How does register access work?

The USRCD operates under two access tiers. 

General access is open to the public via the official web portal. All published decisions are depersonalized — names, addresses, and other sensitive data are stripped out. 

Full access is a restricted, service-use instrument available exclusively to judges, court staff, and authorized personnel of law enforcement and state bodies (NABU, SAPO, SSU, SBI, ARMA, etc.). This tier displays unredacted documents in their entirety. Authorization requires login through the Electronic Court system using personal digital keys or tokens.

Under the USRCD Maintenance Procedure, the administrator — state enterprise Judicial Information Systems — is required to track and log all actions by authorized users. In other words: there’s a paper trail for who searched what, and when.

What’s the problem?

Debate over the unauthorized dissemination of information obtained through full register access intensified following several NABU cases, most notably the Borzykh case. More recently, the Midas operation disclosure revealed officials from multiple agencies browsing sealed rulings without legitimate cause. And during HACC judicial selection interviews, it emerged that candidates — themselves authorized registry users — had conducted searches impossible to justify on professional grounds. 

As we can see, last year alone saw no shortage of unjustified searches in the USRCD. The mechanisms enabling these leaks fall into three categories.

Use of others’ credentials. Various authorities have confirmed cases where third parties (typically lawyers) accessed the sealed register using judges’ login credentials. In one case from the Kyiv Region, a lawyer allegedly logged in under a judge’s credentials to retrieve rulings concerning his clients (operators of fraudulent call centers) and tipped them off about planned investigative actions. This was prosecuted as unauthorized interference with automated systems under Article 361(5) of the Criminal Code.

Court staff acting as insiders. Schemes have also been uncovered where court employees systematically supply information to outside clients. In Dnipro, a judge’s assistant allegedly conducted targeted searches twice a week on behalf of criminal actors and lawyers, printed search warrants (including those in money-laundering cases) and handed them over for payment.

Unjustified searches under full access. Log analysis during HACC selection interviews revealed widespread misuse of service-level credentials for personal purposes. It was established that candidates (sitting judges) had run hundreds of queries on former family members, their businesses, or their own cases. One candidate’s login was linked to 240 queries unrelated to their caseload, including 75 searches on their sister’s ex-husband, who was under investigation. System logs show recurring searches by name on prominent figures in anti-corruption investigations (Alperin, for example), conducted by individuals with no procedural connection to those cases whatsoever. Candidates routinely explain this away as “general professional curiosity,” but for investigators it creates a real risk of prematurely exposing prosecutorial strategy.

Technical logging can trace activity tied to a specific digital key over years. Yet users frequently claim no knowledge of the individuals searched or simply can’t explain the queries — strongly suggesting either credential-sharing or deliberate concealment.

What’s the current legal framework?

The Law of Ukraine on Access to Court Decisions, the primary statute governing the USRCD, specifies when general access may be restricted — but says nothing about restricting full access to particular categories of decisions. 

The assumption, apparently, was that all authorized users would handle the information responsibly. The record shows otherwise.

In response, the High Council of Justice adopted amendments in July 2023, at NABU’s request, permitting investigators and prosecutors to restrict (or delay) general access to certain rulings. The Supreme Court struck those amendments down.

On top of all preventive measures, criminal liability applies to unauthorized actions involving register data. The relevant offenses include: unauthorized interference with the operation of information and communication systems and networks (Article 361 of the Criminal Code); illegal sale or distribution of restricted-access information stored in computer systems (Article 361-2); deliberate entry of false information or failure to timely enter data into judicial automated systems (the UJITC, etc.), as well as unauthorized actions involving data in such systems — whether committed by authorized users or outsiders (Article 376-1).

But criminal liability is reactive — it responds to leaks that have already occurred. It does not deter effectively, nor does it protect ongoing investigations.

The USRCD Maintenance Procedure does authorize Judicial Information Systems to revoke full access from users who violate the law, including by disclosing register information. 

Tellingly, the gaps in USRCD access regulation are acknowledged by the expert community as well. The draft Anti-Corruption Strategy 2026–2030 lists as an expected result the establishment of effective mechanisms to prevent, detect, and respond to abuse in automated case distribution and register access — including audit and automated monitoring of full-access user activity (para. 2.1.5.4). It also requires that any restriction on access to court decisions be justified, proportionate, and based on legally established procedures (para. 2.1.5.5). The message is clear: the current framework is inadequate and the need for changes is already overdue.

What needs to change?

One step has already been taken: as of March 1, 2025, USRCD authorization requires tokens through the Electronic Court system, eliminating simple username-and-password logins. This makes it possible to establish that full access was obtained from a specific judge — not as a result of negligence.

Legislative reform is the other piece of the puzzle. Earlier attempts to amend the law on access to court decisions, including to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information available under full access, have already been made. Last year, MPs actively pushed Draft Law No. 7033-d, which drew public criticism for proposals that would have restricted general access to the USRCD as well — a disproportionate and unacceptable overreach. A revised version is now back before the relevant committee. 

There have also been calls to close off all pre-trial decisions from the register entirely. But it bears repeating: unauthorized dissemination occurs precisely through full access — the tier that is, by design, limited to a narrow circle of users. Moreover, many pre-trial rulings are issued in open hearings, some of which are even broadcast. Blanket restriction on general access to such rulings would undermine public oversight — and that is unacceptable.

It is also worth acknowledging that full access to the register can, in certain cases, be a genuinely effective tool. Quick access to information helps resolve conflicts of interest, prevent attempts to resell assets after a freeze, and address other operational needs. But calibrating the scope of accessible rulings to the actual mandate of the official holding full access would go a long way toward eliminating the risks of unauthorized disclosure.

To protect particularly sensitive pre-trial information, we support legislative proposals to restrict full access as well, so that officials would be unable to retrieve information on search warrants, covert investigative measures, asset freezes, and temporary access orders. Critically, these restrictions should apply specifically to decisions issued in closed hearings. 

The closed-hearing mechanism under Article 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows for the publication of rulings with targeted redaction of information whose disclosure could harm either individual rights or the interests of the pre-trial investigation. Blanket restriction on general access to decisions issued in open proceedings, such as pre-trial detention rulings or extensions of investigation periods, would erode accountability and public monitoring, including the ability to track the progress of corruption investigations. Post-indictment asset freeze decisions, reviewed with the participation of property owners, allow the public to monitor whether confiscation actually follows conviction. That oversight function must be preserved.

Even now, a troubling pattern is visible: access to certain plea agreement verdicts is being restricted from general view, despite judges having the tools to redact only the sensitive portions. However important the interests of an investigation may be, the mechanisms of accountability and transparency must not be sacrificed — they are among Ukraine’s hard-won achievements on the road to democratic law enforcement.

Finally, having reviewed the recordings of joint PCIE and HJCJ qualification sessions on HACC judicial selection, we can confirm that the technical capacity to monitor USRCD activity already exists. What is now needed is a legal obligation to use it: regular audits of search activity, with clear and enforceable consequences — disciplinary action for unjustified queries, and criminal liability where the elements of an offense are present.

***

Unauthorized access to the court register has become a systemic problem — and criminal liability alone will not solve it. Addressing it requires a comprehensive approach combining technical, legislative, and organizational measures.

First, the scope of full register access must be reviewed against the actual mandate of each official who holds it. Where clear criteria can be established, that access should be narrowed accordingly.

Second, legislation must restrict full access to specific categories of decisions: search warrants, asset freezes, and other rulings issued in closed hearings. These should be unavailable in full mode for a defined period, or until a specified trigger — such as the delivery of a verdict in the case.

The closed-hearing mechanism under Article 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code should in turn be applied consistently — with targeted redaction of sensitive information, not wholesale closure of entire decisions.

Third, the existing technical logging capacity must become the foundation for regular audits of search activity, with clear consequences for unjustified queries — disciplinary or criminal, depending on whether the elements of an offense are present.

Throughout all of this, any restrictions must leave the principle of open justice intact. Unjustifiably closing off access to plea agreement verdicts or pre-trial rulings, such as detention decisions, would undermine the democratic oversight of law enforcement that Ukraine has been building.

How quickly NABU investigates cases and SAPO sends indictments to court

The data presented in February point to a certain decline in the number of people notified of suspicion in corruption cases in 2025, but overall, they indicate intensified work targeting top officials. 

While in 2024 notices of suspicion were served on 231 people in total, in 2025 that number was 218. 

So how did these figures change across categories of officials?

• The number of the highest-ranking officials notified of suspicion (ministers, heads of central executive authorities, and their deputies) doubled, from 6 people in 2024 to 12 in 2025.

For example, in 2024 former Minister of Agrarian Policy Mykola Solskyi was notified of suspicion in a land seizure case in Sumy region; former Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andrii Smyrnov was notified of suspicion for laundering illicitly obtained funds and accepting an offer of a bribe; and former Deputy Energy Minister Oleksandr Kheilo was notified of suspicion for offering a bribe. In 2025, those notified of suspicion included Antimonopoly Committee Head Pavlo Kyrylenko in a new episode of failure to declare assets and illicit enrichment; former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unity of Ukraine Oleksii Chernyshov for alleged abuse of office and accepting an undue benefit; and former Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Volodymyr Topchii for alleged abuse of office.

• Representatives of the judiciary: 10 people received notices of suspicion in 2025, compared with 5 in 2024.

Among the NABU-SAPO proceedings in 2024, notable cases included the bribery case involving economic court judges in Lviv region and the case involving judges of the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi court in Odesa region, who allegedly accepted bribes for rulings that became grounds for draft deferments. In 2025, suspects in NABU bribery cases included a judge of a city district court in Dnipropetrovsk region, a judge of one of Odesa’s district courts, and a judge of the Volovets district court.

• Members of Parliament and local councils, as well as other local senior officials: the figure remained at roughly the same level—21 people in 2025 versus 22 in 2024. 

In this category, those notified of suspicion in 2024 included MP Mykola Zadorozhnii, who, according to the prosecution, together with accomplices solicited a bribe from the head of a village council in Sumy region and organized its transfer. Notices of suspicion were also served on Iryna Kormyshkina in a case involving illicit enrichment and false declarations, and on Mukachevo Mayor Andrii Baloha for allegedly ensuring the adoption of a decision to sell a municipally owned land plot at an understated price. In 2025, NABU and SAPO notified MP Viktor Bondar of suspicion for organizing a scheme to supply products to Ukrzaliznytsia at inflated prices. In another case, as many as four sitting MPs—Yevhen Pyvovarov, Ihor Nehulevskyi, Olha Savchenko, and Yurii Kisiel—were named as suspects for, according to the investigation, systematically receiving undue benefits in exchange for voting in Parliament.

• The number of suspected officials of state agencies and state-owned companies decreased: there were 23 such individuals in 2025, compared with 37 in 2024.

This can be explained, among other things, by the implementation of a policy of prioritizing investigations into high-level corruption.

The process of sending cases to court has also changed. The number of people in respect of whom indictments were prepared increased. In 2024, indictments were drawn up against 243 people (131 in the first half of the year and 112 in the second half), while in 2025 that number rose to 280 (154 in the first half and 126 in the second half).

In 2025, the largest number of SAPO indictments concerned:

• heads of other state agencies and state-owned companies—56 people. Among them were four defendants in the case about the embezzlement of funds from Ukrzaliznytsia; officials and their accomplices in the case concerning abuse at the Odesa Portside Plant; and officials charged in connection with laundering funds belonging to state-owned enterprises that were part of the Ukroboronprom concern.
• Members of Parliament and local councils, as well as other local senior officials—23 people. In 2025, cases sent to court included those against two former members of the Odesa Regional Council, who together with other accomplices seized 32 vessels, converted them into 12 barges, and unlawfully appropriated them. Also sent to court with an indictment was the case against MP Zadorozhnii, who, with the assistance of National Police officials, demanded a bribe in exchange for not obstructing infrastructure repair works in Sumy region. A former member of the Kharkiv Regional Council also became a defendant after allegedly organizing a criminal group whose actions in electricity sales during wartime caused losses of more than UAH 58 million to Ukrenergo.
• Law enforcement officials—26 people. Defendants in NABU and SAPO cases in this category included an ex-detective of the central office of the Bureau of Economic Security and a senior investigator of the Main Department of the National Police in Kyiv region for demanding an undue benefit of $150,000; the head of a sector within the SSU Department for the Protection of National Statehood and two other individuals exposed for demanding an undue benefit of $300,000; and a former head of a department of the Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor’s Office and a civilian who were exposed while receiving $41,000.

This trend shows that NABU and SAPO are not only opening more proceedings but are also more effectively bringing pretrial investigations to completion. This dispels the myth that NABU merely announces suspicions while the number of indictments remains low. Of course, once a person has been notified of suspicion, completing the pretrial investigation takes time, especially where mutual legal assistance measures are involved or suspects are being sought. 

Even so, for analytical purposes it would be appropriate for the statistics to include the average duration of pretrial investigations of criminal offenses, with a breakdown of the number of criminal proceedings in which the investigation has been suspended and an indication of the reasons for that, as well as the duration of the defense’s review of the case materials under Article 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. At present, these aggregate indicators, which significantly affect the understanding of the timeline of top-level corruption cases, are unfortunately unavailable.

In addition, NABU’s statistics do not publish information on terminated criminal proceedings, including a breakdown showing whether these are cases with identified suspects or cases without suspects. That would make it possible to take a broader view of the pretrial investigation body’s work, including whether criminal proceedings remain pending there for long periods without notices of suspicion being issued.

It is also worth noting that Parliament still has not passed the changes that would strengthen NABU’s work and that international auditors have stressed are necessary. These include, in particular, abolishing the automatic closure of cases once investigation time limits expire, as well as resolving jurisdiction-related issues. This would allow the NABU and the SAPO to demonstrate an even higher level of effectiveness in investigating cases. In addition, unresolved issues remain with access to wiretapping without SSU involvement, as well as other matters affecting the efficient handling of state secrets and access to independent forensic examination.

The HACC’s effectiveness in court proceedings

The HACC’s annual report shows that its performance in court proceedings improved markedly across key indicators in 2024–2025: from the volume of cases reviewed to the speed of decision-making and the value of confiscated assets.

The HACC significantly increased the pace at which it completed criminal cases. In 2025, the court reviewed 114 cases (concerning 180 individuals), compared with 88 cases involving 137 individuals in 2024.

The number of judgments also rose, from 77 in 2024 (including 38 plea-based judgments) to 109 in 2025 (including 72 plea-based judgments). Overall, 154 individuals were convicted last year, substantially more than in 2024, when the figure was 112. We also see a decline in the number of acquittals, from 10 in 2024 to 8 in 2025. This, too, shows that most of the cases SAPO sends to court are built on a solid evidentiary foundation.

For example, in 2024 the HACC Appeals Chamber sentenced ex-MP Ruslan Solvar to three years in prison for unlawfully receiving compensation for housing rent. The HACC sentenced former SSU investigator Serhii Hlivinskyi to nine years in prison for soliciting and accepting a bribe, and MP Andrii Odarchenko also received his sentence—eight years in prison for attempting to bribe the former head of the State Agency for Recovery with bitcoin. 

Then, in 2025, the HACC sentenced ex-MP Dmytro Kriuchkov in absentia to 15 years in prison for embezzling more than UAH 1.5 billion from the companies Cherkasyoblenergo and Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo; former head of the State Judicial Administration Salnikov to three years for abuse of influence; and, finally, former head of the State Fiscal Service Roman Nasirov received his sentence—six years of imprisonment for abuse of office.

We also see a rise in the number of plea-based judgments. For example, in 2025, based on plea agreements, the HACC sentenced former head of the Western Economic Court of Appeal Borys Plotnytskyi to eight years of imprisonment, barred him from holding senior civil service positions for three years, and imposed a fine of UAH 85,000. Former Prosecutor General’s Office prosecutor Volodymyr Derhunov was sentenced to one year of actual imprisonment; in addition, he was banned from holding office for three years, and his residential house, together with a KIA Sportage, was confiscated. A plea agreement was also concluded with businessman Tyshchenko, a defendant in the case involving the embezzlement of the “Kurchenko oil products.” At the same time, for example, the texts of the judgments in the Plotnytskyi and Tyshchenko cases are sealed, and public communication on these cases does not make it possible to determine what exactly the state received in exchange for mitigating their punishment.

So although the increase in the number of cases reviewed is positive in itself, the growing number of plea-based judgments—especially when access to them is limited—may undermine trust in both the HACC and SAPO. In this regard, it would be advisable to use classification only for specific parts of a judgment and to improve SAPO’s communication regarding its policies on plea agreements in high-level corruption cases.

Despite the increase in the number of cases, the HACC managed to improve the efficiency of its use of time in court proceedings. While in 2024 one criminal case took an average of 618 days from receipt to final judgment, in 2025 that average fell to 405 days. This may have been aided, among other things, by the introduction of single-judge proceedings, as well as by the increased number of plea-based judgments, since such cases take significantly less time to review.

Even so, the number of unresolved proceedings is growing. While there were 287 such proceedings in 2024, involving 749 individuals, in 2025 there were already 327, involving 862 individuals. This shows the need for both legislative and organizational measures aimed at improving the efficiency of criminal case review. 

For example, in the course of monitoring HACC cases, we recorded instances of abuse and delay, including in the case involving the criminal organization at the District Administrative Court of Kyiv, in former State Fiscal Service head Roman Nasirov’s case within Onyshchenko’s “gas scheme,” and in the case of the so-called “king of smuggling,” Vadym Alperin. All of this could be addressed through amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine aimed at countering abuse of procedural rights.

Cassation review of HACC and HACC Appeals Chamber decisions by the Supreme Court also shows positive trends. In 2025, the cassation court reviewed a larger number of appeals filed by parties—164 in total, including 41 reviewed on the merits. By comparison, in 2024 there were 150 such appeals, and only 28 were reviewed on the merits. Overall, the number of HACC decisions left unchanged upon review also increased: in 2025, there were 27 such decisions, or 65.9% of those reviewed on the merits, whereas in 2024 there were 16, or 57%.

It is also encouraging that the court’s effectiveness in asset recovery improved in 2025. Last year, the total value of assets subject to special confiscation exceeded UAH 673 million across 13 proceedings. By comparison, in 2024 this figure stood at UAH 158.8 million in 11 proceedings. Meanwhile, the value of confiscated assets in money laundering cases increased almost tenfold—from UAH 50.6 million in 2024 across 4 judgments to UAH 470.3 million in 2025 across 7 judgments.

