021 and 2025, a total of USD 12 million was laundered for the benefit of “Sigismund” and his family—funds that were largely held in foreign accounts.

Some of this laundered money was spent on the family’s needs, including:

• paying for the children’s expensive education at elite institutions in Switzerland,
• medical services at a clinic owned by one of the scheme’s participants (“Sugarman”),
• buying designer clothing at Kyiv boutiques, and more. 

To launder the funds, Halushchenko built a multi-tiered structure. In particular, three companies were registered via offshore jurisdictions in the Marshall Islands. They became part of a trust registered in Saint Kitts and Nevis and also acted as investors in a fund on the island of Anguilla, which was used to attract and launder money. In this way, the funds were carefully concealed.

Still, the NACP could have noticed certain manipulations from Halushchenko’s declarations. 

Halushchenko listed his former wife and four children as the official beneficial owners of the offshore companies. This is a common concealment scheme: assets are registered in the names of relatives or close associates who do not live with the declarant, allowing their assets to be omitted from the declaration. “Divorces” are also often fictitious for precisely these reasons.

But under the law, minor children must be declared by public officials regardless of whether they live together. Accordingly, in his 2024 declaration, Halushchenko listed his four children as family members. Yet he did not disclose any of his children’s assets—neither in the section on corporate rights nor in the section on beneficial ownership of family members’ assets.

In the 2021 declaration, when Halushchenko was still married and declared his wife’s assets, her corporate rights and beneficial ownership in the architectural bureau Prostir 86 are reported. But there is still no mention whatsoever of beneficial ownership in offshore companies.

If Halushchenko’s declarations had been selected for a manual review not limited to registry cross-checking, Agency staff could at minimum have sent follow-up requests both to the declarant and to national and international authorities.

It is also worth noting that, unlike NABU, the NACP still has weak international cooperation with foreign authorities when it comes to obtaining information on officials’ or family members’ foreign assets. This is an area the NACP clearly needs to strengthen.

Education in Switzerland 

According to an investigation by Schemes, Halushchenko’s son Maksym has been studying for the fourth consecutive year at one of Europe’s most expensive private colleges—College Alpin Beau Soleil in Switzerland—where tuition and boarding can cost up to USD 200,000 per year. Over four years, the total cost could reach roughly USD 700,000, or UAH 26 million—many times more than Herman Halushchenko’s family’s official income and declared savings. Journalists were able to establish this using open-source data.

In court, Halushchenko explained that different people paid for the education—his son’s godparents and family friends. This information requires additional scrutiny by NABU and, ideally, the NACP as well, since the Agency should have examined it much earlier.

NACP guidance indicates that education payments fall under expenses that must be declared. At the same time, only the declarant is required to report such expenses—so if third parties truly paid for the education, this information would not appear in the “expenses” section.

However, the declaration also contains a section on gifts—and that is where information about paying for Halushchenko’s son’s education should have appeared. The NACP has explained that when a third party covers the declarant’s or a family member’s costs for travel (flights, accommodation), treatment, education, and so on, it is considered a non-cash gift. As a general rule, such a gift must be reflected in the declaration with its value indicated.

So if Halushchenko’s son’s education was paid for by godparents and family friends, this should have been shown in Halushchenko’s declaration, unless each of them paid less than the reporting threshold, which is highly unlikely given the tuition figures cited above.

***

Once again, we are looking at a situation where the NACP has remained on the sidelines of a high-profile scandal. Once again, most of the facts were uncovered by journalists or by NABU detectives during criminal proceedings. 

We understand that the NACP’s functions and capabilities differ significantly from NABU’s, and we are not comparing them. Still, it appears the NACP had sufficient tools to verify information about Halushchenko’s assets long before he was notified of suspicion.

Two automated “full” reviews of the declarations of the person whom participants in the scheme allegedly called “Sigismund” produced no results at all. Most likely, the former minister’s declarations will now be selected for a repeat, manual full review—just as happened after the Tetiana Krupa scandal. But the effect of such an after-the-fact review is disproportionate to the mandate of a body that is supposed to prevent corruption. 

The facts we cite should be yet another wake-up call for the NACP: it unquestionably and urgently needs to revise its approach to financial control. But will the Agency listen?

Overall effectiveness

First and foremost, it is important to recall that the NACP became the first anti-corruption authority to undergo a comprehensive independent evaluation. More than two years ago, the first audit of the Agency was conducted, within which experts assessed the effectiveness of its activities for 2020–2021. At that time, despite the institutional reset, auditors deliberately used a double negative in their conclusions, stating that “the NACP’s performance during the assessment period generally did not reach the threshold of ineffectiveness”. At the same time, they issued numerous recommendations aimed at improving the Agency’s performance.

It is precisely these recommendations that the European Commission has now urged the NACP to implement as a matter of urgency, given that since their publication the Agency has, in effect, failed to comment on the extent to which they have been taken into account. The European Commission also recalled that the next performance evaluation of the NACP must be conducted without delay, while applying a robust methodology and clear criteria. We fully share the priority accorded to these recommendations. Moreover, Draft Law No. 14209 has recently been registered, aimed at accelerating the process of conducting a new audit of the Agency — a step that unquestionably deserves support.

The EU also underscored a long-standing issue concerning the improper internal regulation of the NACP’s operations. Specifically, European commissioners stressed that the Agency in particular needs to ensure that its internal processes are regulated through binding bylaws instead of through non-binding recommendations or similar documents, as is currently the case. This issue has repeatedly been highlighted both in the NACP audit report and in our own analytical work.

The European Commission also addressed the issue of the NACP’s anti-corruption review of draft legislation. In its view, such reviews are currently unsystematic, while the recommendations issued by the Agency as a result are not implemented consistently by Parliament. In this context, particular attention is drawn to the problem of the NACP’s excessive discretion in selecting draft laws for review. For example, precisely for this reason, in July the Agency did not even attempt to initiate its own anti-corruption review of the notorious Draft Law No. 12414, which sought to deprive NABU and SAPO of their independence, citing the absence of external requests for such a review.

The Enlargement Report also justifiably raised the issue of the NACP’s insufficient human resources. It notes that attracting and retaining qualified staff requires competitive salary levels, as well as a clear internal HR policy and the strengthening of the skills of anti-corruption officers. Moreover, since this year the Agency has established sector-specific expert units, these units should now be authorized to provide additional methodological support to anti-corruption units and officials within public authorities and state-owned enterprises. 

In the section dealing with effectiveness, the European Commission also indicated that the number of corruption reports received by the NACP increased significantly — from 534 in 2023 to 982 in 2024. At the same time, however, the number of confirmed whistleblowers dropped from 25 in 2023 to 17 in 2024. Furthermore, an extremely small number of individuals were convicted in criminal proceedings based on such whistleblower reports — 0.47% of cases at the level of ordinary courts and 5% in proceedings before the HACC. In our view, this is primarily linked to deficiencies in the functioning of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal, which is also mentioned in the European Commission’s report.

Finally, the European Commission stressed that the NACP must develop its capacity for the effective and impartial monitoring of compliance with lobbying legislation. This is a new area for Ukrainian law and practice, one that clearly requires additional attention.

E-declarations and lifestyle monitoring

However, the European Commission’s top-priority recommendations primarily concern asset declaration. After the mandatory submission of declarations was reinstated in 2023, public demand for their high-quality verification increased in proportion to growing intolerance toward corruption during the full-scale war. Yet, the results have failed to meet these expectations.

Time and again, we read about high-profile corruption scandals and about how the NACP failed to detect them at the stage of verifying officials’ declarations. In addition to last year’s well-known scandal involving the head of the Medical and Social Expert Commission, Tetiana Krupa, we are now awaiting information from the NACP regarding the verification of the declarations of those involved in the corruption scandal surrounding Energoatom.

These and other cases give grounds to doubt the effectiveness of the existing financial control tools used by the NACP in the verification of declarations. We have previously criticized the Agency’s new approach to automating full verifications, and the emergence of new corruption scandals only reinforces this position.

That is why it is particularly important that the European Commission’s report also refers to the need to strengthen the e-declaration system so that it can truly and effectively prevent and detect unexplained assets. The Commission pointed out that the system has practical and legal shortcomings, primarily related to the automated verification process. 

