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	<title>SAPO - Transparency International Ukraine</title>
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		<title>With Midas, NABU and SAPO Have Raised the Stakes — but the “Game” Is Not Over Yet</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/with-midas-nabu-and-sapo-have-raised-the-stakes-but-the-game-is-not-over-yet/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Андрій Боровик]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 08:44:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=34203</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A year ago, when the NABU announced Operation Midas, it looked like a risky bet for the Bureau. Today, it can be said with confidence that the bet has paid off. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/with-midas-nabu-and-sapo-have-raised-the-stakes-but-the-game-is-not-over-yet/">With Midas, NABU and SAPO Have Raised the Stakes — but the “Game” Is Not Over Yet</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A year ago, when the NABU announced </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52025000000000472"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Operation Midas</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, it looked like a risky bet for the Bureau. Only four months earlier, the agency had nearly lost its independence, and suddenly it was taking on a case targeting the president’s inner circle. Today, it can be said with confidence that the bet has paid off. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On November 4, a few days before the case’s anniversary, the NABU and the SAPO </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/uk/news/operaciya-midas-nabu-ta-sap-zaversili-slidstvo"><span style="font-weight: 400;">announced</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the pre-trial investigation had been completed. Over that time, the “Mindich tapes” grew from a single case, albeit a very large one, into a picture of a sprawling criminal scheme that reached many areas of how the state functions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The trial is still ahead, and in cases of this scale, trials last for years. It is therefore too early to say that the NABU has already “won.” What we can assess is the investigation itself and its effect, not the outcome of the case as a whole.</span></p>
<p><b>Yet the most important thing about Midas is the domino effect it set off. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Halushchenko’s bail led detectives to the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52026000000000092"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Forrest Gump</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> case. There, according to the investigation, the required UAH 150 million was raised by a group that included Iryna Mudra, Deputy Head of the Office of the President. In August, Mudra was dismissed, and the HACC remanded her in custody. The November 28 searches of Andrii Yermak’s premises cost him his post, and in May he was served with a notice of suspicion. That came in a different case, however: the laundering of UAH 460 million through the construction of the Dynasty cottages. Then, in September, the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52026000000000295"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Carthage</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> case came to light. It led to the resignation of the Prosecutor General and his first deputy and to the arrest of senior prosecutors. In its second episode, which became public last week, </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52026000000000505"><span style="font-weight: 400;">top officials of the SSU</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the National Police, and the Office of the Prosecutor General were also served with notices of suspicion.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just two years ago, a list of suspects like this seemed out of reach for the anti-corruption agencies. Now a former minister, a former head of the Presidential Office who was widely considered all-powerful, and his former deputy are all suspects. And being a member of parliament or an SSU general (as in the latest Carthage episode) no longer guarantees immunity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">How did this happen?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is worth remembering that Midas cannot be understood without the events of July 2025. This investigation would never have happened without the “Cardboard Maidan.” The protests gave the Bureau something no law can provide: a real public mandate. Back then, skeptics joked that the protesters would not even be able to spell out the acronyms NABU and SAPO. Today, no trace of that doubt remains. Perhaps the best proof is that Midas, Mindich, and NABU searches have become firmly embedded in modern Ukrainian folklore, as memes and TikTok trends.</span></p>
<p><b>Ukrainian society has demanded justice for years, and in the NABU and the SAPO it saw a practical answer. That set off processes within the chain of power that ran far deeper than anyone expected last July or November.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After the first notices of suspicion to Mindich and Tsukerman, the “single voice in the president’s ear” model broke down. Kyrylo Budanov replaced Yermak as Head of the Office of the President, and the way the Office governs began to change gradually. Halushchenko and Hrynchuk left their government posts, and Energoatom got new leadership. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">More and more officials now understand that organizing or joining schemes is not worth the cost. The NABU and the SAPO have become so inconvenient that, on the tapes, Iryna Mudra and Maksym Mykytas plainly acknowledged in private conversation that there is no making deals with these anti-corruption agencies.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This does not mean institutional peace has arrived. The conflict between the anti-corruption institutions and the authorities has simply changed form: it has moved from legislation to personnel decisions and criminal cases. Any new notice of suspicion could inflame it again. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In public, the authorities voice full support for the NABU and the SAPO. In practice, the opposite is happening. In a year, Parliament has not passed a single law from the </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/ukraine-and-the-eu-agree-on-priority-reform-plan-anti-corruption-at-the-top/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kachka-Kos plan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which was meant to substantially strengthen the anti-corruption institutions. Many relevant bills have been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, but none of them has even reached the agenda, and most have stalled in the relevant committees. This is happening even though progress on European integration and financial support under the Ukraine Facility Plan depend directly on these laws.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Public trust is a more complicated picture, and that should be said plainly. The most comprehensive data, from the </span><a href="https://nazk.gov.ua/en/news/corruption-perception-in-ukraine-declines-nacp-presents-annual-research-results/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">NACP’s annual survey</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, only partly cover the period after Midas, so it would be wrong to credit every shift solely to this operation. Still, the direction of change is telling.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the fifth year running, citizens place the main responsibility for overcoming corruption on the president, his Office, Parliament, and the NABU. This time, however, expectations of the president and Parliament have fallen, while expectations of the NABU have risen. The public rated every agency’s anti-corruption performance higher, without exception, and businesses, as usual, gave their highest ratings to the NABU and the SAPO. Even these ratings are not enough, though: none of these institutions has yet scored even 2.5 out of 5. </span></p>
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			            	Just two years ago, a list of suspects like this seemed out of reach for the anti-corruption agencies. Now a former minister, a former head of the Presidential Office who was widely considered all-powerful, and his former deputy are all suspects. And being a member of parliament or an SSU general no longer guarantees immunity.
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			            	Andrii Borovyk
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<p><b>The most compelling argument in the Bureau’s favor, however, came from Brussels last week. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">The </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/what-does-the-2026-european-commission-s-report-recommend/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European Commission’s report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of November 4 cites Operation Midas as an example of strong performance by the anti-corruption institutions, both in investigations and in preventing corruption in procurement. The Commission stated explicitly that the investigation had uncovered alleged large-scale embezzlement of funds and high-level political influence over the award of defense contracts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The report also records a rise in the number of indictments resulting from NABU and SAPO investigations and in the number of HACC verdicts. On that basis, the Commission raised its overall assessment of Ukraine’s level of preparation in the fight against corruption, concluding that the anti-corruption bodies operate independently and effectively.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The same report, however, identifies two negative factors that law enforcement has to work under. The first is </span><b>pressure on the NABU and the SAPO</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">: criminal proceedings against detectives, surveillance, and smear campaigns. The second is a </span><b>passive approach to reform.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Among other things, Brussels calls for expanding NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, strengthening the autonomy of the NABU and the SAPO in investigating cases involving MPs, and finally adopting the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030. In other words, Ukraine is being asked to deliver on commitments it has made but is in no hurry to fulfill, because it does not want to strengthen the anti-corruption institutions any further.</span></p>
<p><b>The European Commission’s report has confirmed that our partners share civil society’s assessment of the agencies’ progress and its doubts about the political will for reform. There is momentum, but systemic political will to reform is still lacking.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In essence, over the past year Midas has made NABU’s independence one of the key conditions for European integration and has taken the fight against corruption to a new level in how state processes are understood. Any future attempt at a rollback will now carry a high price, both at home and in Ukraine’s foreign relations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">King Midas was given the gift of turning everything into gold, and he nearly starved to death. The scheme named after him followed a similar logic: it turned the wartime energy sector into cash until it devoured its own creators. The investigation has now passed the pre-trial stage, but the processes it set in motion are still unfolding.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In one year, the NABU has gained what matters most: the status of a player that both Bankova Street and Brussels have to reckon with. But both sides have raised the stakes. The Midas investigation is over. The next round will be decided not by searches and tapes but by the HACC verdicts in this case and in the others we have read and heard so much about over the past year.</span></p>
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			            	The European Commission’s report has confirmed that our partners share civil society’s assessment of the agencies’ progress and its doubts about the political will for reform.
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			            	Andrii Borovyk
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/with-midas-nabu-and-sapo-have-raised-the-stakes-but-the-game-is-not-over-yet/">With Midas, NABU and SAPO Have Raised the Stakes — but the “Game” Is Not Over Yet</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 11:20:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34093</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The current forensic examination system cannot provide the NABU and the SAPO with expert opinions that are complete, of adequate quality, and delivered within procedural time limits.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/">Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On August 27, 2026, MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, Maksym Khlapuk, and Nataliia Pipa registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70616"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the Verkhovna Rada. The draft law concerns the operation of the Research Center for Independent Forensic Examinations (RCIFE), which would give the NABU and the SAPO access to independent forensic examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law is needed because the current forensic examination system cannot provide the NABU and the SAPO with expert opinions that are complete, of adequate quality, and delivered within procedural time limits. Moreover, the possibility of undue influence on experts undermines the quality of investigations and the overall capacity of the NABU and the SAPO.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two alternative draft laws were registered on September 7 and 15, 2026. MP Serhii Vlasenko submitted alternative </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70705"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569-1</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “on ensuring the exercise of the right to a genuinely independent forensic examination.” MP Volodymyr Kabachenko submitted </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70754"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15569-2</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “on improving the legal framework for forensic expert activity.”</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways</span></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law deserves unequivocal support. It establishes in law an independent expert institution that will be able to provide timely, high-quality, and objective forensic examinations in NABU and SAPO cases.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The expert institution’s independence is ensured through a special procedure for appointing its management and staff and for bringing them to disciplinary liability. It is also ensured by a Supervisory Board with special mechanisms for reporting interference in the work of experts and the institution’s management.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The institution’s mandate must be clearly tied to criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 and No. 15569-2 do not deserve support. They do not create conditions for timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations in NABU cases. They could also destabilize the forensic examination sector by abolishing full-fledged procedures for certifying experts and bringing them to disciplinary liability.</span></li>
</ul>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h2>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the main draft law, clearly extend the RCIFE’s mandate to criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the main draft law, clarify certain technical points in the mechanism for responding to pressure on experts. These are a deadline for considering a report of pressure, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform the NABU and the SAPO of interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reject alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 “on ensuring the exercise of the right to a genuinely independent forensic examination” and No. 15569-2 “on improving the legal framework for forensic expert activity.” Both propose deregulating forensic expert activity without safeguards against corruption risks and without a balanced approach.</span></li>
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			            	The possibility of undue influence on experts undermines the quality of investigations and the overall capacity of the NABU and the SAPO.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What is the current situation?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reform of forensic examinations is a long-standing and unresolved problem in Ukraine’s justice system. The reasons include the following:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine has no independent expert institution specializing in examinations in criminal proceedings under NABU jurisdiction. Similar specialized institutions do exist under other agencies, namely the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Border Guard Service, and the Security Service of Ukraine.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">There are no dedicated legal mechanisms for responding to pressure on experts.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a general rule, any expert institution has 90 days to conduct an examination, and this period can be extended.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Not all expert institutions can prioritize examinations or have criteria for doing so.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Examinations are assigned to experts by the head of the institution rather than by an automated system.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">By law, an expert’s minimum base salary is 10 subsistence minimums. However, this provision has been suspended by budget laws for 8 years, so actual pay may be lower.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Register of Forensic Examination Methodologies publishes only a list of methodologies, without their content.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Private expert institutions have no right to conduct any criminalistic examinations.</span></li>
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			            	Reform of forensic examinations is a long-standing and unresolved problem in Ukraine’s justice system.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What does the main draft law propose?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law would establish an independent expert center that would prioritize NABU and SAPO cases. It would also provide better financial, material, and technical conditions for other experts. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To this end, the authors propose to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reorganize the Research Center for Independent Forensic Examinations (RCIFE) in line with the law’s requirements, so that it conducts forensic examinations in a specific category of cases, in particular corruption and corruption-related cases, based on the criteria of NABU jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">guarantee the RCIFE’s independence by establishing a Supervisory Board of 5 members (3 of them from international partners), which would hold a competitive selection of the center’s director. The authors also plan to introduce independent certification of experts and an independent procedure for bringing them to disciplinary liability, an audit of the center every 2 years, separate funding, and other safeguards;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establish a procedure for responding to pressure on experts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">set a shorter period of 60 days for the RCIFE to conduct an examination, with the possibility of extension;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the RCIFE director to give priority to examinations for NABU and SAPO;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ensure automated assignment of examinations among RCIFE experts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">raise minimum base salaries to 40 subsistence minimums for RCIFE experts and to 30 for experts at other institutions, and prohibit budget laws from reducing them;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">publish in the Register of Forensic Examination Methodologies not only the list of methodologies but also their content, except for restricted information;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow private expert institutions to conduct certain criminalistic examinations at the RCIFE, with the list to be determined by the Ministry of Justice.</span></li>
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			            	The main draft law would establish an independent expert center that would prioritize NABU and SAPO cases. It would also provide better financial, material, and technical conditions for other experts.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What are the advantages of the main draft law?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law offers a comprehensive solution to one of the most acute problems in complex NABU and SAPO corruption and corruption-related cases: the Bureau’s lack of access to independent forensic examination. The European Commission, the IMF, and other international partners, on whom Ukraine’s EU accession and financial support depend, have repeatedly drawn attention to this problem.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Rule of Law Roadmap also </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stresses</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that NABU must have effective access to impartial, timely, and high-quality forensic examinations. Independent examinations for NABU will support high-quality investigations, which may in turn make it possible to recover criminal assets, including taxpayers’ money that officials sought to profit from. According to the </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/07/23/8045475/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Head of SAPO</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, it is precisely the lack of such examinations that directly affects how quickly and effectively corrupt officials are brought to criminal liability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In complex corruption cases, expert opinions are often what makes it possible to establish the amount of damage, the origin of assets, and the substance of financial transactions, and to examine documents and digital evidence. Accordingly, the quality and speed of examinations directly affect both the prospects of proving the charges and the state’s ability to recover proceeds of crime.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The latest example, from the Themis and Forrest Gump cases, confirms this from the mouth of one of the persons involved himself: giving the NABU access to independent examination would cause him and his alleged accomplice a great many problems.</span></p>
<p><b>The main advantage of the draft law is that it creates an institutionally independent examination system for NABU and SAPO cases.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The RCIFE will have separate funding, a special governance procedure, and its own guarantees of independence. Its director will be selected through a competition and may be dismissed only on grounds set out in law. This is a fundamental departure from the current model, under which the heads of state expert institutions are appointed and dismissed by the Ministry of Justice or another agency. At the same time, a Supervisory Board involving international experts will serve as an additional safeguard against political or administrative interference in the Center’s work.</span></p>
<p><b>The institution’s independence is complemented by personal guarantees for RCIFE experts themselves.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Their certification and disciplinary liability will be handled by a separate Expert Qualification Commission and Disciplinary Chamber. This should reduce the scope for pressuring experts with the threat of dismissal, loss of qualification, or disciplinary proceedings. In the event of undue influence, an expert will also be required to report it to the director or the Supervisory Board.</span></p>
<p><b>These guarantees are reinforced by adequate pay for the center’s staff</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The draft law proposes setting the minimum base salary of RCIFE experts at 40 subsistence minimums (UAH 133,120 in 2026) and that of experts at other state institutions at 30 subsistence minimums (UAH 99,840 in 2026). This should help attract and retain qualified specialists and, at the same time, reduce corruption risks associated with low pay. This is especially relevant given that experts currently </span><a href="https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3563513/sudova-ekspertyza-sudova-reforma"><span style="font-weight: 400;">earn</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> UAH 25,000–30,000, while the statutory minimum salary of even 10 subsistence minimums has not been applied in practice since 2018, as it is suspended every year by the State Budget laws.</span></p>
<p><b>Another important change is ending the manual assignment of examinations to experts.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> At present, the specific expert in a state expert institution is usually chosen by its head. The draft law instead introduces automated assignment of examinations among RCIFE experts. This significantly narrows administrative discretion and makes it harder to hand a sensitive examination to the “right” expert in advance.</span></p>
<p><b>Faster examinations are just as important</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Long waits for expert opinions are one of the factors that drag out complex NABU investigations. One example is the </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/129889152"><span style="font-weight: 400;">multi-episode proceedings</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> related, among other things, to possible influence on examinations in the “Medvedchuk pipeline” case, in which investigators needed several different types of examinations at once. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem of time limits is compounded by the risk of leaks. </span><a href="https://nabu.gov.ua/news/u-mene-dostatn-o-amb-tc-i-ta-nstrument-v-shchob-dati-b-i-bud-iakomu-tisku-sprobam-vplinuti-na-nezalezhn-st-nabu-semen-krivonos/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fearing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> premature disclosure of investigation materials, the NABU is in some cases forced to delay handing them over to experts. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A separate institution with stronger guarantees of independence, combined with a shorter standard examination period (</span><b>60 days</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> instead of 90) and the ability to prioritize the most urgent examinations, should reduce both risks.</span></p>
<p><b>Finally, the draft law may make expert opinions more predictable and easier to verify</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Publishing the content of forensic examination methodologies, except for restricted information, will allow the parties and the court to check how an opinion was reached and whether the examination followed the established methodology. This should also help standardize expert practice and reduce cases in which similar examinations produce substantially different results without proper scientific justification.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law’s merit, therefore, is not simply that it creates yet another state expert institution. It proposes </span><b>to change the very model of forensic examination in high-level corruption cases</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">: to protect the institution from external administrative influence, the expert from personal pressure, each examination from manual assignment, and the investigation from excessive delays.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A further advantage of the document is that it sets out in detail the transition from the existing Research Center for Forensic Examinations of the Ministry of Justice to the independent RCIFE. The </span><b>Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine</b> <b>will have three months from the law’s entry into force to ensure</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a decision on reorganizing (transforming) the existing Center in line with the new requirements and to form the Supervisory Board in the manner set out in the law. It is at this stage that the key safeguard of independence, a supervisory body with international participation, is meant to begin operating. Within the same three months, when preparing the draft State Budget Law for 2027, the government is expected </span><b>to provide a separate budget expenditure program for the RCIFE’s operation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which is a practical guarantee of the institution’s separate funding. The government must also ensure the adoption of secondary legislation and bring ministries’ regulations into line with the new Law. </span></p>
<p><b>The Ministry of Justice</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> will have five months </span><b>to approve the RCIFE Charter</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in line with the Law’s requirements. Within another six months, the Ministry must take</span><b> inventory of forensic examination methodologies</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, both those already entered in the Register of Methodologies and those applied outside it. This will make it possible to identify all restricted methodologies and the grounds for restricting them. It will also ensure that methodologies are published in the Register, except for restricted information, as open data available for free viewing. The draft law thus does not merely declare the principle that methodologies should be transparent; it sets a specific timeline and institutional mechanism for putting it into practice.</span></p>