Even so, the HACC’s and NABU’s reports contain no information on the enforcement of asset confiscation decisions, which means it is impossible to track how much of this money has actually reached the state budget. Still, if provided by other state bodies, this information could be highly illustrative from the standpoint of public communication quality.

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The effectiveness of NABU, SAPO, and the HACC is no longer just about the figures in their reports. These are already indicators that stakeholders in Ukraine and abroad look to. 

Indeed, the visible uptick in these institutions’ work was the main reason Ukraine’s score in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index improved by 1 point. In that study, the Bertelsmann Foundation gave Ukraine 5 points, primarily taking into account the extent to which officials who abuse their office are held accountable or punished. And the figures above speak directly to that. The Corruption Perceptions Index is an international study that takes into account a whole range of factors affecting the state of anti-corruption efforts.

So the increase in the number of notices of suspicion issued to top officials, indictments, and judgments is a positive trend not only for the work of NABU, SAPO, and the HACC, but for the entire field overall. At the same time, real trust in the anti-corruption system requires more than just bigger numbers. It also requires transparency: publishing more aggregated information, opening up plea-based judgments to the extent possible, and reporting on the actual enforcement of confiscation decisions. 

We have no doubt that NABU, SAPO, and the HACC are indeed working, but systemic work also means addressing the shortcomings that still exist. That is what will determine whether quantitative growth in the indicators turns into a qualitative result.

Reform status and implementation of the law

To meet the requirements of the ARMA reform law, a package of subordinate regulations has already been drafted, and a substantial portion has entered into force. The implementation status of the key documents is as follows:

• The government has approved procedures for selecting asset managers for “simple” and “complex” assets, for monitoring the effectiveness of management, and for calculating estimated value.
• The resolution on asset insurance has successfully passed the government committee stage and is being prepared for consideration at a Cabinet of Ministers meeting.
• The procedure for approving template agreements and asset management programs is at the final stage of review within the Cabinet of Ministers Secretariat.

In addition, the meeting noted that the commission for selecting managers for complex assets is being finalized, and central executive authorities have already submitted nominations.

Inventory results and asset classification

This was among the most extensive tasks to be completed in the six months after the updated ARMA law was adopted. According to the Agency, as of December 31, 2025, the Unified Register of Seized Assets contained 102,569 entries. To determine the real volume of liquid assets, ARMA filtered out items without independent economic value, including 28,000 household items from Mezhyhiria and 20,000 items from Medvezha Dibrova.

This claim sparked a serious debate at the committee meeting: participants spent considerable time trying to establish how many assets are actually under ARMA’s management. We find the very reasons for this debate deeply unfortunate, because the same ARMA reform law launched the inventory of remaining assets and introduced the concept of an “asset pool” precisely so that economically meaningful groupings of assets could be identified and transferred for management effectively. 

Committee Chair Anastasiia Radina pointed out that ARMA was unable to produce a single official document confirming the inventory results, relying instead on “working materials” and internal memos. Yaroslava Maksymenko explained that methodological confusion and outdated accounting persist, along with a “clogged” seized assets register filled with small items and limited resources. In fact, a full, in-depth inventory of all 102,000 objects—given current staffing—would take roughly four months.

Ultimately, ARMA proposed fixing as a baseline 44,815 assets transferred since 2017 under 1,435 court rulings received by the Agency as of December 31, 2025.

Overall, the breakdown by asset category is as follows:

• Vehicles and equipment: 22,384 assets (including 19,307 units of railway rolling stock)
• Real estate and land plots: 6,842
• Various types of goods: 6,613
• Movable property and inventory items: 6,162
• Financial assets and corporate rights: 2,814 (including 533 business entities)

As for the economic liquidity of these results, there is still no final assessment. However, an overall review of identified assets showed the following distribution:

• 22,730 assets were deemed potentially manageable or suitable for sale;
• 6,982 items were destroyed, damaged, or located in occupied territories, abroad, or listed as wanted;
• 3,542 assets require procedural follow-up or a change in the method of management through the courts.

In summary, an accounting discrepancy was identified for 11,561 objects. As the Agency explained, this reflects a mismatch between assets transferred in practice and the assets listed in court rulings. In addition, work to define liquid units of assets has not yet been completed. Once identification is finished, the Agency plans to conduct a physical inventory and place assets on its balance sheet. When asked how many assets have been transferred to managers, and how many have been put out to competition, ARMA did not provide an answer.

Overall, Radina sharply criticized the absence of a single administrative act that would formally record the inventory results and establish the final number of assets. ARMA must therefore provide official information with verified figures, clearly distinguishing assets that can be managed, those requiring additional documentation, and the “gray zone” (unidentified property).

Social initiatives: housing for IDPs

Although the committee meeting did not ultimately yield a results-focused discussion of ARMA’s performance, MPs raised several questions they considered important. One concerned developing a mechanism for using seized residential real estate to meet the needs of internally displaced persons. ARMA proposed applying Article 21-1 and transferring such assets to state-sector entities, since commercial competitions for these properties did not attract private investors due to the social burden involved.

Maksymenko, however, pointed to technical obstacles. For example, many apartments are currently occupied by minor children, whose eviction is prohibited by law. In addition, commercial hotels have good-faith tenants whose equipment keeps building infrastructure functioning, and there is no mechanism to relocate people if a court unexpectedly lifts an arrest. The parties agreed to revisit the issue at the next meeting. We previously flagged similar risks related to transferring seized assets for IDP needs in our legal analysis of the relevant draft law.

High-profile asset cases: KAMparytet, Pin-Up, and CHP plants

The discussion of high-profile asset management cases was no less telling.

The first example concerned the KAMparytet management company whose interests, in spring last year, were allegedly advanced by then-ARMA head Olena Duma. Radina cited facts suggesting that the manager sublet shopping centers at prices three times higher than the income it declared to ARMA, leading to direct budget losses. The Agency confirmed the revealed violations and reported that it had begun procedures to terminate the contracts with this manager for inefficiency. 

One MP also expressed outrage at the return of UAH 122 million to Pin-Up owner Ihor Zotkin, described as having a questionable reputation. Yaroslava Maksymenko responded that she was executing a court decision: the plea agreement approved by the prosecutor did not provide for confiscation of these funds, which automatically required returning both the funds and the income generated from their management once the arrest was lifted.

A separate point is worth making here: the amendments allowing confiscation as a punishment when concluding an agreement that provides for release from serving a sentence applied only to corruption offenses. In this case, questions should have been directed not at ARMA’s leadership, but at Prosecutor General’s Office prosecutor Maksym Kapustin, who is listed on the court’s website as the prosecutor who submitted the agreement, and at Pecherskyi District Court judge Oleh Soloviov, who issued the judgment based on that agreement after finding it to be in the public interest. 

As for the management of the Novyi Rozdil and Novoiavorivsk CHP plants, seized in the case involving former MP Dubnevych, MPs emphasized the risk of disrupting the heating season because the current contracts expire in November 2026. They stressed that Naftogaz needs guarantees of continued management now to plan budgets for technical upgrades and modernization. ARMA’s leadership assured the committee that all contracts are being processed, but that extending them through the Cabinet of Ministers takes time.

Financial indicators and budget revenues

One committee member presented an analysis of budget revenues from asset management in the second half of 2025, showing a steep decline:

• July 2025: UAH 102 million
• August 2025: UAH 57 million
• September 2025: UAH 45 million
• November 2025: UAH 29 million

ARMA representatives explained that July’s UAH 102 million was an anomalous one-time spike driven by dividend payments from Ukrnafta and Naftogaz. Subsequent figures, they said, reflect problems with previously concluded contracts for managing seized assets and the genuinely low effectiveness of current management for other assets.

***

Taken together, these developments show that ARMA’s reform requires significant resources and systematic, parallel management of several processes—something that still has not happened at the highest level.

Unfortunately, we still have not heard a clear picture from ARMA’s new leadership of how many assets are actually manageable. Confusion over the numbers remains, driven by different accounting approaches. That said, Maksymenko’s and Saienko’s answers were more focused on constructive work rather than populist statements—as was often the case before—which gives some hope that the processes described above will pick up pace.

Ihor Omelian

Lecturer, International European University

PCIE and HQCJ focused most heavily on a series of companies that the candidate had served as a director or founder of and that appeared to be set up under suspicious circumstances. TI Ukraine’s prior review found that in 2020–2021 Omelian served as director of six LLCs with foreign founders—suggesting the companies were used to obtain residence permits for foreigners outside the standard procedure. None of the companies opened bank accounts, conducted business activities, or had staff other than the candidate as director. The entities were also registered, without a clear basis, at the candidate’s apartment.

Omelian said he met these foreigners through a colleague who asked him to provide legal assistance. He ultimately confirmed that the companies were created for residence permits and that the foreigners said they “wanted to live in Ukraine and saw their business in Ukraine,” while adding that the procedure was lawful. Asked directly whether he understood the companies were not created to conduct real business, Omelian answered differently, saying the foreigners liked Ukrainian food and people, and that after moving to another country, they did not like it there. He concluded by saying he does not engage in fictitious company creation.

TI Ukraine also established that the candidate was a co-founder of PODIL AGRO INVEST LLC (charter capital UAH 4.2 billion, of which UAH 1.4 billion was in the candidate’s name) and SEA INVESTMENT GROUP LLC (charter capital UAH 560 million, of which UAH 140 million was in the candidate’s name). The panel asked how “innovative models” could have been valued by the owners at such extraordinary sums and what, specifically, made them innovative.

At first, the candidate responded in general terms, saying that “implementing them could bring the results described in the feasibility studies for those projects.” One idea, he said, concerned building an LNG terminal at a port—something that no one ever built. Another concerned using agricultural enterprises to grow export products. He said the projects failed, and that he later exited the business voluntarily, stating he had no claims regarding his billion-hryvnia stakes. Omelian was unable to explain what intellectual contribution he personally made to the purported know-how.

PCIE asked directly whether the company could have been used for money laundering or fraud—particularly because the names of these companies appear in criminal proceedings involving fraud and money laundering. Omelian responded that to do that “you would need to have money,” and he said the companies did not.

During the interview, the candidate tried to underscore his integrity. He said he could have avoided declaring a piece of property because “if I hadn’t listed it, no one would even know, because it isn’t even in the registry.” He said something similar about a repayable financial assistance (a loan) he received from his own law office: “I could have not declared it (the income—ed.), and the commission would have had no way of knowing, nor would any outside observer.”

Regarding these “loans from himself to himself,” the candidate said they were not a way to avoid paying dividends tax. Instead, he said, during a period when banks were closing he wanted to protect his money: in liquidation, he claimed, funds belonging to legal entities are paid out last, while individuals are paid first and in full.

HQCJ also questioned the candidate about his primary job since 2024 as a university lecturer. It emerged that some of the courses he teaches are not law-related, even though he has only a law degree and no academic title. Omelian explained that he took up teaching because his law office income was unstable and he wanted to understand whether he should pursue a PhD. He said he found the teaching vacancy, which provides a deferment from mobilization, through targeted advertising.

Vitalii Dubas

HACC Judge

The panel asked Dubas about the controversy surrounding the criminal case involving suspected former deputy chair of the High Commercial Court, Artur Yemelianov. In that matter, Investigating Judge Dubas returned the prosecutor’s motion for an interim measure, because he believed the case fell under the jurisdiction not of HACC but of the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv. The HACC Appeals Chamber later overturned that decision and kept the case under HACC jurisdiction. Dubas said the Appeals Chamber should not have considered the matter at all, because the court of first instance was not the Anti-Corruption Court but a local court.

Dubas said he had made similar rulings before, but this case was particularly high-profile, which ultimately led to interference in his work. He noted that the HACC Appeals Chamber had previously held that the case belonged to HACC, but he disagreed with that approach and, among other things, unsuccessfully sought recusal on that basis. 

PCIE asked whether the situation nonetheless allowed him to recuse himself. Dubas replied that every judge has the right to their own legal position and that the correctness of that position is tested through judicial review, adding: “If I issued the decision, I’m ready to be accountable for it.”

A separate topic was that the judge is a blood donor and donates on workdays. Dubas said he donates about once a month. The discussion concerned a situation where he tried to take the days off provided by law, but the court chair allegedly refused, creating an apparent conflict. Dubas said that on those days he typically continues administering justice and then “adds” the days off, for example, to a vacation period. 

The interview also examined an episode in which two of the three judges on a panel (other than Dubas) issued separate opinions. This was discussed from the standpoint of teamwork. Dubas said he has extensive experience working on judicial panels and that this was the only such situation. 

The panel also discussed his use of full access to the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. Part of that topic was considered in a closed session. In the open session, asked why he searched the register for his own surname, Dubas said he was reviewing appellate decisions addressing appeals of his rulings.

The interview also touched on judges’ behavior in court hearings that had been discussed on social media. Dubas said he believes that when a judge behaves like a real person, rather than “a person in a case,” it can increase public trust in the court.

Viktoriia Kytsiuk

Judge, Solomianskyi District Court of Kyiv

This interview largely revisited issues that had already been examined during Kytsiuk’s first participation in the HACC competition in 2018–2019. She was eliminated after a joint session of HQCJ and PCIE. The grounds were, among other things, social media posts criticizing NABU, and an episode involving an “error correction” that in practice narrowed the substance of an earlier ruling.

The key question this time was what, specifically, had changed since the previous competition and why HQCJ and PCIE should reach a different conclusion now. Kytsiuk emphasized that she should be assessed as of the present, referring to the Supreme Court’s position that integrity criteria involve a degree of subjectivity, and said she was prepared to provide explanations.

Regarding the Facebook posts, she said she had drawn conclusions from that situation and would act differently today. Kytsiuk stressed that her repost occurred after her judicial term had already ended, so she was not commenting on a matter pending before her. As for the “error correction,” she emphasized that the appellate court overturned the decision for procedural reasons—specifically, the failure to notify the pretrial investigation authority, which effectively deprived it of an opportunity to provide explanations. However, she noted that the appellate court did not find that the underlying decision had been substantively narrowed, and she focused her explanations on that point.

The interview also addressed Kytsiuk’s transfer to a court in Kyiv in 2013. A PCIE member raised the question of whether the transfer was carried out through a genuine competitive procedure, as required by law. At the time, a judge appointed for an initial five-year term could be transferred only through a publicly announced competition. However, no information about such a competition was found on the HQCJ website, and the practices of that period had previously been criticized by the Public Integrity Council. 

Kytsiuk said she learned about the vacancy by comparing information on judges’ resignations and transfers. She also said that a competence review “apparently took place,” but did not provide detailed circumstances. According to her, there were four candidates for four vacancies and all were appointed. The PCIE member noted inconsistencies in her explanations regarding the nature of that check.

The interview also discussed a 2017 incident with patrol police. Kytsiuk said she does not believe she violated traffic rules and tried not to escalate the conflict. She acknowledged that she may have lacked communication skills and psychological knowledge but said she had no intention of creating a confrontation.

Oleksii Yevtushenko 

Judge, Saksahanskyi District Court

Yevtushenko’s interview began with discussion of his practical experience, including his handling of corruption-related cases. He said he does not find corruption cases difficult; for him, cases affecting people’s lives are more difficult.

PCIE asked about the privatization of a one-room apartment in Kharkiv in 2013. The experts did not understand how the candidate managed to privatize the apartment within only one year of filing an application. At the time, Yevtushenko was the chief of staff of the Kharkiv Region Court of Appeal, and PCIE found that the apartment was allocated to him by the Kharkiv City Council as an exception. It was not official housing; he applied under the general procedure used by citizens seeking housing. 

The candidate was unable to recall, even in broad terms, what the “exception” was. He said he tried to obtain documents on the City Council’s decision-making procedure, but they had been destroyed after the retention period expired. He also said he learned only in 2026 that the apartment had been granted as an exception.

PCIE noted that the City Council reviewed the decision to transfer the apartment within one month—an unusually fast timeline. Yevtushenko again said he does not know why his application was reviewed so quickly, adding: “Honestly, when I applied, getting an apartment felt like winning the lottery,” and “I simply got lucky—it’s a real pity I can’t prove it.”

At the time he received the apartment, the candidate also held an ownership share in property in Chernihiv. Because of this, he said, he had to personally pay part of the privatized apartment’s value. In 2025, he sold the apartment, but said he did not intend to profit, because he used the proceeds to purchase property in his mother’s hometown. 

The interview also covered a lawsuit against Kharkiv heating utilities in which the candidate was represented by his wife’s law firm. The court ordered reimbursement to Judge Yevtushenko of UAH 5,000 in legal fees. The candidate confirmed that he did in fact transfer those funds as payment to his wife’s company.

Yevtushenko also apologized for a remark he made during the interview addressed to a member of the High Council of Justice, saying that he always pays child support and that “that is the nature of a Ukrainian woman—she always pursues child support for herself.” He said the remark may have been inappropriate and that he meant something else.

HQCJ also asked about the candidate’s mobilization history. In March 2022, he contacted the Verkhovyna Center for Territorial Recruitment and began service, including in the Military Law Enforcement Service. His service lasted four months, and the panel sought clarification as to why he joined the military and whether it was intended to obtain a particular status.

On a professional question about a recent Constitutional Court decision concerning detention during martial law, the candidate was unable to say what the decision was about.

Overall, Yevtushenko appeared nervous during the interview and frequently interrupted commission members, for which he received warnings.

Lesia Skreklia

Associate Professor, Lviv University of Trade and Economics

The interview began with a discussion of the candidate’s motivation to work at HACC. Skreklia said she views administering justice at HACC as the peak of the legal profession and described the court as a “court of justice” that, together with Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure, can realistically reduce corruption in the country.

PCIE then asked about her husband, an investigator who won a competition for the State Bureau of Investigation in 2018. The panel asked whether she saw a risk of a conflict of interest, given that the SBI also investigates high-level corruption cases. Skreklia replied that she and her husband share the same values, so there can be no pressure; moreover, she said she would not allow it.

A substantial part of the interview was about her academic work. Experts noted similarities between her dissertation and the work of another scholar. Skreklia said she and the colleague worked simultaneously, had the same academic supervisor—Professor Viacheslav Navrotskyi—and used similar methodology. She stressed that her dissertation abstract and an article on the topic were published earlier, even though the colleague defended first. She also said the colleague asked her for the dissertation text to review. Skreklia denied violating academic integrity rules, but acknowledged that sharing her dissertation with the colleague was a mistake and said she would treat it as a lesson.