The Commission also noted the need to ensure a certain degree of external oversight over the logical and arithmetic control (LAC) of declarations. As early as 2021, we urged the Agency to make the LAC rules public, since it is precisely these rules that determine the risk level of a declaration and its subsequent selection for verification. Nearly five years have passed, yet the NACP has still failed to heed this call, and it remains impossible to assess whether the established rules are sufficiently effective.

Once again, the European Commission rightly called for expanding the list of declarants to include staff of private offices — such as assistants to Members of Parliament, employees of the Office of the President, and others.

Despite its criticism of the e-declaration system, the report gives a positive assessment of the effectiveness and results of lifestyle monitoring of public officials. TI Ukraine does not share this view, as the current lifestyle monitoring procedure is not properly regulated and, in essence, duplicates the substance of full declaration verification. 

Overall, the Commission stressed that greater attention must be paid to the practical application of financial control tools to high-level officials — a position with which it is difficult to disagree. Likewise, we support the recommendation for Parliament to further increase penalties for unexplained assets and to reduce the applicable thresholds to make the sanctions regime more relevant and effective.

Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme

As for strategic documents, the European Commission assessed the impact of the current Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP) as limited. In our view, this result is primarily due to the fact that the NACP cannot directly influence the implementers of the measures and likewise lacks instruments to incentivize and control the implementation of the SAP. At the same time, the implementers of the anti-corruption program themselves lack sufficient political will for its proper execution.

At the same time, the Commission called for the prompt development and adoption of a new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 and a new State Anti-Corruption Programme, to be prepared in a transparent and inclusive manner. These documents should include an ambitious yet realistic level of priority measures in areas most prone to corruption. To avoid implementation problems under the future strategy, institutional capacity and resources, particularly at the level of the NACP, must be strengthened. All of these recommendations echo those outlined in our Shadow Report.

However, in our view, it is also essential to introduce a minimum implementation threshold for the State Anti-Corruption Programme. According to the most recent OECD report, a SAP can be considered effective only if 90% of its measures have been implemented, while the remaining 10% have either justifiably lost relevance or remain unimplemented for financial reasons. This is precisely the benchmark that the NACP and the authorities as a whole should strive to achieve.

***

Among the systemic shortcomings that have been undermining the effective work of the NACP for years, it is possible to clearly identify those related to the organization of its internal operations — shortcomings that the Agency is fully capable of addressing. Yet year after year, the institution chooses not to do so, despite the regular repetition of relevant recommendations both from civil society and in the conclusions of the independent audit. 

These very same recommendations have now been reiterated in this year’s EU Enlargement Report. The Agency no longer has any room to evade this criticism and must finally heed it. First and foremost, it is necessary to rectify the systemic deficiencies in financial control, ensure the high-quality and timely adoption of new strategic documents, and, at last, conduct a new audit of the Agency’s operational effectiveness.

Importantly, even if the Agency were to be provided with all the necessary resources and additional powers, the effective use of these instruments would still depend entirely on its internal system of work. Without changing the existing approaches, we will continue to hear about corruption scandals that the very institution tasked with preventing corruption has failed to prevent.

The Shadow Report was prepared by a coalition of civil society organisations, led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, within the framework of the EU Project Pravo-Justice grant, implemented by Expertise France. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union.

What is it like now?

Although the Law on Corruption Prevention requires a mandatory biennial audit of the NACP’s activities, the last assessment was conducted more than two years ago and covered the period from 2020 to 2021. Since then, the Agency has a new Head, but many ineffective practices remain. The European Commission also notes this in its latest report.

Given the NACP’s lack of transparency and insufficient accountability, an international expert audit of the Agency’s effectiveness in 2024–2025 (the first two years of the new Head’s term) is a constructive step toward improving the quality of corruption-prevention policy and declaration verification. 

Before this, however, the audit methodology and criteria adopted in 2020 must be updated, as they have proved overloaded and flawed. This has not been done under three Ministers of Justice; instead, the Ministry continues to consult the NACP on these documents, allowing the Agency, despite its inherent conflict of interest, to significantly influence their content. 

The current version does not include an assessment of the NACP’s new mandate in the field of lobbying, and the mathematical threshold for determining inefficiency sufficient to dismiss the Head is excessively demanding and unrealistic. The methodology and criteria also fail to account for the individual inefficiency or misconduct of the Agency’s Head. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the Assessment Commission, rather than the government, to approve the new documents, similar to the approach provided in the Law on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine.

Amendments proposed in the draft law

Draft Law No. 14209 proposes supplementing Article 14 of the Law on Corruption Prevention, which regulates oversight of the NACP, with a provision requiring the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to adopt a decision to initiate formation of the Assessment Commission no later than thirty calendar days before the expiry of two years from the date of approval of the Agency’s most recent external independent assessment report. 

The draft law also proposes that, within one month of its composition being approved, the Assessment Commission must adopt and publish the criteria and methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the National Agency, based on its statutory mandate. This includes adopting criteria for determining when the Head of the NACP has improperly performed their duties and criteria for assessing the overall effectiveness of the National Agency. 

The draft law further proposes adding improper performance of duties by the Head of the Agency as a ground for early dismissal under Article 5(5) of the Law, which sets out the conditions for terminating the Head’s powers.

Conclusions

Transparency International Ukraine fully supports the adoption of Draft Law No. 14209, which will finally establish an effective mechanism of external oversight over the NACP’s work, eliminate abuses related to delaying the audit, and ensure real accountability of the Agency’s leadership for inefficiency or improper performance of duties. 

Introducing updated, objective, and independently approved assessment criteria is a key condition for strengthening trust in Ukraine’s anti-corruption system and improving its effectiveness, especially against the backdrop of recent corruption scandals.

At the same time, despite our support for the proposed amendments, it appears paradoxical that launching the mechanism of external oversight of the NACP — already explicitly provided for in current legislation — requires additional legislative intervention to ensure its actual functioning. 

How these issues are handled now 

The issues addressed by the draft law are currently regulated by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, as well as the Laws of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention and on Military Duty and Military Service. These legal regulations provide for the following types of liability for false asset declaration:

• Administrative liability for false asset declaration under Article 172-6 of the Administrative Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount ranging from 100 to 500 subsistence minimums for able-bodied persons (UAH 302,800 – 1,514,000 or USD 7,300 – 36,500 at the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) exchange rate as of June 5, 2025).
• Criminal liability for false asset declaration under Article 366-2(1) of the Criminal Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount from 500 to 2,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 1,514,000 – 6,056,000 or USD 36,500 – 146,000), in the form of a fine ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 51,000 – 68,000 or USD 1,230 – 1,640).
• Criminal liability for false asset declaration under Article 366-2(2) of the Criminal Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount exceeding 2,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 6.056 million or USD 146,000), in the form of a fine ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 68,000 – 85,000 or USD 1,640 – 2,050).
• Claims for the forfeiture and recovery to the state of unjustified assets under civil forfeiture pursuant to Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code are filed when the discrepancy between asset value and lawful income exceeds 500 subsistence minimums (UAH 1,514,000 or USD 36,500).
• Illicit enrichment under Article 368-5 of the Criminal Code is defined as acquiring assets in excess of lawful income worth more than 6,500 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 9,841,000 or USD 237,250).
• NABU detectives may investigate cases under Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the value of the subject matter of the offense is: 500 or more subsistence minimums for Articles 354, 368, 369, and 369-2 of the Criminal Code (UAH 1,514,000 or USD 36,500); over 2,000 subsistence minimums for Articles 191, 206-2, 209, 210, 211, 364, and 410 of the Criminal Code (UAH 6,056,000 or USD 146,000), provided the offense is committed by an official from a state body, law enforcement agency, the military, local government, or a state/municipal enterprise. 
• No term is currently established for the duration of an individual’s inclusion in the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses (“Offender Register,” formerly the “Corruption Register”) under Article 59 of the Law of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention. 

What is proposed in the Committee’s version of the draft law

The new provisions aim to revise the criteria for criminal and administrative liability in the area of asset declaration and illicit enrichment, the range of persons and thresholds for applying civil forfeiture, NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, and to establish maximum time limits for inclusion in the Offender Register, among other things.

