How to change perceptions of “Ukrainian corruption”: the key shift the EU is waiting for

The 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) results from Transparency International have left both Ukraine’s authorities and society with mixed feelings.

Ukraine gained one point. Progress, in a sense, but in wartime, and under EU-integration deadlines, we cannot afford to move this slowly. And this index is a baseline used to assess Ukraine by international businesses and foreign partners alike.

Still, one point is worth re-emphasizing: Transparency International’s score reflects not the actual volume of corruption in the state, but public perceptions.

And Ukraine’s core problem today is not corruption itself, but the sense of stagnation and impunity.

Society is tired of “process”; people now want “results.” Ukrainians need a positive signal.

But it has to be a signal with substance, convincing enough to citizens and backed by authoritative validation. One such signal could be the European Commission’s recognition that Kyiv has made meaningful progress on anti-corruption.

As is well known, the EU does not assess outcomes by the number of “opened cases” or even convictions alone. First and foremost, it wants to see institutional durability.

There is, however, a path to a green light. To get there, Kyiv needs only to implement, or at least show tangible progress on, a short roadmap defined by the European Commission itself. The document is known as the “Kachka–Kos 10 points,” named after the officials who signed it.

Is it possible to demonstrate rapid progress on implementation? Yes. And in this article, we explain how.

Ten points, though in practice there may be more

In December 2025, in Lviv, Ukraine and the EU launched a technical process that allows preparations for closing negotiating chapters to move forward without waiting for Hungary’s veto to be lifted. At the same time, as part of that package of decisions, European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka agreed on a plan of 10 priority reforms in anti-corruption and rule of law.

In reality, however, this list contains significantly more than 10 points.

For example, the first point can reasonably be split into four separate ones, since it covers investigation timelines, limitation periods, safeguards against procedural delays, NABU jurisdiction, and other issues. If we follow the classic route—passing separate laws for each of these matters—we will get stuck in parliamentary corridors for years.

But there is a way to avoid that trap.

Instead of implementing a long list of tasks one by one, they can be consolidated into a single law. In particular, all elements of the first point can be delivered through comprehensive amendments to Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).

According to our sources, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office has chosen exactly this route and decided to focus on CPC amendments as the most substantial item in the document.

The road to the EU runs through the CPC

What should these amendments include to genuinely solve these problems? Let us explain through a concrete example.

In criminal proceedings, especially in high-level corruption cases, delays often arise because participants deliberately abuse procedural rights.

For example, in the case against a former official of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy’s state property management department, accused of receiving a $150,000 bribe, defense lawyers systematically and in a coordinated manner failed to appear at court hearings for a month, causing all five hearings to be postponed. The result was not only a breach of reasonable time requirements, but also de facto impunity for those who committed serious corruption offenses.

The Ministry of Justice confirms plans to introduce amendments that would fix this and similar problems. 

Why, specifically, have CPC amendments become the top priority?

“Because the CPC governs criminal proceedings, and therefore its provisions create space for ‘procedural sabotage’—formally lawful actions that undermine the effectiveness of the justice system. One high-quality law amending the CPC can address several of Brussels’ fundamental rule-of-law requirements at once,” says Pavlo Demchuk, Senior Legal Adviser at Transparency International Ukraine. 

Acting Minister of Justice and Deputy Minister for European Integration Liudmyla Suhak agree that CPC amendments are a priority. However, her comments indicate that the government is not ruling out the adoption of several laws.

“On February 2, the Ministry of Justice submitted to the Government a draft law on strengthening the institutional capacity of the NABU and the SAPO (the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office) and removing procedural obstacles to effective pre-trial investigation. The draft law proposes expanding the range of persons under NABU jurisdiction, granting the Head of SAPO powers to form joint investigative teams, and enabling extradition requests in NABU cases,” Suhak said.

In addition, the Ministry of Justice is now preparing to draft bills amending the Criminal Procedure Code “that will cover the maximum possible number of measures in this area under the Rule of Law Roadmap,” she added.

What exactly needs to change

First, Ukraine needs the already mentioned mechanisms to counter abuse of procedural rights. In particular, courts must be given tools to respond to bad-faith conduct by parties to proceedings.

This is not a simple task, because in some cases parties use sophisticated tactics: stretching out closing arguments (as in the Nasirov and Chaus cases), unjustified failure to appear at hearings, and similar maneuvers.

“In a significant number of European states, such actions are recognized as abuse, and courts have tools to counter them,” says Pavlo Demchuk.

Not all EU countries have these tools—but those that introduced them clearly did so for compelling reasons.

Ukraine now has those same reasons. “The absence of such safeguards in the CPC not only allows people to evade criminal liability, but it also makes justice as a whole more expensive and more cumbersome,” the expert explains.

In addition, the CPC still contains a problematic provision that allows automatic closure of criminal proceedings when the pre-trial investigation time limit is missed. It is often—though not entirely accurately—referred to as the “Lozovyi amendments.”

There have been countless attempts to fix this. In late 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers registered a draft law to remove these provisions, but it never reached a vote and was withdrawn after the government resigned.

Taras Kachka now proposes dropping that label. “The term ‘Lozovyi amendments’ is so loaded that once it appears in a discussion, everyone reacts reflexively—either positively or negatively—and the substance disappears from the debate,” the Deputy Prime Minister said in an interview with European Pravda.

And indeed, the Kachka–Kos document does not mention Andrii Lozovyi by name; it focuses on the problem itself—automatic case closures—which must be resolved.

Another problematic issue is limitation periods, including when they cease, are interrupted, or are suspended. Here, there is no single clear “European standard.”