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			            	In complex corruption cases, expert opinions are often what makes it possible to establish the amount of damage, the origin of assets, and the substance of financial transactions, and to examine documents and digital evidence.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why should the alternative draft laws be rejected?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The alternative draft laws by MPs Serhii Vlasenko and Volodymyr Kabachenko do not propose a separate forensic expert institution for the NABU or any other legislative measures that would give the Bureau real access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations. The two draft laws are virtually identical, apart from a few provisions. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In fact, neither document proposes changes that would ensure high-quality examinations in high-level corruption cases, since none of the risks of influence on experts are eliminated. Nor do they fulfill Ukraine’s international commitments to give the NABU access to high-quality examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead, the alternative documents propose to formally enshrine in the Law of Ukraine on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine rights that NABU detectives already have under criminal procedure legislation: to order an examination on their own and to determine the questions put to the expert. In other words, </span><b>this provision changes absolutely nothing.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, a large block of amendments is devoted to deregulating forensic expert activity, in particular by abolishing the certification procedure. Both authors of the alternative draft laws propose allowing forensic examinations to be conducted by </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“individuals who have the special knowledge necessary to provide an opinion on the questions under examination and at least five years of professional experience in the relevant field of knowledge.”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> This means that any individual, in some fields even without higher education, would be able to provide expert opinions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such practice is indeed common in foreign jurisdictions. Alongside experts with special status, other specialists may be engaged ad hoc, and their opinions may be recognized as proper expert evidence. However, </span><b>admitting such experts does not, as a rule, remove the need to verify their competence</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Competence must be confirmed either in advance through an appropriate professional or registration procedure or directly when the expert is engaged in specific proceedings. Likewise, the absence of special certification does not rule out other mechanisms for ensuring an expert’s proper conduct and accountability. </span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2025/909/pdfs/uksi_20250909_en.pdf?view=extent"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Several</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> foreign legal systems also lack the </span><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2025/909/pdfs/uksi_20250909_en.pdf?view=extent&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clear distinction</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> between the procedural status of an expert and that of a specialist that is characteristic of Ukrainian criminal procedure. This allows a wider range of persons to be engaged as experts, with their competence confirmed by knowledge and skills rather than special status.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the model proposed by MPs Vlasenko and Kabachenko does not reflect international best practices: it allows any individuals with sufficient experience and practice to conduct examinations. Moreover, the draft laws do not even specify who would be responsible for their quasi-certification, that is, for verifying their experience, practical skills, and knowledge.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another important argument is made in a study on the qualifications of forensic experts. It </span><a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11757667/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">states</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that a forensic expert’s specialized knowledge should not be equated solely with knowledge in the fields of science and technology on which the classes, kinds, types, and subtypes of examinations are based. In the author’s view, </span><b>without knowledge of the general scientific foundations of forensic examination and its procedural framework, it is impossible to conduct an examination properly and document its results so that the expert opinion is admissible and reliable evidence</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The model in the Vlasenko and Kabachenko draft laws is underdeveloped. It proposes “delicensing” forensic expert activity without an adequate alternative for verifying an expert’s subjective and objective competence. As a result, it could open the door to abuse, undermine trust in forensic expert opinions, and overload court proceedings with checks on the reliability of such opinions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Worse still, Kabachenko’s draft law No. 15569-2 also seeks to insert into the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination, bypassing the Criminal Procedure Code, provisions declaring inadmissible all evidence that the prosecution refused to provide to the defense for examination.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The alternative amendments also propose to deregulate the procedure and grounds for bringing forensic experts to disciplinary liability. Only experts in employment or service relationships would be punished for disciplinary offenses, while others would not be subject to such liability. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, Vlasenko and Kabachenko propose deleting entirely from the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination the articles on expert qualification commissions, which are also responsible for imposing disciplinary penalties on experts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine does need deregulation of the forensic examination sector, but the approach must take into account and minimize all the associated risks. Deregulation on this scale, without a well-grounded alternative model, will only increase corruption risks, lower the quality of forensic expert opinions, and make them harder to use in court.</span></p>
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			            	The alternative draft laws by MPs Serhii Vlasenko and Volodymyr Kabachenko do not propose a separate forensic expert institution for the NABU or any other legislative measures that would give the Bureau real access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be improved in the main draft law</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes genuinely high-quality changes that can make a real difference to the effectiveness and results of NABU and SAPO investigations. However, to bring it as close to ideal as current conditions allow, two aspects should be improved.</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1">
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Clarify the list of proceedings in which the RCIFE may conduct examinations</span></h4>
</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main draft law proposes adding to Article 7-2(1) of the Law of Ukraine on Forensic Examination a provision establishing the RCIFE as an independent expert institution that would conduct forensic examinations in the following categories of cases:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">criminal proceedings concerning corruption offenses and corruption-related criminal offenses under Article 45 of the Criminal Code, as well as Articles 206-2, 209, and 211 of the Criminal Code, if at least one of the conditions set out in paragraphs 1–3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code is met;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state (civil forfeiture).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, the proposed wording of Article 7-2(1) of the Law on Forensic Examination would not, in practice, allow the NABU to have independent examinations conducted at the RCIFE in all cases under the Bureau’s jurisdiction. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The reason is that, under certain conditions, NABU jurisdiction also covers cases under Articles 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, and 396 of the Criminal Code (Article 216(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code); cases under Articles 354 and 364–370 of the Criminal Code if committed by a Bureau employee (the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code); and cases under other articles of the Criminal Code if the NABU Director so decides with the consent of the Head of SAPO (the third subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Therefore, to cover examinations in all NABU cases as fully as possible</span><b>, the wording should be expanded so that the RCIFE conducts forensic examinations specifically in criminal proceedings investigated by NABU, including those under NABU jurisdiction, as well as in cases on declaring assets unjustified and recovering them to the state.</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1">
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Specify certain technical provisions of the draft law</span></h4>
</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On reporting pressure: the law only obliges an expert to notify the RCIFE Director within two working days (or the Supervisory Board, if the pressure comes from the Director), but sets out no further procedure. There is no deadline for the Director or Supervisory Board to respond to the report, no list of possible response measures (removal from the case, reassignment to another expert, referral to law enforcement), and no obligation to inform the NABU and SAPO, as a party to the proceedings, of the interference with the expert’s work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the higher education of Supervisory Board members (Article 17-1(3)): the wording </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“higher education in law, forensic examination, audit, or financial control”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> also raises questions, since </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“forensic examination”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is not a separate field of knowledge or specialty in Ukraine’s </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/266-2015-%D0%BF#n11"><span style="font-weight: 400;">List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for higher education. It is therefore unclear which diploma would satisfy this requirement, which could leave room for arbitrary interpretation when the list of candidates is drawn up.</span></p>
<p><b>The draft law should therefore set a deadline for considering reports of pressure on experts, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform NABU and SAPO of the interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties. </b></p>
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			            	The draft law should therefore set a deadline for considering reports of pressure on experts, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform NABU and SAPO of the interference.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine supports adopting the main Draft Law No. 15569 at first reading, with its provisions to be refined before second reading. The document has significant potential to resolve the long-standing problem of NABU and SAPO access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, to fully implement the proposed innovations, our recommendations should be taken into account:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clearly extend the RCIFE’s mandate to all criminal proceedings investigated by the NABU;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clarify certain technical points in the mechanism for responding to pressure on experts: a deadline for considering a report of pressure, an indicative list of response measures, and an obligation to inform the NABU and SAPO of the interference. The education requirement for Supervisory Board members should also be aligned with the List of Fields of Knowledge and Specialties.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Addressing these comments will preserve the draft law’s strengths and create a more coherent and predictable model of forensic expert activity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alternative draft laws No. 15569-1 and No. 15569-2 do not deserve support because they are ineffective and risk destabilizing the forensic examination sector, so they should be rejected.</span></p>
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			            	The document has significant potential to resolve the long-standing problem of NABU and SAPO access to timely, independent, and high-quality forensic examinations.
			            </p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/independent-forensic-examinations-for-nabu-analysis-of-draft-laws-no-15569-no-15569-1-and-no-15569-2/">Independent Forensic Examinations for NABU: Analysis of Draft Laws No. 15569, No. 15569-1, and No. 15569-2</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>“Fair Deal”: Do Plea Agreements Really Work in High-Level Corruption Cases?</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/fair-deal-do-plea-agreements-really-work-in-high-level-corruption-cases/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Павло Демчук]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 14:39:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=34037</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The plea agreement in the case of Serhii Pashynskyi is still generating debate, and each new wave of discussion raises more questions about this type of verdict.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/fair-deal-do-plea-agreements-really-work-in-high-level-corruption-cases/">“Fair Deal”: Do Plea Agreements Really Work in High-Level Corruption Cases?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The plea agreement in the case of Serhii Pashynskyi is still generating debate, and each new wave of discussion raises more questions about this type of verdict. Let us try to address some of them.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 23, 2026, the High Anti-Corruption Court approved a plea agreement with Serhii Pashynskyi, former acting head of the Presidential Administration, in the case concerning the misappropriation of seized “Kurchenko’s oil products.” The </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/storage/portal/hcac/summons/991_9337_26_23.09.2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">verdict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> shows that Pashynskyi fully admitted his guilt of abuse of office and participation in a criminal organization and agreed to provide incriminating testimony. The total amount he must pay to the state or direct to the Defense Forces is about UAH 1.1 billion. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Public reaction to the first report of the agreement was nearly unanimous: “He bought his way out.” Nor is this the first time a plea-agreement verdict has drawn such a response.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In recent years, plea-agreement verdicts in high-level corruption cases have become more frequent. According to the HACC, from 2019 through the end of the first half of 2026, the court delivered a total of 201 verdicts based on plea agreements. During the first four years, these were isolated cases, between one and ten verdicts a year. Later, however, the number rose sharply: 27 in 2023, 38 in 2024, and as many as 72 in 2025. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The latest jump is not surprising, since it coincided with the first full year in which the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4033-20#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> streamlining plea agreements in cases involving corruption and corruption-related offenses was in force. Data for the first half of 2026 (35 verdicts) indicate that the plea-agreement mechanism has settled at a relatively stable level. But does it actually work?</span></p>
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			            	Public reaction to the first report of the agreement was nearly unanimous: “He bought his way out.” Nor is this the first time a plea-agreement verdict has drawn such a response.
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<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">How plea agreements are concluded in Ukraine</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">First, a reminder: a plea agreement is a compromise under criminal law. The state agrees to a more lenient punishment, and in return the accused admits guilt and assumes a number of obligations: to expose accomplices, compensate damages, and accept the agreed punishment. </span><b>In other words, a plea agreement is about convicting a person and finding them guilty.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The terms of the agreement are set by the parties: the prosecutor and the accused with defense counsel. The agreement is approved by the court (in high-level corruption cases, the HACC), which does so by delivering a guilty verdict. A person who has entered into a plea agreement is therefore convicted, not </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“released from liability.”</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On receiving the indictment together with the agreement, the court examines whether the agreement’s terms comply with the law and the public interest and whether they violate the rights of others. The court cannot rewrite the agreement or redistribute the payments it provides for. It may only approve the document or refuse to approve it, giving reasons why it contradicts the law. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Refusals to approve agreements concluded at the pre-trial investigation stage are rare. As of mid-September, the HACC reports only four cases in which an agreement was not approved and the case was returned for pre-trial investigation. In the “Kurchenko’s oil products” case, for instance, the court had previously </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/137164259"><span style="font-weight: 400;">refused</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to approve the agreement with Serhii Pashynskyi, finding that it provided for punishments not permitted by law, did not ensure full compensation of damages, and shifted its performance onto an undefined circle of third parties. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From the start, plea agreements in corruption cases have drawn reservations. The main one is the risk that an agreement would become a way to “cut a deal” with the organizers of schemes who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed. For this reason, the law restricted the categories of persons and the grounds for plea agreements. The </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/council-adopts-draft-law-12039-on-plea-bargains-in-first-reading/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">new law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on plea agreements, adopted in October 2024, broadened these grounds: an agreement can now be concluded if the person exposes another individual’s commission of any corruption or corruption-related crime, and also if the person compensates damages and exposes other persons involved.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the law significantly sweetened the “carrot” for the accused. It introduced Article 69-2 of the Criminal Code, which </span><b>allows a sentence below the minimum set by the sanction where the person exposes others.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> If the court imposes such a sentence, the person can no longer be released from serving it on probation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The maximum term of imprisonment at which a plea agreement may still provide for release on probation was raised from five to eight years. It also became possible to impose an additional fine even where the sanction of the relevant article does not provide for one. The procedure changed as well. Agreements must now be cleared by higher-level prosecutors, depending on the gravity of the offense. A plea agreement with the same person may be resubmitted to the court only once, and only after the grounds on which the court previously refused it have been eliminated. This is exactly what we saw with the second plea agreement concerning Serhii Pashynskyi.</span></p>
<p><b>But are these changes enough to ensure truly high-quality agreements, and how have they worked so far? </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the one hand, for the first time there have been verdicts imposing sentences below the statutory minimum under Article 69-2 of the Criminal Code. In at least three such cases, the convicted persons are serving actual, albeit shorter, prison terms: </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52023000000000202"><span style="font-weight: 400;">former Chairman</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Supreme Court Vsevolod Kniaziev, </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/brav-xabar-za-umovne-uvyaznennya-a-sam-otrimav-realne-vaks-zatverdiv-ugodu-z-eksprokurorom-gpu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">former prosecutor</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine Volodymyr Derhunov, and former Ministry of Defense </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52025000000000583"><span style="font-weight: 400;">official</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Oleksii Stasiuk. The additional fine under Article 53(3) of the Criminal Code is being applied, though not consistently, as is special confiscation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The exposure mechanism is also producing results. According to the SAPO, 15 people have already been convicted on the basis of testimony from convicted persons who agreed to cooperate, and in most proceedings in which such testimony has been or will be given, trials are still ongoing.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As for special confiscation, the law still does not expressly require this instrument to be applied when plea agreements are concluded, although we </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/another-attempt-at-agreements-in-corruption-cases-pros-and-cons-of-new-draft-law/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recommended</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> such an amendment. In our view, this is a gap that must be closed: </span><b>where there are grounds for special confiscation, the court should approve an agreement only if it provides for it. This would guarantee that the state receives the property obtained through the crime.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This position is supported and expanded upon by the authors of an analysis of 2024–2025 </span><a href="https://pravo.org.ua/prezentacziya-zvitu-za-rezultatamy-analizu-sudovoyi-praktyky-prytyagnennya-do-vidpovidalnosti-za-korupczijni-ta-povyazani-z-korupcziyeyu-kryminalni-pravoporushennya-za-2024-2025-roky/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> prepared by the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform together with the NACP. They specifically note that asset freezes on land plots, vehicles, and funds were often lifted precisely because the agreement did not include a confiscation requirement. In other words, property the state had already frozen was returned to the convicted persons because of how the agreement was worded.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That said, the court’s </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/documents/140127503"><span style="font-weight: 400;">refusal</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to approve the agreement with former MP Kachnyi in his illicit enrichment case is telling. The agreement provided for special confiscation of an apartment, a house, and land formally owned by the husband of the late nominal owner. Although the husband had acted under a power of attorney when the apartment was purchased, inherited the property free of charge, and expressly confirmed in court that he was only its nominal owner, the court refused approval. The reason given was that the third party’s awareness of the illegal origin of the funds had allegedly not been proven. In our opinion, these circumstances left no grounds for such doubts. </span></p>
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			            	Where there are grounds for special confiscation, the court should approve an agreement only if it provides for it. This would guarantee that the state receives the property obtained through the crime.
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			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main problems with current plea agreements</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite all their benefits, plea agreements are not always well received by the public, because the state does not always explain such verdicts well. Below are what we see as the main reasons for this.</span></p>
<p><b>The first reason is classified verdicts</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The texts of some plea-agreement verdicts, including those concerning Pashynskyi, former Head of the Western Commercial Court of Appeal Plotnitskyi, and others, are fully classified. As a result, the public communications of the court and SAPO make it impossible to learn what exactly the state received in exchange for a lighter sentence. And since these cases very often involve well-known individuals, public outrage at such secrecy becomes a predictable reaction.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the earliest and still most notorious cases of a classified verdict is the agreement with </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52020000000000473"><span style="font-weight: 400;">former Minister of Ecology</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Mykola Zlochevskyi, who tried to have the criminal proceedings against him closed by offering a $5 million “super bribe” to the heads of the NABU and the SAPO. Under the plea agreement concluded in August 2023, the HACC fined Zlochevskyi UAH 68,000. In addition, under the terms of the agreement, he donated UAH 660 million to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. That was all. And because the verdict was fully classified, the public never learned whether the “public interest” requirement had been met or whether the state had truly benefited from the deal.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In fact, this agreement became one of the main reasons the need to update legislation on such verdicts was raised at all. Since then, we at TI Ukraine have consistently </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/obstacles-in-the-work-of-the-anti-corruption-court/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stressed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the need to publish the maximum permissible amount of information about each agreement, so that Ukrainians would not be left asking such questions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Full classification often fails even in its immediate purpose of concealing cooperation with the investigation. If the law requires the convicted person to testify against accomplices, they will learn about the agreement anyway from the very fact that the proceedings have been separated. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is worth recalling that the HACC already knows how to redact individual parts of a verdict without classifying the entire text. For example, in the </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/137601351"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the head of the Agency for Local Roads of Poltava Region, the court kept the public-interest reasoning and other parts of the verdict public. The plea-agreement </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/140008856"><span style="font-weight: 400;">verdict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the Pashynskyi case was also initially classified, which we immediately flagged as a very bad precedent. The HACC responded promptly to our criticism and </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/storage/portal/hcac/summons/991_9337_26_23.09.2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">published</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a partially redacted verdict, which made the details of the agreement clear.</span></p>
<p><b>The second reason is the lack of clear rules for concluding agreements. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its response to our information request, the SAPO confirmed that it has no separate internal methodology for assessing whether an agreement can be concluded. At the same time, its Development Strategy for 2026–2028 provides for developing unified approaches, and the prosecutor’s office plans to involve judges, lawyers, and civil society organizations in this work. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The HACC also informed us that it had not conducted any review of its case law on plea agreements. Nevertheless, a discussion is already </span><a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1SeVLmDtrH/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">under way</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on striking a balance between the effectiveness of criminal justice, the inevitability of liability, the fairness of punishment, and public trust in the anti-corruption system. The groundwork for developing clear policies on concluding agreements has also been laid.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Pashynskyi agreement illustrates this process well. SAPO’s announcement </span><a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1C4tZVijNc/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">listed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the amounts of fines and compensation but did not explain why these terms were advantageous to the state. The necessary explanation appeared only once the verdict was </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/storage/portal/hcac/summons/991_9337_26_23.09.2026.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">published</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. It showed that, under the agreement, the prosecutor obtained testimony regarding other participants and that the overall number of defendants in the case had decreased, which offers a chance to try the case against the remaining defendants before the limitation period expires. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, this information came out almost a week after the news of the agreement, when the public had already spent several days discussing, and expressing outrage over, the “billion for freedom.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The fact that the compensation paid to the budget (UAH 600 million) is smaller than the established damage (UAH 817 million) also turned out not to be accidental. The Pashynskyi case concerns a criminal organization rather than a single defendant, and the damage was caused by the actions of seven people, not one. The parties therefore agreed to partially release Pashynskyi from civil liability, taking into account the obligations of </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/32014100070000038"><span style="font-weight: 400;">other persons</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> convicted under plea agreements (UAH 111 million in compensation and UAH 40 million to the Armed Forces) as well as his own UAH 500 million for the army’s needs. Taken together, the compensation paid to the budget by all convicted persons in this case does not yet reach the established damage. Whether future verdicts against the remaining defendants will cover it is a question for SAPO.</span></p>
<p><b>The third reason is public expectations, </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">and the public wants just punishment</span><b>. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last year, a TI Ukraine sociological survey </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/one-in-three-ukrainians-has-personally-encountered-bribe-demands/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">showed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that 60% of Ukrainians consider the number of corrupt officials actually punished to be the most telling indicator of an effective fight against corruption, and that such punishment should involve imprisonment or confiscation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Agreements built on fines and charitable contributions do not meet this expectation. That is why SAPO must explain them with particular care, and the rules under which prosecutors agree to conclude plea agreements must be clear before the next high-profile case emerges.</span></p>
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			            	A discussion is already under way on striking a balance between the effectiveness of criminal justice, the inevitability of liability, the fairness of punishment, and public trust in the anti-corruption system. The groundwork for developing clear policies on concluding agreements has also been laid.