Below is a detailed overview of the changes introduced in the draft law following its review by the Committee:

1. Administrative liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount ranging from 150 to 750 subsistence minimums (UAH 454,200 – 2,271,000 or USD 10,950 – 54,750).

2. Criminal liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount from 750 to 2,500 subsistence minimums (UAH 2,271,000 – 7,570,000 or USD 54,750 – 182,500), including a fine ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 68,000 – 102,000 or USD 1,640 – 2,460). 

3. Criminal liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount exceeding 2,500 subsistence minimums (UAH 7.57 million or USD 182,500), including a fine ranging from 6,000 to 8,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 102,000 – 136,000 or USD 2,460 – 3,280).

The 50% increase in the threshold for administrative liability and the 25–50% increase for criminal liability for false asset declaration does not raise critical concerns on our part. Once the proposed provisions are adopted, these thresholds in U.S. dollar equivalent will better align with the limits that were in place during the reinstatement of the declaration system following the destructive decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine at the end of 2020. At the time the new law is adopted, the U.S. dollar will cost approximately 50% more than on the day the current thresholds were approved by Parliament on December 4, 2020 — UAH 28.30 versus UAH 41.48 per USD as of June 5, 2025. Moreover, the increase in the maximum threshold for criminal liability under Article 366-2(2) of the Criminal Code is not even 50%, but only 25% — 2,500 subsistence minimums versus 2,000. 

In addition, the increase in criminal liability thresholds will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in fines, which makes this legislative initiative generally acceptable. However, since the proposed changes will have retroactive effect, a portion of currently pending investigations will have to be closed.

4. Claims for the forfeiture and recovery to the state budget of unjustified assets under civil forfeiture pursuant to Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code will be filed when the discrepancy between the asset value and lawful income exceeds 750 subsistence minimums (UAH 2.271 million or USD 54,750).

The depreciation of the hryvnia also justifies the 50% increase in the threshold for civil forfeiture — from 500 to 750 subsistence minimums. The U.S. dollar is currently worth 67% more than on October 31, 2019, the date the current thresholds were adopted, when the rate was UAH 24.99 per USD. Therefore, this change also raises no objections. 

Similar arguments regarding the depreciation of the hryvnia are also expressed by SAPO in its position submitted to the lead Committee. We have previously noted that this threshold is directly linked to the effectiveness of the civil forfeiture mechanism, as the overall state expenditure for organizing the civil forfeiture process — gathering evidence by the prosecutor and proving the unjustified nature of the asset in court — must correspond to the outcome of the proceedings.

5. Illicit enrichment will involve the acquisition of assets exceeding lawful income in value by more than 3,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 9.084 million or USD 219,000) and, along with civil forfeiture, will be extended to include the category of persons listed in Article 3(2)(e) of the Law of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention.

The expansion of the list of persons against whom claims for recovery of unjustified assets can be filed, and to whom the Criminal Code article on illicit enrichment will apply, was recommended by SAPO. As a result, the version of the draft law after the Committee’s review includes a proposal to broaden the scope of individuals subject to illicit enrichment and civil forfeiture provisions. 

Thus, following the adoption of the new provisions, these mechanisms will also apply to the heads and members of expert teams assessing a person’s day-to-day functioning, as well as to the heads, deputy heads, members, and secretaries of non-staff permanent military medical and aviation medical commissions. In our view, this innovation deserves support.

6. NABU detectives may investigate cases under Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the value of the subject matter of the offense exceeds 5,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 15.14 million or USD 365,000), provided the offense was committed by an official of a state body, law enforcement agency, the military, local government, or a state/municipal enterprise under Articles 191, 206-2, 209, 210, 211, 364, or 410 of the Criminal Code. 

This proposal aligns with the findings of the external independent assessment, which positively assessed NABU’s policy of prioritizing criminal proceedings.

7. The retention period for data before removal from the Offender Register for corruption or corruption-related offenses will be as follows:

• in the case of civil or administrative liability – 1 year;
• in the case of criminal liability – until the conviction is expunged or annulled;
• in the case of criminal law measures applied to legal entities – 5 years.

Back in 2023, the Commission conducting the independent assessment of the NACP’s effectiveness emphasized the need to resolve this issue, noting that it could be perceived as a disproportionate interference with individual rights. At the time, TI Ukraine supported this recommendation from international auditors.

8. The transitional and final provisions are supplemented with rules regarding the mobilization of individuals accused of serious and especially serious corruption crimes. 

A court may suspend criminal proceedings against a person accused of a serious or especially serious corruption offense who has been called up for military service during mobilization or under contract, if it determines that the individual’s direct participation in defense-related activities makes it impossible for them to take part in court proceedings, including remote hearings via videoconference.

However, Draft Law No. 13271-1 does not propose suspending the statute of limitations during the mobilization of defendants, as provided in Draft Law No. 13284, which is currently under consideration by Parliament.

How the positive provisions of the draft law can be further strengthened

In the future, when improving Draft Law No. 13271-1, legislators should consider lowering the thresholds for criminal liability for making false statements in asset declarations, as well as extending the relevant statute of limitations. For example, false asset declaration is currently classified as a non-serious offense with a limitation period of three years, which in practice may be insufficient for conducting investigations and completing judicial proceedings.

Moreover, MPs should take into account that the current sanction for illicit enrichment — imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years — has a stronger deterrent effect in terms of future conduct and risk assessment by the person concerned than civil forfeiture. Accordingly, further lowering the threshold for illicit enrichment could have a corrective effect on the potential level of corruption, which can generally be regarded as a positive step in the fight against corruption. 

As for specific recommendations regarding the draft law, we at Transparency International Ukraine are convinced that Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code could be further amended to explicitly grant the NACP the authority to collect evidence without special procedures. Under the current version of Article 290(5) of the Civil Procedure Code, the NABU and SAPO, and, in legally defined cases, the SBI and the Prosecutor General’s Office, are empowered to detect unjustified assets and gather evidence of their unjustified nature, while the NACP is not included in this list. 

Likewise, the final version of the draft law should continue to expand the list of persons who may be subject to civil forfeiture and improve this mechanism overall. Previously, we at Transparency International Ukraine dedicated a separate study to the challenges of civil forfeiture, which included corresponding recommendations for enhancing the implementation of this concept. 

The draft law also fails to address the problem of enforcing the consequence of civil forfeiture that provides for the automatic dismissal of public officials. In the context of civil forfeiture, in addition to the recovery of unjustified assets, the individual must be dismissed from office after the court decision enters into force, with the exception of MPs. At the same time, there is already case law contradicting this provision. 

For example, one decision of the HACC Appeals Chamber on forfeiture entered into legal force on December 3, 2024, and in accordance with the requirements of the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Director of the SBI dismissed the relevant employee from their position. However, on February 12, 2025, the head of the State Bureau of Investigation reappointed that employee to the same position effective February 18, relying on the fact that the Law on the State Bureau of Investigation does not prohibit reappointment. 

Such practice undermines the civil forfeiture mechanism and may encourage public officials to make a psychological decision to acquire unjustified assets. After all, the only consequence they might face is forfeiture of the asset following court proceedings, while they may avoid dismissal and remain in a position that allows further accumulation of such unjustified property. 

Another nuance of the proposed provisions is that the reduction of the illicit enrichment threshold — and, accordingly, the upper limit for civil forfeiture — by UAH 0.75 million has an ambiguous nature, meaning that the change has both advantages and disadvantages.

This adjustment is not aligned with the threshold for aggravated criminal liability for false asset declaration — 3,000 subsistence minimums versus 2,500. Therefore, it would be optimal to harmonize the thresholds for aggravated liability for false declarations and for illicit enrichment, since the latter does not activate at the starting point of the aggravated false declaration threshold. This creates a gap of UAH 1.5 million between the two thresholds, allowing a declarant to avoid liability for illicit enrichment by exploiting this legal loophole. 

On the other hand, the current opportunities for effective use of civil forfeiture remain more limited than would be desirable. It is worth recalling that civil forfeiture operates under a lower standard of proof, making it a more accessible tool. It is based on the “balance of probabilities” principle, under which the burden lies with the state to prove that the assets are more likely unjustified than acquired from lawful sources. In contrast, illicit enrichment requires a significantly stronger evidentiary basis for an indictment, as guilt must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” — with all doubts in criminal proceedings interpreted in favor of the defendant. 

