Key Questions Regarding Cases Against NABU Employees

More than two months have passed since July 21, 2025, a turning point for the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. On that day, several events occurred simultaneously, raising serious concerns about the coordination of actions by various law enforcement bodies with the apparent aim of exerting pressure on anti-corruption institutions. 

The Security Service of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the Prosecutor General’s Office conducted at least 70 searches targeting NABU employees, detained two Bureau officers on suspicion of having ties to Russia, and served notices of suspicion to three detectives in traffic accident cases. During the same time, the SSU launched an inspection of the SAPO for compliance with state secrecy legislation. 

The very next day, on July 22, the Verkhovna Rada continued this apparent pressure by adopting a controversial law dismantling the independence of the NABU and the SAPO, which was later repealed following mass protests and warnings from international partners.

However, the story of criminal proceedings against NABU employees continues. Currently, two NABU detectives — Ruslan Mahamedrasulov and Viktor Husarov — remain in custody. Although the SSU and the PGO have occasionally released new information about the evidence base in these cases, the data still appears problematic. 

At the beginning of September, during an event marking the HACC anniversary, the NABU Director announced that the SSU was preparing a new wave of suspicions against Bureau employees. He linked this activity to the criminal prosecution of SSU General Illia Vitiuk for illicit enrichment and false asset declaration.

All these developments have prompted significant public concern about the quality of investigative processes and approaches applied by the SSU, SBI, and PGO. This article summarizes the key questions that arise from the publicly available information.

The case of Ruslan Mahamedrasulov: were there ties to Russia?

Ruslan Mahamedrasulov served as Head of NABU’s Interregional Directorate of Detectives based in Dnipro. He was detained by the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Security Service of Ukraine on suspicion of aiding the aggressor state under Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. This article establishes criminal liability for intentional actions aimed at assisting the aggressor state in causing harm to Ukraine, either through support for enemy decisions or the transfer of material resources.

The charges are based on claims that Mahamedrasulov allegedly acted as an intermediary in selling technical hemp to the Republic of Dagestan, while the illicit cultivation of this crop was allegedly organized by his father, a private entrepreneur. The prosecution asserts that by facilitating this trade with Russia, the senior NABU official assisted his father in unlawful activity and caused harm to Ukraine. However, the public record lacks details on how exactly such harm is substantiated or whether the alleged hemp sales could indeed qualify as aiding the aggressor state.

What we did see is that law enforcement focused heavily on the NABU official’s family background. The SSU publicized information unrelated to the essence of the suspicion — such as his parents’ citizenship, sources of their income, and his vacation destinations — clearly aimed at eliciting an emotional reaction from the audience.

Evidently, these details were intended to shape a strong emotional perception of NABU detectives as deeply entangled in Russian connections and indifferent to the realities of war in Ukraine, holidaying abroad instead — a tactic that closely resembles manipulation.

The Mahamedrasulov case also raised serious concerns about the quality of the evidence base. Civil society experts have already analyzed discrepancies in the materials released by the SSU. Attention was drawn to the apparent confusion between Dagestan and Uzbekistan in relation to a state program supporting hemp cultivation. In fact, such a program exists in Uzbekistan, not in Russia’s Dagestan. 

As “evidence,” the SSU cited a Russian government resolution providing subsidies only for crops grown on Russian territory and listed in the state register, without any mention of imported products. The Dagestan government’s own resolution makes no reference to hemp as an eligible subsidized crop. Moreover, procurement from abroad could not have been justified under that decree: by the time the alleged “correspondence” began — on July 10, the same day the SSU claims the exchange took place — the application deadline for subsidies had already expired. That correspondence also referenced Agroprime, which has been under criminal investigation in Russia since 2023 for unlawfully obtaining a 22.2-million-ruble subsidy. No firm under investigation could, even in theory, qualify for a subsidy in Dagestan.