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			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Is the money clean?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In nearly half of the plea-agreement verdicts we analyzed, concluded between July 1, 2025, and June 30, 2026, the accused undertook to make a charitable contribution to the needs of the Armed Forces. This practice emerged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that is, even before the updated law on plea agreements in high-level corruption cases was </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4033-20#n41"><span style="font-weight: 400;">adopted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Today, however, it can be considered almost mandatory for this type of verdict.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Charitable contributions range from UAH 10,000 to UAH 20 million. According to the HACC, more than UAH 321 million was </span><a href="https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/pres-centr/news/1970276/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">directed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2025 alone. According to SAPO’s </span><a href="https://t.me/sap_gov_ua/4394"><span style="font-weight: 400;">latest data</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, plea agreements in high-level corruption cases have already channeled more than UAH 1.6 billion to the needs of the Defense Forces. Of this, more than UAH 1.1 billion came through the state fundraising platform United24, more than UAH 272 million through the Come Back Alive foundation, and more than UAH 50 million through the Sternenko Community foundation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Serhii Pashynskyi agreement set one of the records for the amounts involved: UAH 600 million in compensation to the state budget, paid in installments over 2.5 years; UAH 400 million, or weapons worth that amount, to the Come Back Alive foundation within six months of the verdict’s announcement; UAH 100 million to the Sternenko Community foundation for weapons within 30 days; and a UAH 850,000 fine as the principal punishment, plus a UAH 17,000 fine and a one-year ban on holding public office as additional punishments.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Three questions arise around this money, and in fact they apply to all the amounts set out in other plea-agreement verdicts.</span></p>
<p><b>Has inflation “eaten” the compensation? </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the most common arguments made by critics of the Pashynskyi agreement is that damage caused in 2014 is being compensated today at a nominal amount that has lost much of its value over twelve years. In other words, UAH 600 million in 2026 is nowhere near the money Ukraine lost in 2014 through the machinations of the former acting head of the Presidential Administration. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The argument has merit</span><b>, but it is aimed not at plea agreements as an institution but at how the state protects its property interests in criminal proceedings generally.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the whole, the law does not leave the state defenseless against inflation. Under Article 625(2) of the Civil Code, a debtor who has defaulted on a monetary obligation must, at the creditor’s request, pay the debt adjusted for inflation plus 3% per annum. Back in 2018, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/74838873"><span style="font-weight: 400;">held</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that this rule applies to all types of monetary obligations regardless of how they arose, which means it should also extend to damage caused in criminal cases. In addition, Article 1192 of the Civil Code provides that losses from the loss of property are calculated according to its actual value at the time the case is heard. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a case concerning misappropriated oil products, such as Pashynskyi’s, this may be of practical importance, since it involves property whose price changed with the market rather than a fixed sum of money. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, recovering this difference would most likely have required a separate expert examination, which would also have taken time and might not have produced any result.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Claims for inflation losses can also be brought in criminal proceedings by filing a civil claim, and case law contains such examples. In a misappropriation case (Article 191(4) of the Criminal Code), the Kamianets-Podilskyi City District Court </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/109009950"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recovered</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> inflation losses and 3% per annum from the accused. However, because the limitation period for civil claims was applied at the defendant’s request, interest could be recovered only for the last three years. As a result, instead of the more than UAH 419,000 in inflation losses claimed, the state was to receive approximately UAH 30,000. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There is also such a case at the HACC. In the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/62019000000001618"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Oleh Halushko, head of an Armed Forces department, the Ministry of Defense sought to recover almost UAH 8 million in inflation losses on top of UAH 21.5 million in principal damage. However, the court delivered an </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/122732429"><span style="font-weight: 400;">acquittal</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and left the claim without consideration. The review of this verdict is still ongoing: in June 2026, the Supreme Court </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/137802309"><span style="font-weight: 400;">quashed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the HACC Appeals Chamber’s ruling upholding the acquittal, so the issue of compensation adjusted for inflation losses may also be reconsidered.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To recover inflation losses, the obligation must be monetary, that is, clearly defined as a specific amount. In criminal cases, this is mostly possible only where funds have been embezzled or misappropriated, not with other types of damage. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Pashynskyi case</span> <a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/132966967"><span style="font-weight: 400;">did not involve</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">the seizure of a specific sum of money; the subject matter was oil products</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thus, </span><b>the problem is not that the law prohibits taking inflation into account, but that no mechanism does so automatically.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The court cannot index the amount of damage on its own initiative or go beyond the claims submitted. And if the injured state authority, or a prosecutor acting in the interests of the state, has not claimed compensation for inflation losses, those losses will be recovered neither under a guilty verdict in ordinary proceedings nor in proceedings based on a plea agreement. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the Pashynskyi case, no civil claim was filed at all. Therefore, a claim for inflation losses could neither be granted by the verdict nor taken into account in the agreement, and the amount of damage was fixed at its nominal 2014 value of UAH 600 million. Moreover, even when such a claim is filed, it is exposed to the limitation period for civil claims, which in cases involving events from a decade ago may reduce it to symbolic amounts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Hence our recommendation. The issue of inflation losses should be addressed primarily to the prosecution (in this case, SAPO) and to the bodies representing the state as the injured party. A claim for their recovery should become a standard part of civil claims in cases involving the theft of state property, and taking it into account should become one of the criteria by which a prosecutor assesses the amount of compensation in an agreement. </span></p>
<p><b>Separately, it is worth discussing whether the requirement of “full compensation for damages” as a precondition for an agreement covers only the nominal amount of damage or also its real value at the time the agreement is concluded.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The law currently gives no direct answer to this question.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, some of the public’s complaints about the “leniency” of the punishment concern issues that a plea agreement does not resolve. The court did not order confiscation of property in the Pashynskyi case. The SAPO explained that the corresponding additional punishment under Article 255 of the Criminal Code was introduced in June 2020, that is, after the events in the case. The principle prohibiting the retroactive application of a law that worsens a person’s position therefore applies.</span></p>
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<li><b> Why does the money go to foundations rather than to the budget? </b></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Former Head of the HACC Vira Mykhailenko once </span><a href="https://zn.ua/ukr/anticorruption/chomu-piv-miljarda-vid-pashinskoho-pidut-same-fondam-povernis-zhivim-i-sternenka-pojasnennja-eksholovi-vaks.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">explained</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that it is the prosecution and the defense that agree on where charitable payments should go and in what amount, while the court merely checks whether the agreement complies with the law. Therefore, </span><b>the question “why these particular foundations?” should be addressed to the parties to the agreement, not to the court.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But the question should be asked honestly. Are there well-founded concerns about the transparency of the foundations named in the agreement? And if there are none, what difference does it make to the state whether money goes to the budget or to a foundation that procures weapons for the army professionally and accountably? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In wartime, a large share of the budget goes to defense anyway. A foundation, whether Come Back Alive, Sternenko Community, or any other, may be a faster and more targeted channel in this chain. Moreover, Come Back Alive explicitly </span><a href="https://savelife.in.ua/projects/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">states</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that it does not take a percentage of donations for administrative expenses.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The real risks lie elsewhere.</span><b> The first is ensuring that the foundation is not connected to the accused or their associates. The second is ensuring that compliance with the condition can be verified. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Failure to comply with a plea agreement carries separate criminal liability, and the SAPO may ask the HACC to set aside the verdict and hear the case under the general procedure. Notably, in all the time the court has been operating, prosecutors have never filed such a motion. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to SAPO, no cases of deliberate non-compliance with agreements have been identified so far, and no convicted person has been held liable for violating the terms of an agreement. Compliance</span> <b>is confirmed by payment documents that are submitted to the court and the prosecutor and added to the case file</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In other words, verification</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the transfers does exist, but it is carried out solely by SAPO. Beyond that, one can rely on</span><b> the </b><a href="https://savelife.in.ua/reporting/?reportingType=%22income%22&amp;ver=3"><span style="font-weight: 400;">public reporting </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">of the relevant charitable foundations, which should be open to the general public. </span><b>If there is demand for reporting specifically on HACC plea-agreement verdicts, it would make sense for the foundations concerned to publish specific information on exactly what the funds from such verdicts were spent on. This would help show which specific needs of the army these donations are meeting.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the public reaction to the fact that Pashynskyi must donate to </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Come Back Alive and Sternenko Community</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> under the agreement has also produced unexpected results. On September 28, the HACC </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/140127503?fbclid=IwY2xjawUxyntleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMTFSTG1kdzdFT3E5eFpPQ0FzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEepJaof9NSusaWVYdsyUiQOV1DWsar7mhlzClPgjgjDvFtWpfSpUav_YkRkFg_aem_rmrtPd8HAgQX20qPH8n9ug"><span style="font-weight: 400;">refused</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to approve a plea agreement with MP Oleksandr Kachnyi in his case concerning illicit enrichment of more than UAH 12.7 million. Kachnyi had admitted guilt and agreed to transfer UAH 3 million to a Come Back Alive project. In her refusal, however, the judge stated that the use of these funds would be beyond the control of the parties and the court, and that the court therefore could not be satisfied that these provisions served the public interest.</span></p>
<ol start="3">
<li><b> Whose money is it? </b></li>
</ol>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is the third and perhaps the most important risk. A formally positive outcome, such as paid compensation or a donation to the army, may be financed with opaque money. The origin of the funds used to fulfill the terms of an agreement should be checked no less thoroughly than, for example, the origin of money posted as bail. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The SAPO confirmed that, in practice, damages are compensated and charitable contributions are paid not only by the convicted persons themselves but also by third parties; the law does not prohibit this. At the same time, the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for any separate procedure under which a prosecutor would verify the origin of such funds. The SAPO relies on banks, which, as primary financial monitoring entities, are required to check transactions under anti-money laundering legislation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, to be consistent, we must acknowledge something uncomfortable for the critics and </span><b>recall the special confiscation mechanism</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. It involves seizing precisely those funds and property whose criminal origin has been expressly established by a court verdict. When it is applied, the state knowingly fills the budget with money obtained through crime. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From a purely pragmatic standpoint, it is therefore hard to explain why the same logic becomes unacceptable when the funds come not through special confiscation but as compensation for damages or in fulfillment of a charitable condition of an agreement. In the end, the money ends up in the budget or with the army either way, and either way it does not stay with the convicted person. The outrage that “the money did not go to the budget” thus concerns form, not substance. </span></p>
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			            	If there is demand for reporting specifically on HACC plea-agreement verdicts, it would make sense for the foundations concerned to publish specific information on exactly what the funds from such verdicts were spent on. This would help show which specific needs of the army these donations are meeting.
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			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why plea agreements are good after all, and why they need improvement</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main argument in favor of the Pashynskyi agreement lies not in its amount but in the alternative. The events in the case took place in the spring of 2014, yet notices of suspicion were served only in February 2024. The limitation period for abuse of office in this case expires as early as 2028, so the parties explicitly linked the agreement to the fact that it makes it possible to try the case against the other defendants within that period. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A full trial with several defendants, a large body of evidence, and the defense’s procedural tactics could have lasted for years. Had the limitation period expired in the meantime, the person would have been released from liability altogether, and the state would have received nothing: no verdict and no compensation, not even partial. Despite the European Commission’s </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nabu-sapo-hacc-and-eu-integration-what-the-european-commission-proposes-to-strengthen-them/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">requirements</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Ukraine’s rules on limitation periods have still not been reformed.</span><b> In cases investigated decades after the events, a plea agreement is therefore often an alternative not to a harsh sentence but to impunity.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A criminal trial always has a probabilistic outcome. The prosecution considers guilt proven, the defense does not, and the court has the final word. A plea agreement turns probability into certainty: a guilty verdict, the status of a convicted person, real money, and testimony against other participants. A fine is a type of principal punishment under the Criminal Code. It is therefore incorrect to speak of “buying one’s way out” of punishment when the payment is itself a punishment. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By comparison, another defendant in the Pashynskyi case, Serhii Tyshchenko, received eight years’ imprisonment under a plea agreement and was released from serving the sentence on probation. He transferred UAH 40 million to the Defense Forces and must pay another UAH 110 million to the budget within three years. The “Kurchenko’s oil products” case is not over: there were other suspects, and not all of them entered into plea agreements.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Precisely because plea agreements have become the main way high-level corruption cases are resolved, work on their quality must continue. The HACC should consolidate its approaches to assessing the public interest and make partial redaction of verdicts, rather than full classification, the standard practice wherever full classification is not directly required to protect a person or other proceedings. The SAPO should implement the measures in its Strategy on unified approaches to plea agreements and, in every high-profile case, publicly explain what the state stands to gain. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Parliament needs to make special confiscation a mandatory condition for approving an agreement where there are legal grounds for it. Wider use of real, albeit shorter, prison terms and additional fines would also improve public perception of such verdicts. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Finally, the two problems that most fuel outrage over plea agreements lie outside them altogether. These are the </span><b>unreformed limitation periods</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which force prosecutors to negotiate, and the fact that the </span><b>state does not always use the available mechanisms for recovering inflation losses</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, so that nominal compensation loses value, whether under a plea agreement or an ordinary verdict. After all, hundreds of millions in damage caused in 2014 are not the same as hundreds of millions in 2026.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both legislators and practitioners need to address these problems. Until they do, a fair deal remains a better outcome than a case that ends in nothing.</span></p>
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			            	In cases investigated decades after the events, a plea agreement is therefore often an alternative not to a harsh sentence but to impunity.
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			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/fair-deal-do-plea-agreements-really-work-in-high-level-corruption-cases/">“Fair Deal”: Do Plea Agreements Really Work in High-Level Corruption Cases?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>NABU and SAPO Briefing: Details on Prosecutor General Kravchenko&#8217;s Accusations</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nabu-and-sapo-briefing-details-on-prosecutor-general-kravchenko-s-accusations/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 08:57:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33868</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 14, NABU Director Semion Kryvonos and SAPO Head Oleksandr Klymenko held a briefing for the media and the public on the suspicions announced by the Prosecutor General.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nabu-and-sapo-briefing-details-on-prosecutor-general-kravchenko-s-accusations/">NABU and SAPO Briefing: Details on Prosecutor General Kravchenko’s Accusations</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 14, NABU Director Semion Kryvonos and SAPO Head Oleksandr Klymenko held a briefing for the media and the public on the suspicions announced by the Prosecutor General.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Opening the briefing, NABU Semion Kryvonos said he still had not been served with any notice of suspicion, despite the Prosecutor General&#8217;s public statement that he had signed one. According to Kryvonos, a defense strategy will be built only once the materials are received.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Asked whether NABU had known about the Prosecutor General&#8217;s trip abroad, Kryvonos replied that the bureau does not keep track of a business trip Kravchenko approved for himself.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When a journalist asked point-blank whether the President or Servant of the People faction leader Arakhamia was behind the attack, or whether it came down to Kravchenko&#8217;s own inability to cope with pressure, Kryvonos said: </span><b>“The President already responded to these actions this morning. We don&#8217;t want to politicize the NABU and the SAPO.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">He added that the bureau plays no political games and sees the attack itself as an attempt to politicize the work of the anti-corruption agencies.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO Head Oleksandr Klymenko addressed the claim that a suspicion had been served on “a person close to him”: </span><b>“If such a close person turns up, then let them say who it is.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">He said none of his family members had received a notice of suspicion.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Asked whether there was enough evidence on Kravchenko himself within Carthage Operation, Klymenko kept it short: </span><b>“We have never announced suspicions and we will not announce them.”</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, both heads described the situation as a </span><b>new genre, “Telegram suspicions”:</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> public claims of suspicion made through video addresses and social media, without documents ever actually being served on the people concerned.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO Head Oleksandr Klymenko spoke to the substance of the complaints over how old the Kryvonos case is:</span><b> “If you dig up a case that&#8217;s 10–15 years old, it doesn&#8217;t look very good. Especially after an operation like Carthage</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When journalists asked whether Kryvonos was aware of any search activities targeting him, the NABU Director shot back: </span><b>“I don&#8217;t comment on nonsense.”</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> He went on to clarify an important detail about the searches at the PGO: according to him, the seizure report itself states that a reference note was seized, not a criminal case file, as the Prosecutor General had claimed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko added a detail on the scale of what was seized during Carthage Operation: according to him, the searches at the PGO turned up a </span><b>list of NABU detectives</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> who face cases and are actively working on current investigations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Asked about the child Kravchenko had mentioned earlier, Kryvonos was brief: </span><b>“I&#8217;ve already said I&#8217;m not going to comment on fabricated nonsense.”</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On communication with the Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office both before and after the Carthage recordings were made public, Klymenko described the cooperation as </span><b>“simply working-level, technical,</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">” particularly where suspicions against MPs were concerned. He added that neither the PGO nor the SAPO had sought closer cooperation, apart from some activity in July 2025. Kryvonos confirmed: </span><b>“Personally, I&#8217;ve had no tension whatsoever with any law enforcement agency.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Communication, he said, was conducted in the ordinary course of work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Asked directly whether there had been pressure from the PGO or from Kravchenko personally, and whether anyone had approached them for a private conversation, Kryvonos said: </span><b>“Investigative actions are ongoing, and if there is any, it will be assessed through procedural means.”</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The NABU Director also rejected Kravchenko&#8217;s claim that he had been given guarantees that kept him silent for a week: </span><b>“It&#8217;s nonsense that we guaranteed him anything or didn&#8217;t.”</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">NABU Director Kryvonos shared details of his meeting with the President: </span><b>“At the meeting with the President, we mostly discussed the call center situation. This may well be linked to Russian aggression… Purely Russian sabotage.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">He added that tens of thousands of young people had worked at these call centers, robbing European partners, not Russians.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When journalists asked whether SSU officers were involved in the attack on the anti-corruption agencies and whether this was only the first stage of such pressure, Kryvonos chose his words carefully: </span><b>“If we announce attacks, we won&#8217;t be able to do anything.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">He dismissed reports of supposed new operations, such as “Emperor,” as untrue.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pressed on whether Kravchenko is a subject of the Carthage case, Kryvonos declined to answer on the substance, instead describing the scale of efforts to obstruct the investigation: according to him, the court decisions register is under constant monitoring, and in one set of proceedings those involved knew about an upcoming search in advance. Kryvonos also said the movements of NABU detectives&#8217; vehicles are being tracked through the Safe City system, and queries to the property register and the court decisions register were regularly monitored. And two weeks ago, the SSU tried to gain access to D-3, the HACC&#8217;s document management system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO Head Klymenko added that, according to information available to the SAPO, an information attack was already being prepared and carried out in July 2025, involving not only the Prosecutor General but also a close friend and lawyer of his, whom Klymenko called the “architect” of these attacks.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This material is funded by Norway. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Government. </span></i></p>
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			            	Asked whether there was enough evidence on Kravchenko himself within Carthage Operation, Klymenko kept it short: “We have never announced suspicions and we will not announce them.”