Currently, after a court acquittal in an illicit enrichment case, SAPO has no legal option to apply civil forfeiture measures to such individuals. Therefore, lowering the illicit enrichment threshold, which would result in more cases falling under this article, should not preclude the possibility of pursuing civil forfeiture in court if the suspect is acquitted. SAPO also raises this issue in its position, noting the need to preserve this option following the closure of a criminal case. 

To address this issue, it would be preferable for SAPO to be granted the authority to exercise procedural supervision in all illicit enrichment cases — a power not currently provided by law. In such a scenario, SAPO prosecutors could assess, on a case-by-case basis, the judicial prospects of pursuing a case either through criminal or civil proceedings. However, this should not overburden the institution, especially considering that its capacity is expanding and that illicit enrichment cases may only relate to assets acquired since 2019. In addition, the filing of an indictment should interrupt the statute of limitations for filing a civil forfeiture claim. However, the draft law contains no such provision, and it should therefore be improved in this respect.

Furthermore, the possibility for the NABU to investigate other cases that do not fall within the revised thresholds for criminal offenses or damage caused should not be ruled out. Prosecutors are authorized to assign cases to NABU detectives if the offense has caused or could have caused serious consequences for society or the state, and NABU detectives are empowered to investigate cases initially handled by other bodies upon the decision of the NABU Director and with the consent of the SAPO prosecutor. To ensure this, the procedure for requesting such cases and coordinating interactions between the NABU, the SAPO, and other investigative bodies should be improved.

No less important in resolving the issue of the absence of a maximum retention period in the so-called “Corruption Offender Register” is to take into account that the periods of criminal record validity under Article 89 of the Criminal Code are rather short, for example, in the case of a plea agreement that provides for exemption from actual punishment, the maximum period is 3 years. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the duration of the probationary period established under such agreements to at least 6 years, as was proposed in the government draft law on plea agreements. 

We have no objections to the retention periods proposed in Draft Law No. 13271-1 for inclusion in the Offender Register, provided that future amendments to the Criminal Code extend the periods of criminal record validity (to at least 6 years, as proposed in the government’s draft law on plea agreements), and also introduce a retention period for disciplinary offenses. The NACP’s proposal to remove individuals only from the public section of the Register also, in our view, deserves consideration by the legislature.

Which provisions of the original draft law were amended or removed by the Committee’s version?

In the vast majority of cases, the Committee succeeded in removing the most critical provisions from the original version of the draft law.

One particularly dangerous provision in the original draft was the narrowing of NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, which is already imperfect as it does not cover certain high-ranking officials. Such a narrowing could have occurred as a result of raising the thresholds for false asset declarations. If the MPs’ amendments had been adopted, new cases would have fallen outside the NABU-SAPO-HACC framework and instead been handled by the SBI – National Police – Prosecutor General’s Office – courts of general jurisdiction. This would have significantly undermined the effectiveness of pre-trial investigations and court proceedings in terms of ensuring the inevitability of punishment. 

Since the NABU, the SAPO, and the HACC have been granted legal authority to expand their staff, such legislative limitations on their jurisdiction and competence would have been inconsistent. On the contrary, the NABU should be empowered to investigate illicit enrichment and false asset declarations regardless of the declarant’s position, provided that the value meets the offense threshold.

The Committee rejected the proposal to raise the minimum bribe amount for NABU investigations, which could have allowed serious corrupt actors to escape accountability by transferring their cases to less specialized bodies — such as the SBI or National Police. For example, Kyiv City Council member Vladyslav Trubitsyn and five other individuals are currently being tried in absentia for receiving UAH 1.39 million in bribes in exchange for retail outlets in the capital. If such changes had been adopted, this case and others like it would no longer fall within NABU’s purview. 

The original draft also proposed that the NACP’s lifestyle monitoring period not exceed four months from the date of the relevant decision, and that monitoring would be limited exclusively to assets, income, expenditures, services, and other elements of lifestyle acquired or received while holding office, with no authority to monitor candidates for office. These provisions were excluded from the Committee’s version.

In general, the timeframe for lifestyle monitoring should not be regulated at the legislative level under optimal circumstances, as it is too minor an issue from a legal drafting perspective to warrant legislative attention. Nevertheless, the inclusion of such norms in Draft Law No. 13271-1 appeared to be a forced step, as the NACP has never imposed any time limits on lifestyle monitoring in its own subordinate regulations or methodological guidelines. 

According to our research on the lifestyle monitoring mechanism, such lack of time limits can result in excessive interference with the private lives of declarants, which is prohibited by law and may also constitute a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) — the right to respect for private and family life — potentially giving rise to cases before the European Court of Human Rights against Ukraine. 

The NACP also reported at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy that in 2023, the minimum duration of lifestyle monitoring was 3.5 months, the average duration was 10 months, and the maximum reached 18 months. In 2024, the minimum dropped to 2 months, the average stood at 9 months, and the maximum was 15.5 months. In a context where the state has only four years (from the date the disputed assets were acquired) under the statute of limitations for filing civil claims to recognize assets as unjustified, spending up to 1.5 years on lifestyle monitoring alone is excessive. Therefore, calling this procedure an effective tool seems somewhat inaccurate. It is also important to note that, unlike limitation periods for liability, the statute of limitations in these cases is calculated up to the moment the claim is filed with the court. 

Thus, introducing a four-month limit for lifestyle monitoring could be supported if it also included a provision for a justified extension of up to two additional months. The NACP’s proposal to the lead Committee to establish a 180-day monitoring period with the possibility of extending it by another 180 days is not relevant, as a full year of potential lifestyle monitoring does not resolve the issue of its excessive duration. For the same reason, SAPO’s proposal to leave lifestyle monitoring without any time limits should also not be taken into account. Therefore, in the future, the monitoring period should be regulated at the level of the NACP’s internal procedure.

More dangerous provisions in the original version of the draft law included proposals to limit the subject of lifestyle monitoring exclusively to assets acquired while holding office, and to exclude the verification of assets belonging to the declarant’s family members or third parties, which is currently allowed. From the perspective of the goals of the electronic declaration system, such changes would not only create a major legal loophole and the potential for legalizing unjustified assets — for instance, by resigning and later returning to office, or falsely claiming that assets were acquired before taking office — but would also set a dangerous precedent for further narrowing the scope of full declaration verifications. Although Draft Law No. 13271-1, unlike the problematic primary draft No. 13271 by Serhii Vlasenko, does not affect full verifications, the legislator could, in the future, use such a narrowing of lifestyle monitoring as a precedent for restricting the scope of full checks as well. 

It worth mentioning that international standards envisage a single procedure for verifying asset declarations, not a variety of them. This is why Transparency International Ukraine has proposed abolishing lifestyle monitoring altogether, as a procedure that duplicates full verifications. However, if monitoring is retained in legislation, it should be viewed as a preliminary check of specific potential abuses proactively identified by NACP staff through information and analytical work, similar to NABU’s model, which the NACP currently does not conduct. Where the declarant fails such monitoring, the Agency should initiate a full verification, covering all sections of the declaration. Such provisions could also be added as part of improvements to the draft law.

The original version of the draft law did not provide a comprehensive framework for the duration of inclusion in the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses (the “Offender Register,” formerly the “Corruption Register”). It proposed that this period should not exceed the relevant limitation established by Article 39 of the Code of Administrative Offenses — one year for those subjected to administrative sanctions — and the limitation periods set out in Article 89 of the Criminal Code, for those convicted of criminal offenses (with criminal record terms ranging from one to eight years). However, the original draft law made no mention of time limits for inclusion in the Register based on civil, disciplinary measures, or liability of legal entities. The version adopted by the Committee is therefore more comprehensive and coherent.

Conclusions

Transparency International Ukraine believes that Draft Law No. 13271-1 should be adopted as a basis, with further refinement in line with our recommendations. This improvement process should involve international partners, as well as representatives of civil society and anti-corruption institutions. We support the Committee’s decision to reject the alternative draft laws No. 13271 and No. 13271-2. 

