A drop in the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index: a wake-up call for authorities

According to last year’s results, Ukraine lost one point in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Therefore, after a noticeable three-point improvement in 2023, we are falling back in the fight against corruption, now standing at 35 points.

Considering the study’s methodology, such a decline falls within the margin of error. Due to a recent methodology revision, the global movement Transparency International recommends disregarding such fluctuations. However, Ukrainians who follow the news and experience daily life in the country are unlikely to agree with this approach. And understandably so — many feel that Ukraine has lost at least three points rather than just one.

Where does this feeling come from? Why is this year’s study as trustworthy as previous ones? And why are these results not just a marginal error for the authorities, but an important signal?

Where is Ukraine in CPI now

From the perspective of someone unfamiliar with our realities, the situation may not seem so bad, given our current position among 180 countries. We share 105th place with another EU candidate country, Serbia, which also scored 35 points last year. The Dominican Republic is one point ahead of Ukraine on the index, while Algeria, Brazil, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Thailand, and Turkey scored one point lower. 

Overall, over the past 11 years in the Index, Ukraine has gained 10 points, with the current 35 points being the average result for the region. Looking at other countries striving to join the EU, we see that some are either stalled in their progress, like Georgia, Montenegro, and Turkey, or are rolling back, like Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Only Moldova managed to steadily gain another point, while Albania increased its score by as much as 5 points.

The same situation is with Ukraine’s neighbours. Although I’ve already mentioned Moldova, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia also show the same trend, with the latter even losing 5 points. Not to mention Russia and Belarus, which are steadily heading towards the positions of Afghanistan and Somalia, not only in terms of political regimes but also in the CPI.

So, maybe there’s nothing to worry about if this is the case for everyone? It may not be worth paying attention to, but not for Ukrainians who have been living in full-scale war mode for almost three years. Under such conditions, every setback, any drawdown, or even just a pause or delay in the fight against corruption is a loss of territories and lives. Real lives, because every lost hryvnia could have gone towards the defense. 

Therefore, we are concerned about even the slightest decline in the CPI

I wrote last year about the growing negative trends in the CPI when Ukraine was steadily improving in the Index. Even then, the state of uncertainty for many Ukrainians was evident, and unfortunately, this factor has only increased since.

The essence of my concern was also that I understand the key feature of the Corruption Perception Index. Since this is a large study covering many areas, its overall period simply cannot capture all the key events from the previous year in the fight against corruption. 

In the vast majority of cases, the CPI reflects the factors that influenced the perception of corruption a year and a half before its release, often overlooking events from the fall of the studied year entirely. The current CPI indicator almost certainly did not include the scandal with the MSEC or the procurement of low-quality mines, but it likely took into account the suspicion surrounding Kniaziev, the resumption of e-declarations in 2023, and the January 2024 surveillance scandal involving Bihus.Info journalists.

In other words, the events and issues that alarmed us when discussing the CPI 2023 were directly reflected in Ukraine’s loss of points this year.

Notably, Ukraine last experienced a similar one-point decline based on the 2021 results. It was a landmark moment for us — the pre-war tension, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, procurement schemes, and the unpleasant arbitrariness of some officials in anticipation of new election races. 

The feelings are similar now but amplified by the war. There is very little positive news from the front, and even reports of regular strikes on enemy refineries do little to ease internal tension. The increase in the number of corruption cases and convictions in high-profile cases is perceived not so much as evidence of the effective work of anti-corruption bodies, but as a sign of widespread corruption among officials.

All of this unfolds against the backdrop of growing uncertainty about the future of the war, the use of political influence and corruption schemes, and ongoing skirmishes both offline and on social media.

Perhaps not to the full extent, but the Corruption Perception Index has captured all these trends. Therefore, the decline in the study, which focuses primarily on changes in dynamics rather than point successes, serves as a bad signal for our authorities. Ukrainian officials need to pull together and deliver high-quality results on the rear to support the war effort, rather than trying to address situational crises. After all, the stronger the state, the more efficient we become with limited resources. 

Ukraine’s decline in the CPI is a signal for its partners. Our interaction with the world has reached the point where both internal and external perceptions of corruption in Ukraine are increasingly interconnected. Let me note that the Corruption Perception Index largely disregards the feelings and moods of Ukrainians. First of all, the study’s indicators are based on the assessments of global experts, so the decline in the CPI 2024 signals that the internal struggles of Ukrainians are becoming more visible.

As well as the attempts of the country’s leadership to create their personal reality, where all their “excesses” can be justified by war, but at the same time limit institutions and break the rules where their implementation, on the contrary, would have an effect. “We’re at war, for God’s sake, what do you want from us? What reforms?”

This noticeable imbalance also signals a rise in international media coverage of corruption in Ukraine. The further you go, the harder it becomes to refute the facts presented, as reality cannot be denied. 

What actions should we take to improve our CPI score?

In the current Index, Ukraine managed to maintain its position primarily because, even with manual control, there are still attempts at reforms. 

We have heard this word so many times in recent years that, perhaps, for some, it has lost its value and become as “hackneyed” as the word “corruption,” which marks all things unpleasant to the Ukrainian eye. But we cannot deny that Ukraine remains a state not only because of the strength of its defenders on the front line but also because it is striving to reform and change from within. And no matter how hard it is, it sometimes succeeds.

Although real unity is lacking in both the government and parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers continues to draft laws necessary for European integration, while the Verkhovna Rada, at least every second or third attempt, adopts legislative changes required by international commitments. The further we go, the harder these steps are but both MPs and the government continue to fulfill their obligations. 

Unfortunately, that is the bare minimum established in agreements. On their part, MPs do not initiate or do anything beyond the recorded commitments. Why are the authorities even interested in taking these steps? I see several reasons for this.

First and foremost, so that our country still has partners and we can continue to fight for our very existence. It is a significant argument that encourages power branches to do the things they are not really interested in. 

Another reason to proceed with the reforms is because those ticks in the box bring much-needed money to Ukraine. The opportunity to secure financial aid and bridge the huge gap in Ukraine’s budget is what motivates officials to fulfill international commitments. It is not a secret to our partners. No wonder that recommendations in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the IMF Extended Fund Facility are extremely often mentioned and largely complement each other.

Last but not least, positive changes may still happen through the efforts of the few reform-minded forces remaining in the executive and legislative branches. They are scarce, but they exist.

Therefore, no matter how much we talk about the qualitative European integration and implementation of necessary reforms, these talks will never be enough. Behind the talks, we see actions, no matter how slow their progress. These actions, beyond the financial aid they bring, actually strengthen the state — even if we may not feel their impact tomorrow, but only years from now.

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We have reached a point where, the further we go, the more signals emerge for the authorities that this country urgently needs real, comprehensive changes. The CPI 2024 results are one of that signal.

Corruption exists in Ukraine — that is a fact. It would be significantly lower if the state were more effective. If the authorities prioritized established procedures and built state bodies as comprehensive institutions instead of pushing decisions by force, governance would be more stable and efficient. Unfortunately, that is not the case. 

I would gladly be proven wrong and see that systemic changes are possible because the motivation for them is genuinely strong. I would also like to believe that this year’s one-point decline in the CPI is merely a marginal error. However, from what I see now, I regret to admit that the flaws and threats are more than just marginal errors.