Despite all these inconsistencies, on July 22, 2025, the Pechersk District Court ordered Mahamedrasulov into pretrial detention without the option of bail until September 16, 2025, later extended to October 21.

The key issue in the Mahamedrasulov case remains the discrepancy between the seriousness of the charges and the quality of the evidence presented. The SSU relied on selective and emotionally charged communication, emphasizing the detective’s family background — from his father’s citizenship to his vacation in Tenerife — which unmistakably suggests an attempt to create an emotional image of collaboration with the enemy. At the same time, there appear to be critical gaps in the evidence base, ranging from confusion over foreign subsidy programs to the use of information about a company already under investigation for financial violations.

What does the connection to MP Fedir Khrystenko have to do with it?

A central element in how the SSU and the PGO communicated about the Mahamedrasulov case was his alleged connection to MP Fedir Khrystenko, formerly of the now-banned Opposition Platform – For Life party. On July 20, the day before the NABU searches, the SSU and PGO charged Khrystenko in absentia with high treason, claiming that he was a resident (senior agent) of Russia’s FSB and worked to strengthen Russian influence within the NABU.

According to the investigation, the FSB recruited Khrystenko during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, and the MP actively carried out tasks assigned by the Russian intelligence service during the Revolution of Dignity. Following the full-scale invasion, he fled abroad and continued his unlawful activities from there. 

The SSU alleges that Khrystenko had known Mahamedrasulov since their time studying together at Donetsk University. The SSU also disclosed details of supposed links between the two. Additional investigative materials allegedly showed that Mahamedrasulov’s father corresponded with Khrystenko, and in one exchange, they agreed to meet in the European Union. Moreover, in that correspondence, Khrystenko supposedly wrote to the father that he could not reach Mahamedrasulov Jr. (using only the first initial for secrecy) and asked for help in establishing contact.

Interestingly, the official communication contains no explanation of how Khrystenko actually exerted influence on the NABU, raising questions about whether the SSU and PGO truly possess a sufficient evidentiary base to substantiate the criminal charges against the MP.

Khrystenko himself was detained in Ukraine on September 6, 2025, and placed in pre-trial detention. However, he was not returned under a formal extradition procedure, but through political arrangements with the authorities of the country where he had been staying.

Communication surrounding Khrystenko’s suspicion included further examples of manipulation. The PGO released information about his alleged contacts with other NABU officials, explicitly naming them. At the same time, authorities circulated claims that NABU detectives had helped oligarch Hennadii Boholiubov cross the border. 

These claims were based on the fact that the wife of Oleksandr Skomarov, head of a NABU detective unit, left Ukraine in 2022 in a car registered to the family of fugitive MP Khrystenko. However, Skomarov explained to Ukrainska Pravda that on February 25, 2022, he obtained official permission from his management to evacuate his wife and their two-year-old child to the western border. There, he met an elderly man (over 60) who transported vehicles abroad for payment and agreed to take his family. On February 26, from the town of Berehove, Skomarov’s family was taken out of Ukraine. It appears most likely that this man was transporting Khrystenko’s vehicle and agreed to take passengers for an additional fee.

This leads to the question: if the SSU and PGO were confident enough of Skomarov’s ties to Khrystenko to mention him publicly, why was he not formally notified of suspicion of any crime?

Another “information dump” by law enforcement claimed that detectives under Skomarov’s supervision had, at Khrystenko’s request, helped Hennadii Boholiubov cross the border. Specifically, it was alleged that two NABU employees accompanied the fugitive oligarch on a train during his escape. 

The NABU, however, explained in its official communication that the detectives were in fact on a work assignment at the invitation of the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) — a joint program of the World Bank and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The trip had been official, approved in advance, and undertaken to participate in a series of bilateral meetings at the Global Forum on Asset Recovery held in Vienna on June 25–27. It was purely coincidental that Boholiubov happened to be in the same train car.