To improve the draft law, we recommend the following:

• Reduce the administrative threshold from UAH 0.3 million to, for example, UAH 0.15 million and the criminal thresholds from UAH 1.5 million and UAH 6 million to, for example, UAH 1.2 million and UAH 2.4 million for false asset declaration liability, and reduce the threshold for civil forfeiture from UAH 1.5 million to, for example, UAH 1.2 million.
• Grant the NACP the authority to identify unjustified assets and collect evidence of their unjustified nature under Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code without being restricted by special procedures, and improve the civil forfeiture mechanism in line with the recommendations of our separate study. 
• Introduce a flexible option to transition from criminal proceedings on illicit enrichment to civil forfeiture, based on the SAPO prosecutors’ assessment of the evidentiary basis in specific cases. To implement this, all illicit enrichment and civil forfeiture proceedings (excluding those involving NABU, SAPO, and HACC officials) should be handled through the SAPO.
• Improve case referral procedures when granting the NABU the authority to investigate illicit enrichment and false asset declarations regardless of the declarant’s position, provided the offense meets the applicable liability threshold.
• The subject of monitoring lifestyle, if this mechanism remains in the legislation, should be adjusted in the opposite direction — to provide the NACP with the ability to conduct proactive information and analytical work, similar to NABU’s approach, for identifying and preliminarily reviewing specific potential abuses.
• Harmonize the thresholds for aggravated criminal liability for false asset declaration and illicit enrichment, for example, by reducing both to UAH 2.4 million.
• Consider the NACP’s proposal to remove individuals only from the public section of the Offender Register and introduce a specific retention period for inclusion based on disciplinary violations.
• Extend the criminal record duration to at least six years, including for individuals conditionally released from punishment.

At present, Draft Law No. 13271-1 revises key elements of criminal liability and NABU jurisdiction and includes several positive innovations. However, with further improvement of the draft’s provisions, there remains significant potential for a more positive impact on the effectiveness of Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy.

What are Krupa, other heads of the commissions, and Khmelnytskyi prosecutors in for?

Despite all the “spin-offs” in the case involving heads of the medical and social expert commissions, let’s recall the main figures of the scandal.

It all started with the SBI searches at the premises of Tetiana Krupa, head of the Khmelnytskyi Regional Center of the MSEC, and her son Oleksandr, who is also the head of the Pension Fund of the Khmelnytskyi region. After law enforcement officers found USD 6.5 million of undeclared cash at Krupa’s residence and evidence that she had issued disability certificates, she was served with a suspicion notice of unlawful enrichment.

Subsequently, the case was transferred to the NABU from the SBI since Krupa is a member of the Khmelnytskyi Regional Council, and by law, the Bureau has jurisdiction over investigations into officials of this category. An interim measure has already been selected for Tetiana Krupa in the form of detention, this decision is now being appealed. Let’s talk about why this case is special.

The detention of Krupa is just the beginning of the story. Journalists then conducted their own investigation and found that fifty prosecutors of the Khmelnytskyi region, including the regional prosecutor Oleksii Oliinyk, have an issued disability certificate. Under this status, they received pensions for years.

Such a turn eventually led to a series of decisions by the authorities. In particular, the Prosecutor General’s Office initiated official investigations concerning all bodies of the prosecutor’s office. According to preliminary data from the PGO, similar cases with dozens of prosecutors with disability certificates in other oblasts were reported. This was also the reason for the resignation of the Prosecutor General. The Verkhovna Rada has already voted for his dismissal.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reacted to this scandal, announcing large-scale inspections of the entire structure and its elimination. This is where the public part of the scandal ended.

Let’s focus on the case of Krupa. Why is it so special, and how is it different from other MSEC episodes?

As we have already indicated, the case of Krupa is being investigated by the NABU. Later, it will be heard by the HACC because she is a member of the regional council. As for other MSEC representatives, their actions shall be investigated by the SBI. However, not without exception: the investigation into potential corruption schemes by Vira Bieliakova, head of the Mykolaiv regional MSEC, is conducted by the SSU. During the searches at Bieliakova’s premises, more than USD 450,000 dollars was found in cash, as well as a collection of jewelry, which she hid at different addresses. Her son has a Russian passport issued by the Russian consulate in Odesa before the full-scale invasion.

But the main question is: What liability will the defendants bear under the law if the court finds them guilty? The Law on Corruption Prevention establishes an exhaustive list of officials who can be punished for unlawful enrichment, and there are no heads of regional MSECs or any other members of these commissions among them.

This means that the commission heads can be punished only for false declaration. The maximum penalty for such an offense is a 2-year imprisonment without the opportunity to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for 3 years. At the same time, illegal assets cannot be confiscated, no matter how significant they may be, since this article does not provide for an additional punishment in the form of confiscation.

On the other hand, the state still has the opportunity to bring MSEC heads to criminal liability for money laundering (Art. 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) if a MSEC official, for example, purchased property for the received bribe or put these funds into bank accounts. This article has a more severe punishment—up to 6 years in prison, or up to 8 years if it concerns property worth more than UAH 9 million. Under this article, such illegal property can be confiscated. However, in Ukraine, this approached is rarely applied, although it could be a solution in the MSEC cases.

It is precisely because of the complexity of punishment provided for such violators that the parliament should include this category of people in the list of authorized persons to perform the functions of the state or local self-government. This will allow for prosecuting dishonest MSEC heads for unlawful enrichment and confiscate their assets either in criminal proceedings or within civil forfeiture.

As for the prosecutors from the Khmelnytskyi region, as well as other regions, only official investigations against them were reported. However, such investigations do not provide for prosecution for corruption, and following the results of official investigations, prosecutors can only issue reprimands or dismiss them. However, these results can also become the basis for other criminal investigations if the Prosecutor General’s Office transfers them to the SBI or the NABU.

Meanwhile, while the internal investigation is ongoing, all prosecutors whose disability is dubious may continue to exercise their powers if they are not suspended or dismissed before the end of the investigation.

However, if it turns out that prosecutors got a disability certificate illegally a through a corruption scheme, a criminal case may be initiated against them. In particular, under Art. 369—providing improper advantage, under Art. 358—forgery of documents, or Art. 190–fraud. However, there is currently no information that such cases have been initiated or that suspicion notices have been served.

Could the NACP have detected violations in the declarations of MSEC heads?

Heads of regional MSECs are obliged to submit declarations (despite recent statements by the Head of the NACP), and all of them are in the public domain, except that of Natalia Salnykova, head of the Kherson MSEC. We studied the financial condition of 23 heads of regional MSECs and found that not only Tetiana Krupa could be suspected of potential violations.

We are most concerned about the fact that 18 out of 23 MSEC heads receive a pension, or their husband or wife do. In 8 cases, both receive a pension.

Due to the peculiar way of entering data in the declarations, we cannot establish whether these pensions are retirement benefits for years of service, a disability pension, or it was assigned under some other reason. But such an analysis can and obviously should be carried out by the NACP. After all, the receipt of a pension by MSEC heads and their family members, if it was assigned specifically for a disability, may indicate a potential conflict of interest, which is precisely within the NACP mandate.

In addition, in more than half of the cases, a significant increase in assets of the heads of regional MSECs during their tenure can be traced. Of course, most of them are nowhere near the level of Tetiana Krupa and her husband, who, by the way, is also a civil servant, as he heads the Department of the State Audit Service of the Khmelnytskyi region. However, some cases attract attention. For example, the fact that Vasyl Tymoshchuk, head of the Volyn MSEC, declared 50 real estate objects. The level of Tymoshchuk’s income of UAH 492,000 for 2023 (including pension) and information about his previous earnings, which were almost half lower, raises serious doubts about the possibility of buying so many assets.

An alarming trend is the acquisition of a number of large land plots by MSEC heads and their husbands or wives, sometimes for ridiculous amounts of money. Thus, the wife of Mykhailo Kulayets, head of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional MSEC, acquired 4 land plots of more than 1000 sq. m. during his tenure. Kulayets himself in 2023 alone acquired 5 more plots of several thousand square meters. According to the declaration, 4 of them cost less than UAH 10,000.