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nabu-and-sapo-briefing-details-on-prosecutor-general-kravchenko-s-accusations/">NABU and SAPO Briefing: Details on Prosecutor General Kravchenko’s Accusations</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Oleksii Shevchuk Announces He Is Stepping Down as a Member of the SAPO Commission</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/oleksii-shevchuk-announces-he-is-stepping-down-as-a-member-of-the-sapo-commission/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 08:28:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33750</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 3, Oleksii Shevchuk published an appeal to Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko on his social media.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/oleksii-shevchuk-announces-he-is-stepping-down-as-a-member-of-the-sapo-commission/">Oleksii Shevchuk Announces He Is Stepping Down as a Member of the SAPO Commission</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 3, Oleksii Shevchuk — a member of the Commission for the Selection of the Deputy Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor&#8217;s Office — published an appeal to Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko on his social media. In it, Shevchuk announced that he was stepping down as a member of the SAPO commission as of September 7, 2026.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the published appeal, Shevchuk again set out his belief that pressure had been put on him, and that the Commission had not properly considered the matter. As reported earlier, the main topic of the</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-selection-commission-recommends-that-the-prosecutor-general-recall-oleksii-shevchuk-as-a-commission-member/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO commission&#8217;s September 1 meeting</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was that Shevchuk — without coordinating his position with the other members — had gone public with an assessment of the reports coming in to the competition&#8217;s Secretariat. Having considered the matter, five of the six Commission members (all but Shevchuk himself) decided to approach the Prosecutor General with a recommendation to remove Oleksii Shevchuk from his position as a Commission member. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In his appeal to the Prosecutor General, Shevchuk also again insisted that once he lays down his powers, the entire Commission will lose its authority to act</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">: “Based on the provisions of the regulations that define the Commission&#8217;s composition and powers, I believe that, with one of the six designated members absent, the Commission will lack the proper composition to continue exercising its powers, and its continuation of the competition procedure would create significant risks to the lawfulness and legitimacy of the decisions taken.” </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Shevchuk therefore maintains that the Commission&#8217;s work in its current composition must be halted and a new composition formed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This assertion is not true: the law</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sapo-commission-has-appealed-to-the-prosecutor-general-regarding-oleksii-shevchuk-what-it-means-legally-and-what-happens-next/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">sets</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a threshold for taking decisions at a meeting — the participation of at least four of the six members.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So even if the Prosecutor General later decides on removal, and appointing a replacement drags on, that does not necessarily mean the Commission&#8217;s work will grind to a halt.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Prosecutor General is now to consider both appeals and reach a decision. It is worth noting that, back when the Commission was being formed, TI Ukraine and other civil society organizations</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/ti-ukraine-calls-for-revising-the-composition-of-the-sapo-selection-commission/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">called on</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Prosecutor General Kravchenko to reconsider his decision to appoint Oleksii Shevchuk to the Commission selecting SAPO&#8217;s leadership, since his candidacy could jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire competition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Applications from candidates for the post of SAPO deputy head are</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-competition-applications-open-for-the-deputy-head-position/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">being accepted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> until September 21. </span></p>
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			            	It is worth noting that, back when the Commission was being formed, TI Ukraine and other civil society organizations called on Prosecutor General Kravchenko to reconsider his decision to appoint Oleksii Shevchuk to the Commission selecting SAPO&#8217;s leadership, since his candidacy could jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire competition.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/oleksii-shevchuk-announces-he-is-stepping-down-as-a-member-of-the-sapo-commission/">Oleksii Shevchuk Announces He Is Stepping Down as a Member of the SAPO Commission</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The Obstacles to SAPO&#8217;s Work Flagged by Its Head, Oleksandr Klymenko</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-obstacles-to-sapo-s-work-flagged-by-its-head-oleksandr-klymenko/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 12:40:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33751</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In an interview with the Ye Pytannia (“We Have Questions”) project, SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko discussed the details of the latest high-profile investigations, the past and future subjects of the NABU tapes, large-scale schemes among the country's top leadership, and the unprecedented pressure on the NABU and the SAPO.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-obstacles-to-sapo-s-work-flagged-by-its-head-oleksandr-klymenko/">The Obstacles to SAPO’s Work Flagged by Its Head, Oleksandr Klymenko</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In an </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl_FOLZR7Bc"><span style="font-weight: 400;">interview</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ye Pytannia</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (“We Have Questions”) project, SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko discussed the details of the latest high-profile investigations, the past and future subjects of the NABU tapes, large-scale schemes among the country&#8217;s top leadership, and the unprecedented pressure on the NABU and the SAPO. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But beyond the specifics of these recent high-profile investigations, the SAPO head once again underscored the main problems his office is currently facing. Unfortunately, most of them have already become “chronic” — and some we at TI Ukraine have been talking about for years.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Here are the key ones.</span></p>
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			            	Unfortunately, most of them have already become “chronic” — and some we at TI Ukraine have been talking about for years.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">SSU Pressure on Judges and Investigators</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The SAPO head explained that the SSU is systematically pressuring judges through threats to their relatives, the revocation of reserved status, and mobilization — all to secure the rulings it wants in cases involving NABU detectives.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So, the problem of pressure on the anti-corruption law enforcement bodies, which came to a head on the eve of the cardboard protests, has not gone away; and although it is discussed less now, it still gets in the way.</span></p>
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			            	The SAPO head explained that the SSU is systematically pressuring judges through threats to their relatives, the revocation of reserved status, and mobilization — all to secure the rulings it wants in cases involving NABU detectives.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">An Attempt to Take Control of SAPO Through the Deputy Selection</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko claims that one scenario for establishing control over SAPO is to win the competitive selection for deputy head — the stage that is currently accepting applications. That process is already mired in a few scandals. After that, according to Klymenko, interested parties would be in no hurry to hold the selection for the head. Part of the SAPO head&#8217;s powers would then rest with the Prosecutor General.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is a real risk. We have already lived through a period when SAPO went almost two years without a full-fledged head, while the then-Prosecutor General, Iryna Venediktova, stalled certain cases and all but sank the Tatarov case entirely. And on the tapes in the Forrest Gump case, Iryna Mudra, a subject of that case, also mentioned this selection.</span></p>
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			            	We have already lived through a period when SAPO went almost two years without a full-fledged head, while the then-Prosecutor General, Iryna Venediktova, stalled certain cases and all but sank the Tatarov case entirely.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">A Lack of Political Will</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Asked whether the state has the political will to fight corruption, the SAPO head answered directly and without reservation: it does not. Given the pace of delivery on anti-corruption commitments under the Kachka-Kos plan and the European Commission&#8217;s recommendations, these statements are, unfortunately, borne out by reality.</span></p>
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			            	Given the pace of delivery on anti-corruption commitments under the Kachka-Kos plan and the European Commission&#8217;s recommendations, these statements are, unfortunately, borne out by reality.</p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Influence over the Anti-Corruption Bodies&#8217; Selection Commissions</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko confirmed that attempts to influence the commissions that select the leadership of the anti-corruption bodies are a real and systemic problem — as we saw, for example, from the tapes in the Stefanishyna case.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">A Fund to Discredit NABU and SAPO </span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the SAPO head, investigators recorded discussions about creating a special fund to discredit the anti-corruption bodies — and there was no shortage of people willing to finance it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We have no confirmation that such a fund exists, but in recent months we have witnessed systematic communication attacks on the anti-corruption bodies and anti-corruption civil society organizations.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO&#8217;s Institutional Dependence on the Prosecutor General</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite SAPO&#8217;s procedural independence, investigating MPs </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-decisions-in-corruption-cases-against-mps-should-not-rest-with-the-prosecutor-general-alone/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">still requires</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Prosecutor General&#8217;s approval — and Klymenko admits this substantially limits what the anti-corruption prosecution can do.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is worth mentioning here that expanding the powers of the SAPO head is yet another of Ukraine&#8217;s European integration commitments — one on which, nearly a year after the European Commission&#8217;s latest report, we have still seen no movement.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This material is funded by Norway. Its content is the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Government. </span></i></p>
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			            	Expanding the powers of the SAPO head is yet another of Ukraine&#8217;s European integration commitments — one on which, nearly a year after the European Commission&#8217;s latest report, we have still seen no movement.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-obstacles-to-sapo-s-work-flagged-by-its-head-oleksandr-klymenko/">The Obstacles to SAPO’s Work Flagged by Its Head, Oleksandr Klymenko</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The SAPO Commission Has Appealed to the Prosecutor General Regarding Oleksii Shevchuk: What It Means Legally and What Happens Next</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sapo-commission-has-appealed-to-the-prosecutor-general-regarding-oleksii-shevchuk-what-it-means-legally-and-what-happens-next/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:44:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33707</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>We explain what the Commission's Rules of Procedure and the Law provide for at each of the stages ahead.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sapo-commission-has-appealed-to-the-prosecutor-general-regarding-oleksii-shevchuk-what-it-means-legally-and-what-happens-next/">The SAPO Commission Has Appealed to the Prosecutor General Regarding Oleksii Shevchuk: What It Means Legally and What Happens Next</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 1, the Selection Commission for the position of Deputy Head of the SAPO </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/news/komisiya-sap-rekomenduvala-genprokuroru-vidklykaty-oleksiya-shevchuka-z-posady-yiyi-chlena/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">submitted a proposal</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the Prosecutor General to remove Oleksii Shevchuk early from his position as a Commission member. Below, we explain what the Commission&#8217;s Rules of Procedure and the Law provide for at each of the stages ahead.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Step 1 — This is a proposal, not a decision</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission&#8217;s Rules of Procedure and the Law of Ukraine on the Prosecutor&#8217;s Office distinguish between two separate actions:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Commission has the right only to submit a </span><b>proposal</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the Prosecutor General for the early termination of one of its members&#8217; powers;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the </span><b>decision</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the termination of powers itself is taken </span><b>solely by the Prosecutor General</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, who in doing so also designates a replacement member of the Selection Commission.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This means that, as of today, no legal consequences for Oleksii Shevchuk&#8217;s status have arisen. Formally, he </span><b>remains a member of the Commission with the full scope of his rights</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — including the right to vote, to take part in meetings, and to receive all materials. The composition of the Commission provided for by law (six persons) has not changed as of today.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is an important point, because it means that any argument about the Commission&#8217;s “lack of authority” on account of incomplete membership currently has not the slightest factual basis, since the composition remains complete until the Prosecutor General takes his own decision.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Step 2 — The law sets no deadline for the Prosecutor General to respond</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Article 29-1 of the Law sets no time limit within which the Prosecutor General must respond to the Commission&#8217;s proposal. It does, however, provide that, where grounds exist for the early termination of a Selection Commission member&#8217;s powers, the Prosecutor General takes a decision on the early termination of that member&#8217;s powers and, in doing so, designates a replacement member of the Selection Commission in accordance with the procedure established by this part for designating members of the Selection Commission.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Step 3 — If the Prosecutor General decides on a removal</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Law requires that, simultaneously with the decision to terminate powers, the Prosecutor General designate a replacement candidate — under the same procedure as for forming the Commission as a whole (nominations from the Council of Prosecutors). That amounts to up to 20 working days for the nomination of candidates (by the Council of Prosecutors) and a further up to 10 working days for appointment by the Prosecutor General. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For reference, when filling the “prosecutorial” quota of the Selection Commission, the Council of Prosecutors </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/prosecutors-council-launches-procedure-to-select-sapo-leadership/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">began</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> compiling the list of candidates on November 27, and the Prosecutor General actually </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/ti-ukraine-calls-for-revising-the-composition-of-the-sapo-selection-commission/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">appointed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the commission members (one of whom was Oleksii Shevchuk) on December 23 — so the process took less than a month. </span></p>
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			            	As of today, no legal consequences for Oleksii Shevchuk&#8217;s status have arisen. Formally, he remains a member of the Commission with the full scope of his rights.
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">How well-founded is the claim of the Commission&#8217;s “lack of authority” and a “suspended competition”?</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Shevchuk himself has already claimed that the Commission is supposedly without authority, and that further competition procedures, including the acceptance of candidates&#8217; documents, cannot therefore be regarded as legitimate until the question of the Commission&#8217;s full composition is resolved. Let us examine this claim point by point.</span></p>
<p><b>First</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, it is premature at the level of facts alone: no decision to change the Commission&#8217;s composition yet exists. The composition is the same as before, including the very author of this argument. The assertion of an “incomplete composition” describes a hypothetical future situation, not what is happening now.</span></p>
<p><b>Second</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, even if the Prosecutor General were to decide on a removal in the future, and the appointment of a replacement were to drag on (on precedent, for several weeks), this would not necessarily mean the paralysis of the Commission&#8217;s work. The Rules of Procedure and Article 29-1 of the Law itself separately set the threshold for taking decisions at a meeting — the participation of at least four of the six members (including no fewer than two members from the “international” quota) and, where such a quorum cannot be assembled within 10 days or across two consecutive meetings, even three members. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These provisions are designed precisely for situations in which the commission temporarily operates without its full composition; otherwise they would make no sense. A comparative analysis of the work of similar selection commissions — for NABU, the Economic Security Bureau, and ARMA — shows that the legislator has consistently built exactly this logic into all such competitions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This means that even in a hypothetical future period of vacancy, when a replacement has not yet been appointed, the Commission most likely retains a legal basis to continue holding meetings provided a quorum is present.</span></p>
<p><b>Third</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, as regards the</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-competition-applications-open-for-the-deputy-head-position/"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> acceptance of candidates&#8217; documents</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">: this stage is an administrative procedure whose deadlines (from 9:00 a.m. on August 19 to 6:00 p.m. on September 21) were set and published in advance on the basis of a separate announcement by the Commission in accordance with paragraphs 9.1–9.3 of the Rules of Procedure. Neither the Rules of Procedure nor the Law ties the validity of this document intake to the Commission&#8217;s current personal composition. The assertion that the submission of documents “cannot be regarded as a proper continuation of the competition procedure” is not based on any specific provision of the Rules of Procedure or the Law.</span></p>
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			            	Even if the Prosecutor General were to decide on a removal in the future, and the appointment of a replacement were to drag on (on precedent, for several weeks), this would not necessarily mean the paralysis of the Commission&#8217;s work.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-sapo-commission-has-appealed-to-the-prosecutor-general-regarding-oleksii-shevchuk-what-it-means-legally-and-what-happens-next/">The SAPO Commission Has Appealed to the Prosecutor General Regarding Oleksii Shevchuk: What It Means Legally and What Happens Next</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>SAPO Selection Commission Recommends That the Prosecutor General Recall Oleksii Shevchuk as a Commission Member</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-selection-commission-recommends-that-the-prosecutor-general-recall-oleksii-shevchuk-as-a-commission-member/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 18:45:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33708</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 1, 2026, the Selection Commission for the competition for administrative positions in the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office held a meeting.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-selection-commission-recommends-that-the-prosecutor-general-recall-oleksii-shevchuk-as-a-commission-member/">SAPO Selection Commission Recommends That the Prosecutor General Recall Oleksii Shevchuk as a Commission Member</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On September 1, 2026, the Selection Commission for the competition for administrative positions in the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor&#8217;s Office held a meeting. The sole item on the agenda was whether the conduct of Commission member Oleksii Shevchuk complied with the requirements of the Commission&#8217;s Rules of Procedure. Following the discussion, five of the Commission&#8217;s six members supported an appeal to the Prosecutor General proposing the early termination of Shevchuk&#8217;s powers; only Shevchuk voted against.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The meeting was </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/qrfTziT4lOI?si=kQFKyBoJCCaxVnU_"><span style="font-weight: 400;">broadcast</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> live.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">How it all began</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to Laura Stefan, on August 21 the Commission received a letter from NABU Director Kryvonos concerning Shevchuk. On August 26, without notifying the Commission in advance, Shevchuk held a press conference at which he accused NABU of interfering in the Commission&#8217;s work and appealed to law enforcement agencies, a number of international institutions, and representatives of foreign states.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It was precisely the fact and manner of this public reaction — undertaken without prior discussion within the Commission — that became the subject of the September 1 session. The Chair emphasized that the meeting did not concern any assessment of the content of NABU&#8217;s letter as such — though, judging by Oleksii Shevchuk&#8217;s subsequent conduct, he did not agree with that framing.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">An attempt to change the agenda</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the start of the meeting, Shevchuk insisted on adding several further items to the agenda: the NABU Director&#8217;s alleged “interference” in his work; an interview given by the head of the SAPO which, in his view, undermined confidence in the competition; a motion of no confidence in the Head of the Commission&#8217;s Secretariat; and the admission of eleven of his attorney-representatives to take part in the meeting. He also cited allegedly ongoing proceedings before the District Administrative Court of Kyiv which, he claimed, made it impossible to hold the meeting. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We would add that a claim was indeed </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/log_documents/431504/7110/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">assigned</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the afternoon of September 1 in case No. 320/35015/26, brought by Shevchuk against the Selection Commission. However, as of the date of the meeting, there is no information about any rulings issued in that case. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In response to Shevchuk&#8217;s remark that he was unaware of the agenda proposals, Laura Stefan showed participants the email containing the agenda that had been circulated in advance to all Commission members, and stated that no one had prepared any additional materials. The other Commission members — Iryna Horban, Martin Ortner, Serhii Shmalenia, and Jens Madsen —spoke in turn against expanding the agenda, noting that these matters could be considered separately but could not substitute for the scheduled </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">review. Shevchuk&#8217;s proposal was rejected by five members to one (Shevchuk himself).</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">A tense tone of discussion</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The discussion was marked by a clash between Oleksii Shevchuk and Commission member Martin Ortner, who tried to stop Shevchuk when he refused for a prolonged period to yield the floor to others. In response, Shevchuk branded Ortner&#8217;s conduct “chauvinism” and demanded a public apology, repeatedly noting that he was in Kyiv during an air-raid alert while his family was on the road and in danger, and accusing his opponent of being in Austria at the time. Ortner subsequently apologized for raising his voice and interrupting.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Iryna Horban, summing up this part of the meeting, said: </span><b>“I am very sorry that I feel ashamed of my colleagues.” </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">She meant that she was ashamed of</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Oleksii Shevchuk&#8217;s conduct before their foreign colleagues and the viewers of the open broadcast.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These episodes were not directly the subject of the vote on Shevchuk, but they convey the atmosphere in which the decision was taken.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Chair&#8217;s reasoning</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Justifying the need for the review, Laura Stefan referred to several provisions of the Rules of Procedure concerning the avoidance of actions or statements that could discredit the Commission or harm its work, as well as the duty to take into account the public nature of one&#8217;s responsibilities and to act in the public interest, and the fact that the Commission is a collegial body.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">She additionally noted that, under the Rules of Procedure, it is the Chair who represents the Commission in relations with the media. In her opinion, one member&#8217;s coming forward with a public statement on behalf of what is in fact a collegial body, without prior discussion, placed the other Commission members in a position where they had to react to an already-formed public stance rather than shape a common one.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The legal basis for the appeal to the Prosecutor General itself is the Commission&#8217;s right to propose the early termination of a member&#8217;s powers where the member fails to perform their duties or violates the Law of Ukraine on the Prosecutor&#8217;s Office, the Rules of Procedure, or the Commission&#8217;s decisions.</span></p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Shevchuk&#8217;s position</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Oleksii Shevchuk insisted on the opposite reading of the Rules of Procedure. His arguments came down to the claim that he had the right to defend himself against alleged criminal offenses (namely, the supposed arbitrary conduct of Kryvonos, although, in our view, there are no indications of any actual offense there). He also observed that the Commission had gone five days without responding to the NABU Director&#8217;s letter (although, from the context of the meeting, we understood that Shevchuk himself had not raised this matter before the Commission), and that various court rulings (of which he had amassed a fair number) had established individual instances of inaccurate information. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">He further insisted that a Commission member and the Commission are essentially one and the same, so that any criticism directed at him constitutes </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">“interference in the Commission&#8217;s work,”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> which entitles him to speak about it publicly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its final vote, the Commission did not agree with these arguments. We believe, however, Shevchuk&#8217;s entire conduct was aimed precisely at derailing the meeting and at numerous distortions of both the rules and the actual state of affairs, since Shevchuk, as already noted here:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">denied having seen the agenda — even though the Chair immediately displayed the email that everyone had received;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">demanded that 11 of his representatives be admitted, as if this were a court trial rather than a commission meeting;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">kept changing the subject — to the NABU letter, to the bomb shelter, to the Secretariat, to threats to complain to Austrian authorities;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">interrupted everyone, including the Chair — who had to mute his microphone;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">spent 15+ minutes demanding an apology from Martin Ortner, reproaching him for being an Austrian sitting out of range of the shelling;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">muddled his terms and contradicted himself: one moment he was “part of the Commission,” the next the Commission was supposed to protect him specifically; one moment the Commission&#8217;s powers extended only to selecting candidates, the next it was at fault for failing to protect Shevchuk.</span></li>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">The decision</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The meeting&#8217;s agenda (in its original form, as proposed by the Chair) was approved by five members to one. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Following the discussion of Shevchuk&#8217;s conduct, five Commission members voted in favor of an appeal to the Prosecutor General proposing the early recall of Oleksii Shevchuk from his position as a Commission member. Shevchuk himself voted against and called what had taken place at the meeting “an act of sabotage during wartime.”</span></p>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sapo-selection-commission-recommends-that-the-prosecutor-general-recall-oleksii-shevchuk-as-a-commission-member/">SAPO Selection Commission Recommends That the Prosecutor General Recall Oleksii Shevchuk as a Commission Member</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>We Urge the Office of the President to Refrain from Interfering with the Work of Anti-Corruption Agencies</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/we-urge-the-office-of-the-president-to-refrain-from-interfering-with-the-work-of-anti-corruption-agencies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:25:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33557</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>TI Ukraine strongly believes that the points voiced on the recordings attest to the fact that the government is trying to interfere in the work of anti-corruption agencies.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/we-urge-the-office-of-the-president-to-refrain-from-interfering-with-the-work-of-anti-corruption-agencies/">We Urge the Office of the President to Refrain from Interfering with the Work of Anti-Corruption Agencies</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The NABU and the SAPO have</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3UmdUOh5OY"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">published</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the results of another special anti-corruption operation at the highest level. According to the investigators, a group of individuals, including a deputy head of the Office of the President, a former MP, the chair of the board and the chair of the supervisory board of a state-owned bank, have organized legalization of UAH 150 million in cash to bail out one of the individuals involved in the Midas case.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to</span><a href="https://epravda.com.ua/finances/sprava-galushchenka-yak-zastavu-vidmili-cherez-sens-bank-824761/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">media reports</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the tapes featured Deputy Head of the Office of the President Iryna Mudra, former MP Maksym Mykytas, and others.</span></p>
