On 23 July, Law No. 4555-IX came into force, better known to many under its earlier draft number, No. 12414. This law may well put an end to effective efforts to combat corruption in government. In less than 24 hours — from the registration of the amendments to their entry into force — Ukraine’s authorities delivered a serious blow to the system of independent anti-corruption investigations that has taken years to build.
Unless these changes are reversed in the near future, we can expect fewer high-profile revelations involving senior officials, and more corruption overall. Research backs this up.
Why corruption is a matter of rationality
The rational choice theory of crime explains why people commit economic offences through the lens of cost-benefit analysis. Developed by Gary Becker in 1968, the theory argues that potential offenders act like entrepreneurs, weighing expected benefits against possible costs. If the “profit” outweighs the “loss,” they commit the crime.
The key takeaway is that the most effective way to fight crime is not simply harsher punishments, but a higher probability of getting caught. People tend to underestimate low-probability risks, so even the most severe punishment won’t deter them if the chance of being caught is negligible.
Corrupt officials calculate along a simple formula: how much can I gain, what are the odds I’ll be caught, and what is the punishment? The new law radically changes this equation — by lowering the risk of exposure.
How the incentives for corruption are growing
Before Law No. 4555-IX, Ukraine saw several high-profile investigations involving top officials: Vsevolod Kniaziev became the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to be detained on corruption charges. The so-called “Amber Case” involving former MPs Poliakov and Rozenblat is still under review at the HACC. MP Andrii Odarchenko has already been convicted at first instance. The Appeals Chamber of the HACC overturned the verdict in the Gas Case against Oleksandr Onyshchenko on procedural grounds, and the case is now back in the first instance court.
There were serious systemic issues, but many were gradually being resolved thanks to public pressure and international partners. When NABU’s cases were stalling in local courts, the specialized High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) was created. When the appointment of the SAPO head, selected with international experts, was delayed, the rules for future selections were improved. When there was a risk of stealing cases from NABU by shifting jurisdiction, SAPO’s powers were strengthened. When defendants began using mobilization to avoid liability, that loophole was closed.
Still, many problems persisted due to a lack of political will, such as:
– Abuse of procedural rights, which delayed court hearings
– The SAPO head’s lack of power to launch investigations against MPs
– Excessive workloads for a small number of HACC judges
– Ineffective calculation of statutes of limitation
– NABU’s lack of independent wiretapping powers and access to independent forensic examinations.
These procedural obstacles made it easier for suspects to avoid accountability. Some received advance warning about investigations and fled — as in the case of “Kyiv fixer” Denys Komarnytskyi. Other cases were dropped due to the statute of limitations — including those involving Kostiantyn Ruskykh and, more recently, Mykola Martynenko. Still others were closed due to missed deadlines for pre-trial investigations — such as those involving judges Ivan Tulyk and Volodymyr Ponomarenko.
All of these tips the scales in favor of committing corruption-related crimes. And the new law only reinforces that trend — giving suspects even more tools to evade accountability and more reasons to take the risk.
Now the Prosecutor General has been given control over serving notices of suspicion to top officials, meaning such decisions can be made based not only on legal, but also political considerations. The principle of NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction is being eroded — allowing cases to be handed off to less effective bodies like the State Bureau of Investigations. There’s also a greater risk of leaks, which could allow powerful suspects to prepare for searches. And in exceptional cases, the Prosecutor General can even close a case, overriding the position of both the prosecutor and the SAPO head.
A return to the old system
The commission auditing NABU issued numerous recommendations for improving its performance, including granting it independent wiretapping powers, access to impartial forensic examination, and fixing issues like the “Lozovyi amendments.” But none of these recommendations involved making the NABU more dependent on the Prosecutor General.
Rational choice theory works both ways: when corrupt actors see the likelihood of punishment drop, they become more active.
A presidential draft law (No. 13533), registered on 24 July, seeks to repeal the harmful provisions undermining the independence of the NABU and the SAPO — and introduces so-called “security” checks. However, the logic behind these checks is questionable.
Right now, Ukraine has taken a step backward — from inevitability to avoidability of punishment. From a system where corrupt officials had a real chance of being caught, to one where they can rely on political cover. These changes are difficult to frame as mere technical adjustments or efforts to protect anti-corruption bodies from “Russian influence.” Their true goal is to create anti-corruption bodies that are controlled and dependent.
That’s why Parliament must act quickly to repeal them, by adopting one of the legislative initiatives already on the table.
Source: lb.ua