This raises the question: did the NACP check the above-mentioned declarations of regional MSEC heads, and what conclusions did the Agency reach following the results of such checks?

Overall, the declarations of 6 MSEC heads successfully passed the automated full check by the NACP, which consisted in verifying if the data of the declaration corresponded to those from the registers. However, many questions remain about the success of automated checks. During a full manual check, the authorized person can ask the declarant for an explanation of the origin of the declared savings, while an automated check does not provide for such a possibility. Similarly, an automated full check will not be able to identify a likely conflict of interest when MSEC heads unreasonably provide disability conclusions about themselves or their family members. The NACP cannot check the amount of cash savings of declarants by mandate; only law enforcement agencies can do this during searches.

Interestingly, among all the declarations we studied, only one was manually checked by NACP authorized persons, and this was precisely the declaration of the Khmelnytskyi MSEC head. The results of the check revealed only signs of an administrative offense, not a criminal one.

The certificate on the results of the full check of Tetiana Krupa indicates that the NACP specialists found discrepancies only regarding the undeclared value of the property, checking them with the state register. But the authorized persons did not order an examination of whether the value of land plots or houses acquired by Krupa in 2022 in the Khmelnytskyi region corresponded to the market value, and the declaration indicated roughly UAH 2,000 or UAH 10,000. We have seen many similar cases with land plots purchased for peanuts. In other declarations of regional MSEC heads, we have seen many interesting things.

When resuming declaration, MPs laid down a new rule in the law on Prevention of Corruption on the presumption of reliability of state register data, with the only exception—the information from them is unreliable if it is established legally. Therefore, the NACP should not only be guided by data from state registers and title documents, but also check them in regard to the market value.

Now the declarations of Krupa and her husband are being re-checked. However, the overall picture with the checks of the MSEC head declarations gives reason to doubt the effectiveness of the current NACP financial control measures when checking declarations. We have already criticized the Agency’s new approach to automating full checks, and this analysis of ours confirms the previous position.

We cannot comment on the reasons why, in addition to the declaration of Tetiana Krupa, the declarations of other MSEC heads were not selected for a full manual check by the NACP. All because the rules of logical and arithmetic control, according to which the risk of declarations is determined, still have not been disclosed. We have long called on the NACP to make these rules public so that potential problems could be identified and the selection of declarations could be improved.

It is important to understand that it is a quality check of officials’ assets by the National Agency that may eventually become the basis for the opening of proceedings by law enforcement agencies regarding potential violations.

How do we change all that?

Unfortunately, personnel decisions within the MSEC scandal, as well as the liquidation of the very institution, do not solve the systemic problem—insufficient control over the operation of these commissions and the impossibility of bringing their representatives to justice. Currently, there are practically no mechanisms that would ensure proper detection, investigation, and punishment for this category of civil servants.

The system needs comprehensive fundamental changes that will become reliable safeguards against similar scandals in the future. In the future, similar neglected issues may emerge in other fields despite all attempts to control this process.

What should be done so that there are no more such large-scale scandals?

1. The NACP should review the existing approach to conducting full checks, in particular abandon their automation and focus on conducting these audits manually by authorized persons.
2. The parliament should synchronize the circle of persons who can be punished for unlawful enrichment or whose assets can be considered unjustified with the entities obliged to submit declarations in accordance with the Law on Prevention of Corruption.

However, such changes will not impact the story that has unfolded. After all, criminal law does not have a retroactive effect, and therefore it is necessary to develop a mechanism for bringing to criminal liability for the legalization of property.

Unless this is done, then at best, the NACP will select the declarations of MSEC heads for full checks; based on the results, it might establish the following signs:

• of false declaration, which we mentioned above or
• of a real conflict of interest if it is proved that MSEC heads received a pension based on their own expert opinions. Liability for such a violation is a fine of UAH 1,700 to UAH 13,600 with a deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period of 1 year (Articles 172-7 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses).

In addition, based on the violations established above, MSEC heads may be brought to disciplinary liability, that is, in the best-case scenario, those who have not yet been dismissed will be dismissed. Can this be precisely the kind of punishment that Ukrainians expect for such crimes? Hardly.

Unjustified “love” for lifestyle monitoring

Judging by public communication, just as his predecessor did, Viktor Pavlushchyk is betting on strengthening the tool for monitoring the lifestyle of officials, which he covers quite enthusiastically in commentaries to journalists. This approach is a bit surprising because the mechanism of lifestyle monitoring still has a lot of deficiencies. Despite the fact that it has recently been regulated by an officially registered procedure, and not by optional methodical recommendations, the use of the tool by the National Agency still raises many questions.

Viktor Pavlushchyk does not say anything about improving the lifestyle monitoring procedure, but again and again emphasizes that the introduction and expansion of this mechanism within the activities of the NACP will become his main task, a kind of basis for the entire operation of the NACP.

For example, the difference between the application of lifestyle monitoring and the full checks of declarations is still unclear. The legal grounds for launching the procedures are quite similar; in practice, there may be confusion about which one should be started in different cases.

There are also questions about the extent to which lifestyle monitoring will allow disproportionate interference by NACP employees in the private lives of officials. Moreover, some powers of NACP employees engaged in this are quite dubious because these specialists, for example, have the right to freely enter the premises of public authorities, local self-government bodies, legal entities, etc. using their employment IDs. In our opinion, this is definitely too much, since lifestyle monitoring is a “desk check,” for which the authorized person does not need to leave their workplace. If the NACP uses this right in practice, the court could potentially find it an undue interference with privacy.

But our greatest concern is that there is still no automatic distribution of monitoring cases among NACP employees to conduct the procedure. This is fraught with the fact that specific categories of declarants or even individuals will be checked by very specific people in the National Agency, and there is already a space for abuse and political influences, isn’t there?

There are also questions to the so-called “quick” checks—an artificially created control measure by the NACP to verify the completeness of declarations. Nothing has changed here since the time of Oleksandr Novikov in office: the relevant department continues to function within the structure of the NACP. The problem with “quick” checks is that they are not aimed at finding signs of illicit enrichment, unreasonable assets, or conflict of interest at all.

As far as the new NACP practices of conducting full checks of officials’ declarations are concerned, the situation has even taken a turn for the worse. Full checks in practice turn out to be less effective than lifestyle monitoring—this is indicated in particular by the figures recently published by the Agency. The NACP noted this as an achievement, but in practice, a new risk-oriented approach to the selection and verification of declarations led to the fact that from the perspective of finding unjustified assets of officials alone, one case of lifestyle monitoring turned out to be more effective than more than 200 full checks of declarations for the first six months of the year because it found almost UAH 29 million worth of such assets, and two hundred inspections found a half—UAH 14.4 million.

It seems that such a difference in results is due to the fact that when fully checking a declaration, the NACP, in our opinion, focuses more on identifying inaccuracies in the e-declaration, for example, declared differences of several hundred hryvnias on bank accounts. Subsequently, they rely on such inaccuracies, and not on the persona of the declarant and their family members, who are the main subject in lifestyle monitoring and have to be as important within full checks.

Instead, in order to increase the number of formally verified declarations, in addition to all the already mentioned tools, the NACP, already under Pavlushchyk, erroneously introduced the concept of automated full checks, which we opposed, just as we did with “quick” checks.

The NACP now states that automated verification can cover up to 30% of all submitted declarations. It might have sense only at first glance because fewer declarations (about 0.2% of the annual number of submitted) get checked in Ukraine than we would like to. However, such artificial overestimation of verification rates through automation can lead to the fact that even those officials who “failed” lifestyle monitoring can successfully pass an automated check.

Therefore, the current NACP Head, instead of bragging about formal figures of formal checks of declarations, should focus more on the quality of such a verification. This is impossible without the proper engagement of a person, not a computer. In addition, close European countries of the region—Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, Latvia, and Poland—also check about 0.2-2% of the submitted declarations.

So far, there have been no changes in the approaches to identifying conflicts of interest and stalling in the issue of whistleblower protection.

The issue of monitoring conflicts of interest and related anti-corruption restrictions (for example, on gifts to officials) by the NACP in Ukraine remains undefined. At any rate, Viktor Pavlushchyk does not cover this problem in his public commentaries, and there is still no automatic distribution of relevant monitoring cases among the Agency’s employees, nor is there an officially registered procedure for conducting such monitoring.