<p><b>Transparency International Ukraine strongly believes that the points voiced on the recordings attest to the fact that the government is trying to interfere in the work of anti-corruption agencies, to sabotage their activities, and to undermine their independence.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is confirmed by the following facts provided by the NABU.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">1. </span><b>The Deputy Head of the Office of the President spoke about the need to have insiders in the SAPO and other anti-corruption agencies.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In particular, she spoke about creating a “staff reserve” for future competitive recruitment for anti-corruption agencies, asking to facilitate the election of the “right” members for the Public Oversight Council under the NABU.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The official complains about the head of the SAPO being difficult to reach an agreement with, pointing out potential negative consequences if Klymenko were to be re-elected as Head of SAPO, and mentions that her team has no “reserve” for positions in anti-corruption and other agencies.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It can thus be concluded that high-ranking officials in the Office of the President are already planning to continue their attempts to plant insiders into anti-corruption agencies.</span></p>
<p><b>2. The Deputy Head of the Office of the President and other individuals were planning to collect funds to bail out a person involved in the Midas case bypassing the law.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The individuals featured in the tapes are discussing a plan to collect UAH 150 million in cash to bail out a suspect in the Midas case, Herman Halushchenko. To this end, they have presumably used the state-owned Sense Bank to legalize the funds.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thus, representatives of the Office of the President are likely using existing powers to circumvent anti-laundering legislation. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This indicates that the cleansing or reboot of the authorities, announced to the international partners, has failed as of now: the President’s inner circle continues to use their powers to support individuals under investigation for grand corruption. Even the urgent dismissal of Iryna Mudra from her position as Deputy Head of the Office of the President is insufficient to prove otherwise.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine emphasizes that the current means of supporting anti-corruption agencies are lacking.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, we call on the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Verkhovna Rada:</b></p>
<ul>
<li><b> </b><b>to refrain from actions that could be interpreted as pressure on anti-corruption bodies;</b></li>
<li><b>to fulfill the undertaken European integration obligations, particularly the ones set forth in the so-called Kachka-Kos plan;</b></li>
<li><b>to refrain from interfering in existing criminal proceedings on grand corruption at the highest level;</b></li>
<li><b>to ensure continued participation of international experts in selection commissions for high-profile positions.</b></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Operation Forrest Gump is among those cases that best explain why independence of the anti-corruption infrastructure cannot become a bargaining chip.</span></p>
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			            	Transparency International Ukraine strongly believes that the points voiced on the recordings attest to the fact that the government is trying to interfere in the work of anti-corruption agencies, to sabotage their activities, and to undermine their independence.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/we-urge-the-office-of-the-president-to-refrain-from-interfering-with-the-work-of-anti-corruption-agencies/">We Urge the Office of the President to Refrain from Interfering with the Work of Anti-Corruption Agencies</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:18:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33643</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On June 16, Members of Parliament registered two draft laws at once, both intended to improve Ukraine's Criminal Procedure Code as it applies to the investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/">Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On June 16, Members of Parliament registered two draft laws at once, both intended to improve Ukraine&#8217;s Criminal Procedure Code as it applies to the investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These are Draft Laws No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70211"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15333</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and No. </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70210"><span style="font-weight: 400;">15334</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, authored by MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, and others. The first proposes a package of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) concerning the time limits for pre-trial investigation and countering the abuse of procedural rights. The second concerns improving the rules for determining investigative jurisdiction and the procedural framework for international cooperation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both are designed to fulfill the requirements of the “Kachka-Kos Plan” for </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/15-out-of-100-limited-progress-on-the-kachka-kos-plan/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European integration</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and to bring Ukraine closer to EU membership by delivering on specific measures set out in the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Rule of Law Roadmap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Laws No. 15333 and No. 15334 would resolve the problems of unjustified case closures once investigation deadlines expire, the dragging-out of trials, the unlawful investigation of NABU cases by other agencies, and the limited powers of the Head of SAPO in matters of international legal assistance;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">these acts are aimed at meeting the requirements of the Rule of Law Roadmap and the Kachka-Kos list;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">some of the legislative proposals should nonetheless be refined to achieve the best effect in practice. </span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15333:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">retain judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and — should this draft law pass — 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen the mechanisms for responding to violations of reasonable time limits in pre-trial investigation, in particular by improving Article 308 of the CPC of Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clarify the conditions for suspending court proceedings due to the mobilization of the defendant;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow monetary penalties to be imposed on defense counsel for failing to appear when summoned without valid reasons.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15334, a provision should be added to allow the Head of SAPO to open criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament.</span></p>
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			            	The first proposes a package of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) concerning the time limits for pre-trial investigation and countering the abuse of procedural rights. The second concerns improving the rules for determining investigative jurisdiction and the procedural framework for international cooperation.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">How do things stand now?</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, the application of the CPC of Ukraine in investigating and trying top corruption cases has revealed opportunities for abuse and delay, creating unjustified obstacles to holding people criminally liable.</span></p>
<p><b>On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">at present, under Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, criminal proceedings may be closed simply because the case was sent to court after the pre-trial investigation period had lapsed — even by just one to three days;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the CPC of Ukraine provides no separate mechanism allowing a victim or the defense to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation once the relevant deadline has passed; it does, however, require the prosecutor under Article 308 to respond to any failure to observe reasonable investigation timeframes;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the maximum period of pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion is 12 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the head of a prosecutor&#8217;s office may extend the pre-trial investigation period up to 3 months, while extensions to 6 and 12 months may be granted only by an investigating judge.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>On preventing abuse of procedural rights:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the systematic failure of defense counsel to appear when summoned — including for court hearings — is not clearly established as a standalone ground for bringing in defense counsel from the free legal aid (FLA) system. Nor does the law expressly prohibit filing and considering certain motions, applications, and complaints that have been submitted repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">courts are often forced to adjourn hearings because some participants in the proceedings fail to appear, even without valid reasons. Formally, the law does not establish that the presence of at least one of the defendant&#8217;s defense lawyers is sufficient to realize the right to a defense. And bringing in a new defense counsel or prosecutor — even when the previous ones are still taking part in the proceedings — is often used as grounds for adjournment;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">suspending court proceedings due to the mobilization of the defendant is possible only in cases involving grave and especially grave corruption offenses, and only if it is proven that the defendant cannot take part directly because of their involvement in Ukraine&#8217;s defense efforts;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">where a trial is being dragged out, the law does not expressly empower the presiding judge to limit the parties&#8217; speaking time during closing arguments and the final statement.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>On extending the duration of obligations</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as part of preventive measures: current law allows a court to impose on the suspect or the defendant any of the procedural obligations listed in Article 194(5) of the CPC of Ukraine in connection with a preventive measure for a maximum of two months, with the possibility of extension.</span></p>
<p><b>On NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction and its powers in international cooperation:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction based on the category of official does not expressly extend to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the Economic Security Bureau and the State Bureau of Investigation; or by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises. And the mechanism for transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction is not regulated in any way;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Head of SAPO cannot, without the Prosecutor General, independently set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation, nor send extradition requests on their own.</span></li>
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			            	Currently, the application of the CPC of Ukraine in investigating and trying top corruption cases has revealed opportunities for abuse and delay, creating unjustified obstacles to holding people criminally liable.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What the draft laws propose</span></h3>
<p><b>Draft Law No. 15333</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proposes three blocks of changes.</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the time limits for pre-trial investigation after a notification of suspicion:</span></li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remove the expiry of the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion from the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">introduce a mechanism whereby, if the pre-trial investigation deadline expires, the victim or the defense would have the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">increase the maximum pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion to 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that the pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion is extended to 6 and 12 months by the head of the prosecutor&#8217;s office, and to 18 months by an investigating judge.</span></li>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">On preventing abuse of procedural rights:</span></li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow defense counsel from the FLA system to be brought in where the suspect&#8217;s or the defendant&#8217;s own lawyers systematically (twice or more) fail to appear when summoned by the investigator, prosecutor, or court;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the court to decline to consider motions to apply measures to secure the proceedings, motions during the trial, and appeals, cassation appeals, and applications to review decisions on the basis of newly discovered or exceptional circumstances, where such applications, complaints, and motions have been filed repeatedly or contain offensive or indecent language;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow the trial to continue in the absence of certain participants who were duly notified but failed to appear when summoned, while giving them the opportunity to set out their position in writing and present it at the next hearing;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">formally establish that, to ensure the right to a defense, the participation of all of the defendant&#8217;s lawyers in a hearing is not mandatory — the presence of at least one is enough;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide that a hearing will not be adjourned to allow new prosecutors or defense counsel to familiarize themselves with the case file, so long as the previous prosecutors or defense counsel continue to take part in the hearing;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC the court&#8217;s right to suspend proceedings on a charge of any criminal offense where the defendant is performing military service and is unable to take part in the trial;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">give the court the ability, where it finds that a participant is abusing their procedural rights, to limit the length of any of that participant&#8217;s addresses.</span></li>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">To streamline the process of extending the duration of obligations, it is proposed to give the court the ability, for </span><b>up to 6 months</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, to prohibit a suspect (or the defendant) subject to a preventive measure from leaving the country, from leaving certain localities (districts, regions), and from visiting certain areas; to prohibit them from communicating with specific individuals; and to require them to appear when summoned and to report any change of residence or workplace.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><b>Draft Law No. 15334</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proposes to expand NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction and to resolve the questions around the powers of the Head of SAPO as follows:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extend NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to corruption and corruption-related offenses committed by the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; by senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI; and by deputy heads, supervisory board members, and members of the executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">regulate the transfer of cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction by setting a deadline for handing over the materials and for the prosecutor&#8217;s decision determining such jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">empower the Head of SAPO to set up joint investigation teams as part of international cooperation and to send extradition requests independently.</span></li>
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			            	The registered draft laws can be seen as a logical response to the problems that stand in the way of effectively investigating and trying criminal proceedings.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">The advantages of the proposed changes</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The registered draft laws can be seen as a logical response to the problems that stand in the way of effectively investigating and trying criminal proceedings. They almost entirely remove the risk of proceedings being closed over investigation deadlines and the problem of procedural rights being used to the detriment of the process, and they fill some of the procedural gaps.</span></p>
<p><b>Removing the option to close a case over an expired investigation period</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pre-trial investigation deadlines were introduced by the “Lozovyi amendments,” passed in 2017. They were supposedly meant to guard against unjustifiably long criminal prosecution, yet the problem of pressure on business does not </span><a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/news/onovlena-rada-z-pitan-pidtrimki-pidpriyemnictva-zbilshit-pre-98705"><span style="font-weight: 400;">appear</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to have been solved. Their partial repeal in 2023 did not fully fix the issue, because the law retained the rule in Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine, which still allows criminal proceedings to be closed over a purely formal expiry of the pre-trial investigation deadline — even by just one to three days.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The most recent telling example is the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52017000000000365"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Dubnevych case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> concerning the misappropriation of Ukrzaliznytsia&#8217;s funds. On May 26, 2026, the HACC granted a defense motion and, on this ground, </span><a href="https://t.me/fightcorruptor/5251"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the criminal proceedings against former MP Yaroslav Dubnevych and his accomplices over the misappropriation of UAH 93 million from Ukrzaliznytsia. This is not the first time the case has been closed — back in September 2022, the HACC had already </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/5-questions-about-lozovyi-s-amendments-what-is-the-essence-of-the-problem/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed it</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the same ground.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its monitoring of the HACC, TI Ukraine</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/hacc-turns-six-analysis-of-achievements-challenges-and-recommendations/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stressed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that closing criminal proceedings is a disproportionate response and an opening for manipulation and abuse. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The European Commission </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/limited-progress-in-the-fight-against-corruption-what-the-2025-european-commission-report-recommends-for-ukraine/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stated directly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the provision on the automatic closure of criminal proceedings over expired pre-trial investigation deadlines must be removed from the CPC of Ukraine — that is, the element of the “Lozovyi amendments” still in force must finally be scrapped.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In this context, an equally important innovation</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> could be the introduction of a maximum 18-month pre-trial investigation period after a notification of suspicion, where the investigation requires a significant volume of investigative (search) and procedural actions, as well as international cooperation. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even longer investigation periods are permitted under the laws of European countries such as</span> <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/id/107820-kriminalprocesa-likums"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Latvia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and</span><a href="https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:1988-09-22;447"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Italy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><b>Building safeguards against abuse and delay</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Until now, Ukraine&#8217;s criminal justice system has lacked adequate tools for responding to abuse, which can seriously stall investigations and trials — and some bad-faith participants make active use of this.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In its latest </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/hacc-turns-six-analysis-of-achievements-challenges-and-recommendations/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">report monitoring HACC cases</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the TI Ukraine team found that it is most often the defense that resorts to abuse during hearings, doing everything to drag them out through unfounded recusals, the non-appearance of participants, unreasonably long addresses, and the filing of identical applications and motions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because of these abuses, a significant share of HACC cases were, or </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/shelf-life-of-high-level-corruption-cases/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">still are</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, at risk of closure. Perhaps the loudest example is the gas embezzlement episode in the “Onyshchenko case” involving Roman Nasirov, where unreasonably long addresses, the mobilization of the defendant, non-appearance of defense counsel, and the like were all used. As a result, the case </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/52017000000000218"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ended in a verdict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> only a few days before the statute of limitations for holding Nasirov liable expired.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15333 offers real tools to combat such tactics, including the ability to halt unreasonably long addresses and set time limits on them; to continue a hearing in the absence of certain participants and bring in new defense counsel or prosecutors; to bring in FLA defense counsel where a retained lawyer fails to appear twice in a row; to have the court decline to consider repetitive and offensive motions; and to permanently enshrine in Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine the rule that a trial cannot be automatically suspended solely because the defendant has been mobilized.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">International experience likewise </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/analytics/zapobigati-zlovzivannyam-ne-zlovzivayuci-yak-rozvyazati-problemu-zatrimok-rozglyadu-sprav-pro-topkorupciyu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">confirms</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the proposed changes are entirely workable and effective.</span></p>
<p><b>Extending NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to more top officials</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alongside the package of procedural changes, in Draft Law No. 15334 the MPs propose extending NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction to:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the leadership of the SBI, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the state, military, and military-civil administrations of the regions and of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">senior command staff of the ESBU and the SBI;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">deputy heads and members of the supervisory boards and executive bodies (management boards, directorates) of state-owned and municipal large enterprises.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Tellingly, two years ago NABU </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/42023000000000436"><span style="font-weight: 400;">exposed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> suspected corruption by former Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andrii Smyrnov. And the defense tried to exploit the imperfections of Ukraine&#8217;s Criminal Code and CPC to convince the investigating judge that NABU had no right to investigate the case against him — in particular because Smyrnov&#8217;s position does not appear in the list of cases falling under NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction set out in Article 216(5) of the CPC of Ukraine. The European Commission, too, insisted on </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/17115494-8122-4d10-8a06-2cf275eecde7_en?filename=ukraine-report-2025.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extending</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> jurisdiction to cover all top positions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the MPs are refining the mechanism and time limits for requesting and transferring cases to NABU under the rules of jurisdiction. </span></p>
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			            	The registered draft laws almost entirely remove the risk of proceedings being closed over investigation deadlines and the problem of procedural rights being used to the detriment of the process, and they fill some of the procedural gaps.
