In August, the DOZORRO team helped prevent the potentially inefficient use of UAH 89 million. The greater part of this sum was saved by reducing contract values. The rest came from canceling a procurement and terminating contracts.
These results are the outcome of more than a month’s work. Some of these stories began back in 2024–2025, when our experts analyzed procurements, found likely inflated prices, and contacted contracting authorities.
Here are several such cases, where the result took anywhere from a month to more than a year to arrive.
They disagreed with the analysis but cut the contract by UAH 8.5 million
In July, our experts analyzed a procurement for the restoration of an apartment building at 18 Mykola Rudenko Boulevard in Kyiv. The building was damaged by a Russian drone on September 7, 2025: the UAV struck the entrance, and apartments from the first to the eighth floor sustained significant damage.
For the major repairs of this building, the Directorate of Construction, Architecture, and Land Use of the Sviatoshynskyi District State Administration in Kyiv contracted Bud-Pro Systems LLC for UAH 40.6 million. The company is to restore the building by the end of 2027.
During their analysis, DOZORRO analysts at TI Ukraine found that the contracting authority might overpay UAH 6.3 million on construction materials — more than 15% of the contract value. The largest share — UAH 4.8 million — was on cement plaster. Bud-Pro Systems LLC had entered it in the cost estimate at UAH 68.38 per kg, although the market price was six to nine times lower. At Epicenter, for example, Ceresit cement plaster cost UAH 9.16 per kg at the time, and Siltek at Nova Linia cost UAH 10.60 per kg.
So in July, DOZORRO asked the Sviatoshynskyi DSA to review the prices. This was possible because the contract has a dynamic price, meaning the cost of materials can be adjusted while the works are under way. The reply came in August: the contracting authority did not agree with the findings of the analysis. Even so, that same month the parties revised the prices of the materials DOZORRO had flagged and reduced the contract value by UAH 8.5 million.
The contractor for this restoration thanked the DOZORRO experts in an interview with the outlet KyivVlada. The company said that DOZORRO’s request had prompted it to reconsider the materials it had planned to use for the repairs and to choose more affordable but no less high-quality options in order to save public funds.
An old case: the contract was terminated a year and a half later
This story began back in late 2024 and ended only in the summer of 2026. At that time, the Central Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management signed a contract with Spetstermomontazh-Energo LLC to complete the reconstruction of the Buriakivka substation in the Exclusion Zone in Kyiv Region. The works were valued at UAH 24.4 million.
This concerned the second phase of the reconstruction — the rerouting of the Poliova – Lubianka-2 and ChNPP – Prypiat overhead power lines. The works were initially planned for completion by the end of September 2025.
In January 2025, DOZORRO experts analyzed Spetstermomontazh-Energo’s cost estimate and found that materials could be overpaid by UAH 4.1 million — nearly 17% of the contract value. The largest likely overpayment the analysts calculated was on reinforced concrete poles: UAH 2.3 million. Their price in the estimate was four times the market rate. Inflated prices were also found on bare conductor and on foundations for the supports. We asked the Central Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management to review the prices. In reply, the contracting authority said that, together with the contractor, it would review the cost of materials and their delivery. After that, the parties intended to adjust the contract price. Since it was fixed, this required concluding an additional agreement.
The contract value was subsequently reduced somewhat, but the final point in this story came only a year and a half after our request. In July 2026, the contracting authority terminated the contract unilaterally. So UAH 4.1 million — the amount of the likely overpayment avoided thanks to the termination — was counted toward DOZORRO’s August results.
Cogeneration unit: prices revised a year later
This case, too, dates back to last year. In June 2025, Kyivteploenergo Municipal Enterprise directly contracted Garant Energo LLC for UAH 27.3 million to install reinforced concrete structures for trestles and facilities serving utility networks. The works were part of a project to increase the capacity of one of Kyivteploenergo’s stations, where a cogeneration unit was being installed and its physical protection arranged.
DOZORRO analysts examined the cost estimate and found that Kyivteploenergo might overpay UAH 2.4 million on materials — nearly 9% of the contract value. The most questions arose over the formwork panels, which accounted for UAH 2.2 million of the overpayment we identified. The analysts also found inflated prices on rebar, slabs, and crushed stone.
In August, our experts sent the contracting authority a letter asking it to review the prices and avoid overpayments. Kyivteploenergo replied that the estimate referred to timber-metal formwork panels, whose actual reuse rate could only be determined once the works were completed. The enterprise promised to bring the prices of rebar, slabs, and crushed stone into line with the market.
The result came only a year later. In August 2026, the parties amended the contract and reduced the prices of the materials DOZORRO had flagged — by UAH 2.4 million in total. The cost of the formwork panels changed especially sharply: for panels 25 mm thick, it was cut from UAH 13,144.55 per m² to UAH 758.53 per m² — a seventeenfold reduction.
What we did over August
While some of the older cases were producing results, the DOZORRO team continued to analyze new procurements. In August, its experts reviewed 85 procurement transactions with a total estimated value of UAH 5.8 billion.
Problems were found in 56 procurements — nearly two-thirds of those analyzed. Most often, the analysts found likely inflated prices: there were 41 such procurements, and the total potential overpayment reached UAH 121.7 million.
Other problems were identified in a further 15 procurements. In particular, these concerned the publication of information and documents, as well as the review of tender proposals.
Based on August’s analyses, the team sent 50 requests to contracting authorities. We are now continuing to monitor these procurements, so some of the results of August’s work will likely become visible in the coming months.
This material is funded by the European Union. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.