PCIE then asked about the family’s financial situation. Skreklia said she lives in her parents’ apartment in Lviv, purchased in 2016 for UAH 1.3 million. According to her, her parents earned those funds while working in Russia in the 2000s.

She also described the purchase of an apartment in Kyiv for UAH 3.7 million in 2026. She said the family had saved for 13 years and previously did not own housing. The apartment is still under construction, and the couple does not rule out selling it in the future in order to buy housing in Lviv.

In 2021, Skreklia’s husband purchased a damaged car from the United States for $9,500, and the family spent a total of $16,500 on repairs. Skreklia said the family could afford this because her husband earns a high salary.

HQCJ pointed to several inaccuracies in her declarations. Skreklia confirmed that the listed price of a parking space contained a typo (UAH 120,000). She explained differences in the dates of acquiring a share in an apartment in her and her husband’s declarations as her husband’s carelessness. She also said she unintentionally failed to report her right to practice law because she completed that section mechanically.

HQCJ also noted that in the declaration of the value of her parents’ apartment in Lviv, Skreklia selected “not applicable.” She said this was due to inexperience in completing the forms and stressed that she had no intent to conceal anything.

HQCJ further noted errors in her family ties declaration and her integrity declaration: she listed all relatives without distinction and completed the document only for 2024, even though it was required for her entire life period. Skreklia said she was unaware of the requirement. 

The commission also noted that in her questionnaire she stated she had not participated in competitions, even though she is currently undergoing selection for local courts. Skreklia acknowledged that this was another mistake.

The commission also asked about sources of the family’s savings reported in her 2018–2019 declarations. Skreklia said she saved all of her own income, while the family lived on her husband’s earnings.

In closing, the commission expressed doubts about the unusually large number of her co-authored scholarly publications, which is atypical for legal research. Skreklia said such co-authorship reflected academic exchange and was not intended to artificially inflate her publication count.

Nataliia Makhno

Judge, Kolomyia City District Court, Ivano-Frankivsk Region

During the interview, some questions concerned the family’s finances, including her father’s work abroad. A PCIE member noted that her father had worked in France and asked about the type of work and income level. Makhno said her father was officially employed as a worker and, in her words, earned up to €2,000 per month; she added that before France he also worked in other countries.

The interview also discussed the construction of a residential house of about 140 m², built roughly 30 years ago. Makhno said it was built “by the artisanal method,” meaning by the family’s own efforts. Asked about subsequent renovations, she confirmed that repairs were made but was unable to estimate the approximate costs.

PCIE examined in detail Makhno’s purchase of a 2008 HYUNDAI ACCENT in 2017 for UAH 48,744. PCIE questioned whether the vehicle’s value may have been understated given market prices. Makhno said the car required repairs and that she used her personal salary savings to buy it. A PCIE member noted that documentation of the repairs was provided only partially. One HQCJ member remarked that at such a price it might have been more profitable for the prior owner to sell the car as scrap, which further increased doubts about whether the stated price was realistic.

A separate block of questions concerned her academic track: the commission asked why she changed both her academic supervisor and her institution. Makhno said the first institution could not form a specialized academic council due to the lack of relevant scholars, and that most of the research had already been completed by the time she transferred. At the same time, an HQCJ member pointed out that the first institution had issued a conclusion with reservations about the work’s readiness and that by the end of her doctoral studies the research had not been completed in full. This raised doubts about the consistency of her explanation for changing institutions. Another HQCJ member also noted that in those years the first institution hosted defenses on similar topics, which further undermined the claim that it was impossible to form a specialized council. 

The interview also addressed Makhno’s integrity declaration. She said she had not been held liable. During the interview, however, she confirmed that a traffic ticket had been issued against her and that she challenged it; the higher authority later overturned it for lack of an offense.

Oleksandr Vernyhor

Attorney

During the interview, PCIE paid particular attention to the candidate’s business model. In 2024, he received most of his income through his individual entrepreneur status, which is taxed at a lower rate, while income from his independent professional activity as an attorney accounted for only about 20% of his total annual income. Vernyhor said he has the right to choose the format under which he provides services and that the law does not prohibit this. He explained that he received funds as an attorney only when a client insisted on signing a legal services agreement specifically with him in his capacity as an attorney. In other cases, he signed contracts as an individual entrepreneur, which prompted extensive questions from PCIE members.

Health-related issues, which form the basis for the candidate’s deferment from mobilization, were discussed in a closed session.

The panel also reviewed questions of Vernyhor’s tax compliance, noting that enforcement proceedings were opened against him for nonpayment of the unified social contribution. Vernyhor described this as an accounting error in his 2020 reporting (during the COVID-19 pandemic there were temporary USC payment relief measures), which the tax authority did not allow him to correct. A court ultimately upheld the tax authority’s position; Vernyhor did not appeal further and paid the assessed amounts.

HQCJ was interested in the candidate’s successful track record of challenging tax authority decisions through the administrative (out-of-court) appeal procedure, especially given his prior work in the tax service. Because such complaints have a low success rate in Ukraine, the commission asked what explained his results. Vernyhor said he simply prepared strong legal reasoning against decisions that were plainly unlawful, and he categorically denied exerting any influence on former colleagues.

As for potential ties to the Nash Krai party, election commission data listed Vernyhor as a member of an election commission nominated by that party (his full name and taxpayer number matched). The candidate said he had never served on such a commission and had not participated in elections at all, suggesting he may have been added to lists by mistake without his knowledge.

The offshore scheme

NABU detectives established that between 2021 and 2025, a total of USD 12 million was laundered for the benefit of “Sigismund” and his family—funds that were largely held in foreign accounts.

Some of this laundered money was spent on the family’s needs, including:

• paying for the children’s expensive education at elite institutions in Switzerland,
• medical services at a clinic owned by one of the scheme’s participants (“Sugarman”),
• buying designer clothing at Kyiv boutiques, and more. 

To launder the funds, Halushchenko built a multi-tiered structure. In particular, three companies were registered via offshore jurisdictions in the Marshall Islands. They became part of a trust registered in Saint Kitts and Nevis and also acted as investors in a fund on the island of Anguilla, which was used to attract and launder money. In this way, the funds were carefully concealed.

Still, the NACP could have noticed certain manipulations from Halushchenko’s declarations. 

Halushchenko listed his former wife and four children as the official beneficial owners of the offshore companies. This is a common concealment scheme: assets are registered in the names of relatives or close associates who do not live with the declarant, allowing their assets to be omitted from the declaration. “Divorces” are also often fictitious for precisely these reasons.

But under the law, minor children must be declared by public officials regardless of whether they live together. Accordingly, in his 2024 declaration, Halushchenko listed his four children as family members. Yet he did not disclose any of his children’s assets—neither in the section on corporate rights nor in the section on beneficial ownership of family members’ assets.

In the 2021 declaration, when Halushchenko was still married and declared his wife’s assets, her corporate rights and beneficial ownership in the architectural bureau Prostir 86 are reported. But there is still no mention whatsoever of beneficial ownership in offshore companies.

If Halushchenko’s declarations had been selected for a manual review not limited to registry cross-checking, Agency staff could at minimum have sent follow-up requests both to the declarant and to national and international authorities.

It is also worth noting that, unlike NABU, the NACP still has weak international cooperation with foreign authorities when it comes to obtaining information on officials’ or family members’ foreign assets. This is an area the NACP clearly needs to strengthen.

Education in Switzerland 

According to an investigation by Schemes, Halushchenko’s son Maksym has been studying for the fourth consecutive year at one of Europe’s most expensive private colleges—College Alpin Beau Soleil in Switzerland—where tuition and boarding can cost up to USD 200,000 per year. Over four years, the total cost could reach roughly USD 700,000, or UAH 26 million—many times more than Herman Halushchenko’s family’s official income and declared savings. Journalists were able to establish this using open-source data.

In court, Halushchenko explained that different people paid for the education—his son’s godparents and family friends. This information requires additional scrutiny by NABU and, ideally, the NACP as well, since the Agency should have examined it much earlier.

NACP guidance indicates that education payments fall under expenses that must be declared. At the same time, only the declarant is required to report such expenses—so if third parties truly paid for the education, this information would not appear in the “expenses” section.

However, the declaration also contains a section on gifts—and that is where information about paying for Halushchenko’s son’s education should have appeared. The NACP has explained that when a third party covers the declarant’s or a family member’s costs for travel (flights, accommodation), treatment, education, and so on, it is considered a non-cash gift. As a general rule, such a gift must be reflected in the declaration with its value indicated.

So if Halushchenko’s son’s education was paid for by godparents and family friends, this should have been shown in Halushchenko’s declaration, unless each of them paid less than the reporting threshold, which is highly unlikely given the tuition figures cited above.

***

Once again, we are looking at a situation where the NACP has remained on the sidelines of a high-profile scandal. Once again, most of the facts were uncovered by journalists or by NABU detectives during criminal proceedings. 

We understand that the NACP’s functions and capabilities differ significantly from NABU’s, and we are not comparing them. Still, it appears the NACP had sufficient tools to verify information about Halushchenko’s assets long before he was notified of suspicion.

Two automated “full” reviews of the declarations of the person whom participants in the scheme allegedly called “Sigismund” produced no results at all. Most likely, the former minister’s declarations will now be selected for a repeat, manual full review—just as happened after the Tetiana Krupa scandal. But the effect of such an after-the-fact review is disproportionate to the mandate of a body that is supposed to prevent corruption. 

The facts we cite should be yet another wake-up call for the NACP: it unquestionably and urgently needs to revise its approach to financial control. But will the Agency listen?

Yevhen Didenko

Judge, Pryazovske District Court, Zaporizhzhia Region

The interview opened with questions about how the candidate’s mother, a pensioner, was able to save more than half a million hryvnias to give her son as a gift. Didenko said that, at least as of 2019, his mother’s pension exceeded UAH 40,000, which, given her limited expenses—allowed her to save roughly UAH 31,000 per month. He said the gifted funds were used to purchase a car and cover household expenses.

Experts also asked about the $9,000 purchase price of an apartment owned by the candidate’s mother and used by Didenko. This amount is nearly half the market price, but the candidate said it was not significantly different from market rates because the seller discounted the price due to sewerage problems and because another person was still registered at the address. He added that his mother purchased the apartment in part with proceeds from the sale of an apartment in Zaporizhzhia. PCIE noted that the candidate declared the apartment as being rented from his mother, even though he was in fact living there rent-free. Didenko said he had described the arrangement inaccurately and that it was actually free use. He said he separately reported this to the NACP.

Questions were also raised about the fact that in 2020 the candidate’s mother gifted him the apartment, but the gift agreement listed the apartment’s value as UAH 20,000, even though she had purchased it for UAH 193,000. Didenko could not recall why UAH 20,000 was listed instead of UAH 193,000, but said the figure did not affect anything, including the tax base, and that there was therefore no intent to evade taxes.

PCIE pointed to possible signs of a conflict of interest in Didenko’s work, noting that he served as the judge in a case where defense counsel was his recommender, attorney Hanna Lapshyna, who in the 2000s was also his mother’s business partner. Didenko said that until 2011 he rented a workspace from Lapshyna, but that, in his words, there was no joint work between them, and that his mother also ended her cooperation with Lapshyna by that date.

The panel also asked about Didenko’s challenge to a tax audit report on his declarations in 2015. The audit found, among other things, that he had acquired two land plots in the Zaporizhzhia region. Didenko said he had no connection to those plots and that the issue was apparently a match on name and patronymic. He therefore went to court to contest the audit report.

The interview also had questions about his searches in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. Didenko made a number of full-access searches concerning people involved in illegal border crossings. He could not recall the specific reason, but suggested it may have related to a case in his docket where some suspects were severed into a separate proceeding.

Didenko did not answer all professional questions precisely. For example, he could not clearly list the circumstances in which “extortion” as an aggravating element is excluded. Asked about the academic novelty of his dissertation, the candidate said, among other things, that it was the first comprehensive study of its kind. HQCJ also recalled that in the practical assignment the candidate ordered the special confiscation of a laptop used by the defendant to file a false asset declaration. Didenko responded that, formally, such items may qualify as instruments of the offense, adding: “I don’t know how judges, for example, at the HACC, resolve these issues in criminal cases involving intimate products: is everything confiscated, destroyed…?” 

Oleh Kimstachov

Judicial Assistant, HACC Appeals Chamber

Kimstachov is participating in the HACC competition for the third time. His previous attempt, about a year ago, ended unsuccessfully at the assessment stage involving PCIE. At that time, the candidate did not dispel reasonable doubts regarding the circumstances of his resignation as a judge, his handling of a case involving a judge with whom he had worked, and the origin of funds for a cryptocurrency gift he received from his mother.

In the current interview, the central question was essentially what had changed in the candidate’s explanations and position compared to the previous competition, so that PCIE and HQCJ could reach a different conclusion. The panel also noted that Kimstachov challenged the decision on his assessment, but the Supreme Court did not uphold his claim.

A separate set of questions concerned the candidate’s resignation, at his own request, from his position as a judge of the Uman City District Court. Several disciplinary proceedings involving him were being considered during that period. This timing prompted pointed follow-up questions from HQCJ, because it raised the issue of whether resigning “by request” was a way to avoid possible dismissal as a disciplinary sanction. Kimstachov insisted that he made the decision because he intended to participate in the HACC competition, and that his resignation was not connected to any attempt to evade accountability.

Iryna Teslenko

Judge, Kreminna District Court, Luhansk Region (seconded to the Solomianskyi District Court of Kyiv)

Teslenko’s interview began with her motions to recuse two HQCJ members—Sydorovych and Volkova. She argued that they had previously voted in favor of a decision finding that she lacked the competence required for appellate court positions, a competition in which she had also participated. 

Teslenko said that competition had taken place only two months earlier and that her dossier was essentially unchanged, so those commission members already had an established view of her. HQCJ rejected this reasoning, stating that the subject of evaluation was different: in the appellate court competition, the focus was competence, whereas here the central issue was integrity. The recusal motions were denied.

PCIE spent considerable time examining why the candidate had not declared any housing in Kreminna, Luhansk Region, where she served as a judge from 2016 to 2022. Teslenko said that in 2016–2017 she stayed in hotels or short-term rentals, arriving in Kreminna on Mondays and returning to Kharkiv on weekends. She said she did not rent any single place long enough to trigger the NACP declaration requirements. From 2017 to 2020 she was on maternity leave and therefore stayed in Kharkiv. After returning to work in February 2020, she said she continued using short-term rentals and only in 2021 found permanent housing, which she then began declaring.

Asked about hotel prices, Teslenko gave an estimate of about UAH 150–200 per night, but said she cannot even find the hotel on Google because Kreminna is a very small town. She said she likely paid for gasoline by card, but paid cash for apartments and hotels, without supporting documents. Teslenko said the distance from Kharkiv to Kreminna is about 200 kilometers. In HQCJ’s view, this weekly travel would normally leave at least some documentary trail, but she was unable to provide any, citing the fact that she cannot access the court in Kreminna due to the full-scale invasion.

PCIE also focused on the family’s vehicle transactions. According to her declarations, over several years the family bought cars and then sold them at much higher prices—even accounting for inflation and exchange-rate changes. When asked how it was possible to sell vehicles for more than they had cost, Teslenko said her husband, a retired law enforcement officer, repaired the cars, which increased their value. She said she could not describe this as entrepreneurial activity because, as she put it, the repaired cars were bought for family use and sold after one or two years of use. 

According to Teslenko’s 2019 declaration, her savings were about UAH 345,000. That same year, the family purchased a Toyota RAV4, yet the amount of savings increased further, even though she was on childcare leave. Asked how the family could buy the car and still increase savings, Teslenko said the car was purchased using proceeds from selling a previous vehicle. As for savings, she said they existed already at the end of 2018, and in 2019 the family simply converted $10,000 into hryvnias. She added that the family’s expenses were minimal—food, utilities, and childcare. The family lived in its own house, so utility payments were limited to electricity and gas. She also said the grandparents provided financial support for the grandchildren by purchasing clothes, vitamins, and food.

HQCJ was not satisfied with her explanation of the purchase price of a 98.2 m² apartment in Kharkiv, which she bought in 2020 for UAH 849,900. HQCJ pointed out that the document she provided to confirm the property’s value was an appraiser’s “consultation,” not a formal appraisal report. The distinction matters, HQCJ noted, because a consultation does not carry liability for the appraiser, whereas a formal report can result in loss of a license if it contains errors. Teslenko responded that a long time had passed since the purchase, and the apartment’s condition and appearance were now very different from what they were at the time of purchase. 

HQCJ also noted that a retrospective valuation can be ordered to establish a property’s value as of a specific past date, but Teslenko did not commission such an assessment either. She explained this by pointing to tight deadlines in the qualification process, her physical absence from Kharkiv, and her inability to provide the appraiser access to the apartment.

HQCJ also asked about travel to the Russian Federation, which her declarations described as being in “extreme necessity.” Teslenko said that in 2016 she needed to pick up medication for her parents, and that in 2014 she flew out of Belgorod airport, which is near Kharkiv. When asked again why she had an urgent need to travel to Moscow after 2014, she repeated that it was for her parents’ medication and stressed that no one else could collect it.

Dmytro Kravets

Legal Counsel, Legal Service of the Central Base of Military and Technical Support, National Guard of Ukraine

PCIE opened the interview by reviewing Dmytro Kravets’s career. He has worked as a lawyer since his student years and has experience as an attorney. In 2025, he served as legal counsel within a military service structure and later moved to the Main Directorate of the National Guard of Ukraine. Kravets said he worked on criminal proceedings involving misappropriation of property, abuse of office, and nondisclosure (in declarations), but that his practice was primarily civil. He said he has no experience participating in court hearings in corruption cases.

Discussion of the candidate’s law firm revealed significant financial anomalies. Kravets said the drop in income in 2024 to UAH 93,000 was due to having fewer cases. He also explained his family’s low standard of living (below the subsistence minimum) by saying they are “an ordinary Ukrainian family”: they do not go to restaurants, they save money, and they receive food from his wife’s parents. Despite his claim that he had only 10 cases in 2024, the court register reflected his involvement in more than 50 cases. 

The biggest questions concerned the source of funds for an apartment in Sofiivska Borshchahivka purchased for UAH 1.4 million (2021). By the commission’s calculations, Kravets’s official income for 2013–2018 totaled only about $13,000; at the same time, he reported saving $13,000, and his first real estate investment was $20,000. Kravets said he supplemented his savings with wedding gifts (about $15,000) and a loan from relatives, and that he conducted all transactions exclusively in cash.