The alleged connection between oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi and Oleksandr Skomarov, supposedly regarding the “resolution” of Kolomoiskyi’s criminal cases if Skomarov were to win a position at the ESBU, also appears extremely tenuous. This conclusion was drawn from a screenshot containing Kolomoiskyi’s remark: “Looks like there will be a second NABU.” How law enforcement interpreted this phrase in such a way is unclear. It appears they sought to use a single piece of information to plug multiple holes in the government’s problems at the time.

Thus, this case also lacks sufficient detail to assess the validity of the accusations but certainly not a shortage of manipulative communication tactics from the SSU, which is, of course, deeply concerning.

Suspicion of trading in influence

On September 16, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced that Ruslan Mahamedrasulov had been served an amended notice of suspicion. According to the investigation, the NABU official accepted an offer of unlawful benefit for himself and third parties in exchange for influencing decisions made by public officials — an offense under Article 369-2(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Investigators allegedly discovered this information on the suspect’s phone. He had reportedly received an offer from one of his contacts to help resolve tax-related issues for several Ukrainian companies. The matter involved illegal decisions by the State Tax Service to remove about ten companies from its list of “risky” entities, allowing them to conduct financial transactions worth around UAH 30 million. The PGO stated that analysis of the companies’ activities indicated signs of affiliation with a “conversion center.” The cost of such “services” was reportedly UAH 900,000, roughly 3% of the total amount of blocked funds. 

According to investigators, the NABU officer accepted this offer and attempted to resolve the issue through a former high-ranking tax official, at a time when the current Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko, headed the State Tax Service. Mahamedrasulov also allegedly sought assistance from a former law enforcement colleague with whom he had previously worked at the NABU. During interrogations, the individuals in question confirmed that the NABU official had indeed contacted them with such a request.

It is important to note that as of the date the suspicion was served to Mahamedrasulov, investigators were only considering whether to charge the individual who had offered him the bribe, and there is no public record confirming that such a notice of suspicion has been served to that person. Nevertheless, the media reported that the individual who corresponded with Mahamedrasulov during the time Kravchenko led the Tax Service is currently listed as an assistant to the Prosecutor General.

Following an analysis of the published information, questions remain as to whether the investigators truly possess all the evidence required to prove the alleged offense. The available data do not demonstrate that the NABU official accepted a proposal to influence anyone for unlawful gain, nor is it clear which specific official Mahamedrasulov was allegedly supposed to influence, according to the PGO’s version.

The case of Viktor Husarov

Viktor Husarov worked in the “D-2” unit of NABU’s Central Office. He was detained by the PGO and the SSU on suspicion of high treason and unauthorized actions with information.

According to investigators, Husarov committed more than 60 episodes of transmitting restricted information to Dmytro Ivantsov, a former deputy head of Yanukovych’s security. The SSU claims that in February 2014 Ivantsov helped the fugitive president escape to Russia, after which he stayed in Crimea and joined the occupying forces.

The SSU further alleged that Husarov was part of a large enemy agent network run by FSB officer Igor Yegorov. This network allegedly also included SSU Major General Valerii Shaitanov (convicted in 2020 and sentenced to 12 years in prison) and a serviceman of the National Guard.

A particular feature of Husarov’s case is that his cooperation with Ivantsov allegedly began as early as 2012, when he worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not at the NABU. Publicly available information contains no indication that this cooperation continued during his employment at the NABU. 

The NABU, for its part, presented a version of events that differs from that of the SSU. According to the Bureau’s leadership, in August 2023 it received information from the SSU about possible risks associated with Husarov. The claim was that during his service at the MIA (2012–2015), he had emailed information about Ukrainian citizens to a staff member of the State Guard Directorate. The NABU immediately became involved in clarifying the circumstances and organized an additional check together with NABU officers and SSU unit heads. However, during this joint inspection, no evidence was found to suggest that Husarov was aware of the State Guard official’s ties to Russian intelligence services. This was confirmed by an SSU representative during in-person meetings.

