Ukraine Once Again Assumes EU Integration Commitments. When Will They Finally Be Fulfilled?

On December 11, European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka announced an agreed action plan intended to demonstrate Ukraine’s readiness for EU accession. The ten key reforms that the Cabinet of Ministers promises to deliver under this plan largely duplicate the provisions of the Rule of Law Roadmap approved in May 2025. December also brought renewed discussion of abolishing the automatic closure of criminal proceedings due to the expiration of pre-trial investigation deadlines, revising limitation periods, ensuring NABU’s access to high-quality forensic examinations, and amending rules on jurisdiction.

Again, because this is far from the first document to mention these and other anti-corruption priorities. And since their implementation has been postponed for years, questions inevitably arise as to how genuine this “priority” really is.

Much of this has been repeatedly emphasized by civil society and the expert community. The European Commission has identified these steps as necessary in its reports. Ukraine undertook to implement them through the adoption of the Rule of Law Road Map. They were incorporated into the Ukraine Facility Plan and the IMF Memorandum. Yet progress remains stalled, and 2025 has turned out to be one of the least productive years in terms of adopting meaningful EU integration decisions.

The new plan relies on the Rule of Law Road Map, which exposes a clear paradox. For example, under the same Road Map, the abolition of automatic closure of high-level corruption cases was scheduled for Q3 2025—that is, it was supposed to be completed by September of the current year. Nevertheless, this reform is once again listed as a priority in the new EU integration plan.

The same applies to the goal of “eliminating procedural delays and increasing the effectiveness of criminal justice”—a formulation that essentially conceals the issue of counteracting abuse of procedural rights.

If these overdue measures have still not been implemented, what can be said about those scheduled for a later stage? For example, improving NABU’s jurisdiction is planned for completion by the end of Q2 2026. At what level must Ukraine assume commitments for decision-makers to stop resisting and finally implement these and other promises? And if Parliament also adopts and begins work on the report of the Vlasenko–Buzhanskyi Temporary Investigative Commission—whose key theses directly contradict a significant number of European Commission recommendations and these very EU integration documents—how can one believe that such steps, however “priority” they may be labeled, will ever be taken at all? Especially when looking at the behavior of members of parliament during the final plenary week of this year.

Ukraine has no alternative to EU accession. This means there is also no alternative to genuine, high-quality anti-corruption reforms. And, as so often happens, everything once again comes down to political will, coordinated action by the authorities, and the real agency of Parliament and the Government. I hope these conditions will finally align in 2026—because it is long overdue.