The commission also pointed to questionable employment history at an insurance company (2013–2015), where official records showed he earned a very modest salary. Kravets did not clearly rebut suggestions of “cash-in-envelope” payments, nor did he provide a convincing explanation of how he managed to accumulate foreign currency without spending earnings on basic needs.

Continuing the questions about the apartment purchase, the commission also raised doubts about his investment activity. Kravets said he invested $20,000 in a property and, a year later, earned $42,000 in profit from assigning the rights—funds that, together with a loan from his brother, allegedly went toward the purchase of the new apartment. However, he provided no contracts, saying the documents were not preserved—neither by him nor by the developer. 

The panel also questioned the underreported values of vehicles. In 2016, he bought a Honda for UAH 100,000 and sold it for only UAH 40,000, which is far below market. Even more doubts were raised by a Volkswagen purchased for UAH 49,000: that price allowed him to bypass the legal requirement for non-cash payments (the threshold is UAH 50,000) and pay in cash. 

HQCJ emphasized that Kravets might appear to be an “unsuccessful attorney” with minimal income, yet the court register for 2024 alone shows his participation in 82 court decisions. In one case, he formally sought reimbursement of UAH 50,000 in legal fees; in another, the file reflected a direct transfer from a client to his personal account in the amount of UAH 16,000. Even though the cost of just one of his statements of claim (UAH 9,000) exceeded his official monthly income, Kravets continued to deny receiving undeclared money.

When a commission member asked him directly, “If you were an observer, would you believe this?” Kravets did not give a concrete answer, limiting himself to the statement that the law firm’s income is “distributed across months.” 

A separate block of questions concerned military registration and the candidate’s current service. Oleksandr Kravets said that since April 2025 he has been on active military service and holds the position of senior officer in the National Guard’s legal service, where he provides legal support for procurement in the construction sector. There was also confusion about the dates of updating his military records: the candidate said he updated information through “Reserve+” in 2022, but commission members noted that the app did not exist at that time. He said he underwent a military medical commission for the first time only in March 2025.

Viktor Maslov 

HACC Judge

Viktor Maslov’s interview opened with a discussion of his views on EU requirements in the context of judicial reform. He said he closely follows legal developments and is familiar with the full list of Ukraine’s commitments to the European Union. In particular, he supported the involvement of international experts in selection commissions, describing it as justified and beneficial for transparent recruitment.

PCIE noted that his position is sensitive because in 2019, as a member of the Council of Judges of Ukraine, Maslov participated in delegating representatives to the selection commission for HQCJ members. Responding to public criticism that the process was allegedly being blocked, Maslov said the Council of Judges did not obstruct competitions and acted only after they were officially announced, in line with legal requirements.

The interview then turned to the Onyshchenko case and Maslov’s role in it. PCIE first asked about the episode in which the former MP himself reported to anti-corruption authorities an unsuccessful attempt to bribe a HACC judge.

PCIE then raised an older case in which Maslov was alleged to have persuaded a suspect to plead guilty. Maslov said it was one of the first cases assigned to him after HACC was established, and that a different panel considered the plea agreement. According to him, his panel later heard the indictment after a reclassification of charges and ultimately issued an acquittal, which was later upheld by the appellate instance and the Supreme Court.

One of the central issues was the decision by the HACC Appeals Chamber to return the Onyshchenko case for a new trial. Maslov’s panel spent several months in deliberations. The HACC Appeals Chamber found that the judges had breached the secrecy of deliberations by attending training events and a judges’ congress while drafting the verdict. Maslov argued that it is not realistically possible to remain in the deliberation room for months without leaving the courthouse at all. He said the judges did not communicate with third parties and that the events they attended were mandatory, so he did not view their actions as a violation.

A separate part of the interview covered financial matters. PCIE asked about a 2020 loan from his father of approximately UAH 700,000 and a subsequent cash gift to Maslov of UAH 1.53 million (nearly $50,000). Maslov said half of the gifted amount was counted toward repayment of the loan, and he used the other half to purchase a land plot. He said the transaction was notarized, the funds were declared, and the bank conducted financial monitoring.

PCIE also asked about allegedly undeclared property belonging to Maslov’s wife in the Sumy region. The judge said everything was correctly reflected in the declarations: his wife inherited a house and land plots in the Sumy region, but sold them to a relative in the same year and declared the income. HQCJ asked about a reported sale amount that did not match tax data. Maslov suggested the tax authority may have entered the appraised value into the register rather than the contract price.

The interview also addressed Maslov’s disciplinary record. Specifically, a warning issued by the High Council of Justice in June 2025. Under the law, a judge with an unexpunged disciplinary sanction cannot participate in a competition for a position in another court. Maslov said the sanction is now considered expunged because six months have passed. He added that he is challenging the decision in the Supreme Court and that the hearing is scheduled for April 2. Explaining why he submitted documents while the sanction was still in effect, Maslov said he did not consider it an obstacle because the competition was for the same court where he already serves.

The final question concerned eight speeding tickets issued between 2021 and 2025. Maslov said he considers himself a disciplined driver and described the incidents as isolated and unintentional. He also said he would make efforts to avoid such violations in the future.

Oksana Yevlakh

Judge, Romny City District Court, Sumy Region

The first pointed question for Judge Yevlakh concerned the gift of a house in Romny in the summer of 2022. PCIE demanded an explanation of why such a gift was made and the status of the person who provided it. The candidate said that during her divorce, her husband proposed that he keep the jointly acquired marital home, and that he would instead find (purchase) property for her in Romny. They found the house through listings, and her husband arranged with the owner to execute the transfer as a gift deed in Yevlakh’s name. She said she did not witness the actual transfer of money at the time of the purchase and has no evidence of it. 

Yevlakh said she does not view this as a violation of gift restrictions for public officials. She said she reached that conclusion by reviewing court decisions stating that a gift constitutes a violation only if it is provided in connection with the recipient’s official position. However, she added that today it looks “at least complicated and strange,” and that “a judge should not act that way.” 

She said she did not know the donor and saw him only when the documents were signed before a notary. Later, the candidate transferred the house to her aunt as a gift for 10 months and then transferred it back into her own ownership, because for a period of time she was concerned that her husband might try to challenge how she obtained it after a conflict.

PCIE also asked about the allegedly understated value of a 2004 Toyota Avensis. Yevlakh said the declared figure reflected the car’s real value given the need for repairs. The experts also considered understated the price of a land plot purchased for UAH 15,000, which the candidate said she intended to use for office premises. The plot’s appraised value was nearly UAH 50,000, but Yevlakh said a realtor selected the property for her and negotiated the price because the sale was urgent.

Asked about purchasing a house for her daughter in the village of Ovlashi, Yevlakh said she and the child’s father made the joint decision so their daughter would have a summer house, but plans changed due to the war. The candidate explained her former husband’s high income by saying he was an entrepreneur engaged in wholesale trade, and that her declarations reflected gross receipts from sales rather than net income. 

Many questions concerned situations where the candidate did not report the value of certain real estate and a vehicle in her declarations despite having that information. She said that at the time (2015–2016), there were no clear explanations, so she interpreted the obligation to declare value as applying only in the year the asset was acquired. 

The interview also noted that from 2010 to November 2013, Yevlakh served as a local council member affiliated with the Party of Regions. Experts found that in some questionnaires she reported being only a member of the Our Ukraine party, while in another she listed membership in the Party of Regions as well. Yevlakh said she provided different information because she did not consider herself a member of the Party of Regions. She said she was not part of the central party organization and did not attend party congresses, unlike with Our Ukraine. 

It also emerged that in 2025–2026 Judge Yevlakh showed active interest in a commercial case involving the Komyshanskyi company, which concerned, among other things, wholesale transport services—an area in which her husband was also engaged. The candidate could not recall why she used full access to search the court decisions register and reviewed nearly all personalized texts. She suggested only that she may have been looking for identifying details of participants in her own case.

Vitalii Koriahin

Judge, Ternivka City Court

During Vitalii Koriahin’s interview, members of PCIE and HQCJ focused on several areas involving his assets, professional activity, and a civil matter in which questions were raised about his wife’s role as an attorney. 

A substantial portion of the interview concerned how the candidate’s mother acquired an apartment. The issue was about a situation where the property was initially registered in Koriahin’s name and later transferred to his mother by a court decision. Koriahin said the apartment was in fact purchased with his mother’s funds, but she was ill at the time and could not appear before a notary, so she did not object to having the apartment registered in his name. He said the subsequent court dispute arose from a family conflict and deteriorating relations with his parents, and the court ultimately granted his mother’s claim. 

The very fact of a lawsuit between close relatives prompted follow-up questions, including why the ownership right was initially registered in the candidate’s name. Koriahin again linked this to his mother’s health at the time the contract was signed. He also said that in court he acknowledged the apartment belonged to his mother and asked for the case to be considered without his participation. He explained that he made this request because he worked at that court. 

Additional questions concerned his use of a garage. Koriahin said the garage had been built without permits in the late 1990s and that he had no formal legal basis for using it. However, he emphasized that he nevertheless reported the garage in his declarations.

A separate block of questions concerned criminal proceedings that later became the subject of European Court of Human Rights review due to excessive length. The candidate said his procedural involvement was limited in time and that key decisions on interim measures were made by other judges both before and after the case was assigned to him. He said the decision he made was well-reasoned and was not overturned on appeal.

PCIE and HQCJ also returned to the issue of a potential conflict of interest in a civil case in which one of the parties filed a complaint about him. In particular, the complainant alleged that Koriahin’s wife represented the opposing party. Koriahin said the allegation related to different proceedings: he considered one case in which his wife was not the claimant’s representative. Moreover, he said that by the time he heard that case, the contractual relationship between his wife and the participant had already ended because the other case had concluded. 

Oleksandr Ivasyn

Associate Professor, Department of International, Civil, and Commercial Law, State University of Trade and Economics

The interview began with a review of Ivasyn’s professional background. He said he combines legal practice with teaching. From 2011, he headed the university’s legal department and later moved into academia. He currently teaches civil and commercial procedure and also runs short courses for civil servants on how to complete asset declarations and prevent corruption. 

 

In his legal practice, Ivasyn primarily specializes in commercial law, but said about 30% of his work involves criminal proceedings. He has participated in roughly 15 cases—at both the pretrial investigation and trial stages—involving abuse of office, misappropriation of property (Article 191 of the Criminal Code), official forgery, and receiving an improper benefit. 

PCIE raised questions about CASE & PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL, a firm Ivasyn co-founded. Although the company has operated since 2016 and handled about 30 cases, the first officially reported profit in his declarations appeared only in 2021. Ivasyn said that in the early years all earnings were reinvested into developing the business—office rent, marketing, and launching training courses—and that he supported himself during that period through academic and teaching work.

The commission also referred to Ivasyn’s prior attempt to join HACC in 2018. At that time, PCIE and HQCJ found that he did not meet integrity criteria, citing numerous issues in his declarations. Ivasyn acknowledged that he had made mistakes in preparation and had not taken all necessary steps, but said he had drawn conclusions since then and was now fully ready to serve as a judge. He confirmed that he accepted HQCJ’s earlier criticisms regarding his savings as of 2015 and the declared values of a land plot and a Hyundai Getz. He also explained the purchase of a garden house and a land plot in 2025. 

The commission questioned him in detail about how he accumulated savings given his ongoing expenses. Ivasyn said he currently spends about UAH 15,000–20,000 per month, not counting loan payments of UAH 18,000. He said his savings resulted from a long period of working as an individual entrepreneur and regularly setting money aside, which he said is reflected in his declarations since 2018.

A separate focus was a Facebook post published by the candidate titled, “How to declare cash you have always had but did not previously disclose.” PCIE noted that the post appeared a year after he had been found not to meet integrity criteria in the previous HACC competition. Ivasyn said that since 2016 he has lectured to civil servants, and that the post was an attempt to respond to frequent questions from participants who were afraid to declare cash because they feared criminals might steal it. He acknowledged that he chose an unfortunate wording and later deleted the post, insisting that he had never followed such recommendations himself.

When HQCJ noted that this advice about declaring cash coincided with his participation in the competition for the Kyiv Court of Appeal, Ivasyn could not provide a clear explanation. He called it an unfortunate mistake and again stressed that he was not proposing any mechanism to conceal real wealth, but was trying to be helpful to his audience.

During the interview, HQCJ posed a hypothetical: if, as a HACC judge, Ivasyn were considering a case against another judge for false asset declarations and the defendant claimed to have acted based on Ivasyn’s post, would he recuse himself? The candidate said no, stating he saw no grounds for recusal in that scenario.

The commission also referred to a 2021 article by Ivasyn in which he argued that individuals should have a chance to reform and that, after a certain period, it should be possible to be removed from the public register of corrupt officials. He said this was his academic position and that it now aligns with recent legislative changes adopted by Parliament and with NACP procedures.

Petro Romanenko

Deputy Head for Legal Affairs, District Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center, Samar District

A central issue in the interview was whether Romanenko has sufficient experience to work at HACC. He said he had participated in only one case involving a corruption offense, which prompted follow-up questions given the court’s specialized jurisdiction.

The candidate was also asked about his participation in elections to the Novomoskovsk City Council. He said he was not a party member and agreed to run at the request of friends who wanted to influence the city’s development in a way that aligned with his values.

The interview also addressed his wife’s acquisition in 2012 of a house and land plot in Samar for a total declared value of UAH 129,000. Romanenko said the purchase was funded through their joint savings and emphasized that the house was in poor condition, adding that he has photographs to confirm this. PCIE members noted that the candidate reacted rather emotionally to questions about assets.

The panel also discussed a case in which Romanenko sued a local authority over amendments to a public square reconstruction project and sought compensation for moral damages. He said he filed the claim out of outrage at the local government’s actions and the destruction of a green area in the city. He added that the moral damages claim was not particularly important to him, but was included as a point he could concede during negotiations.

HQCJ asked a number of questions about his knowledge of anti-corruption legislation, and in several instances the candidate said he was not ready to answer.

Yurii Bodnaruk 

Judicial Assistant, HACC Appeals Chamber

This is Bodnaruk’s second attempt to become a HACC judge. The first point PCIE members raised was that on February 26 the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear Bodnaruk’s case challenging the previous decision finding him unfit for a HACC judgeship.

For the experts, the central question was whether anything had changed since the last competition. Bodnaruk’s position was that PCIE’s earlier decision contained factual and methodological errors that, in his opinion, resulted in his income being calculated as lower than it actually was.

The previous decision concluded that for 13 years Bodnaruk lived on an unusually low income—about $150 per month. He argued that this calculation was wrong, saying he did not live on $150 per month but on $236, because under the Family Code his parents were obligated to support him for two of those 13 years while he was in postgraduate study. In addition, he said that different registries reflecting his official income showed inconsistent figures for 2008 and 2011, which, in his view, added another $600 to his total income for those years.

PCIE nonetheless questioned how the candidate could live in a large city like Odesa on $7.36 per day ($236/30 days). Bodnaruk responded that, taking into account savings, and assuming a subsistence minimum of $100, “I still had about 2.5 subsistence minimums left for expenses, given my modest lifestyle.”

A particularly notable point was that in May 2025 he signed a gift agreement documenting that his mother had given him $30,000 to purchase an apartment—an attempt to dispel doubts that he had sufficient funds to buy real estate in Odesa. HQCJ noted, however, that the gift itself allegedly took place in 2016, while the contract was executed in 2025, which is not permissible under civil law because the gift transaction had already been completed and the legal relationship had ended. Bodnaruk said he had previously provided explanations about the gift, but they were not mentioned in PCIE’s earlier decision, so he signed the agreement as additional confirmation.

The experts also asked about the candidate’s sale of a car. In his 2019 declaration, he reported income from the sale but did not declare the fact of entering into the sales transaction. Bodnaruk said the car was actually sold in 2019, but due to malfunctions at service centers it could not be formally processed at the time. As a result, he and the buyer drew up a power of attorney, and the vehicle was ultimately re-registered and sold in 2020.

In closing, Bodnaruk said he challenged PCIE’s earlier finding of unfitness because he had two conflicting assessments: a decision by the selection commission for HQCJ members finding him eligible to serve on HQCJ, and the opposite conclusion by PCIE regarding a HACC judgeship.

Serhii Kovalchuk

Professor, Ivano-Frankivsk Educational and Research Law Institute, Odesa Law Academy

The interview opened with questions about Kovalchuk’s background. He said he has been an academic since 2002. He has defended a dissertation and argued that deep familiarity with case law, together with producing scholarly work, is sufficient preparation for judicial service.

Discussing his participation in prior competitions, Kovalchuk said he is seeking professional growth. He noted, however, that he previously did not score enough points to qualify for the Supreme Court, and in the competition for the High Council of Justice he received a negative opinion from the Ethics Council finding that he did not meet the standards of integrity and professional ethics—an assessment he disputes.

The commission asked about his cohabitation with his mother, given that she was not listed in his declarations. Kovalchuk said his mother spent a long period caring for his grandmother in another region, so he did not consider it necessary to include her, and he said he had no intent to conceal her income. 

The greatest doubts concerned Kovalchuk’s reporting for 2018. With an official after-tax income of UAH 134,000, he reported saving UAH 54,000 in cash. He also said he spent about UAH 39,000 on support and had only about UAH 40,000 left for living expenses for the year (roughly UAH 3,000 per month). Kovalchuk acknowledged that this could raise questions, but said it was a single difficult year during which he lived at roughly the subsistence minimum.

PCIE found that in 2008 the price of a Toyota Corolla he purchased (UAH 117,500) exceeded his family’s total income (UAH 110,000). Kovalchuk explained this by saying his parents helped him financially and suggested registry data may be inaccurate. Additional questions were raised about his accumulation of $13,000 in savings between 2014 and 2019.

PCIE also paid special attention to his work at the Ivano-Frankivsk institute of the Odesa Law Academy. Asked about his relationship with the Academy’s president, Serhii Kivalov, Kovalchuk said they have known each other for 15 years but have strictly professional relations. He emphasized that he views Kivalov’s political links to the Russian Federation negatively, and said the Ivano-Frankivsk institute is a separate legal entity to which the founder’s politics do not extend.