That is, this issue, which was described in detail by the auditors in their report, and which was repeatedly stated by public experts, was not in the focus of the new Head of the NACP.

In his communication with journalists, Pavlushchyk also mentions the launch of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal almost a year ago. But he says something strange about it, allegedly, it is necessary “… not to change the portal 10 times; it should be done once and for all.”

But we have not seen such changes, a plan, or a concept of their implementation in almost six months. This is despite the fact that the connection to the portal continues, and the number of reports received through it is constantly growing; currently there are more than 3,500 of them. Who can access these reports and how? How does the NACP plan to improve the use of this anti-corruption tool? What does “once and for all” mean?

The portal does not fully comply with best practices, primarily in terms of ease of use, anonymity, and confidentiality. We are convinced that it is impossible to delay further with the improvement of the portal, and the NACP already has a proposal for a changes roadmap—a few months ago, the public presented a list of the main problems in the field of whistleblower protection that need to be addressed.

Dubious personnel policy

During the interviews in the competition for the selection of the NACP Head, Viktor Pavlushchyk promised to properly organize competitions following the model of the NABU, stating that all such appointments should be made transparently and openly. The NACP under Korchak was known for incomprehensible transfers within the body without competitions.

However, as we can see, what was said in February can be forgotten by July. At least, we have not noticed any positive practical changes in this area in almost six months. But we have noticed unexpectedly unpleasant personnel decisions: the post of deputy was given to Serhii Hupiak.

Why are anti-corruption experts so dissatisfied? We are talking about one of the finalists of the competition for the NACP Head!

That’s because Serhii Hupiak, the ex-head of the investigative department of the SBI territorial branch in Khmelnytskyi, already raised doubts about his impartiality during the selection. For example, journalist Natalia Sedletska then spoke about Hupiak’s participation in the NABU competition as follows: “He is the head of the SBI in Vinnytsia Oblast, that is, a subordinate of Oleksii Sukhachov, and therefore it is a direct vertical of Oleh Tatarov. Back on the weekend, the Presidential Office really considered appointing Hupiak as the NABU director. International partners were against it.” 

The candidate, for his part, at an interview for the NACP Head insisted on the independence of the SBI, where he then worked, and several times quite emotionally declared his own independence; however, he remains to be taken at his word. Neither did Hupiak fully answer the questions about the origin of some of his and his family’s savings, which he was asked about both this year and a year before during the competition for the NABU director.

The media also reported that Pavlushchyk and Hupiak were classmates, which was eventually confirmed to journalists by the Head of the NACP himself. He argued the appointment of Hupiak as follows: “We simply do not have time to prepare a person from another field.”

Representatives of the NACP said that Hupiak was fully prepared for this work, as he had been among the finalists of two competitions—for the position of the NABU director in 2023 and for the position of the NACP head in 2024. However, the agency fails to see a conflict of interest in this appointment, as it has repeatedly stressed that the very fact of the work or training of persons in the past is not an unconditional circumstance that indicates its existence. The relationship of the NACP head with Serhii Hupiak, according to the Agency, is exclusively business-like.

Interestingly, the NACP’s units for the formation of integrity (in the private and public spheres), the development of the whistleblower institution, as well as the minimization of corruption risks and anti-corruption expertise will be subordinated to Hupiak. Therefore, it is already clear that there will be a lot of attention to his activities in the Agency.

But is there hope?

Of course, we would not say that everything in the work of the NACP and Pavlushchyk has failed or has been unsatisfactory.

For example, the undeniable achievement of the NACP under Pavlushchyk is that the Agency has finally transferred the groundwork in the field of sanctions policy not provided for by the legislative mandate of the NACP to the relevant Interagency Working Group.

The Head of the NACP also mentioned the need to implement the recommendations of the external independent audit provided a year ago, and has already divided the previously unified internal control and corruption prevention unit. This is a useful step as these two departments have a different nature—control and preventive. Moreover, internal control stopped checking the declarations of intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers, etc.; this function was taken over by a separate newly created unit, which is a positive step.

It is unfortunate, however, that the very procedures for checking intelligence officers remain closed contrary to audit recommendations. Therefore, it is impossible to determine their effectiveness and make sure that there are no gaps. More than a hundred other recommendations of the independent audit are still awaiting implementation.

In our opinion, the partial autofill of the draft e-declaration with information from state registers at the stage of its submission by the declarant has prospects and will significantly simplify the life of officials when filling out declarations.

However, a potentially dangerous precedent was that the updated and registered by the Ministry of Justice procedure for logical and arithmetic control (LAC) of submitting declarations began to directly stipulate that the LAC rules were not subject to publication and distribution. Even under Oleksandr Novikov’s leadership, we were very critical of the closure of the LAC, and the auditors did not find a legal justification for such actions of the Agency.

By the way, the Plan for the Implementation of External Audit Recommendations announced a year ago could not yet be found on the NACP website. We very much hope that the NACP does not plan to ignore most of the opinions of international experts on the implementation of these recommendations.

An independent audit mechanism with the possibility of dismissal of the head for inefficiency of the body was introduced into the legislation after the negative experience of the collegial NACP, whose first head was Natalia Korchak.

How did Kniazev get busted with the rental of the four-room apartment in Lypky?

In May 2023, detectives visited Kniazev’s home and uncovered large-scale corruption in the Supreme Court. According to NABU and SAPO, Kniazev received $2.7 million in bribes for favorable court decisions benefiting oligarch Kostiantyn Zhevaho.

During the search, they found not only piles of cash but also a rental contract for an apartment, which immediately interested law enforcement officers. Since 2017, Vsevolod Kniazev has been renting a 4-room apartment with an area of 133 square meters in Lypky, not far from the government quarter, and has been paying a symbolic thousand hryvnias for it.

Based on the existence of this contract, the NACP drafted a report, which was then reviewed by the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv. The same court determined that Kniazev had thereby violated restrictions on receiving gifts. In fact, this is related to corruption, for which the former chair of the Supreme Court was fined UAH 2,550 and the gift was confiscated.

The court classified as a gift the difference between the minimum market value of the apartment, which could range from UAH 51,000 to 57,000 per month, and the actual rent paid during the time that the former chair of the Supreme Court lived there. Accordingly, Kniazev saved UAH 906,600, that is, he received these funds as a gift from the lessor.

“The apartment is not new, and the contract pertains to a different property,” Kniazev argued

Kniazev emphasized in court that the rent was not UAH 1,000 but rather USD 1,100. According to the ex-chair of the Supreme Court, this was outlined in a separate contract, which NABU detectives did not find. He stated that such a price corresponded to the market rate according to his research, as “the apartment was not new; it was part of the old housing stock, with no renovations done for 30 years.” Kniazev, on the other hand, “worked all the time, so it was not fundamentally important to him.”

And the contract found is purportedly related to the lease of a parking space. Why was an apartment included in the contract for a thousand hryvnias? Kniazev’s lawyer explained that the owner did not have documents for the parking space.

The court took a critical view of these arguments because the ex-chairman of the Supreme Court never once indicated in the declaration and during the search neither another contract nor a parking space as the object of the lease. The apartment owner actually only had ownership rights to the garage at another address, which was registered by a private notary – revealed to be Kniazev’s wife. When NACP asked why the rental contract was concluded at the price of UAH 1,000, Kniazev replied that it was agreed upon on terms acceptable to both parties.

Moreover, the defense attorney claimed that Kniazev’s individual renting of housing did not create corruption risks in the performance of his work functions. However, neither these nor other arguments of the defense party convinced the judge, and on December 26, 2023, the court made the aforementioned decision to confiscate the gift of UAH 906,000.

Unsuccessful confiscation – where did the money go?

The defense filed an appeal and received a response in March 2024. The Kyiv Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first instance because even receiving a minor gift with violations is sufficient to classify it as an administrative offense. If we discuss the potential influence on Kniazev’s actions as the former chairman of the Supreme Court, then this could lead to criminal charges.

In parallel with the court proceedings regarding the lease, in January 2024, Kniazev was released on bail in the bribery case, and the former chair of the Supreme Court was released from the pretrial detention center.