“There is no single recognized approach to regulating limitation periods in the criminal legislation of other states. However, international anti-corruption instruments pay considerable attention to this. Moreover, the draft EU Directive says the minimum limitation period should be from eight to fifteen years, depending on the gravity of the offense,” says Pavlo Demchuk.

In Ukraine, where the period is often several times shorter, the need for reform is urgent. “Even so, effective work by investigators and courts to ensure reasonable time limits in pre-trial investigation and court proceedings is just as important,” he stresses.

Ukraine also urgently needs to simplify and accelerate procedures by introducing written proceedings in certain cases, narrowing grounds for panel hearings, and removing excessive formalities such as mandatory participation of attesting witnesses.

For example, cases against MPs for false asset declaration (a non-serious offense) must currently be heard by a three-judge panel, consuming significant judicial resources.

Another example: if even one judge is replaced, the court must restart hearings from scratch, even where the new judge sees no need to do so. At the High Anti-Corruption Court, several top cases have already restarted “from square one.” This significantly delays proceedings and may lead to limitation periods expiring and cases being closed. The CPC could instead provide that replacing judges does not trigger a retrial, except where, for example, the new judge disagrees with earlier rulings.

As a third reform track, TI Ukraine proposes strengthening the capacity of anti-corruption institutions by clarifying NABU jurisdiction, granting additional powers to the Head of SAPO, and ensuring better coordination among institutions, including with the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) on the management of seized assets. For example, clear deadlines should be set for transferring proceedings to the NABU following a relevant decision by its director. It should also be specified that NABU jurisdiction extends to the Head of the Presidential Office and their deputies.

Because these “small details,” taken together, undermine the effectiveness of the NABU and the SAPO.

“We have prepared our proposals for CPC amendments and are engaging with different stakeholders. If MPs listen and agree to adopt comprehensive CPC changes, this will move forward the largest requirement in the Kos–Kachka plan,” Pavlo Demchuk explains.

At the same time, this must be defined from the outset: for real change, including a jump in CPI-2026, we need public validation, meaning a public green light for the new package from the European Commission.

Because once Brussels officially confirms that “Ukraine has removed key barriers in justice,” and those changes are effectively implemented, this will change how the country is perceived by investors, international institutions, and Ukrainian citizens themselves.

It converts “process” into “trust.”

List of CPC amendments proposed by TI Ukraine:

• Introduce written proceedings, i.e., allow courts to consider and decide certain procedural issues without the participation of parties and without holding a court hearing.
• Establish, as a core principle of criminal proceedings, the inadmissibility of abuse of procedural rights, and define mechanisms for its enforcement.
• Provide that, where a case is heard by a panel, this applies to the trial stage rather than preparatory proceedings; and reduce exceptions to the single-judge rule by limiting panel hearings to especially serious criminal offenses, rather than tying them to the defendant’s office or status.
• Provide that the absence of one or more defense counsel for a suspect/accused does not prevent a hearing from proceeding; postponement to safeguard defense rights should be allowed only if all defense counsel for the suspect/accused are absent.
• Supplement the CPC with mechanisms for interaction with ARMA when deciding whether to transfer assets to the Agency. 
• Clarify that an investigating judge is barred from participating in the same case at trial only where that judge exercised judicial control with respect to the specific person concerned.
• Ensure the possibility of imposing monetary penalties on both defense lawyers and prosecutors if they fail to appear without valid reasons or fail to report reasons for non-appearance.
• Expand NABU’s personal jurisdiction to include the following positions: Director of the State Bureau of Investigation and their first deputy/deputy; Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and their first deputy/deputy; head of a regional, Kyiv City, or Sevastopol City state administration and their first deputy/deputy; head of a regional or Kyiv City Military-Civil Administration and their first deputy/deputy; head of a Regional Military Administration or Kyiv City Military Administration and their first deputy/deputy; senior leadership of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine and the State Bureau of Investigation; and members of supervisory boards and executive bodies of large enterprises where the state or municipal ownership share exceeds 50%.
• Provide that a pre-trial investigation body must transfer the available materials of relevant criminal proceedings to NABU immediately, and no later than five working days from receipt of the NABU Director’s decision requesting those materials.
• Remove the requirement to involve attesting witnesses during searches and inspections.
• Remove the court’s obligation to close criminal proceedings due to expiry of the pre-trial investigation time limit (Article 284(1)(10) of the CPC of Ukraine).
• Provide that, if a judge on a judicial panel is replaced, the court may, by a reasoned ruling, decide there is no need to restart the trial from the beginning or to repeat all or part of procedural actions.
• Provide that a court may impose time limits on a participant’s closing argument where the speech shows signs of abuse of procedural rights.
• Add that an investigating judge/court may, depending on case circumstances, issue a separate ruling where participants breach procedural duties, perform them improperly, or abuse procedural rights.
• Provide that after drafting and signing the full text of a judgment, the court may limit public pronouncement to the operative part, with mandatory service of the full text on parties the same day. 
• Remove the appellate court’s power to quash a judgment/ruling and order a new trial in the court of first instance.
• Allow the court to request collected pre-trial investigation materials or require prosecutors to submit such materials to the court together with the indictment and plea agreement.
• Make special confiscation mandatory, where legal grounds exist, when approving a plea agreement.
• Grant the Head of SAPO the power to initiate criminal proceedings and approve investigative actions involving Members of Parliament.
• Provide that matters related to the enforcement of judgments convicting a person of a corruption criminal offense are considered by the HACC.
• Grant the Head of SAPO powers in international cooperation (not only via CPC amendments, but also through corresponding ratification laws for international treaties).