How to Prevent Loopholes for High-Profile Corruption Cases

The recent case of former State Fiscal Service head Roman Nasirov, who failed to appear in court due to mobilization, once again highlights a systemic flaw in our legislation. His case, already nearing its conclusion, could have been suspended indefinitely. Nasirov is neither the first nor the last high-ranking official to exploit legal loopholes in order to evade liability.

Below, we examine what these gaps are and how they can be fixed.

Military service as a shield from justice

According to the SAPO, after indictments were sent to court, 48 defendants in its cases have voluntarily mobilized into the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. When it comes to suspending the consideration of their cases, practices vary: some judges grant such motions, while others explore the possibility of continuing the trial despite the defendant’s military service. However, the Supreme Court has taken a categorical position on this issue: the case must be suspended. Such a decision, while consistent with the letter of the law, contradicts its spirit and undermines the principle of the inevitability of punishment, especially since the statute of limitations in such cases continues to run.

At the same time, a clear trend has emerged: defendants whose cases are in the final stages of trial suddenly sign contracts with the Armed Forces of Ukraine or “voluntarily mobilize.” The Parliament has already taken the first step to address this problem—top corrupt officials who have already been sentenced by the court are now prohibited from having their sentences replaced with military service. But that’s not enough.

A telling example is the case of former MP Ruslan Solvar, who signed a contract with the Armed Forces of Ukraine just before the final stage of his trial, after several court sessions had already been postponed due to his illness. Unlike Nasirov, Solvar did manage to join the ranks of the Armed Forces, but his service ended after the Anti-Corruption Court delivered a guilty verdict.

Such cases confirm that, in many instances, mobilization is used not to fulfill a constitutional duty, but as a tool to delay or derail judicial proceedings.

Forgiving corruption after the statute of limitations expires

Another major problem in high-level corruption cases is the statute of limitations—one of the factors that can lead to the closure of proceedings, even for serious corruption offenses. According to our information, the HACC has released more than 90 individuals from criminal liability or punishment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Most of these releases involve cases of official forgery, false declarations, and abuse of power—offenses that are subject to some of the shortest statutes of limitations. These are not just statistics—they represent decisions about specific individuals who were meant to face justice for corrupt acts but ultimately avoided it.

The current statute of limitations model fails to account for the international dimension of corruption investigations. Most high-level corruption cases are highly complex and require considerable time for investigation and judicial review. Notably, the same issue may soon arise in Nasirov’s “gas” case, as the statute of limitations is set to expire next year.

A bureaucratic trap for investigative authorities

Another obstacle to effective legal proceedings is the infamous “Lozovyi amendments,” which no longer concern the statute of limitations but instead limit the duration of pre-trial investigations. The court’s obligation to close cases due to the expiration of the pre-trial investigation period could result in the dismissal of several high-profile proceedings—including, for example, the Rotterdam+ case and the case against Vadym Alperin.

Moreover, due to these deadlines—and in line with a Supreme Court ruling—former judge of the Rakhiv District Court Ivan Tulyk was left without a verdict. The HACC had convicted him for accepting a bribe from an individual accused of driving under the influence. The same happened to former judge of the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal Volodymyr Ponomarenko, whom the HACC had convicted of “trading in influence.”

Although in December 2023 the Parliament partially addressed the issue by lifting the time limit for investigations until a suspicion is formally notified, courts are still required to close proceedings if the investigation period has already expired. This remains a ticking time bomb for dozens of corruption cases.

The Rotterdam+ case clearly illustrates the scale of the problem. According to investigators, electricity consumers overpaid more than UAH 20 billion in 2018–2019 due to the introduction of this formula—and the corruption scheme could go unpunished because of technical issues in calculating the pre-trial investigation period. The closure of such cases could result in losses amounting to billions of hryvnias—funds that the state budget would forfeit and that could otherwise be directed toward defense or recovery efforts.

It is also worth noting that issues with calculating investigation periods arose during the pre-trial stage of the PrivatBank case, in which the main figure is Ihor Kolomoiskyi. Although there are currently no high-profile cases where the “Lozovyi amendments” have played a decisive role, there is no guarantee that this will not happen in the future.

Deliberate delays as a defense strategy

Particular attention should be given to the abuse of procedural rights by defense lawyers. According to our research, the proportion of postponed hearings initiated by the defense remains high—55% of all attended sessions show signs of such abuse.

The most common tactics include the non-appearance of defense lawyers, repeated motions to change interim measures, frequent challenges to judges, and the defendants’ sudden “illnesses” on the eve of court sessions.

Monitoring shows that the average duration of court sessions at the HACC in criminal proceedings is just 1 hour and 32 minutes, with 13% of sessions starting more than 15 minutes late. When combined with numerous procedural abuses, this leaves very little actual “productive” time for the consideration of cases. Even HACC judges acknowledge that such tactics are used solely to delay trials, sometimes enabling defendants to reach the expiration of the statute of limitations, as noted above. Therefore, legislative safeguards are needed to prevent such delays.

What needs to change to close legal loopholes?

To prevent the problems outlined above from completely halting the investigation and trial of high-level corruption cases—and undermining the work of the NABU and SAPO—lawmakers must urgently adopt concrete measures.

1. Regarding mobilized defendants, it is necessary to stipulate that court proceedings may be suspended only if the individual is unable to participate due to the nature of their military duties.
2. Regarding the statute of limitations: the grounds for its suspension should be expanded, and the expiration point should be revised, so that it is tied not to the entry into force of the verdict, but to its issuance by the court of first instance.
3. Regarding the “Lozovyi amendments”: the mandatory requirement for courts to close criminal proceedings due to the expiration of the pre-trial investigation period should be abolished.
4. Regarding the abuse of procedural rights: the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine should explicitly prohibit such abuse by participants in the process and empower judges to impose monetary penalties for violations, including on defense lawyers.

We are confident that implementing these recommendations will help bring to justice those who have long evaded accountability due to flawed legislation. With these changes, cases like those of Nasirov and Alperin will become far less common.