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<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should be improved</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although both draft laws resolve a large share of the pressing problems, certain provisions should, in our view, be refined so that they can be applied effectively in practice in the future.</span></p>
<p><b>Do not hand prosecutors judicial oversight over the extension of deadlines</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Returning to the heads of prosecutor&#8217;s offices the power to extend pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6 and 12 months </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-government-proposes-to-partially-cancel-the-lozovyi-s-amendments-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-12367/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">creates</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a risk of weaker judicial oversight over compliance with reasonable pre-trial investigation time. After all, the proposed approach means such a decision would be taken by a representative of the prosecution — a party with a procedural interest in prolonging the investigation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This </span><b>weakens the principle of adversarial proceedings</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Judicial oversight in such matters is a guarantee that any extension will be justified, proportionate, and necessary.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Constitutional Court has not expressed a position on the need for judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines. But its </span><a href="https://ccu.gov.ua/storinka-knygy/211-kryminalne-procesualne-pravo-ta-provadzhennya-u-spravah-pro-administratyvni"><span style="font-weight: 400;">position</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on such oversight generally comes down to this: the rule of law makes judicial oversight over any interference with a person&#8217;s right to liberty mandatory. Criminal proceedings are themselves a precondition for applying the harshest restrictions on human rights and freedoms compared to any other legal process. Judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines — on which the duration of such restrictions depends — is therefore no less important a guarantee of respect for human rights and freedoms during criminal prosecution.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such proposals may also raise doubts in light of the constitutional prohibition on narrowing the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms when adopting new laws or amending existing ones. The extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and 18 months should therefore remain within the competence of the investigating judge.</span></p>
<p><b>Improve the existing mechanism for overseeing reasonable investigation time</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Along with removing the automatic closure of cases over expired investigation deadlines (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine), the authors of the draft law propose giving participants in criminal proceedings the right to ask an investigating judge to order the prosecutor to complete the pre-trial investigation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A similar provision appeared in government Draft Law No. 12367. At the time, TI Ukraine</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-government-proposes-to-partially-cancel-the-lozovyi-s-amendments-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-12367/"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> pointed out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that this could place a </span><b>substantial additional burden</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the court system. To reduce that burden and to improve the legislation systematically, the changes should be made not to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine, which governs the list of grounds for closing criminal proceedings, but to Article 308, which governs the procedure for challenging an investigator&#8217;s or prosecutor&#8217;s failure to observe reasonable time limits. Specifically, if a higher-level prosecutor rejects the complaint, the interested party could then turn to an investigating judge, who should be able to issue the very decisions that the MPs propose adding to Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the law could expressly provide that evidence whose gathering was initiated outside the pre-trial investigation period (with certain exceptions) is inadmissible. This could serve both as a safeguard against abuse and as a proper incentive in investigations. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is therefore more sensible not to create a new mechanism, but to improve the tools that already exist.</span></p>
<p><b>Regulate more clearly the suspension of court proceedings due to military service</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 2025, after Nasirov&#8217;s </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/ekskerivnik-dfs-nasirov-dobrovilno-mobilizuvavsya-do-zsu-na-etapi-sudovix-debativ-zaxist-prosit-zupiniti-spravu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“sudden” mobilization</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Parliament </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4496-20#n25"><span style="font-weight: 400;">limited</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the ability to suspend the hearing of grave and especially grave corruption cases based solely on the defendant&#8217;s formal status as someone performing military service. In such proceedings, the court must establish that the defendant is objectively unable to take part in the proceedings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15333 proposes moving this logic to Article 335 of the CPC of Ukraine and extending it beyond grave and especially grave corruption offenses to other criminal proceedings as well. On the whole, this is the right approach.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the proposed wording </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/mobilization-and-justice-what-draft-law-no-13284-changes/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> too broad. It could allow proceedings to be suspended even where the defendant is in a location from which remote participation in a hearing is realistic and does not interfere with the performance of their military duties.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It would therefore be advisable to provide that a trial may be suspended only where the defendant have no objective possibility of taking part in hearings because of their genuine involvement in Ukraine&#8217;s defense efforts directly in the areas where those efforts are carried out — on temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, or in the zone between the positions of the defense forces and those of the aggressor state&#8217;s troops — during the period of those efforts, and where they are carrying out combat (special) tasks. </span></p>
<p><b>Allow the court to impose monetary penalties for non-appearance without valid reasons</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Countering the abuse of procedural rights could be reinforced by a monetary penalty for defense lawyers who fail to appear when summoned to court without valid reasons. The </span><a href="https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/gromadyanam/reports/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">statistics</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the HACC alone show that the second most common reason for adjourning hearings is the non-appearance of defense counsel — over five years of the court&#8217;s work, 588 hearings were adjourned for this reason.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LYCElJIODlfLt-w7X8HKvtn8t1ubqjB/view"><span style="font-weight: 400;">monitoring HACC cases</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, TI Ukraine has repeatedly observed how the non-appearance of defense counsel at hearings seriously affects the reasonable timeframes for hearing a case. Striking examples of this were the</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> hearings in the</span> <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/lukash-case-in-hacc-first-hearing/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against the former Minister of Justice under Yanukovych and the </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/32-non-appearances-and-almost-20-recusals-how-defense-delays-kdac-case-consideration/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against the judges of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So, in addition to the suspect, the defendant, witnesses, victims, and other participants, it makes sense to also allow the court to fine defense lawyers who fail to appear at hearings without valid reasons.</span></p>
<p><b>Allow the Head of SAPO to open investigations against MPs</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Along with the changes to the Head of SAPO&#8217;s powers regarding international legal assistance, it is logical to remove an </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2026/06/27/747672_chomu_koruptsiynih_spravah.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">obstacle to investigating</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> cases involving Members of Parliament. The point is that only the Prosecutor General can open an investigation against MPs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such changes are one of the EU&#8217;s </span><a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-18-2026-INIT/en/pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">key requirements</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. We have also repeatedly seen how this can stall an investigation and, with it, diminish the quality and quantity of the evidence gathered. One of the first notable examples of a case against an MP was the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sprava-nardepa-yurcenka-pro-plyuski-vaks-rozpocav-dopit-iogo-pomicnika"><span style="font-weight: 400;">investigation into</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Oleksandr Yurchenko. In September 2020, the NABU publicly reported that it had sent Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova the materials and a draft suspicion for registering the proceedings and serving the notification of suspicion. However, the Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2020/09/15/465982_nabu_provodilo_spetsoperatsiyu_z.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">replied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that it saw insufficient grounds for registering proceedings.</span></p>
<p><b>To avoid such situations, the Head of the SAPO should be empowered to open investigations against Members of Parliament independently, without the Prosecutor General.</b></p>
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			            	Although both draft laws resolve a large share of the pressing problems, certain provisions should, in our view, be refined so that they can be applied effectively in practice in the future.
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<h1><span style="font-weight: 400;">Conclusions</span></h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, Draft Laws No. 15333 and No. 15334 are a systematic and long-overdue response to a set of problems that for years have hampered the effective investigation and trial of top-level corruption cases — from the automatic closure of proceedings over a formal expiry of deadlines to procedural abuse and gaps in NABU&#8217;s jurisdiction. Of course, resolving all of them will require far </span><a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2026/02/12/7231031/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">more changes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine supports the adoption of both draft laws, as they bring Ukraine closer to meeting the requirements of the Ukraine Facility, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos Plan. At the same time, several points are worth improving during committee review and consideration in the session hall.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15333:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">retain judicial oversight over the extension of pre-trial investigation deadlines to 6, 12, and — should this draft law pass — 18 months;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strengthen the existing mechanisms for responding to violations of reasonable time limits, in particular by improving Article 308 of the CPC of Ukraine, which sets out the procedure for challenging an investigator&#8217;s or prosecutor&#8217;s failure to observe reasonable time limits, by establishing clear consequences where a prosecutor takes no action once deadlines have expired;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">set out a rule under which court proceedings could be suspended due to military service only where the defendant is objectively unable to take part in hearings — including remotely — because of their direct involvement in measures to defend Ukraine;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allow monetary penalties to be imposed on defense counsel for non-appearance.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Draft Law No. 15334, add a provision allowing the Head of the SAPO to open criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fine-tuning these provisions will preserve the balance between the effectiveness of criminal prosecution and the guarantees of the rights of those involved in the process.</span></p>
<p><em>This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.</em></p>
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			            	TI Ukraine supports the adoption of both draft laws, as they bring Ukraine closer to meeting the requirements of the Ukraine Facility, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the Kachka-Kos Plan.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/improving-the-investigation-and-trial-of-top-level-corruption-cases-an-analysis-of-the-draft-laws/">Improving the Investigation and Trial of Top-Level Corruption Cases: An Analysis of the Draft Laws</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:57:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33642</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The need to improve the regulation of the statute of limitations has long been recognized in state policy documents and forms part of international recommendations.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/">Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On June 26, 2026, MPs Yaroslav Zhelezniak, Anastasiia Radina, Iryna Herashchenko, and others registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/70243"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, amending Article 49 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (the Criminal Code), which is meant to improve the rules for calculating the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the authors&#8217; explanatory note, this draft law will help ensure the inevitability of criminal punishment for intentional criminal offenses, increase the effectiveness of court proceedings, and close the legislative gaps that allow offenders to evade liability by artificially dragging out the trial.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The need to improve the regulation of the statute of limitations has long been recognized in state policy documents and forms part of international recommendations. It is set out, in particular, in the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roadmap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the Rule of Law, as well as in the joint </span><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/statement_25_3030"><span style="font-weight: 400;">statement</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Marta Kos and Taras Kachka. We at TI Ukraine have </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">long drawn attention</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to this problem and proposed ways to solve it.</span></p>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">Key takeaways:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 addresses the right questions — in particular, it aims to improve the rules that let defendants in corruption cases avoid criminal liability once the statute of limitations expires;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">however, the effectiveness of the proposed provisions may not be as high as declared, for a number of reasons, including the absence of comprehensive amendments and flaws in the drafting of the proposed rule.</span></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="font-weight: 400;">What we propose:</span></h4>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but instead either to interrupt its running — that is, to start counting it anew — or to provide that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to extend the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to proportionately increase the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses, and to add the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation as a ground for suspending their running.</span></li>
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			            	According to the authors&#8217; explanatory note, this draft law will help ensure the inevitability of criminal punishment for intentional criminal offenses, increase the effectiveness of court proceedings, and close the legislative gaps that allow offenders to evade liability by artificially dragging out the trial.
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<h2><b>How do things stand now?</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The current Criminal Code provides that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended only where a person has evaded pre-trial investigation or trial. Meanwhile, a defendant&#8217;s military service — which may lead to the suspension of the court proceedings against them — does not, for instance, suspend the running of the statute of limitations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Referring a case to court likewise does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. What is more, these periods continue to run right up until the verdict enters into legal force — until the 30-day window for appeal expires, or until appellate review is completed.</span></p>
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			            	The current Criminal Code provides that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended only where a person has evaded pre-trial investigation or trial.
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<h2><b>What Draft Law No. 15354 proposes</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 proposes the following changes:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">automatically suspending the running of the statute of limitations in NABU and SAPO cases if the defendant is performing military service and the court proceedings against them are suspended;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">moving the point at which the statute of limitations is suspended in cases involving grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses from the moment the verdict enters into legal force to the moment the indictment is referred to court.</span></li>
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<h2><b>What are the advantages of the proposed changes?</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 15354 responds to the fact that in a number of NABU cases the statute of limitations expires — something we have noted more than once as part of our multi-year project monitoring cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court. This often </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">happens</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> because of the considerable time taken by international legal assistance, lengthy expert examinations, the late transfer of a case to the NABU, or the abuse of procedural rights by participants in court proceedings.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For example, in October 2025 the HACC </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/vaks-zakriv-spravu-pivovarskogo-za-strokami-davnosti"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the criminal proceedings against former Minister of Infrastructure Andrii Pyvovarskyi due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In July this year, the HACC closed — again on statute-of-limitations grounds — the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/vaks-zakriv-spravu-posobnici-nasirova-za-strokami-davnosti"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case of Liudmyla Solotva</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, who was accused of aiding and abetting Nasirov. The case of </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nasirov-otrimav-realnii-termin-uvyaznennya-apelyaciya-zminila-virok-eksposadovcyu"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roman Nasirov</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> himself was also on the verge of being closed. It was heard across two instances for 6.5 years and was accompanied by numerous delays on the part of the defense, so that Nasirov received his verdict just a few days before the ten-year statute of limitations set by the Criminal Code expired.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A similar problem appears in other high-profile proceedings — for instance, in the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sprava-ogxk-vaks-viznav-pricini-neyavki-zaxisnici-nepovaznimi"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UMCC case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, where one of the defendants mobilized, which almost completely paralyzed the normal course of the trial. And while no proper trial on the merits takes place, the statute of limitations in the case keeps running.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is why the very idea behind the draft law is correct: the statute of limitations should not stand in the way of holding to account persons who are performing military service. Nor should the completion of appellate review become the point at which the counting of these periods stops.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If a case has already been referred to court, the state should not lose the chance to obtain a decision on the merits merely because the trial is taking a long time, or because participants in the process are dragging it out. This is especially important for corruption cases.</span></p>
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			            	Draft Law No. 15354 responds to the fact that in a number of NABU cases the statute of limitations expires — something we have noted more than once as part of our multi-year project monitoring cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court.
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<h2><b>What should be improved</b></h2>
<h3><b>Interrupting, rather than suspending, the statute of limitations could offer more guarantees to participants in court proceedings </b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The authors of the draft law propose that the statute of limitations be suspended upon the referral of the indictment to court only in cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses. And there is only one ground for resuming the periods — a court ruling returning the indictment. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the Criminal Code provides that the special, undifferentiated limitation period — after which a person who has committed a crime of any gravity is released from criminal liability, even if they evaded justice — is 15 years. This conclusion was also </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/108960086"><span style="font-weight: 400;">confirmed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in 2023. The same period is set for especially grave criminal offenses, while for grave ones it is 10 years. It therefore follows from the proposed changes that, compared with the current rules, only 5 additional years would be “gained” for grave corruption crimes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, we should point out the not-entirely-successful drafting of the amendments. Under the proposed version of Article 49(2) of the Criminal Code, the sentence “In these cases, the running of the limitation period resumes from the day the person surrenders with a confession or is detained, and from the time a criminal misdemeanor was committed — after five years” is placed immediately after the description of the new ground for suspension — mobilization or acceptance for military service under contract. As a result, in light of the amendments, this wording — “the person surrenders with a confession” and “is detained” — will apply to the person&#8217;s mobilization, rather than (as the authors presumably intended) to the person&#8217;s evasion of pre-trial investigation or trial. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This drafting inaccuracy creates a real risk that the new rule will be interpreted ambiguously.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond this, the very approach of suspending the statute of limitations upon the referral of the indictment to court creates additional problems:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">there is no substantive rule on the grounds for resuming the running of the limitation period, since the return of an indictment does not happen all that often in NABU and SAPO practice;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">extending this rule only to cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses is an inaccurate and unjustified narrowing. In that case, the legislator&#8217;s response leaves out the less grave corruption and corruption-related crimes provided for in Articles 366-2 and 366-3, Article 369-2(1) and (2), Article 369(1), Article 364(1), and Article 191(2).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In view of this, a more balanced solution would be not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but to interrupt its running. Alternatively, it could be provided that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such an approach would preserve the incentive for the parties and the court to hear a case without unjustified delays, while at the same time preventing situations in which a case has already been heard on the merits and a verdict delivered, yet the person is released from liability solely because the statute of limitations expired at the appellate-review stage. That said, if the limitation period is to run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict, the court should be given robust tools to counter the abuse of procedural rights</span></p>
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			            	The authors of the draft law propose that the statute of limitations be suspended upon the referral of the indictment to court only in cases of grave and especially grave corruption criminal offenses. And there is only one ground for resuming the periods — a court ruling returning the indictment. 
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<h3><b>Changes to the statute-of-limitations rules should cover all corruption and corruption-related offenses</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The authors of the draft law propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem is that corruption and top-level corruption cases are sometimes investigated not only by NABU, but also by the SBI, the National Police, and the ESBU. According to the statistics, most corruption verdicts are handed down by local courts on the basis of materials from these bodies; and although such cases are generally less complex, there are far more of them. According to the </span><a href="https://court.gov.ua/inshe/sudova_statystyka/zvit_dsau_prot_kor_2025"><span style="font-weight: 400;">latest data for 2025</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, local courts convicted 3,268 persons of corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since the Criminal Code already contains a list of such criminal offenses, it would be more </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/mobilization-and-justice-what-draft-law-no-13284-changes/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">systematic</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in terms of legal regulation, to suspend the running of the statute of limitations on account of a suspect&#8217;s/defendant&#8217;s mobilization not only in NABU and SAPO cases, but in all cases concerning the criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, Draft Law No. 15333 proposes to improve the grounds for suspending a trial by extending them not only to persons accused of a grave or especially grave corruption criminal offense, but to all criminal proceedings. It is therefore hard to trace any clear logic in why the running of the statute of limitations should be suspended in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor. </span></p>
<p><b>Accordingly, the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization should be extended to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code.</b></p>
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			            	The authors of the draft law propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of military service only where a case is investigated by NABU or referred to court by a SAPO prosecutor.
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<h3><b>The statute-of-limitations rules require comprehensive changes </b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Given that the authors of the draft law acknowledge the problems with regulating the statute of limitations, a comprehensive overhaul of this institution should be ensured.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As part of its monitoring of HACC cases, TI Ukraine has </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-what-is-forgotten-is-not-prosecuted/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">systematically examined</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the question of the statute of limitations in corruption cases and concluded that the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability needs to be improved in several directions: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">proportionately strengthening criminal liability for certain criminal offenses, which would in turn lengthen the corresponding limitation periods; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">establishing additional grounds for suspending the running of the limitation period — for example, mutual legal assistance in criminal proceedings; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">changing the end point for calculating the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability (to the delivery of the first-instance verdict, rather than the entry of the verdict into legal force).</span></li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/the-hacc-during-the-war-key-trends-challenges-and-recommendations-for-improvement/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Comparing the statute of limitations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for bringing offenders to criminal liability for various corruption crimes in EU member states and in Ukraine, we can conclude that for certain acts our limitation periods are unjustifiably short. This is most pronounced for obstruction of justice, but also for bribery in the public sector (Articles 368 and 369 of the Criminal Code), bribery in the private sector (Article 354 of the Criminal Code), trading in influence (Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code), and abuse of office (Article 364 of the Criminal Code).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, the legislation of foreign states and international recommendations point to a much broader list of grounds for suspending the statute of limitations. In particular, the 2007 </span><a href="https://www.unodc.org/pdf/legal_advisory/Model%20Law%20on%20MLA%202007.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UN Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> provides for suspending the running of the limitation period for the time a mutual legal assistance request is being executed. The criminal </span><a href="https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/Statutes-of-Limitation_web.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">legislation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of EU member states additionally singles out, as grounds for suspension, the existence of immunity and other legally established obstacles to prosecution, the minority or illness of the alleged offender, and the referral of a case for additional investigation. Among the grounds for interrupting the periods, a number of jurisdictions include the initiation of a criminal prosecution, the issuance of an international or European Arrest Warrant, the official recognition of a person as a suspect, as well as any procedural notification to the person — a summons, a call to appear, or the holding of a confrontation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In light of the above, consideration should be given to expanding the list of grounds for suspending the limitation period, at least as regards the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation. Such an expansion should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards against abuse by pre-trial investigation bodies — in particular, by empowering the court that will decide on release from criminal liability to verify that the relevant procedural actions within international cooperation were justified and genuine.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, to improve the statute of limitations for bringing a person to criminal liability, the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses should be proportionately increased, and the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation should be added as a ground for suspending their running.</b></p>
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			            	Given that the authors of the draft law acknowledge the problems with regulating the statute of limitations, a comprehensive overhaul of this institution should be ensured.
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<h2><b>Conclusions</b></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Overall, Draft Law No. 15354 is something of a response to problems that have already arisen repeatedly during the hearing of corruption cases. We recommend that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 15354 as a basis, subject to revision. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ahead of the second reading, the text of the draft law should be refined on the following points:</span></p>
<ol>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">not to suspend the statute of limitations from the moment the indictment is referred to court, but instead either to interrupt its running — that is, to start counting it anew — or to provide that these periods run until the first-instance court delivers its verdict;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to extend the suspension of the statute of limitations on account of a defendant&#8217;s mobilization to all criminal proceedings concerning corruption and corruption-related criminal offenses provided for in the note to Article 45 of the Criminal Code;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to proportionately increase the penalties for certain corruption criminal offenses, and to add the performance of procedural actions within international cooperation as a ground for suspending their running.</span></li>
</ol>
<p><em>This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.</em></p>
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			            	We recommend that the Verkhovna Rada adopt Draft Law No. 15354 as a basis, subject to revision. 