The NABU also initiated an interview of the employee, but the SSU strongly recommended refraining from any action so as not to interfere with operational work. The special service further mentioned that the identified connections did not concern the NABU employee, and no contacts between them had been recorded.

On August 1, 2024, a search was conducted at Husarov’s residence on the basis of a court order, after which he was summoned for questioning. In August 2024, the SSU orally informed the NABU that during the investigation of the high treason case, no evidence of the NABU employee’s involvement had been found, and no proof of participation in anti-state activities existed.

Since then, the NABU has repeatedly requested documentary confirmation of the check results from the SSU but has received no official response.

Husarov’s defense lawyer stated in court that her client had indeed transmitted data in 2015 but believed that Ivantsov was still employed at the State Guard and did not know about his flight to Crimea or his cooperation with the Russians. She also reported that during Husarov’s detention on July 21, SSU officers beat him to force disclosure of his phone password.

On July 22, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court ordered Husarov to be held in custody for 60 days without bail. On September 8, the appellate court upheld the decision.

For us, the Husarov case raises the greatest number of questions concerning the motivation for his detention specifically in July 2025. If the SSU had information about his contacts with Ivantsov since 2023, conducted checks in 2024, and even orally informed the NABU that no evidence of anti-state activity existed, then why was the arrest carried out precisely on the eve of the parliamentary vote on dismantling NABU’s independence? The defense’s claim that Husarov was unaware of Ivantsov’s shift to the Russian side, along with reports of beatings during his detention, add further doubts regarding the legality of the procedural actions.

The case of false asset declaration

On September 10, 2025, the SSU announced that it had exposed NABU detective Vitalii Tiebiekin for false asset declaration (Article 366-2(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). He was accused of attempting to conceal the purchase of a two-room apartment in Uzhhorod worth $100,000. According to the SSU, the detective allegedly registered the property under the name of his close acquaintance’s mother. Despite the family residing in the apartment, Tiebiekin failed to declare the property in his 2023 asset declaration and, in his 2024 declaration, listed it as rented. However, investigators reportedly obtained evidence showing that the individual registered as the owner did not receive any payment for its use.

Interestingly, although the overall tone of SSU statements on this case was rather restrained (in stark contrast to the earlier, more aggressive communication in previous cases), the agency still decided to add that the detective’s parents hold Russian passports and live in temporarily occupied territory — information that Tiebiekin allegedly failed to disclose when applying for security clearance to access state secrets, thereby violating the law.

By doing so, the SSU continued to shape a narrative of NABU’s alleged “pro-Russian infiltration.” Moreover, its actions undermine the understanding of forced passportization as a violation of international humanitarian law, and cast doubt on the Russian Federation’s deliberate policy of creating conditions that discriminate against residents who refuse Russian citizenship, depriving them of basic rights and services.

Another concerning element is the prosecutor’s request for bail in the amount of over UAH 4 million and a personal recognizance for the suspect to report any change of residence and to appear when summoned by the prosecutor. Ultimately, the court imposed bail of over UAH 2.9 million and placed additional procedural obligations on the NABU detective. Yet the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine clearly sets the maximum bail for non-serious crimes at 20 subsistence minimums for employable persons — just over UAH 60,000. A higher amount cannot legally be applied because the alleged offense is neither serious nor especially serious. The HACC, for example, routinely imposes bail consistent with this standard for similar cases.

Road traffic accident cases

In parallel with the detentions over the alleged “Russian trace,” the State Bureau of Investigations announced suspicions against NABU employees in cases related to road traffic accidents that resulted in injuries to victims.

All three accidents occurred earlier — two in 2021 and one in 2023. The first accident took place in Kyiv when a law enforcement officer, exiting from a secondary road, collided with a vehicle traveling on the main road. The second accident occurred at the 61st kilometer of the Kyiv–Odesa highway, where an officer, while overtaking another vehicle, failed to maintain a safe speed, veered off the road, and overturned the car, which subsequently hit a gas station building. The third accident involved an officer driving a service vehicle at a regulated intersection in Kyiv; he struck a pedestrian crossing the road on a green light. The pedestrian sustained injuries classified as moderate.

