On 22 July, Members of Parliament, in violation of parliamentary procedure, introduced amendments to Draft Law No. 12414 for its second reading that aim to dismantle the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Originally, the draft law focused on amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine concerning the specifics of pre-trial investigations into criminal offenses related to the disappearance of persons under special circumstances during martial law.
This amended law was subsequently adopted by Parliament, signed by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, and is now pending the signature of the President of Ukraine.
Brief conclusions:
- Once enacted, the Head of SAPO will lose autonomy in organizing SAPO’s work and overseeing NABU investigations.
- The Prosecutor General will gain access to all NABU cases and be empowered to reassign them to other bodies.
- A “single window” will be created for closing cases involving top officials by decision of the Prosecutor General.
Our recommendation:
- The President of Ukraine should veto the law.
What is it like now?
The independent functioning of anti-corruption institutions is directly tied to their ability to expose and investigate corruption free from unjustified external control.
The current provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code guarantee the following to the NABU and the SAPO:
- The NABU and the SAPO may notify the President’s Office leadership, Cabinet members, and heads of ESBU and SBI, as well as other Category “A” officials, of suspicion without needing the Prosecutor General’s approval.
- Only the prosecutor directly supervising an investigation may request NABU case files, and only SAPO prosecutors may resolve jurisdictional disputes.
- Other pre-trial investigation bodies and prosecutors from the Prosecutor General’s Office have limited access to NABU case materials.
- The Head of SAPO is recognized as the head of a prosecutor’s office, having authority to independently organize the operations of a subordinate body.
- The Prosecutor General has no authority to close criminal cases against top officials.
What did Parliament change?
Members of Parliament, including Maksym Buzhanskyi, in violation of Article 116 of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada (which governs submission of proposals and amendments before second readings), introduced and passed the following provisions in Draft Law No. 12414:
- Only the Prosecutor General will have the authority to notify the leadership of the President’s Office, Cabinet of Ministers, ESBU, SBI, and other Category “A” officials of suspicion.
- The Prosecutor General may request any materials from any investigative body, including NABU.
- The Head of SAPO loses the power to determine NABU’s exceptional jurisdiction and to resolve jurisdictional disputes.
- Any NABU/SAPO case against top officials may be closed by the decision of the Prosecutor General, and plea agreements in corruption cases may now bypass SAPO leadership and be concluded through the Prosecutor General.
What are the key risks of the draft law?
The adopted version of Draft Law No. 12414 undermines all progress made in securing the procedural autonomy of the SAPO and will negatively affect NABU’s investigative effectiveness. Strengthening SAPO’s procedural independence has been a key condition for continued financial support from Ukraine’s international partners, including the IMF.
Additional barriers to issuing notices of suspicion to top officials
The law now requires that notices of suspicion to the President’s Office, Cabinet, ESBU, SBI, and other Category “A” officials be issued exclusively by the Prosecutor General.
This decision is a major setback in the ability of anti-corruption bodies to act independently. Rather than simplifying procedures for special-status subjects such as Members of Parliament, the state is erecting new barriers to investigations.
The requirement to coordinate procedural actions with the Prosecutor General has already caused case delays and introduced political interference.
A telling example is the case of MP Oleksandr Yurchenko, caught accepting a bribe. When the SAPO lacked a head, Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova coordinated all procedural actions. She delayed signing the NABU-prepared suspicion for seven days, effectively blocking the investigation.
Undermining NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction
Previously, no other pre-trial investigation body had the right to interfere in cases under NABU’s jurisdiction. However, under the adopted law, the Prosecutor General may now assign NABU cases to other agencies.
Moreover, the Prosecutor General alone now decides whether the NABU may investigate cases of exceptional public interest, enabling them to reassign cases to the National Police, ESBU, SBI, or SSU.
For example, the case of former SSU employee Artem Shylo, suspected of embezzling funds from Ukrzaliznytsia, could now be reassigned to the SSU.
This effectively legalizes practices that have already been used in the Pavlo Vovk case, the chairman of the now liquidated DACK. Then the Pecherskyi Court ordered the Prosecutor General Venediktova to transfer the case away from the NABU.
Leaks of NABU case information
The new law obliges the NABU and the SAPO to immediately provide all case-related information to the Prosecutor General upon request.
Moreover, the Prosecutor General may assign another prosecutor to review whether investigative procedures are being followed correctly, after gaining full access to pre-trial case materials.
This creates an unprecedented risk of leaks in high-level cases involving top officials — including prosecutors, judges, ministers, and heads of ARMA, ESBU, SBI, and NSDC.
It is especially concerning that the draft law simplifies transfers of prosecutors to the Prosecutor General’s Office during martial law without competition and even allows for appointments from outside the prosecutorial system. These changes appear designed to strengthen the Prosecutor General’s control over NABU cases but contradict merit-based principles for appointments and promotions within the prosecution service.
Curtailing the powers of the Head of SAPO
The law effectively strips the Head of SAPO of influence over most pre-trial investigation procedures. Not even two years after SAPO was granted institutional independence, we are witnessing an attempt not only to reverse that autonomy but to significantly strengthen central control.
Specifically, the Head of SAPO is no longer recognized as the head of a prosecutorial body, which may obstruct the organization of SAPO’s operations and complicate appeals or cassation proceedings.
Even more paradoxically, the Head of SAPO may now exercise prosecutorial powers in a specific case only if permitted to do so by the Prosecutor General.
Prosecutor General may unilaterally close cases involving top officials
The document grants the Prosecutor General authority to close NABU cases, bypassing the SAPO. This is not about ordinary proceedings, but specifically those involving high-ranking officials, including: Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov, former Deputy Minister of Energy Oleksandr Kheilo, former Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy Taras Vysotskyi, and others.
This is dangerous, as the Prosecutor General is appointed without a competitive procedure and is politically dependent.
Concentrating such powers creates significant corruption risks, undermines institutional safeguards for investigative independence, and erodes the hard-won autonomy of SAPO.
Conclusions and recommendations
Transparency International Ukraine urges the President of Ukraine to veto this law.
The law was adopted in blatant violation of democratic procedure and in defiance of the Verkhovna Rada’s Rules of Procedure.
If enacted, the law will significantly harm ongoing anti-corruption investigations and effectively prevent new cases from being opened against public officials because:
- It introduces new barriers by giving the Prosecutor General authority to issue suspicions to certain high-ranking officials (e.g., the head of the President’s Office), meaning anti-corruption bodies will no longer be able to independently bring charges, even with sufficient evidence.
- It dismantles the principle of NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction, as the Prosecutor General may now reassign NABU’s cases and the Head of SAPO loses the power to resolve jurisdictional disputes. As a result, major cases may be transferred to other pre-trial investigation bodies capable of quietly closing them.
- Other agencies will be able to access information from NABU’s criminal proceedings. This means that, if necessary, suspects can be warned in advance, and all obtained evidence can be undermined through its disclosure.
- The Prosecutor General may issue binding instructions directly to SAPO prosecutors, bypassing the Head of SAPO. This means prosecutors may be forced to pursue weak leads that derail investigations.
- The law allows the Prosecutor General to unilaterally close any criminal case against a public official. That is, even if all other levers of influence fail, the Prosecutor General will be able to simply close the case, bypassing the position of the prosecutor overseeing the investigation.