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/statute-of-limitations-in-corruption-cases-a-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-15354/">Statute of Limitations in Corruption Cases: A Legal Analysis of Draft Law No. 15354</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Key NABU and SAPO Problems Remain Unresolved: Takeaways from the Briefing</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/key-nabu-and-sapo-problems-remain-unresolved-takeaways-from-the-briefing/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 07:23:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33525</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The information presented at a joint briefing on August 10 by NABU Director Kryvonos and SAPO Head Klymenko effectively confirmed that a number of key systemic problems remain unresolved.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/key-nabu-and-sapo-problems-remain-unresolved-takeaways-from-the-briefing/">Key NABU and SAPO Problems Remain Unresolved: Takeaways from the Briefing</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The information presented at a </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/z3UN7pnAGKY"><span style="font-weight: 400;">joint briefing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on August 10 by NABU Director Kryvonos and SAPO Head Klymenko effectively confirmed that a number of key systemic problems remain unresolved.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This echoes the warnings that Transparency International Ukraine has been documenting in its Shadow Reports for several years now, even though the necessary recommendations and steps to address these problems were made public, discussed, and even written into certain legislative initiatives long ago.</span></p>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">SAPO&#8217;s powers over MPs</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the briefing, Klymenko described in detail the mechanism through which SAPO is effectively stripped of its independence. To open an investigation into a Member of Parliament, the prosecution must apply to the Prosecutor General — and in a number of cases, according to Klymenko, it is refused even when grounds for an investigation exist. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is precisely the problem TI Ukraine has been pointing to for several years, and one whose resolution was never reflected in the latest legislative initiatives to improve SAPO&#8217;s work. </span><b>We are convinced that the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor&#8217;s Office should be empowered</b> <b>to</b><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-decisions-in-corruption-cases-against-mps-should-not-rest-with-the-prosecutor-general-alone/"><b> independently initiate</b></a> <b>criminal proceedings and authorize investigative actions concerning Members of Parliament</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Tellingly, this recommendation never made it into the Rule of Law Roadmap adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers under Cluster 1, Fundamentals. In other words, the gap remains outside the formal negotiating track with the EU. However, the commitment to grant the SAPO head such powers is mentioned in Ukraine&#8217;s arrangements with the World Bank, and a corresponding provision became a recommendation in the latest Enlargement Report for 2025.</span></p>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">A dedicated forensic institution — a problem at a standstill</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Among the unresolved issues, Klymenko named the absence of a separate forensic institution to serve the needs of the anti-corruption bodies. This affects both the speed of collecting evidence in high-level corruption cases and the quality of that evidence base when the prosecution presents it in court.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine has recommended creating such an institution while ensuring the independence of its experts and management — both from the NABU and from outside actors. This recommendation was already voiced in the Shadow Report to the European Commission&#8217;s 2023 report, and today&#8217;s statement confirms that nothing has changed in two years.</span></p>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Extradition and joint investigation teams</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko separately emphasized the need to obtain powers over extradition and to form international joint investigation teams to investigate transnational corruption. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Here, this is no longer merely a recommendation from civil society but an overdue international commitment: under the updated Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies with the IMF (June 2025), Ukraine was to amend the Criminal Procedure Code and enable the Prosecutor General to delegate to SAPO the handling of extradition requests and mutual legal assistance. The deadline for this measure expired back in late July 2025.</span></p>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">The “Lozovyi amendments”</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The SAPO head also pointed once again to the still-unrealized repeal of the so-called “Lozovyi amendments,” which make it possible to close proceedings on formal grounds once procedural deadlines expire. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">TI Ukraine has </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/the-government-proposes-to-partially-cancel-the-lozovyi-s-amendments-legal-analysis-of-draft-law-no-12367/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">analyzed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> attempts at a partial repeal of these provisions — in particular, government draft law No. 12367 (since withdrawn) and its alternative, No. 12367-2. The latter has still not been passed in a form that would truly close this loophole for evading accountability.</span></p>
<h3><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pressure from the SSU</span></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">NABU Director Kryvonos described in detail the forms of pressure exerted by the SSU on NABU staff: monitoring of registers, surveillance through the Safe City system, and tracking of detectives&#8217; movements. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This continues a story TI Ukraine has already </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/key-questions-regarding-cases-against-nabu-employees/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">documented</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — from the detention of detectives and searches at the homes of a detective&#8217;s relatives to the installation of surveillance devices in the residence of a unit head. This is another facet of the SSU&#8217;s influence over NABU, which TI Ukraine captures in its recommendation on conducting wiretapping autonomously, without the involvement of the SSU. And Kryvonos&#8217;s words at the latest briefing only confirm that this dependence continues to be used not for cooperation but for pressure.</span></p>
<p><em>This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International Ukraine and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.</em></p>
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			            	This echoes the warnings that Transparency International Ukraine has been documenting in its Shadow Reports for several years now, even though the necessary recommendations and steps to address these problems were made public, discussed, and even written into certain legislative initiatives long ago.
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</p></div>
</p></div>
<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/key-nabu-and-sapo-problems-remain-unresolved-takeaways-from-the-briefing/">Key NABU and SAPO Problems Remain Unresolved: Takeaways from the Briefing</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>How Public Demand Works, Written on Cardboard</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/how-public-demand-works-written-on-cardboard/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Андрій Боровик]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 07:48:41 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Ukrainians are marking the anniversary of the protests against curtailing the independence of the NABU and the SAPO with cardboard signs once again. And, just as last year, it came as a response to “unexplainable” decisions by the authorities.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/how-public-demand-works-written-on-cardboard/">How Public Demand Works, Written on Cardboard</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainians are marking the anniversary of the protests against curtailing the independence of the NABU and the SAPO with cardboard signs once again. And, just as last year, it came as a response to “unexplainable” decisions by the authorities. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The events of July 2025 tore up the tacit, unwritten social contract under which citizens had held back from protesting during the war. But once parliament placed the independence of the NABU and the SAPO — and the resilience of the entire anti-corruption system — under direct threat, public patience ran out. And it was the public&#8217;s reaction that proved decisive in reversing that decision.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 2026, we are feeling a certain déjà vu. Although the protests are now attached to specific names, what people are really speaking out against is mounting pressure and the rollback of reforms — exactly as they were a year ago. So these two protests genuinely are alike, and not only because of the cardboard </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why this keeps happening in July is a mystery of its own. It would be good if the authorities stopped going in circles and started </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">planning ahead instead of assembling reactive damage control.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> And everything would be different if decisions like these were preceded by honest communication and explanation — otherwise the protests may not stay confined to July.</span></p>
<p><b>But the people&#8217;s cardboard worked — last year and now alike.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As we can see, for all the skeptics&#8217; doubts, the authorities are in fact compelled to listen to what people in the squares are asking for — whether it concerns the anti-corruption institutions or the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief. That matters for a state that declares its principles to be democratic. But what happens after a response like that?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A year on from the protests against stripping the NABU and the SAPO of their independence, we can now assess whether the state used that time to strengthen these institutions, whether it genuinely moved along the European integration track and removed the systemic obstacles to their work. And here it is worth turning to the foundational document on these questions — the </span><b>Rule of Law Road Map</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/analysis-of-the-rule-of-law-roadmap-anti-corruption-aspects/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">sets out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> concrete steps to strengthen the anti-corruption institutions. Implementing it is one of our European integration requirements.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There has certainly been </span><b>some progress over the years</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, but it has mostly concerned the internal work of the institutions themselves (progress in numerous investigations and new verdicts) rather than external players such as parliament. The SAPO and the HACC have adopted institutional development strategies, the NABU is implementing the recommendations of independent international auditors, and their performance overall has improved. The competition for HACC judgeships is nearing completion, and the question of proper premises for the court has finally moved off the ground.</span></p>
<p><b>…But the key commitments still have not been met. </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The SAPO head has still not been given the power to send extradition requests independently or to form joint investigation teams in top-level corruption cases. The NABU still has not been provided with access to impartial, timely, high-quality forensic examinations. Examples of what these delays cost </span><a href="https://suspilne.media/1323469-zataguvanna-strokiv-vitoki-j-tisk-comu-nabu-vimagae-stvoriti-nezalezne-buro-ekspertiz-ale-poki-cogo-ne-vdaetsa/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">keep</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> piling up. Nor have the legislative changes needed to remove procedural delays in the HACC&#8217;s work been adopted.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The July events — last year&#8217;s and this year&#8217;s — should serve not only as a reminder of how real the risk of rollback is, but also as a point of accountability. We now know that had people not come out onto Ivan Franko Square in Kyiv and onto the squares of other Ukrainian cities last year, everything in anti-corruption investigations would have stayed as it was. There would have been no Chernyshov cases; he might even have kept his place in government. There would have been no Mindichgate and no Dynasty case. Andrii Yermak would still be sitting in the Office of the President. And dozens upon dozens of other investigations would have been shut down.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The consequences of what is happening now are still ahead of us. But the protests already show clearly what society is asking for: not the rollback of reforms, but their continuation. This applies to the NABU, the SAPO, and the HACC too: their capacity must keep being strengthened, and no encroachment on their institutional independence can be tolerated. All the more so because, on Ukraine&#8217;s path to EU membership, the reform commitments we have taken on are not a formality — they are effectively a condition of our survival as a country. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainian society is demanding higher-quality governance, protection of its rights, and greater prosperity. So the authorities must not only deliver change, but also explain the logic behind their actions to citizens. Society has grown up, and it is time to finally recognize that.</span></p>
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			            	The July events — last year&#8217;s and this year&#8217;s — should serve not only as a reminder of how real the risk of rollback is, but also as a point of accountability. We now know that had people not come out onto Ivan Franko Square in Kyiv and onto the squares of other Ukrainian cities last year, everything in anti-corruption investigations would have stayed as it was.
			            </p>
<p>
			            	Andrii Borovyk
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</p></div>
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/how-public-demand-works-written-on-cardboard/">How Public Demand Works, Written on Cardboard</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Why Decisions in Corruption Cases Against MPs Should Not Rest with the Prosecutor General Alone</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-decisions-in-corruption-cases-against-mps-should-not-rest-with-the-prosecutor-general-alone/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Павло Демчук]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 14:23:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33277</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>One of the key points reflected in the Fundamentals cluster benchmarks, the Kachka-Kos plan, and the Ukraine Facility remains the genuine independence of the SAPO leadership.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-decisions-in-corruption-cases-against-mps-should-not-rest-with-the-prosecutor-general-alone/">Why Decisions in Corruption Cases Against MPs Should Not Rest with the Prosecutor General Alone</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><strong><em>The material was prepared in co-authorship with Andriy Tkachuk, legal advisor to Transparency International Ukraine.</em></strong></p>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine has transitioned to direct negotiations with the European Union on membership, a path that is impossible without swift implementation of already-agreed anti-corruption commitments. One of the key points reflected in the Fundamentals cluster benchmarks, the Kachka-Kos plan, and the Ukraine Facility remains the genuine independence of the SAPO leadership. This concerns granting him exclusive authority to approve investigative measures and open proceedings against MPs—a step that would demonstrate whether Ukraine is ready for real change in its courts and corridors of power.</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This article examines why the SAPO head requires such powers and how this will affect anti-corruption investigations into parliamentary representatives overall.</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The cancellation of parliamentary immunity was one of the most prominent political promises made by Ukraine&#8217;s fifth and sixth presidents. Eventually, in 2019, the Verkhovna Rada indeed </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/27-20#n5"><span style="font-weight: 400;">amended Article 80</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Ukrainian Constitution, removing the provision that MPs could not be prosecuted, detained, or arrested without parliamentary consent. Both the </span><a href="https://ccu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/docs/2-v_2018.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">draft law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the </span><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/va02p710-22#n77"><span style="font-weight: 400;">law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> itself were recognized as constitutional by the Constitutional Court.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Although the law eliminated the need to obtain Verkhovna Rada consent for investigative measures against MPs, it simultaneously introduced a new mechanism: instead of parliamentary consent, key procedural and investigative actions must be approved by the Prosecutor General.</span></p>
<p><a href="https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/388-20#Text"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Law No. 388-IX</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> supplemented the Criminal Procedure Code with Article 482-2, which stipulates that only the Prosecutor General may register criminal proceedings against an MP. The same official also approves applications for detention, remand in custody or house arrest, searches, and interception of correspondence, phone calls, and other measures restricting rights and freedoms.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And it is precisely these Prosecutor General powers that have proven especially problematic in high-profile corruption cases, which by default are investigated by the NABU and prosecuted by the SAPO. The concentration of all key decisions in this single position has at times seriously hampered investigations.</span></p>
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			            	One of the key points reflected in the Fundamentals cluster benchmarks, the Kachka-Kos plan, and the Ukraine Facility remains the genuine independence of the SAPO leadership.
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<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Prosecutor General&#8217;s Monopoly Over MP Cases</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A parliamentarian should be protected from pressure for their political position, voting, statements, and general representative activities. Without such protection, an MP could become dependent on executive power. However, Article 482-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code “protects” MPs from a far broader range of situations. It applies not only to politically motivated prosecution for parliamentary activity but extends to corruption offenses that have nothing to do with protecting the parliamentary mandate.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As far back as 2017, GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) </span><a href="https://rm.coe.int/grecoeval4rep-2016-9-p3-76-greco-19-23-2017-/1680737206"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recommended</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> implementing clear and effective measures to ensure that the removal of immunity from parliamentarians would not prevent criminal prosecution of those suspected of committing corruption offenses. In particular, it proposed adopting clarifications on this matter with clear and objective criteria.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Interestingly, in 2020, after immunity was removed, GRECO </span><a href="https://nazk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Greko.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">concluded</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that this recommendation had been implemented only </span><b>“</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">satisfactory.</span><b>”</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> According to the Council of Europe&#8217;s monitoring body, this assessment was apparently linked to the fact that the new law can only be effectively implemented in the absence of abuses and political bias. And this is something Ukraine cannot yet hope for—even the Prosecutor General remains a politically interested party. He is appointed by the President of Ukraine with the consent of MPs, without formalized competitive procedures assessing competence and integrity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From nearly the beginning, the expert community </span><a href="https://pravo.org.ua/vysnovok-na-proekty-zakoniv-ukrayiny-2237-ta-2237-1/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">noted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that such a construction effectively creates a modified form of immunity from criminal prosecution. Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide analogous special procedures for initiating criminal proceedings against judges, who also enjoy certain immunity. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">During the discussion of the relevant draft laws themselves, some MPs </span><a href="https://komzakonpr.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/32623.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">emphasized</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that making investigations dependent on the will of a single person—the Prosecutor General—creates corruption risks and may result in the impossibility of prosecuting an MP criminally.</span></p>
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			            	Making investigations dependent on the will of a single person—the Prosecutor General—creates corruption risks.
			            </p>
<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">The practice already demonstrates the problem </span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the first prominent examples involving an MP was the </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/news/sprava-nardepa-yurcenka-pro-plyuski-vaks-rozpocav-dopit-iogo-pomicnika"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Oleksandr Yurchenko. In September 2020, the NABU publicly announced that it had submitted materials and a draft suspicion notice to Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova for registering proceedings and notifying the MP of suspicion. However, the Prosecutor General&#8217;s Office </span><a href="https://lb.ua/pravo/2020/09/15/465982_nabu_provodilo_spetsoperatsiyu_z.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">replied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that it saw insufficient grounds for registering proceedings. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The NABU was effectively forced to publicly call on the Prosecutor General to sign the suspicion notice. Eventually this did happen, but the episode itself demonstrated the key point: a corruption case against an MP can be stalled in this manner.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We observed numerous examples where journalists uncovered suspected corruption by MPs, yet the Prosecutor General refused to open proceedings. And the most recent and telling such </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/42022000000001637"><span style="font-weight: 400;">case</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is the matter against Iryna Kormyshkina. In early 2025, she and her husband admitted guilt and, based on a plea agreement, received a sentence for illicit enrichment and money laundering. However, as far back as 2022, the Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin had </span><a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-allakhverdieva-kostin-tspk/32114444.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stalled</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the initiation of the case, first refusing to register the crime report, before a court eventually ordered him to launch an investigation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These cases are not isolated, and from time to time they become a genuine obstacle to NABU and SAPO investigations of high-profile corruption within parliament.</span></p>
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			            	These cases are not isolated, and from time to time they become a genuine obstacle to NABU and SAPO investigations of high-profile corruption within parliament.
			            </p>
<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why comparison with other countries works against the Ukrainian model</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In democratic states, parliamentary immunities typically follow a different logic, designed to protect the parliamentary function rather than create a blanket barrier to criminal process. The Venice Commission has </span><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2014-011-e"><span style="font-weight: 400;">drawn attention</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to this dangerous paradox: in young democracies, immunity can simultaneously protect MPs from state abuse and become an obstacle to fighting corruption.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is deeply important for Ukraine. We are not an established democracy with a substantial legacy of political traditions and unconditional confidence in the prosecution service, law enforcement agencies, and political institutions—Ukrainian institutions are still earning such trust from society. For this very reason, a model in which corruption proceedings against an MP depend on one politically appointed official cannot be considered optimal.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, even developed democracies, while granting their parliamentarians immunity similar to what we abandoned in 2019, </span><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2014-011-e"><span style="font-weight: 400;">do not erect barriers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to initiating pre-trial investigations. And certainly, do not afford protection to MPs from all categories of criminal offenses, including corruption—the Venice Commission considers this unacceptable.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In many European approaches, immunity often applies only to arrest, detention, or prosecution (formal suspicion)—as in Belgium, France, Italy, and Portugal. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Several of these countries conducted constitutional reforms as far back as the 1990s, whereby opening an investigation against a parliamentarian requires no separate authorization. In France, for example, following </span><a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000188958/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">constitutional reform</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Chamber consent to opening criminal proceedings is not mandatory—it is required only for detention, arrest, and other judicial control measures. In Italy, Constitutional </span><a href="https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge.costituzionale:1993-10-29;3!vig=2012-05-21"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Law No. 3</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of October 29, 1993 removed the requirement for prior Chamber consent to open proceedings against MPs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Ukrainian model moved in the opposite direction, placing even the submission of information to the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPI) under special control.</span></p>
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			            	We are not an established democracy with a substantial legacy of political traditions and unconditional confidence in the prosecution service, law enforcement agencies, and political institutions—Ukrainian institutions are still earning such trust from society.
			            </p>
<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
			            </p>
</p></div>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why the SAPO head should receive such powers</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine deliberately created a separate anti-corruption system in which the NABU investigates high-profile corruption, the SAPO provides prosecutorial supervision, and the HACC ensures judicial control and adjudication of such cases. This model was meant to reduce the dependence of investigations on any political influences. Yet the Criminal Procedure Code has long recognized the special role of the SAPO head regarding MPs, giving him the authority to independently sign notices of suspicion to them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, that same Article 482-2 does not grant the SAPO head an analogous role regarding submission of information to the URPI or approval of key investigative applications during pre-trial investigation. This creates a contradiction: the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor&#8217;s Office can notify an MP of suspicion, but lacks direct authority to independently launch proceedings or approve a search or other investigative measure. And this is all the more significant because ultimate control over searches, arrests, interception of communications, and preventive measures must still be exercised by an investigating judge.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Furthermore, when addressing the legislative removal of parliamentary immunity, an alternative </span><a href="https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=67135"><span style="font-weight: 400;">draft law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> had proposed authorizing the SAPO head to perform the same functions regarding prosecution of MPs as the Prosecutor General. In its explanatory memorandum, the authors specifically noted that concentrating powers solely in the Prosecutor General creates risks that material evidence and traces of crime could be destroyed, and that it may become impossible to conduct investigative measures swiftly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond this, granting such powers to the SAPO head benefits not only the efficiency of anti-corruption investigations, but the MPs themselves. In cases involving parliamentarians, there is always a risk that any decision by the Prosecutor General will be perceived as political pressure, especially when it concerns opposition cases. Involving the SAPO head in NABU cases reduces this risk by shifting decisions to a more specialized and institutionally removed plane—recall that our Prosecutor General is appointed by specific officials. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For honest MPs, such powers in the SAPO head mean greater protection from selective political prosecution; for society, it means less reason to believe that anti-corruption cases are blocked or initiated based on political expediency.</span></p>
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			            	Yet the Criminal Procedure Code has long recognized the special role of the SAPO head regarding MPs, giving him the authority to independently sign notices of suspicion to them. 
			            </p>
<p>
			            	Pavlo Demchuk
			            </p>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">What must change </span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In reality, the fix requires nothing particularly deep, as parts 1 and 2 of Article 482-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code need only be supplemented with a provision allowing the SAPO head in criminal proceedings within NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction to: </span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Submit to the URPI information that may indicate the commission of a criminal offense by an Ukrainian MP;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Approve applications for authorization of detention, selection of a preventive measure in the form of remand in custody or house arrest, search, breaching the secrecy of correspondence, telephone calls, telegraph and other communications, as well as applications regarding other measures, including covert investigative measures.</span></li>
</ul>
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<h2><span style="font-weight: 400;">***</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The cancellation of parliamentary immunity in Ukraine was an important political decision, but it did not resolve the problem of MP privileges in criminal procedure. Ukraine should not have replaced old parliamentary immunity with new prosecutorial immunity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As practice has shown, such an approach is especially dangerous in corruption cases against MPs, as it creates a risk that investigations may be delayed or blocked not through weakness of evidence, but through the lack of political will of a single official—the Prosecutor General.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Granting such powers to the SAPO head in proceedings within NABU&#8217;s investigative jurisdiction will strengthen guarantees for parliamentarians and make it impossible to use such cases as a hidden form of immunity. And this benefits both MPs and anti-corruption law enforcement agencies.</span></p>
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			            	Ukraine should not have replaced old parliamentary immunity with new prosecutorial immunity.