The commission also asked about the candidate’s second degree—a master’s in psychology. Kovalchuk was unable to explain the difference between cognitive and psychological approaches. When asked to name prominent psychology scholars, he named three people, two of whom (Oleksii Chernovskyi and Viktor Koshchynets) hold doctorates in law rather than psychology. He was also unable to name any international experts in the field.

The commission also referred to Kovalchuk’s academic article on plea agreements. He said legislative amendments adopted in November 2024 took an approach diametrically opposed to the one he had advocated, because he supported HACC’s earlier practice of not entering into plea agreements in corruption cases. During a rapid-fire HQCJ “blitz” on the nuances of plea agreements, the candidate made an inaccuracy when answering a question about whether agreements can be concluded with an organizer.

Viktoriia Bazeliuk

Assistant Lecturer, Criminal Law Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

The candidate’s interview began with questions about her recent legal practice: Bazeliuk began working as an attorney in 2025 and has handled fewer than 10 cases so far.

She was asked many questions about apartments in the Poltava region and in Kharkiv. In 2009, her family sold an apartment in the Poltava region for about $14,000, of which she received a $4,500 share. The local Bureau of Technical Inventory valued the apartment at UAH 37,000–38,000, while the contract reflected the actual amount, which in dollar terms was $14,000. Bazeliuk said she accumulated those funds—together with savings from salaries, gifts, and fees—to purchase an apartment in Kharkiv. 

However, the greatest number of questions concerned her relationship with, and events involving, her former live-in partner.

Bazeliuk acknowledged that she was formally listed as the owner of vehicles on two occasions. One involved a Hyundai SANTA FE purchased in 2016 by a close acquaintance who could not be present for re-registration and asked her to serve as the nominal owner for less than two months. She said she neither received nor paid any money and did not use the car even once.

The story with a Honda Civic drew even more attention. Bazeliuk said she had to register it in her name because otherwise she and her partner would not have been able to enter Belarus—she claimed that there was already a car with the same owner registered there.

It was also noted that in summer 2017, Bazeliuk and her partner, Yurii Milshyn, were involved in a traffic accident in that vehicle. Police drew up two reports against the candidate: one under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (refusal to undergo a sobriety test) and one under Article 124 (the accident itself). During the court review, it was established that Bazeliuk was not the driver and that the vehicle was driven by her partner; the police had mistakenly issued the reports against her. Experts noted that she had lived with Milshyn since 2013, so it appeared odd that in her testimony she referred to him as “a man I barely knew.” 

PCIE members asked whether Milshyn might have been intoxicated, since he had previously been held liable under Article 130, which could explain the accident and why he was detained when he allegedly tried to flee. Bazeliuk responded that the driver on their vacation did not drink alcohol, except possibly nonalcoholic beer.

The candidate acknowledged an error in not declaring her use, in her 2024 declaration, of a Chevrolet Volt belonging to her former partner. She said she believed that having a power of attorney for the car, without actually using it, did not create an obligation to declare it.

The interview also addressed the fact that around 2020, Bazeliuk asked to keep her registered address at a dormitory of Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University. She explained that in order to obtain a mortgage loan, she needed to have residence registration at the dormitory and to be placed on the housing waiting list.

It also emerged that before 2010, the candidate served as a representative at certain polling stations and received income that she did not report to the tax authorities.

Bazeliuk said she traveled to the Russian Federation multiple times before 2020 because her partner’s relatives lived there. Asked about the ethics of such travel, she said that at the time it was difficult for her to explain to her partner why she would refuse to visit his relatives.

Several questions concerned her academic work. In one of her papers, for example, she argued that the HACC is not a specialized court because it does not have a special procedural law. Asked whether every court must have its own procedural law, Bazeliuk said she had not fully worked through the issue. She also answered incorrectly when asked whether the legal conclusions she had drafted qualify as evidence under the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

Oleh Batiuk

Attorney

PCIE opened the interview by asking about the candidate’s motivation and professional development, including his completion of several anti-corruption courses. The greatest number of questions, however, concerned Batiuk’s ethics and integrity. 

In 2019, the candidate declared total household income of UAH 33,000—an extremely low figure for a family with a child. Batiuk said the family’s annual spending was UAH 143,000, including UAH 100,000 in savings.

What concerned the experts more was that during the same period the candidate was practicing law, yet his declaration stated that his only income for 2019 was UAH 9,710, while the remaining UAH 24,000 consisted of his wife’s social benefits. However, it was established that Batiuk provided legal services in at least 15 cases, which would imply he earned less than UAH 1,000 per case. The candidate was unable to say what fee rates he charges for legal services.

Batiuk suggested that he may have had no income in 2019 because some matters could have been ongoing since 2016–2018 and clients might have paid retainers in advance. PCIE countered that in 2016–2018 he did not have cases that were at the trial stage.

Batiuk then acknowledged that on several occasions he received small “thank-you” payments of UAH 200–500 that he did not declare. He also did not declare income of UAH 10,000–11,000 from subleasing a land plot, which he likewise considered small.

PCIE also found that in 2018, under a decision of the Obolonskyi District Court, Batiuk was ordered to repay unemployment benefits he had received unlawfully. While working as an attorney, he applied to an employment center to receive unemployment payments. He said he believed that by paying social insurance contributions he would be protected from such situations, noting that shortly before applying he had been dismissed from his position as director of the Mariupol Legal Aid Center.

A separate block of questions concerned apartments purchased by the candidate’s mother—first in Mariupol, where the price doubled over 18 months, and later in Kyiv. The candidate attempted to explain the origin of funds for his mother, a pensioner, but provided no documentary support. Batiuk also said that the sale contract for the Mariupol apartment listed an understated price, and that the true amount was later transferred to his mother in cash.

Overall, during the interview the candidate often avoided giving direct, specific answers, and in some areas the experts did not receive clear explanations.

HQCJ noted that the candidate completed the HACC candidate questionnaire very carelessly and, as later became clear, copied it without changes from an appellate court questionnaire, resulting in numerous errors. For example, he stated that he had applied to the High Council of Justice as a judge regarding interference in his work, even though he was not a judge.

Batiuk also claimed he had not been held liable recently, but several automated speeding tickets were issued in his name. He said the violations were committed by his wife while driving his car and that he was unaware of the fines. 

HQCJ also found that for a period from March 30 to October 2, 2022, the candidate was listed as being in unauthorized absence from his unit. According to his account, that information was later not confirmed by the military unit itself.

Batiuk was also asked professional questions. For example, he was asked what he would do if another judge at his court received a gift in violation of anti-corruption legislation. He said he would report it to the High Council of Justice and to anti-corruption agencies, but added that if he learned about something like that only from rumors, he “wouldn’t run to” the High Council of Justice and “that wouldn’t happen.”

Questions about how the candidate combined military service with legal practice were reviewed by HQCJ in closed session.

Nataliia Doroshenko

Judge, Rivne District Administrative Court

The interview opened with questions about a garden house declared in 2013. According to the candidate, her husband and his father built it on their own back in 2003. However, the land plot was privatized only in 2024, which drew the attention of the PCIE experts because the construction had taken place on land that had not been privatized at the time. Doroshenko explained that the house was built within a summer-house community association, and that the association’s land is currently being transferred into the ownership of the territorial community. The house is not registered as a residential property; she said it will be registered as such once it meets the relevant requirements.

Members of both PCIE and HQCJ also asked about Doroshenko’s husband’s garage business. She said he has been self-employed since 1998 and is currently registered as a first tax group individual entrepreneur. In 2025, he paid nearly UAH 46,000 in rent for the premises used for his business. 

However, a HQCJ member questioned the profitability of his car repair business. Doroshenko said that her husband’s income is UAH 350,000; however, given taxes, rent, utilities, and the cost of parts, the commission member suggested the business would appear unprofitable and raised doubts that all income was being declared. Doroshenko responded that there is no division into “men’s” and “women’s” work in their family; they have been married for 36 years, she relies on her husband’s support, and—she said—no one who knows how he works has such doubts.

HQCJ members also asked about decisions Doroshenko made during the Revolution of Dignity period, when she served as a judge at the Rivne District Administrative Court in 2013. Among other things, they asked about rulings that annulled decisions by local councils to display the European flag alongside the State Flag of Ukraine during holidays and international events. Doroshenko was asked whose rights, and which specific rights, had been violated by those local council decisions, given the purpose of administrative justice.

She replied that although both sides in those cases were public authorities, the claims had been filed by prosecutors who, under their powers at the time, were required to protect the interests of the state, and the legislation then in force allowed them to do so. In her view, establishing that circumstance was sufficient grounds to cancel the local council decisions. 

Questions were also raised about her professional competence. Asked how the amount of a whistleblower reward is determined, Doroshenko was unable to provide a correct answer. Her explanation of the definition of a “whistleblower” was also not sufficiently clear.

At the end of the interview, a PCIE member appeared surprised by Doroshenko’s response to a question about whether she had personally encountered corruption. She said no one had ever tried to influence her and no one had ever approached her about corrupt ways of resolving cases. The panel member replied that this was “hard to believe.”

Vladyslav Kukhta

Chairman of Chernihiv District Court, Chernihiv Region

The interview began with a question from PCIE about what the candidate, as chief judge, had done to foster a corruption-free environment in the court. Kukhta responded that the court currently has only four judges, and that they are essentially “in full view” of one another. Any deviation from fair and honest adjudication, he said, would be noticeable to colleagues.

A PCIE representative then asked whether the candidate saw additional corruption risks in the fact that all judges can see case assignments, and that, in some situations, it may even be possible to predict who will receive a case if, for example, someone is out sick. Kukhta replied that their court uses an automated case assignment system. He added that some cases require a three-judge panel, so hearings are postponed until colleagues return from sick leave. In his view, there have been no situations in which it was possible to anticipate which judge would receive a particular case.

PCIE then asked about a disciplinary sanction imposed on the candidate by the High Council of Justice in 2020 for removing himself from a criminal case. The recusal was based on the fact that the candidate’s wife was acquainted with one of the defense attorneys in the case. Kukhta said that he and the other judges on the panel granted the recusal so the defense would not be able to challenge the decision on that basis. As a result, however, the High Council of Justice sanctioned him for violating recusal rules. He did not appeal that decision.

Kukhta did not disclose this in his 2021 integrity declaration because, he said, he believed that in 2019 he had not yet been held liable, and by December 2020 the sanction had already been expunged. He therefore saw no need to report it, though he later acknowledged that this might not have been entirely ethical.

The judge was also asked about the negative practice of closing DUI cases (Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses) due to the expiration of the statutory time limit. He explained that such decisions occurred when the limitation period was three months. Because the court has jurisdiction over rural areas, sending postal notices takes at least three days, and additional time is needed for a summons to be delivered or returned if not received. In that way, the deadline could expire. He noted, however, that since the limitation period was extended to one year, the court has not had such cases.

The commission pointed out that in another Article 130 case (driving under the influence), the judge had treated the offense as minor. At the time, however, legislative amendments had already entered into force, prohibiting courts from classifying Article 130 offenses as minor. The judge acknowledged the error, after first explaining that the person facing administrative liability had cancer.

Further questions concerned the candidate’s judicial ethics—specifically, a situation in which he stepped down as court chairman for two months and then was elected chairman again for a third term. Under the law, the same judge may not serve more than two consecutive terms as court chairman. A brief “pause” in leadership therefore appeared to the commission to be an attempt to circumvent that restriction in order to secure a third term. Another notable aspect was that the judge elected as court chairman after Kukhta, who served for those two months, resigned immediately upon reaching the required length of service, obtaining lifetime judicial benefits. Legislation also provides a 10% salary supplement for serving as court chairman. As a result, that judge retired with the additional 10% reflected in her benefits, while Kukhta was able to be elected for a third term.

Kukhta said he views the three-year term limit positively, but that his colleagues did not want to run for chairman. He added that after completing his second term, he took leave to give colleagues time to discuss and agree on a candidate. However, aside from the colleague who ultimately resigned, no one volunteered.

When asked by the commission whether he knew about that judge’s intent to resign, he initially said yes, but then stated that he “did not know for sure.” He also said he had hoped she would “work at least another year and a half.” Asked whether he vacated the court chairman’s office during her two-month term, he replied, “No.” 

HQCJ asked why he had not explained these circumstances in response to PCIE’s inquiry. He answered that at the time he did not see a need to do so, because he had “always acted honestly.”

Ihor Makaryk

Attorney

The interview opened with questions about Makaryk’s motivation and his lack of judicial experience. Ihor Makaryk said he views the absence of courtroom experience as an advantage because it allows him to approach criminal procedure from a different perspective. He also emphasized his high level of competence, stating that he performed well on the exams and drafted procedural documents that, in his words, were even better than those prepared by sitting HACC judges.

A substantial portion of the questions from PCIE and HQCJ focused on financial integrity and potential conflicts of interest. In particular, the panel was interested in Makaryk’s lease of office space for his legal practice. He rents a 49.1 m² office in Lviv from his employer for UAH 1,000. Asked whether this rate reflects market pricing, he said it does, citing the experience of other attorneys. 

During the interview, it also emerged that the candidate had represented, free of charge, relatives of the owners of the company where he works, and from which he rents office space for UAH 1,000. Makaryk said he does not see this as a conflict of interest or connected to the low rent: “All my work and my entire legal life—I consider it a hobby, my true calling.” He added that under martial law he decided he would provide all legal services pro bono. 

HQCJ pointed to a 2023 decision of the Sykhiv District Court under which UAH 5,000 in legal fees was awarded in favor of the candidate’s client, but those funds were not reflected in his tax reporting. Makaryk explained this by saying either the contract had been terminated or the funds were never actually paid despite the court decision.

TI Ukraine also found a case involving this candidate in which, in the Terebovlia District Court, he represented the claimant, his father, a former judge of the same court. In 2022, the court granted his father’s claim and ordered reimbursement of his litigation costs, including UAH 2,000 in legal fees, from the state budget.

Separate attention during the interview was given to military service obligations. The candidate received “reserved” status in the summer of 2024 as in-house counsel for a critical enterprise. Asked what he had done to comply with his obligations between 2022 and 2024, Makaryk said he contacted the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center to update his records, where he was allegedly told that “his candidacy was not being considered.”

Makaryk was unable to answer a question about how many European countries have anti-corruption courts, even though during the interview he referred to his desire to join the “European family.” He also interrupted members of the commission, prompting remarks asking him to listen to questions through to the end.

Olena Tanasevych

HACC Judge

Olena Tanasevych’s interview focused largely on the circumstances of her attendance at an event that attracted public attention as the “Kivalov party.” According to Tanasevych, she came to the educational institution’s premises outside working hours to discuss organizing online lectures. Once she arrived, the head of the institution informed her that a pre–New Year’s event was taking place and invited her to join briefly. She agreed, saying she planned to stay for no more than 15–20 minutes.

Describing what happened at the event, Tanasevych said that upon entering the venue she noticed people present whom she described as figures in publicly known criminal proceedings. She stated that she understood the potential sensitivity of the situation and therefore avoided any communication with those individuals; she added that they did not attempt to initiate contact with her either. Tanasevych also emphasized that no complaints about her actions had been filed with the High Council of Justice. She referenced her public explanations, including participation in a conversation with the Executive Director of Transparency International Ukraine. Asked whether she was aware of allegations involving Serhii Kivalov, Tanasevych said she had not interacted with him personally but rather with the head of the relevant unit at the institution, and added that she was not aware of any criminal proceedings involving Kivalov.

The next block of questions concerned asset declarations and financial circumstances. PCIE and HQCJ pointed to the results of a full review of her declarations and noted inaccuracies. Tanasevych attributed these issues to the specifics of anti-corruption legislation and the possibility of differing interpretations, denying any intent to conceal information. 

The cost of vehicles was discussed separately. Tanasevych said that some of the vehicles were owned by legal entities and used by her under a right-of-use arrangement; in her view, she was therefore not responsible for their purchase and did not know their value. She emphasized that she still listed them in her declarations even when, as she put it, there was no direct legal obligation to do so. A PCIE member also raised the possibility of concealing assets through companies, noting that the lack of clear answers about vehicle values could create that impression and that, as a HACC judge, she should demonstrate a high standard of disclosure. 

HQCJ also asked a series of follow-up questions about the nature of Tanasevych’s cooperation with educational institutions, reports of interference in her work as a judge, cross-border travel, and certain aspects of her declarations. Tanasevych acknowledged that a land plot had not been reported in her 2021 declaration and said her husband provided the information too late. She said that once she learned her husband had acquired it, she contacted the National Agency on Corruption Prevention through her personal online account. 

The interview also addressed her use of official housing in Kyiv. Tanasevych said that while she was on maternity leave she does not actually live there and instead stays with her child in the suburbs of Kyiv. She explained that the apartment is located near a military facility and lacks heat and electricity, which makes it unsafe to live there with a small child.

Mykola Rubashchenko

Associate Professor, Criminal Law Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

The interview began with a question about the professional accomplishments the candidate is most proud of. Among five key achievements, Rubashchenko cited his academic work, including dissertations on national security and liability for collaborationism, as well as his expert involvement in drafting legislation to criminalize sanctions violations. In response to a PCIE follow-up about his membership in a working group on amendments to the Criminal Code, the candidate clarified that he served as an expert evaluating the concept and helping develop the draft law on criminal liability for violations of sanctions legislation. 

Asked about a point in his motivation letter regarding insufficient reasoning in court decisions, the candidate was unable to recall specific examples from HACC case law. He explained this by noting that he has published relatively few articles on anti-corruption topics. PCIE also asked about his work with the “Institute of Legislative Ideas” and whether that could create a conflict of interest if he became a HACC judge. Rubashchenko said that while conflicts of interest are a potential risk in any field, in his case the risk is not “extremely high.”

PCIE questioned his motivation given that he is simultaneously participating in a competition for a position at the Kharkiv Court of Appeal. Rubashchenko stated candidly that if he were successful in both competitions, he would choose the Kharkiv Court of Appeal. He explained that Kharkiv is his alma mater and that appellate work appeals to him because it involves a broader range of cases than the narrower specialization of the HACC.

PCIE and HQCJ pointed to inconsistencies in his declarations regarding his place of residence and family composition. Rubashchenko explained that from 2006 to 2022 he lived in a dormitory, and after the start of the full-scale invasion he moved to his parents’ home in the village of Myronivka. He said he listed the dormitory in his declarations only as long as his rental agreement remained in effect. As for why his brother, who also lived with him in the village, was not included in his 2022 declaration, Rubashchenko referred to the “183-day rule,” stating that he carefully calculated the duration of their shared household in order to comply with legal requirements.