The NABU made public its position on these cases. In each incident, the employees immediately provided first aid to the victims, called an ambulance and the police, and reported the incidents to the relevant authorities. These actions were properly recorded and confirmed by the findings of NABU’s Internal Control Department.

The employees did not use their official positions for personal advantage, nor did they attempt to avoid liability. On the contrary, they fully cooperated in establishing the circumstances of the incidents. One of the detectives even provided financial assistance to a victim for medical treatment.

The NABU expressed surprise at the decision to conduct mass searches over events that occurred several years ago, as well as the initiation of motions for interim measures in the form of unconditional detention. At the same time, the SBI filed motions to suspend all three employees from their positions, despite the absence of risks of interference in the investigation.

On July 22, the court imposed interim measures on all three suspects. The first detective was suspended from duty until September 21 and ordered to notify authorities of any change of residence and not to leave Kyiv. The second was placed under personal obligations for 60 days and also suspended from work. The third was placed under nighttime house arrest for 60 days.

Particularly puzzling is the suspension from duty of these NABU detectives. Such an interim measure requires establishing circumstances that justify the belief that the suspect’s continued service contributed to the commission of the crime, or that while in office, the suspect might destroy or falsify evidence, unlawfully influence witnesses or other participants in the proceedings, or otherwise obstruct the investigation. Based on the publicly available facts, it is unclear how such risks could have been proved.

Thus, the road accident cases raise questions about the proportionality of the measures applied and their synchronization with other proceedings against the NABU. The suspension of detectives over traffic accidents is especially questionable, since the law requires substantiated grounds showing that remaining in office contributed to the crime or poses risks to the investigation.

Instead of conclusions: questions that require answers

An analysis of the events of July 21, 2025, and the subsequent investigation into NABU employees raises a series of fundamental questions that concern not only these specific cases but also the overall adherence to the rule of law in Ukraine.

Why did all actions by different law enforcement bodies take place simultaneously on the same day, just before the parliamentary vote on dismantling the independence of the NABU and the SAPO? Why did cases of entirely different jurisdiction — from traffic accidents to high treason — advance at the same time? Why were searches conducted without court warrants, and why were appellate reviews delayed?

Particular concern arises over the quality of the evidence base in cases qualified as treason and aiding the aggressor. In Mahamedrasulov’s case, analysis revealed inconsistencies regarding an apparent confusion of countries in relation to subsidy programs. In Husarov’s case, the SSU initially informed the NABU that no evidence of anti-state activity had been found, but a year later suddenly detained the employee without providing further documentary confirmation.

Why did law enforcement communication rely so heavily on manipulative tactics — from emphasizing family ties to unlawfully disclosing the names of suspects? Why was the evacuation of a detective’s family in February 2022 interpreted as a “connection with a Russian agent,” and why was an oligarch’s remark “looks like there will be a second NABU” presented as an attempt to “settle criminal cases”?

Any criminal proceedings, regardless of the seriousness of the charges, must be conducted in strict compliance with the rule of law, the presumption of innocence, and procedural guarantees. However, the published facts, including reports of beatings during detentions, excessive pre-trial measures in traffic accident and false declaration cases, the coordinated actions of multiple law enforcement bodies, and public communication that undermines the presumption of innocence, point to systemic violations.

These circumstances suggest that the criminal prosecutions of NABU employees have become one of the key elements in attempts to dismantle independent anti-corruption institutions. The synchronization with the parliamentary vote, the scale of the operation, and the nature of the communication all indicate a political motivation behind these actions.

If, however, genuine evidence emerges proving that employees of anti-corruption bodies acted in the interests of the aggressor state, such matters must be resolved within the framework of existing disciplinary and criminal procedures in full compliance with procedural guarantees.