The Vovk Case: Why the Argument Against Covert Investigative Actions No Longer Works in Judges’ Disciplinary Cases

On June 18, the Supreme Court ruled that Pavlo Vovk’s dismissal was lawful. The ruling relied on materials from covert investigative (search) actions that the NABU had obtained in the “DACK tapes” case.

The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court issued this ruling almost two weeks earlier, but the full text was only published on June 30.

One of former DACK judge Vovk’s main arguments was that the High Council of Justice (HCJ) had no right to use materials from covert investigative actions to hold him disciplinarily liable. 

But the Grand Chamber’s decision continues its established practice: there is no such prohibition. The HCJ may use materials from covert investigative actions to justify a judge’s disciplinary offense. Indeed, on May 14 this year, the Grand Chamber did not change its position on this question in case No. 990SCGC/32/25, in which Serhii Burkhan, a judge of the Verkhnodniprovsk District Court, similarly challenged the HCJ’s use of covert investigative action materials to prove his guilt in disciplinary proceedings — despite heated debate.

The debate over using such materials in disciplinary proceedings has continued for years. We have previously noted that, since NABU was created, many high-profile corruption cases have involved judges. The most notorious example is the DACK tapes case, which recorded attempts to seize control of Ukraine’s judicial system. As a result, the HCJ has already dismissed several figures in that case for disciplinary offenses, including Yevhenii Ablov and Bohdan Sanin. 

The problem is that recordings of conversations, or other materials from covert investigative actions, remain the key evidence in many such cases. Based solely on wiretap materials, the HCJ has already disciplined more than 50 judges, 48 of whom were dismissed.

With its May ruling, the Grand Chamber upheld this practice as lawful. This means the HCJ can continue to discipline and dismiss dishonest judges based on properly assessed materials from criminal proceedings.

Key nuances of the Grand Chamber’s decisions

In the Burkhan case, the Grand Chamber noted that while information from covert-action records can be used in disciplinary proceedings, it cannot serve as a ready-made conclusion. The HCJ must carefully assess it first.

The Supreme Court also explained that what matters in a disciplinary case is not the type of evidence — including information from covert-action records — but a fair procedure for using such data. The HCJ must independently assess such materials and determine whether they confirm a specific disciplinary offense, even before the underlying criminal proceedings conclude.

At the same time, the ruling includes an important safeguard against wrongful disciplinary action based on such materials. The HCJ may discipline a judge before a criminal case concludes only if there are obvious, clear, and convincing signs of conduct incompatible with judicial status — and only if there is no arbitrariness, political persecution, or other improper motive, and the right to a defense has been respected. 

Acting on this basis, the HCJ dismissed DACK judge Bohdan Sanin on June 22 — one of the key figures in the DACK tapes case. Covert recordings captured him discussing court cases outside official proceedings, coordinating positions with others, and effectively allowing outside influence over judicial decisions. He was dismissed because this conduct is incompatible with judicial status.

However, if reasonable doubt remains, it must be resolved in the judge’s favor. In such cases, the HCJ must suspend disciplinary proceedings until a verdict is reached, or decline to impose liability.

How this will affect disciplinary proceedings against judges

After these rulings, the argument that covert-action materials cannot be used in disciplinary proceedings at all has far less chance of success. Judges challenging HCJ decisions will now have to prove specific procedural violations, rather than arguing that such materials are inherently inadmissible.

These rulings also give the HCJ clear guidance: beyond a general green light to use such materials, the Council must avoid citing them formally without proper assessment and justification.

In short, the Grand Chamber’s rulings stabilize HCJ practice in cases involving covert investigative action materials. They reduce the risk of a mass review of HCJ decisions already made — while still preserving real procedural safeguards for judges against the arbitrary use of criminal case materials and pressure against them.