HQCJ also raised questions about the lease of an apartment in Kyiv, including the absence of the owner’s details. The candidate said the arrangement had no legal significance and was signed between a friend of the owner’s mother and his own friend. Asked about his father’s income from cultivating approximately 11 hectares of land in 2022, reported as only UAH 16,000, Rubashchenko said he does not get involved in those matters and that he took the figure from his father’s online taxpayer account. He added that such income is entirely plausible and that the activity could even have been loss-making. 

HQCJ noted the candidate’s atypical activity as an individual entrepreneur: in 2023, after six months of work and UAH 76,000 in income, he closed his business, then later entered into two additional contracts as an individual, and in 2024 reopened his individual entrepreneur account. Rubashchenko described this as a “first attempt,” explaining that clients had been unwilling to work with him as an individual entrepreneur. He denied that this was an effort to optimize taxes. HQCJ also asked about the royalties he declared in the amount of UAH 12,000 for an expert examination. The candidate said this wording reflected requirements imposed by the commissioning organizations, for which he developed tests. 

In the end, responding to questions about his lack of judicial experience, the candidate acknowledged that he has no courtroom experience at all. He said his qualifications are also based on analyzing judicial decisions and watching livestreams of HACC hearings. Rubashchenko added that he is inspired by academic colleagues who have gone on to serve at HACC and at the Supreme Court.

Iryna Kuzina

Attorney

During Iryna Kuzina’s interview, members of PCIE and HQCJ paid particular attention to her income, which appeared significantly understated in certain periods. The candidate explained that early in her career, or when she wanted to gain experience, she worked “for her name,” including within the pro bono legal aid system, and that she reduced her workload during periods of pregnancy. 

The panel separately examined the issue of so-called “gray” salary and Kuzina’s income during her employment at the law firm Ilyashev & Partners. When asked directly about the practice of unofficial payments, the candidate confirmed that in the past she had agreed to such arrangements, noting that she would act differently today. 

The subsequent discussion was about the relationship between her description of the firm’s prestige and compensation level, and the amounts reflected in official records (approximately UAH 50,000 for part of 2015, and for 2016–2017 combined). Kuzina pointed to the employer’s responsibility for accurate financial reporting and said she was limited in what she could disclose about her income due to a nondisclosure agreement. At the same time, given the discrepancy between the circumstances she described and the recorded income, these explanations do not objectively eliminate reasonable doubts that she may have received unofficial payments during that period, especially in light of her own description of the firm’s high status.

Many questions concerned matters reviewed by the High Council of Justice in connection with a 2018 report of interference in a judge’s activities. Members of PCIE and HQCJ examined Kuzina’s role and procedural conduct as defense counsel in detail, including her lateness to hearings, the filing of numerous motions, and the overall logic of the defense strategy. The candidate disagreed with the assessments contained in the High Council of Justice materials, emphasized concerns about the Council’s review procedure, and presented her own account of the situation. In particular, she said the delays were due to objective reasons and that she informed the court in advance, which is confirmed by the case materials.

The interview also addressed the candidate’s trip to the Russian Federation in 2018. Kuzina explained that the business trip to Moscow was professionally necessary as part of her work at Ilyashev & Partners and related to work for a client from Kazakhstan. She said she did not stay overnight in Moscow and did not spend any money, as all expenses were paid by the law firm, and that her work that day took place at the firm’s Moscow office.

Dmytro Ostapenko 

Attorney

The first questions from PCIE focused on how Ostapenko responded to attempts at corrupt influence—both from clients and from colleagues who tried to leverage his membership in the Public Integrity Council to make it easier to pass the qualification assessment. He referenced these incidents in his dossier. Ostapenko said he cut off any communication with such people, viewing them as a threat to his reputation and career. However, he noted that as an attorney he is bound by confidentiality and professional ethics rules, and therefore could not cooperate confidentially with law enforcement to investigate such approaches.

Asked whether he informed colleagues on the Public Integrity Council about specific cases of pressure, Ostapenko confirmed that such discussions took place in the council’s group chat. In response to a hypothetical question about what he would do in a similar situation as a HACC judge, he said the law requires a judge to report any interference in their work and that he would follow that requirement.

Most of Ostapenko’s interview focused on his role on the selection commission for the head of ARMA, specifically his vote for Olena Duma in the final round. After civil society criticism of Duma’s appointment as head of ARMA, he withdrew his vote and publicly apologized for the decision. Notably, Ostapenko was the only commission member to publicly acknowledge that his vote had been a mistake.

A PCIE expert asked who had delegated Ostapenko to the commission, and he replied that it was then–Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin. The expert then asked what motivated Ostapenko to vote for Duma, and later to withdraw that vote. Ostapenko explained that some materials about the candidates were sent to him by email, while other documents were stored on a computer at the Cabinet of Ministers, and he was not always informed when new information appeared. In particular, he said that the full information from NABU concerning a criminal proceeding involving Duma, as he later learned, was available only on that computer. The documents he had access to did not indicate that she was a suspect. He said that if he had had the full information, he “would never have voted for Ms. Duma.” 

He also said the voting procedure had not been clarified in advance and in fact conflicted with the rules of procedure. Ostapenko said he believed the public vote was only meant to rank candidates, but in practice the commission chair announced the winner essentially after the first round.

Members of PCIE and HQCJ noted, however, that a clear agenda should have been set before the official vote and that commission members had information from the NACP, NABU, NGOs, and other sources—and therefore should not have made such an error. Ostapenko again stated that he did not have access to all the information. His withdrawal of the vote prompted a further PCIE question: did that mean that, as a judge, Ostapenko might similarly respond to public pressure and reverse decisions after high-profile media coverage? Ostapenko said he sees a clear difference between serving on a selection commission and serving as a judge: in the first case there is far more discretion; in the second, there is a strict procedure, deliberations in chambers, and a system of appellate review. “A judge cannot withdraw their vote,” he emphasized, adding that the ARMA selection process was “more political than legal.”

HQCJ also asked directly whether the candidate felt he had developed “professional distortion” from identifying with civil society. Ostapenko replied that he does have a form of distortion, but an attorney one—an inclination toward critical assessment of information and distrust even toward his own clients. At the same time, he acknowledged that some NGOs irritate him because of the way they communicate.

Among other issues, HQCJ focused on several facts from the candidate’s dossier. These included a $25,000 loan received in 2020, part of which ($9,000) was repaid that same year, although the repayment was not declared as debt repayment. Ostapenko explained that the declaration form in use at the time did not technically allow him to record such a repayment. 

Regarding his membership in the Svoboda party in 2013–2014 and his candidacy for Parliament in single-member District No. 54 (Shakhtarsk, Donetsk Region), Ostapenko said this reflected his desire to counter trends of Russification and separatism in Donetsk Region during the Yanukovych era. According to him, at the time only that party promoted a clearly pro-Ukrainian stance. He said that beginning in March 2014 he ceased all party involvement.

Nazar Hryn

Judge, Saksahanskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih

The interview opened with PCIE questions about a land plot in Poltava that Hryn received in 2010 while working as a prosecutor. The commission noted that his brother, also a prosecutor, received a similar plot around the same time. Hryn said he acted strictly within the Land Code: he filed an application and completed the paperwork to obtain land for construction. He denied exerting any influence on the council or making any payments, and explained that no construction took place because he ultimately continued working in Kryvyi Rih.

PCIE also raised questions about the candidate’s official housing in two different cities. Regarding an apartment in Kryvyi Rih, for which he received a right of use in 2018, Hryn said he did not actually live there and lost the right to it in 2022. According to him, he was not given keys to the apartment and was advised to climb in through a window to access it. It also emerged that unhoused people were living inside, so he had to rent alternative housing.

Questions were also raised about an official apartment in Poltava that he received in 2010. The candidate said he did not vacate it after moving from the prosecutor’s office to the judiciary because his wife (a prosecutor) continued living there, and later her parents—who have internally displaced person status—began living there as well. Although he had only about nine years of service at the time he left, he said he believed he had the right not to vacate the apartment. He also noted that his ex-wife has not actually lived there since 2018.

PCIE drew attention to the purchase of an apartment in Kryvyi Rih by the candidate’s mother-in-law, where Hryn now lives with his wife. Questions arose because the candidate held a power of attorney for the purchase but did not state the purchase price in his declaration. Hryn acknowledged this as a mistake, explaining that although he knew the price when the contract was signed, he failed to include it. The panel also focused on the price itself: the apartment was purchased for UAH 164,000, which PCIE said was three times below market value. The candidate denied that the price was understated, explaining that the owners needed to leave urgently for Poland and that the apartment had an old Soviet-era renovation. He also stressed that he did not contribute any personal funds, as the purchase was made entirely with his mother-in-law’s money. 

PCIE raised the issue of child support litigation. In 2018, the candidate’s first wife filed a claim; in 2020, his current wife filed a claim even though they were married at the time. Hryn explained that his second wife did so to equalize the rights of the children. He later filed his own claim to reduce the payment amount.

HQCJ noted that the candidate’s questionnaire did not have examples of cases involving corruption-related offenses, even though he had handled nine such administrative proceedings. Hryn said he remembers that one was closed due to the statute of limitations, and in the others he did not issue a final decision because his judicial term ended.

HQCJ also discussed delays in a case on holding a judge liable. Hryn attributed this to the case being transferred among courts over an extended period and to the inability to consider the matter without the person concerned being present. The commission also pointed to 24 disciplinary complaints, including one from the Prosecutor General regarding a case under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, involving a prosecutor. HQCJ was struck by the speed of the review—the case was closed within a week. The candidate denied there were grounds for recusal, saying that although the prosecutor had supported the prosecution in some of Hryn’s cases, their relationship was purely professional. Hryn closed the case for lack of an offense. 

HQCJ also asked about the repeated viewing, in the unified database of court decisions, of information about a person with the surname Mehamiedov. According to system logs, searches were conducted using the candidate’s access key over the period 2018–2025. Hryn said he did not recognize the name, was not monitoring anything, and could not explain the activity. He added that an internal inquiry would be conducted.

During HQCJ’s theory questions, the candidate appeared uncertain. He was unable to clearly list corruption-related crimes and gave a vague answer about how to distinguish administrative corruption offenses. 

Vita Matolych

Judge, Nadvirna District Court, Ivano-Frankivsk Region

PCIE asked Matolych to explain her commute, since she lives in Lviv while working in Nadvirna, Ivano-Frankivsk Region (about 86.1 km from Lviv). Matolych said she wakes up at 5:00 a.m. almost every day to catch a 5:30 a.m. bus to Ivano-Frankivsk, where she transfers to another bus to Nadvirna. She said the trip takes about three hours one way. When she had to work late, she said she rented hotel rooms, but could not provide proof. For example, because she paid in cash. Matolych confirmed that this schedule sometimes meant violating curfew. 

HQCJ expressed doubts that she truly spends up to seven hours per day commuting to and from work. Matolych answered she had considered moving to Ivano-Frankivsk, but no longer had that opportunity by the time of her appointment; she did not provide additional details, citing personal circumstances.

A particularly notable point was that in 2018, while serving as a judicial assistant, Matolych searched for court decisions involving her relatives by name or phone number using her full access to the court decisions register. She claimed that name-based searches can be performed not only with full access but also via the public portal of the judiciary. As for the phone numbers, she confirmed they belonged to her relatives but could not recall why she ran the searches: “All of these phone numbers belong to members of my family; I don’t remember why that search request was made.”

PCIE also asked about her motivation to pursue academic work, given that she defended a dissertation titled “Protection of Professional Secrets in Criminal Proceedings.” She explained that in 2017 she decided to become a judge, but the competition was canceled by a Supreme Court decision, so she chose to develop in another field.

Experts also asked Matolych to provide her academic papers in DOC format, but she did not, saying she only had PDF versions. She later acknowledged that she had drafts, but the final DOC files that she exchanged with her academic supervisor were not saved. PCIE found this unusual.

The candidate reported no savings despite a judge’s relatively high salary, explaining that additional expenses and full financial support for her parents were the reason.

HQCJ suspected that the candidate uses her mother’s undeclared vehicle. The first question concerned a traffic accident involving an undeclared TOYOTA RAV4 owned by her mother. On the day of the accident, Matolych was driving that car to work and picked up a colleague. The commission found it odd that she drove the car only once and caused an accident. Matolych added that she had been at her parents’ home that day, there was no public transportation connection, and the only option was to go by car; she also said her mother sometimes gives her a ride. 

Matolych claimed she travels to her parents in Stryi by public transportation, not the other way around. However, HQCJ said it had information that the vehicle in question had traveled the Stryi–Lviv route dozens of times. Matolych said her parents traveled to Lviv because they have an apartment there, but that does not mean they were traveling to see her. She did not provide complete information about how her parents serviced and maintained the vehicle.

Questions were also raised about her professional performance: despite a relatively light caseload, there were 193 instances of missing deadlines for sending the texts of court decisions to the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. Matolych attributed these problems to power outages in 2023–2024.

It was also noted that the candidate listed no referees in her questionnaire, because she believed she was supposed to name someone competent in the anti-corruption field. Asked about dismissals in DUI cases, she responded that the problem lay with case participants who failed to appear and did not provide necessary evidence, police officers included.

Overall, during the interview, Judge Matolych at times avoided giving direct answers, which required experts to repeat certain questions multiple times.

Dmytro Movchan 

Judge, Novokodatskyi District Court of Dnipro

During the interview, PCIE paid particular attention to an analysis of access logs for the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. Movchan was asked about systematic searches (more than 100 times between 2018 and 2025) conducted using the full name of a third party with whom the candidate is said to have long-standing personal ties and indirect property and financial connections. A PCIE member noted that this frequency of checks required a separate explanation given the nature of full access to the register and judicial ethics standards.

The candidate gave two reasons explaining the searches. First, he said he was trying to avoid a potential conflict of interest. According to Movchan, in one criminal proceeding, there was a piece of real estate that a long-time acquaintance of his intended to acquire in the future. Even though he received a response from the pretrial investigation authority stating that the person was not involved in the proceeding, the judge said he decided to verify this himself in the register, explaining that he needed to personally confirm there were no risks. However, in response to follow-up questions from HQCJ about the legal nature of such a conflict of interest and what it might have entailed, the candidate did not provide a clear answer.

Second, Movchan said the same individual had approached him for advice about another matter the person had in a different court. The person reportedly contacted him because of doubts about the attorney’s legal position. Movchan said he checked information about the proceeding to understand its substance and possible risks in that legal strategy, and then allegedly advised the person to change counsel. This episode also drew PCIE’s attention in terms of the limits of permissible judicial conduct outside a judge’s own procedural powers and the use of full-access tools in the register.

The interview also addressed Movchan’s simultaneous status as both an attorney and a judge. He said he obtained his attorney’s certificate during a period when he did not have judicial authority, and that, at the time, this was not regarded as a violation. He stressed that he did not actually practice law and that he suspended the certificate on the same day it was issued. 

PCIE also examined his family’s assets and publicly available information about his wife’s professional activity. In particular, PCIE noted social media references suggesting she had a substantial consulting practice as a psychologist, while no corresponding income was reflected. Movchan explained that her work was purely unpaid because she is still in training, and such practice is required as part of the certification process. He said it was not accompanied by any income.

Oleksii Zaitsev

Associate Professor, Criminal Law Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

During the interview, PCIE focused primarily on financial and asset-related issues. A major point of discussion was the candidate’s opening of a large number of bank accounts within a short period of time. Zaitsev explained that this was part of a strategy to place funds in deposits and earn interest income, adding that in previous years he had received substantial amounts of interest. To illustrate the cash flow, he filed a request to submit a separate explanatory chart.

PCIE noted that in earlier years the candidate declared significant funds held in bank accounts, while in more recent declarations bank accounts are scarce, suggesting that savings may have been kept in cash. Zaitsev linked this decision to tax changes affecting passive income and to broader risks to the banking system during the full-scale war. PCIE emphasized that a sharp change in how funds are stored, combined with previously significant deposits, requires additional assessment in terms of financial consistency.

The interview also discussed Zaitsev’s privatization of an apartment and its sale almost immediately afterward. In particular, in 2005, as a servicemember, he received an apartment in Kharkiv Region, even though he had expected to receive housing in Kharkiv. He said that as early as the first viewing he decided to sell the apartment. He explained this by citing the inconvenient location, stressing that disposing of the property was his legal right. 

Separate questions were raised about income from notarial practice. The candidate described the declared amounts as ordinary professional fees and explained that he stopped working as a notary when he transitioned into academia. 

The commission also returned to the issue of holding attorney and notary status simultaneously. Zaitsev referred to the lack, at the time, of a clear mechanism for suspending an attorney’s certificate and said he did not, in practice, engage in legal work as an attorney. Nonetheless, the legal incompatibility itself became a distinct focus of the evaluation, because such dual status was essentially prohibited by law even if no attorney work was performed.

Additional topics concerned Zaitsev’s living in his sister’s apartment, his publication of an academic article in a Russian journal in 2014, and certain property-related matters involving family members. As in other parts of the interview, these issues were considered through the lens of the completeness of his explanations, consistency with his declarations, and the overall perception of the candidate’s integrity. 

Marta-Mariia Yatsynina 

Senior Lecturer, Ukrainian Catholic University

The interview began with a detailed discussion of the candidate’s employment history. From 2014 to 2023, she worked for 11 different companies involved in retail fuel sales.

PCIE members noted that the gas station chain where the candidate worked (including ANP) has been publicly linked to Ihor Kolomoiskyi’s Privat Group. Yatsynina said she worked as in-house counsel and had no information about the ownership structure; she added that she learned about the alleged links to Kolomoiskyi later from media reports. She also said that her numerous transfers among companies (registered under the same address and phone number) occurred without her involvement. Overall, she said she did not see any legal violations in this and was primarily interested in receiving official remuneration and ensuring taxes were paid.

In 2019, the candidate purchased a new car. PCIE members questioned whether she had sufficient funds for the purchase. Yatsynina provided detailed calculations of her family’s savings over several years, explaining what funds were available in each period to demonstrate her ability to pay for the vehicle.

PCIE also raised the similarity between the candidate’s dissertation and another dissertation defended in 2020. Yatsynina rejected allegations of plagiarism, stating that she had published articles on the topic as early as 2016–2017. In her view, it could have been the other scholar who adopted her sequence of presentation, rather than the reverse.