But he claimed to have no money to fulfill the appellate decision. It is worth noting that before making the bail deposit, Kniazev waited for more than half a year until its amount was reduced from the initial UAH 107 million to UAH 18 million. We cannot definitively state whether the judge has UAH 900,000 remaining after paying the bail.

What property was seized?

However, the State Penitentiary Service of the Ministry of Justice (SPS) did not wait for Kniazev to transfer funds to fulfill the court decision and seized his property and bank accounts. Deputy Minister for Penitentiary Service Andrii Haichenko noted that if there is no money in the accounts of the former chair of the Supreme Court, the SPS will seize any property found on him.

The SPS reports 4 real estate properties in Mykolaiv and Mykolaiv region registered to the former chair of the Supreme Court but it appears that not all of this property is solely owned by Kniazev. On April 26, the court divided the property between Kniazev and his ex-wife Yulia, who filed for divorce after the bribery scheme was exposed in the Supreme Court. The ex-wife retained ownership of the apartment building, $52,000 in cash, and funds in numerous bank accounts.

Why is this Kniazev’s case also important?

Most often, illegal gifts did not cause many problems for those who received them. The standard fine for violating legal restrictions on receiving gifts, regardless of their value and without considering confiscation, is only UAH 3,400 tops. And the payment of such funds was hardly a problem for other officials for whom relevant decisions were made.

TI Ukraine previously discussed the format and total value of gifts permitted by law, which was UAH 10,736 in 2023. If the limit is exceeded, then the official will be subject to the aforementioned fine.

At the same time, a unique situation unfolded with Kniazev. The significant confiscation of a gift amounting to UAH 906,000, as ordered by the court, is one of the largest confiscations to become public knowledge. And in general, such a decision is an important precedent.

The publicity of this case may lead unscrupulous officials to reconsider whether it is better to refuse a valuable gift to avoid facing such a substantial confiscation. And this, in turn, will contribute to the real prevention of corruption-related violations.

The fact that we learned about such a violation during the investigation of another, larger case, and it resulted in real punishment, refutes the thesis about the total ineffectiveness of anti-corruption bodies. Because if there wasn’t one, there wouldn’t be another either. And I think we will see similar stories again.

The main challenges the NACP is currently facing 

The past 4 years have been a period of real turbulence for the Agency.  

Perhaps the greatest challenge the NACP faced after its reboot was the constitutional crisis of 2020, which had been caused by the decision of the Constitutional Court to destroy the electronic declaration system and deprive the Agency of part of its powers. Back then, it seemed that the very existence of the institution was in jeopardy. Responding to the crisis, the authorities quickly joined in solving this problem: the powers of the NACP were restored, although it took almost a year to wait for the restoration of imprisonment for false declaration. 

However, after the full-scale invasion of Russia broke out, MPs abolished the mandatory e-declaration of officials for the duration of martial law. Thus, the Agency ceased to perform a crucial function assigned to it—checking declarations.  

Last October, MPs restored it, along with the mandatory e-declaration. However, this has caused a new challenge: now NACP specialists have to check the declarations for 2021-2023, which amount to about 2.5 million documents.  

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused no fewer problems. This was the reason the submission of reports by political parties was suspended for almost four years. The parliament eventually remedied this shortcoming, and last December, mandatory party reporting was resumed. However, now all the reports of political parties need to be collected and checked, which also requires considerable resources. 

Some of the external problems that have arisen during this time have already been solved, but they could have generated new ones. There are certain tasks within the Agency that the previous Head of the NACP either could not or did not want to solve, so this work will have to be done by Viktor Pavlushchyk. 

In general, the main focus of the NACP should be the prevention of corruption. According to the law, in addition to checking the declarations of officials and reports of political parties, the functions of the NACP include the protection of whistleblowers, monitoring of conflicts of interest and gifts, as well as the general formation of the anti-corruption policy of the state, etc. There have been difficulties in fulfilling each of these functions in recent years. 

First of all, the new Head of the NACP, in our opinion, will need to make changes to the structure of the work of the body itself. For example, some units currently perform the functions they are not supposed to perform. In particular, the internal control unit of the NACP checks the declarations of intelligence officers, counterintelligence officers, etc. This is not provided for by law and does not correlate with what this unit should do. 

Many of the NACP’s documents are closed from the public. We cannot assess how effectively the Agency does what it should do. For example, the rules of logical and arithmetic control of declarations are closed, according to which they are automatically analyzed and compared with data from registers and past declarations. 

There are other closed documents, for example, the procedures for inspections of intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers, etc. The procedure for lifestyle monitoring, which is now endless, is still inadequately regulated, and the mandate of the NACP employees is not clearly defined. There is currently no procedure for monitoring conflicts of interest in the NACP. 

Considerable potential for the development of the institution of whistleblowers remains. We still see problems in the functioning of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal, in particular in ensuring the confidentiality of both the whistleblowers themselves and the information they provide.

How Viktor Pavlushchyk plans to update the work of the NACP 

Let us remind you that Pavlushchyk came to the NACP from the outside. Before that, he worked in the NABU from the moment of its inception. So, there was a possibility that it might be a little more difficult for him to adapt to a new position because, in addition to scaling up his leadership skills, he would also have to switch from law enforcement to corruption prevention. The next six months will demonstrate how efficient he will be. 

Interestingly, already during his first speech before the NACP team, Viktor Pavlushchyk emphasized the importance of overcoming corruption as a prerequisite for integration with the European community and victory over the aggressor country. He also underscored that the Agency must fulfill its mandate effectively and noted that he expected each unit manager and employee to stay focused while implementing the tasks for which the NACP was created. 

In this context, we see the results of the independent external audit as the main benchmark for the new Head to increase the capacity of the NACP. International experts have provided well over one hundred recommendations that relate to all areas of the Agency’s activities. On the bright side, the selection commission has already supported the need to provide the winner of the competition with the results of the external evaluation. The new Head, in turn, showed his willingness to take them, as well as the recommendations of the European Commission, into consideration. 

Pavlushchyk has already proved that he is able to work on complex tasks. For example, in the NABU, it was he who dealt with the case of KAC films and the chairman and judges of the Supreme Court. Therefore, implementing the recommendations to improve the Agency’s operation can be just another difficult yet doable task. 

This is confirmed by the recent decision to terminate the NACP’s sanctions focus area. Thus, this week, at a meeting of the government, where Viktor Pavlushchyk was present together with representatives of the National Security and Defense Council, the Security Service, and the Prosecutor General’s Office, a decision was finally adopted to close the International Sponsors of War portal, which was administered by the NACP. Although this portal is important for Ukraine, in our opinion, this is the right step, given the lack of legislative grounds for the Agency to maintain this register, its limited resources, and international conflicts caused by the inclusion of certain companies in this list. The new Head mentioned the need for the NACP to move in the direction outlined by the legislator at the interview stage, and the decision gives hope that Viktor Pavlushchyk will fulfill what he promised during the interviews. 

Much of what the new Head said at the final interview correlates with the existing problems of the Agency. Pavlushchyk noted that competitions in the NACP lacked transparency, in contrast to the NABU. We at TI Ukraine have also repeatedly pointed this out in our studies. 

Thus, the first month of Viktor Pavlushchyk’s chairmanship in the NACP has been marked by positive changes that correspond to the strategic vision of the NACP development, which the new Head voiced while still a candidate. We hope that he will continue solving the long-known problems of the Agency’s operation and develop positive practices. Moreover, both the authorities and the public have enough mechanisms to control the work of the Head of the NACP. We at TI Ukraine will continue monitoring the activities of the Agency.

*** 

As we can see, Viktor Pavlushchyk will face many challenges in his new position, but now it seems that he is quite capable of overcoming them. 

In general, the competition for the new Head of the NACP took place smoothly and set a high standard of transparency. Some stages of selection, for example, the final discussion and selection of the winner, demonstrated a new level of openness of such commissions. The organizational and technical support of the process by the Secretariat of the Commission ensured a smooth selection process.  

However, high-quality competitions are not a panacea for the inefficiency of the selected winner, but an opportunity to select top officials in a competitive and transparent manner. Time will tell how efficient they will be in their new positions.