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			            	Pavlo Demchuk
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-decisions-in-corruption-cases-against-mps-should-not-rest-with-the-prosecutor-general-alone/">Why Decisions in Corruption Cases Against MPs Should Not Rest with the Prosecutor General Alone</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Draft Law No. 14292: Improving International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings — an Analytical Overview</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-no-14292-improving-international-cooperation-in-criminal-proceedings-an-analytical-overview/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TI Ukraine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:21:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ti-ukraine.org/?post_type=news&#038;p=33247</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For the anti-corruption field, this draft law matters above all because in high-level corruption cases the international element often becomes decisive.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-no-14292-improving-international-cooperation-in-criminal-proceedings-an-analytical-overview/">Draft Law No. 14292: Improving International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings — an Analytical Overview</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On December 11, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers registered </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/59347"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 14292</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in parliament, amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and other legislative acts with regard to international cooperation in criminal proceedings. The draft law is designated as European integration legislation, and its adoption is intended to help Ukraine fulfill certain commitments in the field of criminal justice and international cooperation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the anti-corruption field, this draft law matters above all because in high-level corruption cases the international element often becomes decisive. Suspects may be located abroad, evidence may be held by foreign authorities or companies, and assets may be registered in other jurisdictions. The quality of international cooperation procedures therefore directly affects the state&#8217;s ability to investigate such cases, enforce judgments, and recover criminally acquired assets.</span></p>
<p><b>Key takeaways:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 14292 is a revised version of </span><a href="https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/44135"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 11223</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, previously registered by the government and withdrawn in July 2025 following the government&#8217;s resignation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the document aims to modernize international cooperation procedures: the electronic exchange of requests, engagement with international organizations, and the regulation of certain matters relating to the search for wanted persons, extradition, the enforcement of judgments, and the confiscation of property — both in Ukraine at the request of foreign states and abroad;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">despite a generally positive assessment, the draft law contains shortcomings that could, in some respects, reduce the effectiveness of confiscating property abroad, of extradition, and of the search for and summoning of persons abroad, and that would leave unresolved the problem of the HACC&#8217;s lack of jurisdiction to rule on matters relating to the enforcement of its own judgments.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><b>What we propose:</b></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">introduce an obligation for the prosecution to prove the location of criminal property abroad, and allow enforcement officers, when enforcing judgments or rulings, to engage ARMA to locate corruption-related or laundered property subject to confiscation or special confiscation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">take into account that special confiscation may be imposed not only on the basis of a conviction but also through rulings imposing special confiscation without a conviction, as provided for in Article 96-1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">clearly establish that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person&#8217;s use of them is documented);</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">given that amendments are being made to the relevant article of the CPC, provide that matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments must be considered by that court itself, rather than by local courts under the general rules of territorial jurisdiction;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">add clear deadlines for the court to respond to the Ministry of Justice on whether an extradition request remains valid, and provide that it is a negative response from the court — not the absence of a response — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing such a request;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">to align the provisions, the proposed clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC — which allows extradition to be refused for a person who has been surrendered to the ICC or a tribunal — should be supplemented with a further ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.</span></li>
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			            	Suspects may be located abroad, evidence may be held by foreign authorities or companies, and assets may be registered in other jurisdictions. The quality of international cooperation procedures therefore directly affects the state&#8217;s ability to investigate such cases, enforce judgments, and recover criminally acquired assets.
			            </p>
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<h3><b>How do things stand now?</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most articles in the CPC section devoted to international cooperation have not been amended since the Code was adopted in 2012. At that time, digitalization was not a global priority, and the practice of international cooperation had not become widespread enough to reveal the weaknesses in its legal regulation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, the provisions currently in force lag in many respects behind technological progress and the new legal approaches to mutual legal assistance — particularly when it comes to confiscating assets located in foreign states and dealing with participants in criminal proceedings who are abroad.</span></p>
<p><b>The exchange of materials in international cooperation. </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">Current legislation permits requests and case materials to be exchanged in paper form during international cooperation. This significantly slows down Ukraine&#8217;s interaction with partner states in the fight against crime, since it requires a considerable amount of time.</span></p>
<p><b>The protection of information in international cooperation</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Information processed within such cooperation currently has no clear safeguards against disclosure — especially where the cooperation does not require opening criminal proceedings in Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><b>The international wanted list.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> The CPC does not expressly define the moment from which a person is considered to be on the international wanted list.</span></p>
<p><b>The enforcement of HACC judgments.</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Although the HACC hears high-level corruption cases as a specialized court, certain matters arising in the enforcement of its judgments — such as a convicted person&#8217;s parole or the replacement of the unserved part of a sentence with a more lenient one — still go before local courts under the rules of Article 539 of the CPC, rather than before the HACC.</span></p>
<p><b>The confiscation and special confiscation of property abroad</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The CPC does not contain a sufficiently detailed mechanism for establishing the location abroad of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation. The engagement of ARMA to trace and seize property abroad when enforcing confiscation decisions is also currently unregulated.</span></p>
<p><b>Questioning from abroad</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Witnesses or victims located abroad can be questioned only from the premises of a court at their place of residence, which means that a corresponding request must be sent each time to the competent authorities of the foreign state through mutual legal assistance. Only for the duration of martial law or a state of emergency has it become possible to question a witness or victim directly by videoconference from any location.</span></p>
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			            	The provisions currently in force lag in many respects behind technological progress and the new legal approaches to mutual legal assistance — particularly when it comes to confiscating assets located in foreign states and dealing with participants in criminal proceedings who are abroad.
			            </p>
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<h3><b>What does the draft law propose?</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Draft Law No. 14292 proposes a fairly broad package of changes. Among the key positive updates:</span></p>
<ul>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">permission to make wider use of electronic communications for international cooperation requests;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">regulation of the protection of information and materials in international cooperation;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a more detailed set of grounds for refusing or postponing mutual legal assistance requests, and of the procedure for executing them;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">improvement of the procedure for recognizing and enforcing judgments, as well as for confiscating property abroad;</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the introduction of the ability to question persons located abroad by videoconference or from the premises of a Ukrainian diplomatic mission, regardless of whether martial law or a state of emergency has been declared in the country.</span></li>
</ul>
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			            	Draft Law No. 14292 proposes a fairly broad package of changes.
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<h3><b>Which provisions need refining?</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite its generally positive thrust, the document contains a number of procedural gaps, legal ambiguities, and risks that could negate the intended effect in practice.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the mechanisms it establishes to work smoothly, the document should be refined in the respects described below.</span></p>
<h4><b>Confiscation of property abroad: the right direction, but a weak procedural design</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The amendments to Articles 535 and 568 of the CPC are intended to ensure the enforcement of judgments insofar as they concern the confiscation or special confiscation of property located abroad. This is an important step, particularly in countering organized crime, and corruption in particular. There are two problematic points whose resolution could improve this process.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the proposed wording of Article 535(7) of the CPC, the drafters would require the court to draw up a petition for the recognition and enforcement, in a foreign state, of a Ukrainian court&#8217;s conviction insofar as it concerns the confiscation or special confiscation of property. However, the drafters failed to take into account that </span><b>special confiscation may be imposed not only by a court&#8217;s verdict </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">but also, under Article 96-1(2) and (3) of the CC, by rulings on release from criminal liability, on the closure of criminal proceedings, on extended confiscation, on the imposition of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, and on the imposition of criminal-law measures on a legal entity. </span><b>The aforementioned provision of Article 535(7) of the CPC should therefore also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, the draft law would require those enforcing the judgment (chiefly the State Enforcement Service) to notify the court of any property discovered abroad that is subject to confiscation or special confiscation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This innovation is consistent with </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1260/oj/eng"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU Directive 2024/1260</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, under which the tracing and identification of property subject to freezing and confiscation must be possible even after a final court decision. Yet, although the draft law offers such an option, the point at which criminal property — or property subject to confiscation — is discovered should not be deferred all the way until the court&#8217;s final decision. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The reason is that state enforcement officers cannot match law enforcement agencies or ARMA in detecting and tracing property, especially abroad — they lack sufficient powers and resources for this. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As noted earlier, it is law enforcement agencies during the pre-trial investigation, and ARMA, that have the most tools for tracing and identifying assets subject to confiscation. Even they, however, do so fairly rarely, and the reason is that Article 91 of the current CPC </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/recovering-criminal-assets-from-abroad-what-should-be-changed-in-ukrainian-legislation/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">in no way requires the location of property subject to confiscation or special confiscation to be proved</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> within criminal proceedings. Largely because of this, in most cases such property ultimately goes unnoticed by the enforcement service.</span></p>
<p><b>Therefore, to adapt the provisions of EU Directive 2024/1260 to Ukrainian realities, it would be sensible, first, to supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. Second, to establish that, when enforcing court decisions on confiscation for the laundering of criminal property or for corruption, ARMA may be engaged to identify property that may be confiscated. Article 535(7) of the CPC should also include a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC. </b></p>
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			            	Despite its generally positive thrust, the document contains a number of procedural gaps, legal ambiguities, and risks that could negate the intended effect in practice.
			            </p>
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<h4><b>2. The international wanted list, the digitalization of summonses, and the removal of procedural obstacles for persons abroad</b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of the draft law&#8217;s provisions concerns placing a suspect on the international wanted list. In Article 291 of the CPC, the drafters propose to draw a clear distinction between a domestic search within Ukraine and an international one, and to establish that a suspect is deemed wanted precisely from the moment the investigator or prosecutor issues a decision to that effect.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This will help settle</span><a href="https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/991768/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">long-standing debates</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> about the moment from which a person is considered placed on the international wanted list and will allow courts to follow a single line of application. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the same time, the amendments to this article will not resolve another, more acute problem. It concerns cases where suspects or the defendants are abroad and the defense, invoking Article 135(7) of the CPC, </span><a href="https://justtalk.com.ua/post/in-absentia-pid-chas-dosudovogo-rozsliduvannya"><span style="font-weight: 400;">argues</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that they may be reached solely through the diplomatic-channel procedure. Currently, under this provision, a summons for a person </span><b>residing abroad</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is served through international cooperation mechanisms.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">HACC case law </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/123147563"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reasonably explains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that a person&#8217;s mere presence abroad does not require summoning them through diplomatic channels, since such channels should be used only if the person has formally arranged permanent residence, registered with a consulate, deregistered their residence, and the like. If no such facts are established during the criminal proceedings, the person is summoned in the ordinary manner.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Even so, the debate over this issue continues, owing to lawyers&#8217; inconsistent reading of the said Article 135(7) of the CPC. This is precisely why the </span><a href="https://dap.nazk.gov.ua/osr/288/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">measure</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> under the State Anti-Corruption Program to simplify the procedure for summoning, in criminal proceedings, persons who reside abroad and are citizens of Ukraine has not yet been implemented.</span></p>
<p><b>It would therefore be best to specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person&#8217;s use of them is documented).</b></p>
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			            	It would therefore be best to specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person&#8217;s use of them is documented).
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<h4><b>3. Matters concerning the enforcement of HACC judgments should remain within that court&#8217;s jurisdiction </b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law also proposes amendments to Article 539 of the CPC. In this article, the drafters seek to clarify that the question of parole, or of replacing the unserved part of the sentence of a convicted person who has been transferred to serve their sentence abroad, is decided by the Ukrainian court that delivered the verdict. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This provision carries no risks; however, while amending this article of the CPC, the legislator could also resolve the problem of matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments being decided by courts other than the HACC. Thus, by amending Article 539 of the CPC, the legislator could solve two problems at once.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The HACC has special subject-matter jurisdiction over corruption-related criminal proceedings. Yet most matters relating to the enforcement of its judgments are decided by local courts — in particular, at the person&#8217;s place of serving the sentence or place of residence. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Local courts are entitled to grant parole to persons convicted by HACC judgments, to substitute their punishment, and to release them from it altogether. Such situations are not uncommon. For example, in 2024 the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv </span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/convicted-by-hacc-released-for-military-service/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">granted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> parole to a person convicted by the HACC — an accomplice in the bribery case involving the director of the Rzhyshchiv Military Forestry State Enterprise — so that he could serve in the military. And in 2025 the Voznesensk City-District Court </span><a href="https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/131286946"><span style="font-weight: 400;">released</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from punishment the head of a private company who had been convicted of </span><a href="https://hacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org/en/cases/42016000000003517"><span style="font-weight: 400;">misappropriating UAH 787 million of an NBU loan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and of participating in the Yanukovych–Kurchenko criminal organization.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Matters relating to the enforcement of HACC judgments should be decided by that very court, since they can substantially affect the actual extent of the punishment imposed on those convicted of corruption-related criminal offenses — and therefore its deterrent, punitive, and rehabilitative effect.</span></p>
<p><b>Article 539 of the CPC should therefore be supplemented with a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. </b></p>
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			            	Article 539 of the CPC should therefore be supplemented with a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. 
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<h4><b>4. Eliminating the risks associated with the extradition procedure </b></h4>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law&#8217;s amendments also touch on extradition. The drafters spell out the procedure for submitting extradition requests, the handling of situations where several states request a person&#8217;s extradition, the application of preventive measures to such persons, and so on. Some of the proposed innovations require clarification.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The draft law adds to Article 575 of the CPC a mechanism for confirming that an extradition request remains valid. Under it, the court must respond to the Ministry of Justice on whether the request remains valid, and a failure to provide such a response becomes grounds for withdrawing it. Yet the drafters set no deadline at all for providing this response.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This creates a risk that, because the response deadline is undefined, the Ministry of Justice may mistakenly treat such an extradition request as withdrawn — even though the court has provided no response at all.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is therefore important to add to the new Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for the court&#8217;s response, and to provide that it is a negative response from the court — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing such a request.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In addition, to align the rules on simultaneous requests for a person&#8217;s surrender, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with a further ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.</span></p>
<p><b>Thus it is necessary, first, to add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and to provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that constitutes grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. Second, the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC should be supplemented with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.</b></p>
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			            	The drafters spell out the procedure for submitting extradition requests, the handling of situations where several states request a person&#8217;s extradition, the application of preventive measures to such persons, and so on. Some of the proposed innovations require clarification.
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<h3><b>Conclusions</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Transparency International Ukraine recommends adopting Draft Law No. 14292 in the first reading as a basis, with refinement ahead of the second reading, since adopting it in its current wording would leave gaps that would diminish the effect of the changes made.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In our view, the following recommendations should be taken into account during this refinement:</span></p>
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<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Supplement Article 91 of the CPC with provisions requiring the prosecution to prove the location of assets subject to confiscation or special confiscation. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Establish that state enforcement officers may engage ARMA to identify property that may be confiscated when enforcing judgments or rulings for the laundering of criminal property (Article 209 of the CC) or for corruption (Note 1 to Article 45 of the CC). </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Add to Article 535(7) of the CPC a reference to the rulings listed in Article 96-1(2) of the CC.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Specify clearly in Article 135(7) of the CPC that a person located abroad may also be summoned through electronic means of communication — official email addresses, messengers, and social media (provided that the person&#8217;s use of them is documented).</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Add to Article 539 of the CPC a separate clause under which matters relating to the enforcement of a HACC judgment will be decided by the HACC alone. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Add to the proposed Article 575(7) and (8) of the CPC clear deadlines for courts to respond to the Ministry of Justice, and provide that it is a negative response from the courts — not the absence of one — that will constitute grounds for withdrawing an extradition request. </span></li>
<li style="font-weight: 400;" aria-level="1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Supplement the new clause 5-2 of Article 589(1) of the CPC with the following ground for refusing extradition: the surrender of the extradited person to one of the requesting states.</span></li>
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			            	TI Ukraine recommends adopting Draft Law No. 14292 in the first reading as a basis, with refinement ahead of the second reading, since adopting it in its current wording would leave gaps that would diminish the effect of the changes made.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/draft-law-no-14292-improving-international-cooperation-in-criminal-proceedings-an-analytical-overview/">Draft Law No. 14292: Improving International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings — an Analytical Overview</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Operation Midas: What NABU and SAPO Chiefs Said at the Briefing</title>
		<link>https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/operation-midas-what-nabu-and-sapo-chiefs-said-at-the-briefing/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 12:55:52 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Kryvonos and Klymenko on pressure against experts, the new Midas episode, and whether the president features in the case</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/operation-midas-what-nabu-and-sapo-chiefs-said-at-the-briefing/">Operation Midas: What NABU and SAPO Chiefs Said at the Briefing</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></description>
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<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kryvonos and Klymenko on pressure against experts, the new Midas episode, and whether the president features in the case</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On May 12, 2026, NABU Director Semion Kryvonos and SAPO Head Oleksandr Klymenko</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/kCnZfmyaQWc"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">answered</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> journalists&#8217; key questions about Operation Midas — including the latest development: suspicion notices served on former Presidential Office Head Andrii Yermak and new notices for former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov and several others.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko opened by noting that the </span><b>case is highly complex and multi-layered, and that to prevent information leaks, it was divided into several tracks handled by separate detective units</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that had no knowledge of each other&#8217;s findings — a deliberate response to the leak</span><a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/nabu-leaks-investigation-legal-analysis/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">allegations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> NABU had faced in previous years. Klymenko himself served as the lead prosecutor in Operation Midas.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">He also reported attempts by various individuals to pressure expert witnesses in the case, and called for the </span><b>creation of an independent expert institution</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> protected from such interference.</span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">&#8220;The pressure on experts is a difficult issue. We have been communicating the need to establish an independent expert institution for quite some time to prevent such attempts,&#8221; </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko said. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> &#8220;Because even when we find expert institutions capable of processing this volume of material and conducting examinations, we don&#8217;t always manage to complete them — experts genuinely encounter unknown individuals who convey messages along the lines of: &#8216;Don&#8217;t think this will end with just the loss of your certificate.&#8217;&#8221;</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This problem is long-standing and has been acknowledged at the highest political level — specifically in the</span><a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/12/11/7226939/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">joint communiqué</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Taras Kachka and Marta Kos. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice has</span><a href="https://minjust.gov.ua/news/ministry/lyudmila-sugak-prezentuvala-predstavnikam-krain-es-progres-u-sferi-verhovenstva-prava"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">drafted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a forensic expertise reform bill, which as of February 2026 had been submitted for approval. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Klymenko also cited </span><b>difficulties arising from the State Financial Monitoring Service</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which he said has been engaging in a work-to-rule slowdown — failing to respond to requests and providing documents of no investigative value. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">&#8220;They imitate activity but don&#8217;t actually engage with the investigation,&#8221; </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">he added.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On Andrii Yermak, Klymenko stated that SAPO will seek</span><b> pre-trial detention with a bail alternative of UAH 180 million.</b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">More broadly, Kryvonos and Klymenko noted that the case extends beyond the energy sector to the defense sector, including investigations into drone and weapons procurement. </span><b>NSDC Secretary Rustem Umerov</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has been questioned in this context but currently holds witness status.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Semion Kryvonos stated that </span><b>the President of Ukraine has not featured and does not feature in this case</b><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
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			            	On Andrii Yermak, Klymenko stated that SAPO will seek pre-trial detention with a bail alternative of UAH 180 million.
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<p><!--/.row--></p><p>The post <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/operation-midas-what-nabu-and-sapo-chiefs-said-at-the-briefing/">Operation Midas: What NABU and SAPO Chiefs Said at the Briefing</a> first appeared on <a href="https://ti-ukraine.org/en/">Transparency International Ukraine</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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