Since 2021, the candidate has served as the anti-corruption compliance officer at Ukrainian Catholic University while also teaching. She explained her desire to become a HACC judge as a logical next step in her career, saying that in teaching the law is “static” rather than “dynamic,” and that she is also interested in practical work. Although her legal practice has mostly involved administrative and commercial disputes, she emphasized her strong academic interest in criminal law and in “special subjects” (public officials).

Ivan Posokhov 

Judge, Siverskodonetsk City Court, Luhansk Region 

The interview began with PCIE questions about Posokhov’s management experience at the Storozhynets District Court. Asked what he had done to build a corruption-free culture in the court, the candidate said that when he was appointed, the court chair assured him there was no corruption. Posokhov stated that he is not aware of any instances of misconduct within the staff and that he did not hold any special meetings on the issue.

Regarding his own experience handling corruption-related cases, the candidate said he had dealt with relatively few. He explained that he often did not manage to issue final decisions because his judicial term ended. Posokhov confirmed that he wants to work at the HACC, noting that he has experience handling other complex categories of cases, including those involving drug trafficking and crimes against life and health.

PCIE noted that since 2015, the candidate has kept all savings exclusively in cash. Posokhov said his only source of funds is his salary, and that he prefers cash because of exchange-rate volatility and for his own peace of mind, despite the risks of keeping money in rented housing. He said he keeps only current salary payments in bank accounts.

There were also questions about a land plot whose declared value increased twelvefold over two years. The candidate explained the discrepancy by valuation methodology: he said the plot was initially purchased with an expert valuation of UAH 9,000 because it was an empty piece of land. Later, however, for tax purposes the tax authority required a new monetary valuation, which set the value at UAH 116,000.

HQCJ asked about an enforcement proceeding from 2014 in which the debtor’s full name and date of birth exactly match the candidate’s. Posokhov denied having any enforcement proceedings against him, stating that he had been held administratively liable only once, back in 2007.

PCIE asked about a 2016 HQCJ conclusion that the candidate’s actions contained a disciplinary offense, but he was not sanctioned only because the limitation period had expired. The candidate acknowledged that he extended an interim measure for a defendant without first considering a pending recusal motion. He described this as choosing “the lesser of two evils,” explaining that the defense was systematically delaying the process and the detention deadline was approaching. Posokhov said that in similar situations today he involves legal aid attorneys for specific procedural steps and never schedules hearings for the last days of an interim measure.

PCIE asked about a potential conflict of interest because the register contains a decision by Posokhov in a case where the attorney was his sister’s husband. The candidate said he checked the decision and did not find the relative’s surname there. He also said he mistakenly listed the person as his brother-in-law in his integrity declaration because he misunderstood the terminology, although he does not consider him a close person (his sister is now divorced). 

Posokhov was unable to provide a specific answer on the content and adoption procedure for the Anti-Corruption Strategy and anti-corruption programs. He also said he was unfamiliar with the basic legal concept of habeas corpus. 

HQCJ also reviewed the candidate’s decision in a case under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, in which a person with a recorded alcohol level of 2.57‰ was released from liability. The commission noted that the ruling evaluated only the defense’s arguments and that witnesses were not examined. Posokhov explained his decision by pointing to the episodic nature of the video recording. He also said police officers cannot serve as witnesses and that no motions were filed to summon other individuals. 

When discussing “zero tolerance” for corruption, the candidate described it as complete rejection of corrupt conduct and avoidance of questionable schemes. Asked about exposing corruption and actively supporting anti-corruption efforts, Posokhov said he was not aware of any abuses by colleagues or others. When an HQCJ member remarked ironically that the candidate had been “lucky,” Posokhov agreed, adding that while corruption exists as a phenomenon, he has not personally encountered such cases.

Oksana Hutsal 

Judge, Orikhiv District Court, Zaporizhzhia Region

During Oksana Hutsal’s interview, a substantial share of the questions concerned financial and asset-related matters. Members of PCIE and HQCJ asked about the candidate’s living arrangements and her daily travel to work. She lived in Zaporizhzhia but worked at a district court in the region. Hutsal said that for several years she commuted by public transportation, and that she purchased a personal vehicle only after about three and a half years of commuting because earlier she had not been able to save money and had not yet obtained a driver’s license.

HQCJ asked specifically whether her income in 2015–2020 was sufficient given typical living expenses and transportation costs. Hutsal said her family lived frugally and that her parents helped cover some household expenses, including by providing food.

A separate set of questions was about her husband’s income, including a situation in which, in 2015, her husband reportedly had no income. The candidate linked this to personal circumstances and asked to provide an explanation in closed session, which was accepted by HQCJ and PCIE.

PCIE also drew attention to her handling of cases under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of Ukraine, particularly instances where proceedings were closed due to the expiration of statutory time limits. Hutsal explained these episodes by pointing to the parties’ procedural behavior, including motions requesting adjournments.

Additional questions concerned her rent-free use of housing. Hutsal said she lives in an apartment owned by her parent’s cousin, who, she added, provided documentation confirming their family relationship. The candidate said she covers utility costs and also paid off her relative’s outstanding utility debt. 

Oleksandr Ostrohliad

Associate Professor, Department of Law and Law Enforcement, Zhytomyr Polytechnic State University

The most extensive questions from PCIE and HQCJ concerned Ostrohliad’s household expenditure calculations. According to his declarations, in 2016 a family of five spent only UAH 25,600 for the entire year (about $83 per month), and UAH 36,000 in 2017. Given that the state subsistence minimum for a family of that size was about three times higher, the candidate explained the family’s austere spending by pointing to support from parents: his in-laws covered utilities (they live in the same building on different floors), while his own parents provided food and preserved goods. The candidate claimed he saved up to 70% of his income, although the commission noted that even taxes were not included in the calculations he provided.

Despite the modest lifestyle described, the family regularly upgraded its vehicles with new, showroom purchases:

• 2016 — Citroën (UAH 616,000)
• 2021 — Opel (UAH 673,000) 
• 2025 — Toyota valued at over UAH 2 million.

Questions were also raised about Ostrohliad’s real estate. He purchased a house from the son of his academic supervisor at an undervalued price, which he explained by the property’s “neglected condition.” His father-in-law and mother-in-law purchased an apartment in central Kyiv for UAH 867,000, while comparable apartments in that residential complex cost around $220,000. Later, in the same complex, another apartment (107.4 m²) was purchased with his in-laws’ funds in the name of his wife’s brother. The commission questioned both the stated prices and whether there were lawful funds for such purchases. The candidate said his in-laws had the means because his father-in-law is a businessman and his mother-in-law is a notary; he added that they also receive pensions and that the apartments were purchased when the complex was still “problematic” and not yet commissioned.

In 2022, Ostrohliad’s family obtained UK residence permission as a “backup option,” citing security conditions and responsibility for three children. 

HQCJ also pointed to his notary wife’s low official income, which could indicate underreporting of earnings. The candidate attributed her low income to maternity leave.

In summary, HQCJ representatives emphasized that the combination of asset purchases worth millions of hryvnias with declared spending below the minimum amounts set by the state for people of the relevant age groups creates “reasonable doubt” that the candidate should have dispelled.

Yevhen Kapitonov

Judge, Vilniansk District Court, Zaporizhzhia Region

The interview began with questions about systematic irregularities in Kapitonov’s asset declarations. In 2015–2019, he did not report the property in Vilniansk where he lived with acquaintances, explaining that he believed declarations were mandatory only for ownership rights, not for use. Despite becoming aware of the requirement back in 2019, he took no steps to correct the information, commenting, “What happened, happened.”

PCIE also noted that in Section 11 of his declaration, regarding a Mercedes-Benz, the candidate did not identify the actual buyer and instead listed himself as the source of income. In addition, the value of a Dacia Logan was not declared, and its sale for UAH 140,000 was not reflected in his annual declaration. In 2018, the value of a Mitsubishi Outlander was also not declared.

The candidate acknowledged all of these errors and also agreed with the decision of the Ethics Council of the High Council of Justice, which in December 2025 found that he did not meet the standards of professional ethics and integrity.

HQCJ also asked about his wife’s vehicle transactions, including the sale of a Toyota Auris with a $2,000 price increase, which the candidate attributed to repairs. HQCJ also noted her purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser Prado in 2022 for $6,000 despite a market value of around $20,000; Kapitonov explained the discrepancy by saying the purchase was made at the start of the full-scale invasion. 

Questions were also raised about whether the candidate’s father could afford to purchase an Acura MDX in 2020. Kapitonov said it was funded by proceeds from selling a Skoda and a house (sold about six months after the Acura purchase), but he did not provide supporting documents, citing his father’s illness.

PCIE drew attention to his systematic closure of cases under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of Ukraine (driving under the influence) due to the expiration of statutory time limits. Kapitonov explained that the delays were caused by the parties’ abuses, the filing of numerous motions, and the need to comply with fair-trial standards as outlined in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 

The interview also addressed his trip to the Russian Federation in 2016, which Kapitonov said was motivated by a desire to visit close relatives. HQCJ also pointed to the candidate’s lack of attention to detail, noting that in a previous HACC competition he was rejected because he had failed to submit an application. 

HQCJ examined the candidate’s approach to recusals in detail. Kapitonov recused himself in a case involving a prosecutor from the Zaporizhzhia Prosecutor’s Office who had handled prosecution in some of his cases, explaining that he was being overly cautious. 

HQCJ, however, noted selectivity, because the candidate did not see a conflict of interest in cases involving his wife that were heard by his colleagues in the same court (including a challenge to a traffic fine and the establishment of the fact of death in an occupied territory). Kapitonov said he had only ordinary professional relationships with those judges and did not ask them for anything, so there were no grounds for them to recuse themselves.

The interview also raised his handling of cases involving deprivation of mothers’ parental rights. HQCJ identified nine cases in which Kapitonov issued judgments in absentia. The candidate explained that in those cases the mothers’ ties with their children had long been severed (in one instance the mother had moved to the Russian Federation), and that his decisions were based on the best interests of the children and the available evidence, despite the mothers’ failure to appear.

Andrii Dudikov 

Judge, Ternivskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih

PCIE paid the greatest attention to Dudikov’s improper use of full access to the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. Under the candidate’s login, 240 targeted searches were recorded that were unrelated to his own cases. In particular, Dudikov searched 75 times for information about his sister’s ex-husband and that person’s companies, in relation to whom a criminal proceeding has been registered. He also checked information about another person and about himself, 30 times. At first, the candidate gave vague answers, suggesting he may simply have forgotten to log out of the system, but later explained the searches as professional curiosity and, as to the searches about himself, a desire to learn the outcome of an appeal. 

The Commission also raised questions about his asset declarations. In 2018–2020, he used a car owned by his ex-wife but did not report its value. He explained this by saying his ex-wife did not tell him the price, and he did not want to mislead by providing an inaccurate figure.

Dudikov was also asked about his rent-free use of housing in Kryvyi Rih. He said that in practice it was like a rental arrangement, but the owners did not formally lease it to him, so the arrangement was based on friendly relations, while he reimbursed utility costs. HQCJ also noted that in 2021 the candidate’s father bought an apartment in Chabany, and in the same year his ex-wife bought a parking space there as well. Dudikov insisted this was a coincidence—he does not use it, and his ex-wife made that decision on her own.

According to the NACP, there is also a significant discrepancy between the value of property Dudikov declared and the values reflected in the register, including a parking space declared at UAH 400,000 but listed in the register at UAH 50,000. The candidate said he reported prices that reflected the actual amounts.

It also emerged that in 2025, the Territorial Recruitment Center was searching for a candidate as someone who had committed an administrative offense. Dudikov called this “strange” and suggested it could be an employer’s error, insisting that he himself had not violated anything.

HQCJ also asked about several of Dudikov’s cases under Article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offenses that were closed due to expired time limits. The candidate attributed this to the nonappearance of the parties and other delays. Quoting The Garden of Gethsemane, he said he does not share the idea that “it is better to convict 100 innocent people than let one guilty person go,” and that he always seeks the truth. He also made an error in the practical assignment by failing to apply the law in force at the time the offense was committed—something he himself acknowledged during the interview.

HQCJ paid separate attention to the candidate’s motivation for changing courts. In 2019, he was seconded from the Ternivskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih, where the normative caseload was critical (31,000 cases), to a court in Vinnytsia Region, where the caseload was lower—about 4,000 cases.

Dudikov explained that decision by saying he wanted to live closer to home and claimed that at the time the court to which he was transferred had no judges at all. However, HQCJ members noted that, according to their information, there were two sitting judges there at the time, and they said they would verify this further. Questions were also raised about Dudikov’s secondment to the National School of Judges, which he said was an attempt to maintain his professional level after his judicial term expired.

Pavlo Shtifonov

Attorney

The most controversial issue in the interview was the candidate’s income. In 2023–2024, he received more than UAH 10 million (about $264,000) from a single client. Shtifonov explained that he, in fact, played the role of an “outsource legal department,” engaging other colleagues under oral arrangements.

An HQCJ member pointed out that the client company’s total revenue was about UAH 30 million, meaning it paid roughly one-third of its turnover to a single attorney, significantly reducing its taxable base. However, Shtifonov’s active participation in the company’s cases is not reflected in court registries. The candidate was unable to state how much he spent on services provided by the colleagues he engaged, saying only that his goal was not only to complete the work but also to make a profit. The commission calculated that most of the income received (more than $220,000) was converted into the candidate’s personal assets and a new car.

A separate block of questions concerned military registration obligations. Oleksandr Shtifonov acknowledged that from the start of the full-scale invasion until he obtained reservation status in summer 2025, he had neither a deferment nor reservation status. He also admitted that, despite the legal requirement to update his records by July 2024, he did so only on August 11, 2025, explaining the delay by his own “understanding of the legislation,” and only shortly before obtaining reservation status. Shtifonov currently works as a staff employee at a company owned by his long-time client, where he received reservation status; he said he took the job because of the need to preserve information confidentiality and due to signing an NDA. The attorney also did not fulfill continuing legal education requirements, stating that he does not comply with requirements he considers unlawful.

The candidate visited Crimea three times after 2014. Once, he said, was to find out the status of a criminal case in which he was the injured party and to visit his sister; the other two visits were to see his sister.

The Commission also asked about a profile on the Pravoved.ru service, where legal advice on Russian law may have been provided in the candidate’s name in September 2014. Shtifonov stated that he was “unaware of such registration.”

Shtifonov ran in local elections from the Nash Krai party and advised the Civil Position campaign headquarters. During the interview, he initially said he “did not know about one of the candidacies,” but later recalled that he had personally signed the documents and had simply forgotten about it over the past 10 years. 

Oleksandr Shtifonov explained his motivation for becoming a HACC judge as a desire to be useful to society, since as an attorney he is limited by the client’s interests.

During the interview, the candidate interrupted Commission members without listening to questions to the end and systematically avoided giving direct answers.

Oleksandr Dudchenko

Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Procedure, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

At the start of the interview, PCIE pointed to the fact that during 2004–2009, while studying at university, the candidate was able to save $12,000. Dudchenko explained this by his status as an orphan: he received state assistance and had free housing and transportation, which allowed him to save nearly all of his funds.

In 2011, the candidate received $12,000 from his grandmother. He described this as a combined inheritance. Specifically, a share of proceeds from the sale of property after the deaths of his grandfather and father, as well as his mother’s savings, which he said he had entrusted to his grandmother for safekeeping while still in school.

More broadly, Dudchenko explained his ability to save through what he described as “the restrained lifestyle of a lecturer.” According to him, until 2023 his family did not spend one-third of its income, avoiding unnecessary expenses such as buying flagship smartphones.

PCIE also paid particular attention to Dudchenko’s experience as an individual entrepreneur. The candidate said that in 2019, together with friends who were investors, he opened a retail outlet (coffee, snacks, fast food) opposite an office center. Although he terminated his business in 2020, during that short period he declared substantial income—UAH 1 million. 

Dudchenko said margins on some products reached 60–120%, while ordinary goods carried margins of 20–30%. When PCIE noted that margins are usually only 15–20%, he attributed the success to the favorable location in front of an office center and to taking goods on consignment. Overall, he described his role as creating a ready-made business. Once operations were established, he transferred management to an administrator, took the proceeds, and ceased the business activity.

The commission also established that the candidate and his wife purchased an apartment in Kharkiv for UAH 1.2 million and a Volkswagen car using funds from his wife’s parents. After 2022, Dudchenko lived rent-free with friends—first in Vinnytsia, then in Kyiv. 

In his questionnaire, the candidate did not report 2 of 7 instances of administrative liability because, as he explained, he did not find them in his driver’s online account. He also failed to disclose one disciplinary sanction imposed by the regional bar disciplinary body, explaining that he learned about it only recently. He explained arrears in bar membership dues by his mistaken belief that payment was not required if he was not practicing law.

HQCJ also focused on Dudchenko’s dissertation, which concerned administrative positions in the judicial system. The candidate correctly noted that the powers of the HACC Chair do not extend to the HACC Appeals Chamber. Asked about the procedure for electing court leadership, he also pointed out that the HACC had not yet been established at the time he wrote his academic work. Dudchenko also answered questions about which courts are prohibited from being established and explained how they differ from specialized judicial institutions.

He explained a border crossing into Belarus in 2018 as part of a trip to Poland. Regarding relatives, he said he rarely communicates with his biological brother, and that his wife had learned only recently about her brother’s trips to Crimea; according to Dudchenko, she had seen him only once in her life. The candidate also said he himself was last in the Russian Federation in 2014 for a funeral.

Dudchenko was unable to immediately state the bail limits for especially serious crimes. After an HQCJ member prompted him by referring to ranges in subsistence minimums, he gave an unclear answer about the possibility of going beyond those limits. The candidate also misstated the term of office of an HACC investigating judge, naming three years instead of two. He was also unable to provide specific ideas for improving judicial self-governance, even though he had mentioned such ideas in his motivation letter. It also emerged that the candidate had been in a courtroom only during his university studies and postgraduate training.

Viktor Antypenko

Judge, Rokytne District Court, Kyiv Region

The interview opened with a question about why the candidate was applying to the HACC after working as a judge for only a year and a half. Antypenko said his motivation had two components: a professional one, wanting a “more prestigious profession,” and a social one, because although working at the HACC is much harder, this is “offset by a powerful social package,” including better financial support (for example, on housing) and a higher level of state protection.

The commission was also interested in the cash assets he declared in 2023. The candidate explained that they came from long-term entrepreneurial activity during the period from 2016 to 2023, when he was not filing declarations. The panel also discussed why the declared price of his TOYOTA COROLLA was below market value, which the candidate explained by significant damage (the vehicle’s safety system has still not been repaired). As for the savings that appeared in the accounts of his son, a student, the candidate said they were transfers he had made for his child’s future education.

HQCJ paid special attention to the candidate’s access logs for the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. It turned out that in June 2023 Antypenko used full access to search for decisions using the keyword “Alperin” (the surname of a figure in high-profile anti-corruption cases). The candidate could not recall the specific reason for this interest, but explained it as general professional curiosity and drew a parallel to the Kernes case: “I was interested, from a professional standpoint, in how such cases are decided.”

Ten points, though in practice there may be more

In December 2025, in Lviv, Ukraine and the EU launched a technical process that allows preparations for closing negotiating chapters to move forward without waiting for Hungary’s veto to be lifted. At the same time, as part of that package of decisions, European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka agreed on a plan of 10 priority reforms in anti-corruption and rule of law.

In reality, however, this list contains significantly more than 10 points.

For example, the first point can reasonably be split into four separate ones, since it covers investigation timelines, limitation periods, safeguards against procedural delays, NABU jurisdiction, and other issues. If we follow the classic route—passing separate laws for each of these matters—we will get stuck in parliamentary corridors for years.

But there is a way to avoid that trap.

Instead of implementing a long list of tasks one by one, they can be consolidated into a single law. In particular, all elements of the first point can be delivered through comprehensive amendments to Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).

According to our sources, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office has chosen exactly this route and decided to focus on CPC amendments as the most substantial item in the document.

The road to the EU runs through the CPC

What should these amendments include to genuinely solve these problems? Let us explain through a concrete example.

In criminal proceedings, especially in high-level corruption cases, delays often arise because participants deliberately abuse procedural rights.

For example, in the case against a former official of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy’s state property management department, accused of receiving a $150,000 bribe, defense lawyers systematically and in a coordinated manner failed to appear at court hearings for a month, causing all five hearings to be postponed. The result was not only a breach of reasonable time requirements, but also de facto impunity for those who committed serious corruption offenses.

The Ministry of Justice confirms plans to introduce amendments that would fix this and similar problems. 

Why, specifically, have CPC amendments become the top priority?

“Because the CPC governs criminal proceedings, and therefore its provisions create space for ‘procedural sabotage’—formally lawful actions that undermine the effectiveness of the justice system. One high-quality law amending the CPC can address several of Brussels’ fundamental rule-of-law requirements at once,” says Pavlo Demchuk, Senior Legal Adviser at Transparency International Ukraine. 

Acting Minister of Justice and Deputy Minister for European Integration Liudmyla Suhak agree that CPC amendments are a priority. However, her comments indicate that the government is not ruling out the adoption of several laws.

“On February 2, the Ministry of Justice submitted to the Government a draft law on strengthening the institutional capacity of the NABU and the SAPO (the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office) and removing procedural obstacles to effective pre-trial investigation. The draft law proposes expanding the range of persons under NABU jurisdiction, granting the Head of SAPO powers to form joint investigative teams, and enabling extradition requests in NABU cases,” Suhak said.

In addition, the Ministry of Justice is now preparing to draft bills amending the Criminal Procedure Code “that will cover the maximum possible number of measures in this area under the Rule of Law Roadmap,” she added.

What exactly needs to change

First, Ukraine needs the already mentioned mechanisms to counter abuse of procedural rights. In particular, courts must be given tools to respond to bad-faith conduct by parties to proceedings.

This is not a simple task, because in some cases parties use sophisticated tactics: stretching out closing arguments (as in the Nasirov and Chaus cases), unjustified failure to appear at hearings, and similar maneuvers.

“In a significant number of European states, such actions are recognized as abuse, and courts have tools to counter them,” says Pavlo Demchuk.

Not all EU countries have these tools—but those that introduced them clearly did so for compelling reasons.

Ukraine now has those same reasons. “The absence of such safeguards in the CPC not only allows people to evade criminal liability, but it also makes justice as a whole more expensive and more cumbersome,” the expert explains.

In addition, the CPC still contains a problematic provision that allows automatic closure of criminal proceedings when the pre-trial investigation time limit is missed. It is often—though not entirely accurately—referred to as the “Lozovyi amendments.”

There have been countless attempts to fix this. In late 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers registered a draft law to remove these provisions, but it never reached a vote and was withdrawn after the government resigned.

Taras Kachka now proposes dropping that label. “The term ‘Lozovyi amendments’ is so loaded that once it appears in a discussion, everyone reacts reflexively—either positively or negatively—and the substance disappears from the debate,” the Deputy Prime Minister said in an interview with European Pravda.

And indeed, the Kachka–Kos document does not mention Andrii Lozovyi by name; it focuses on the problem itself—automatic case closures—which must be resolved.

Another problematic issue is limitation periods, including when they cease, are interrupted, or are suspended. Here, there is no single clear “European standard.”

“There is no single recognized approach to regulating limitation periods in the criminal legislation of other states. However, international anti-corruption instruments pay considerable attention to this. Moreover, the draft EU Directive says the minimum limitation period should be from eight to fifteen years, depending on the gravity of the offense,” says Pavlo Demchuk.

In Ukraine, where the period is often several times shorter, the need for reform is urgent. “Even so, effective work by investigators and courts to ensure reasonable time limits in pre-trial investigation and court proceedings is just as important,” he stresses.

Ukraine also urgently needs to simplify and accelerate procedures by introducing written proceedings in certain cases, narrowing grounds for panel hearings, and removing excessive formalities such as mandatory participation of attesting witnesses.

For example, cases against MPs for false asset declaration (a non-serious offense) must currently be heard by a three-judge panel, consuming significant judicial resources.

Another example: if even one judge is replaced, the court must restart hearings from scratch, even where the new judge sees no need to do so. At the High Anti-Corruption Court, several top cases have already restarted “from square one.” This significantly delays proceedings and may lead to limitation periods expiring and cases being closed. The CPC could instead provide that replacing judges does not trigger a retrial, except where, for example, the new judge disagrees with earlier rulings.

As a third reform track, TI Ukraine proposes strengthening the capacity of anti-corruption institutions by clarifying NABU jurisdiction, granting additional powers to the Head of SAPO, and ensuring better coordination among institutions, including with the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) on the management of seized assets. For example, clear deadlines should be set for transferring proceedings to the NABU following a relevant decision by its director. It should also be specified that NABU jurisdiction extends to the Head of the Presidential Office and their deputies.

Because these “small details,” taken together, undermine the effectiveness of the NABU and the SAPO.

“We have prepared our proposals for CPC amendments and are engaging with different stakeholders. If MPs listen and agree to adopt comprehensive CPC changes, this will move forward the largest requirement in the Kos–Kachka plan,” Pavlo Demchuk explains.

At the same time, this must be defined from the outset: for real change, including a jump in CPI-2026, we need public validation, meaning a public green light for the new package from the European Commission.

Because once Brussels officially confirms that “Ukraine has removed key barriers in justice,” and those changes are effectively implemented, this will change how the country is perceived by investors, international institutions, and Ukrainian citizens themselves.

It converts “process” into “trust.”

List of CPC amendments proposed by TI Ukraine:

• Introduce written proceedings, i.e., allow courts to consider and decide certain procedural issues without the participation of parties and without holding a court hearing.
• Establish, as a core principle of criminal proceedings, the inadmissibility of abuse of procedural rights, and define mechanisms for its enforcement.
• Provide that, where a case is heard by a panel, this applies to the trial stage rather than preparatory proceedings; and reduce exceptions to the single-judge rule by limiting panel hearings to especially serious criminal offenses, rather than tying them to the defendant’s office or status.
• Provide that the absence of one or more defense counsel for a suspect/accused does not prevent a hearing from proceeding; postponement to safeguard defense rights should be allowed only if all defense counsel for the suspect/accused are absent.
• Supplement the CPC with mechanisms for interaction with ARMA when deciding whether to transfer assets to the Agency. 
• Clarify that an investigating judge is barred from participating in the same case at trial only where that judge exercised judicial control with respect to the specific person concerned.
• Ensure the possibility of imposing monetary penalties on both defense lawyers and prosecutors if they fail to appear without valid reasons or fail to report reasons for non-appearance.
• Expand NABU’s personal jurisdiction to include the following positions: Director of the State Bureau of Investigation and their first deputy/deputy; Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and their first deputy/deputy; head of a regional, Kyiv City, or Sevastopol City state administration and their first deputy/deputy; head of a regional or Kyiv City Military-Civil Administration and their first deputy/deputy; head of a Regional Military Administration or Kyiv City Military Administration and their first deputy/deputy; senior leadership of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine and the State Bureau of Investigation; and members of supervisory boards and executive bodies of large enterprises where the state or municipal ownership share exceeds 50%.
• Provide that a pre-trial investigation body must transfer the available materials of relevant criminal proceedings to NABU immediately, and no later than five working days from receipt of the NABU Director’s decision requesting those materials.
• Remove the requirement to involve attesting witnesses during searches and inspections.
• Remove the court’s obligation to close criminal proceedings due to expiry of the pre-trial investigation time limit (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine).
• Provide that, if a judge on a judicial panel is replaced, the court may, by a reasoned ruling, decide there is no need to restart the trial from the beginning or to repeat all or part of procedural actions.
• Provide that a court may impose time limits on a participant’s closing argument where the speech shows signs of abuse of procedural rights.
• Add that an investigating judge/court may, depending on case circumstances, issue a separate ruling where participants breach procedural duties, perform them improperly, or abuse procedural rights.
• Provide that after drafting and signing the full text of a judgment, the court may limit public pronouncement to the operative part, with mandatory service of the full text on parties the same day. 
• Remove the appellate court’s power to quash a judgment/ruling and order a new trial in the court of first instance.
• Allow the court to request collected pre-trial investigation materials or require prosecutors to submit such materials to the court together with the indictment and plea agreement.
• Make special confiscation mandatory, where legal grounds exist, when approving a plea agreement.
• Grant the Head of SAPO the power to initiate criminal proceedings and approve investigative actions involving Members of Parliament.
• Provide that matters related to the enforcement of judgments convicting a person of a corruption criminal offense are considered by the HACC.
• Grant the Head of SAPO powers in international cooperation (not only via CPC amendments, but also through corresponding ratification laws for international treaties).

What will HACC judicial candidates be asked about?

First, a definition. The law provides that a judicial candidate is considered to have integrity if there are no serious doubts that they are honest, independent, impartial, non-bribe-taking, ethically compliant, and irreproachable both professionally and in private life, and that all their property and lifestyle correspond to their official income.

Unfortunately, based on our preliminary assessment, not all 72 candidates (Tetiana Kononenko withdrew from the competition) meet these requirements. We should stress that we reviewed only publicly available information about participants and formulated our questions accordingly. At interviews, candidates will have an opportunity to provide explanations and persuade outside observers otherwise. 

So what concerns did we find? Let us go point by point.

1. Declared asset values do not match market prices

Candidates often report real estate and vehicle values that are significantly below market levels at the time of purchase. 

This practice may indicate artificial undervaluation in documents to evade taxes, financial monitoring, or conceal the true origin of funds. In some cases, we found that the declared and actual values of such assets differed severalfold. That raises serious questions about the lawfulness of the sources used to acquire the property.

2. Official income does not match actual lifestyle

For some candidates, declared income differs significantly from spending patterns and lifestyle. 

For example, lawyers report earnings at minimum wage level despite active practice and dozens of court cases. Or families maintain real estate and cars on funds barely above subsistence level. Such discrepancies may point to shadow income or underreporting of official income.

3. Integrity concerns in judicial practice

Some candidates with prior judicial experience have issued rulings that raised concerns about integrity. These include, for example, systematically closing administrative DUI cases due to expiration of limitation periods or being subjected to disciplinary liability for procedural violations. 

Such episodes may indicate a negligent attitude toward judicial duties or a risk of bias.

4. Conflicts of interest and ethical concerns

Some candidates were involved in situations that created, or could have created, conflicts of interest. During our analysis, we found examples of participation in cases involving close persons or colleagues, attendance at events with individuals subject to criminal proceedings, and non-transparent explanations of gifts received from relatives. 

Unfortunately, candidates do not always explain such circumstances consistently, which undermines confidence in their ability to uphold high ethical standards.

5. False or incomplete declarations

There were cases where candidates failed to declare assets they likely used in practice, misstated asset values, or did not declare certain income or property at all. In some instances, oversight bodies even established that declaration data were inaccurate, which is a direct breach of anti-corruption legislation.

6. Questionable employment arrangements

Our analysis also revealed likely formal employment at companies whose actual activity raises questions. For example, when a lawyer is formally listed as a construction-site team leader, this may be a way to obtain exemption from mobilization. 

Using legal mechanisms for purposes other than those intended undermines the country’s defense capacity and indicates a willingness to manipulate the law for personal gain.

7. Contacts with the aggressor state or pro-Russian structures

Some candidates visited the territory of the Russian Federation or temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine after 2015 or worked at companies that maintained business ties with Russia and Belarus after the start of aggression. 

Absent critical circumstances that could justify such conduct, this may indicate disregard for the wartime context and national interests, unacceptable for an anti-corruption court judge.

8. Abuse of legal mechanisms for personal benefit

We also found cases where candidates, in their professional or private lives, appear to have used abusive schemes for personal gain. These include likely facilitating circumvention of the standard procedure for lawful stay of foreigners in Ukraine through the creation of fictitious companies. Or remaining on waiting lists for free housing in breach of legal requirements. 

At times, candidates also appeared to evade taxes, including by receiving company profits not as dividends but as repayable financial assistance not subject to taxation. 

All this gives rise to doubts about irreproachable conduct in both private and professional life.

***

Our preliminary analysis revealed a range of concerns regarding some candidates: from declared assets that do not match market prices or lifestyle, to questionable episodes in professional activity. In this article, we deliberately do not name specific candidates; however, all materials we have prepared may be used by the PCIE and HQCJ so that, during interviews, the public can receive answers to the questions we have outlined.

These facts require careful clarification, because HACC judges must meet the highest standards of honesty, independence, and incorruptibility. The special joint sessions of the PCIE and HQCJ are precisely the forum where candidates can provide convincing explanations and dispel doubts.

The CPI point gained is an advance that can still be used well

What we did not see in 2025 was the comprehensive reform package promised by the authorities. Even though some processes were launched, many recommendations and commitments from the previous year had to be rolled over to 2026.

Last year the Cabinet approved Transformation Road Maps in the areas of the rule of law, public administration reform, and democratic institutions, and parliament finally voted for ARMA reform. But the NACP audit remains blocked; over the course of the year, the Verkhovna Rada still failed to establish a commission for selecting candidates to the Accounting Chamber; and a number of legislative initiatives intended to improve the effectiveness of investigating and adjudicating corruption cases never found the necessary “political will.” 

And, as the final touch on this negative picture, international experts’ participation in the Selection Commission for appointing HQCJ members was terminated. This precedent may be highly damaging for future competitions to staff public institutions. A risk already hinted at in several points from the much-criticized Vlasenko–Buzhanskyi temporary commission report. The episode involving attorney Oleksii Shevchuk points to additional risks. It demonstrates what kind of selection-commission members purely domestic appointing actors are prepared to nominate, with Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko being one such actor.

The progress achieved so far in fighting corruption has been possible primarily because of the commitments Ukraine has undertaken with international partners. These commitments remain the main incentive that can still drive improvements in anti-corruption policy, and, fortunately, society generally supports implementing these changes.

Over recent years, Ukraine has signed a number of agreements and strategic documents shaping its development path, including the Ukraine Facility Plan, the EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine, the IMF program under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the Rule of Law Road Map, and the Plan of 10 Priority Reforms in Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law. In one way or another, these documents account for the need to implement reforms that will continue to significantly affect Ukraine’s scores in the Corruption Perceptions Index.

Overall, in TI Ukraine’s view, 6 steps are needed in 2026 to produce real change in the fight against corruption:

• safeguard the independence of anti-corruption institutions;
• improve outcomes in corruption cases, especially in freezing and confiscating illicit assets;
• enhance the institutional capacity and focus of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention; 
• update legislation to ensure swift, high-quality justice;
• expand the involvement of international experts in the selection commission for appointing HQCJ members; 
• adopt an Anti-Corruption Strategy and a State Anti-Corruption Program. 

Unfortunately, we have discussed most of these steps many times before. Now, it is time to complete our overdue homework.

What about the global picture?

CPI 2025 shows that, overall, the corruption situation is worsening. Even in established democracies, corruption is rising amid weakened leadership. And the number of countries scoring above 80 points has fallen from twelve ten years ago to just five this year.

Among Ukraine’s western neighbors, only Poland’s score remained unchanged—53 points and 52nd place in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2025. By contrast, Slovakia (48 points, 61st place), Romania (45 points, 70th place), Moldova (42 points, 80th place), and Hungary (40 points, 84th place) each lost 1 point. That is, despite all of Ukraine’s current challenges, Ukraine became the only country in the region that managed—even if only slightly—to improve its position in the study.

Negative trends are also visible across the European Union and Western Europe: while the average score for these countries was 66 in 2022, it has dropped to 64 this year. 

More broadly, country scores in the Index point to an alarming decline across democratic states. Another troubling pattern has been the growing number of restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and assembly in many countries—and this has not been limited to areas with active armed conflict. 

A lack of visible anti-corruption progress is also evident among Ukraine’s largest partners. In December 2025, the EU agreed its first Anti-Corruption Directive to harmonize criminal legislation on corruption. But the final version of this document turned out to be far from what was expected: many of the adopted provisions that were supposed to ensure zero tolerance for corruption in EU countries were watered down. In addition, some countries took questionable positions. For example, Italy blocked the criminalization of abuse of office by public officials. 

The situation in the United States is even more troubling: in CPI 2025, the U.S. received the lowest score in its history—65. And that is despite the fact that most events of 2025 were not fully reflected in the study. It is therefore already possible to predict that measures by President Trump’s current administration aimed against freedom of expression and toward undermining judicial independence will be reflected even more negatively in future Indexes. 

And, unfortunately, these processes inside the United States will have a tangible impact on anti-corruption progress in other countries, because reductions in U.S. financial support for civil society and humanitarian initiatives have weakened global anti-corruption efforts.