The main considerations and conclusions on combating corruption and organised crime from the sections of the Shadow Report for the European Commission, prepared by Transparency International Ukraine.

On 20 October, Transparency International Ukraine, in coalition with civil society organisations, presented the second Shadow Report under Chapter 23 “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” and Chapter 24 “Justice, Freedom and Security” of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s Progress under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package. 

“This year, our section of the report was notably different from how we described the challenges in anti-corruption efforts last year. If in the first Shadow Report we primarily recorded the state of play in the work of various anti-corruption institutions, this time we were able to track progress in addressing the previously identified shortcomings. And, of course, we described new challenges — and there turned out to be quite a few over the past year. We approached the part on organised crime in the same way as last year, since for us and future readers this is new information that needs to be documented for further tracking,” explained Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director of TI Ukraine for Legal Affairs.

The period from September 2024 to July 2025 was characterised by mixed trends in the field of combating corruption and organised crime in Ukraine. During this time, we witnessed certain positive developments; however, society was alarmed by the rollback of reforms and the emergence of systemic challenges in the functioning of anti-corruption institutions.

Based on this analysis, TI Ukraine experts provided 143 recommendations to improve the situation.

Among the positive developments during this period were:

  • A large-scale recruitment of new staff to the NABU and the SAPO 
  • Adoption of the law that improved the procedure for concluding plea bargains in corruption cases, marking the first step towards systematising this practice in Ukraine
  • Formulation by the Supreme Court of important legal positions on distinguishing between official offences
  • Measures undertaken by the NABU to enhance information security
  • The Cabinet of Ministers updating the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025, while preserving its key measures
  • The long-awaited launch of the ARMA reform, following a delay in adopting the relevant law. 

At the same time, during preparation of the report, TI Ukraine experts identified three main groups of problems in combating corruption and organised crime, which significantly hinder Ukraine’s progress on its path towards EU accession.

1. Prevention of corruption

  • The NACP has retained problematic practices in financial control despite previous criticism from civil society and international auditors. Meanwhile, the number of recorded conflict-of-interest violations has decreased, raising doubts about the effectiveness of high-level monitoring.
  • The NACP’s overall capacity for anti-corruption mainstreaming — that is, integrating anti-corruption initiatives across various sectors — remains low.
  • Implementation of measures under the updated State Anti-Corruption Programme has not reached a satisfactory level. Delays have been observed in preparing the new Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Programme.

2. Anti-corruption segment of criminal justice

  • The Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine still contains provisions requiring the mandatory closure of criminal proceedings due to expiry of pre-trial investigation terms.
  • There have been more frequent cases of suspects and accused persons absconding, while the number of HACC cases at risk of closure due to statute of limitations continues to grow.
  • Despite calls from civil society, the Verkhovna Rada has failed to improve mechanisms to counter procedural abuse. As a result, the average duration of cases in the HACC has reached 618 days — the highest figure since the court’s establishment — with procedural abuses identified in 55% of cases.
  • Problems persist in the effectiveness of criminal asset confiscation, while tools for extended confiscation require improvement, particularly regarding the grounds for property seizure.

3. Institutional capacity of anti-corruption bodies

  • The new audit of the NACP’s performance remains on hold due to delays in updating its methodology, criteria, and evaluation period. Meanwhile, most recommendations from the previous audit have not been properly implemented, even after the change of the NACP leadership in early 2024, and some practices have even worsened.
  • Following the dismissal of the Head of ARMA, this vacant position should be filled as soon as possible under the new competitive selection rules, and an audit of the Agency (as envisaged by the new law) should be conducted.
  • The terms of international experts in selection commissions for top positions are already expiring, which will increase risks of political interference in these processes.
  • Although the Head of SAPO currently acts as an independent procedural figure, certain powers, particularly regarding the initiation of criminal proceedings against specific categories of subjects and certain aspects of international cooperation, still belong exclusively to the Prosecutor General.

In addition to the above issues, TI Ukraine emphasizes new negative trends threatening the institutional independence of anti-corruption bodies, identified already during the preparation of the Shadow Report. In particular, serious concern was caused by Law No. 4555-IX (Draft Law No. 12414), which in July 2025 put at risk the institutional independence and autonomy of the SAPO and the NABU for nine days. The adoption of this law was accompanied by violations of democratic procedures and provoked a sharp negative reaction from both the public and the international community. 

Although the harmful law was almost entirely deactivated on 31 July 2025, some of its provisions remain in force and may still have adverse effects — as may the controversial provisions of the subsequently adopted Law No. 4560-IX.

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This year, our section of the report was notably different from how we described the challenges in anti-corruption efforts last year. If in the first Shadow Report we primarily recorded the state of play in the work of various anti-corruption institutions, this time we were able to track progress in addressing the previously identified shortcomings. And, of course, we described new challenges — and there turned out to be quite a few over the past year.

Kateryna Ryzhenko

How we prepared our section of the Shadow Report

Alongside TI Ukraine, the report was prepared by The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, the Ukrainian Bar Association, Europe Without Barriers, and European Pravda.

In preparing our section on combating corruption and organized crime, Transparency International Ukraine experts:

  • Conducted 22 interviews with representatives of international partners, civil society experts, and government officials — we are deeply grateful to all respondents for their time
  • Analysed legislation and its practical implementation
  • Examined information obtained from nine state institutions
  • Analysed international standards, including EU regulatory documents
  • Reviewed official and statistical data and, based on these, identified trends in the activities of the state bodies covered by the report.

In our view, this approach to preparing our chapters of the Shadow Report made it possible to develop comprehensive recommendations and to assess the current state of play.

 

Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom, and Security, examined in the Shadow Report, are part of Cluster 1, “Fundamentals.” It is key to the entire negotiation process, as it will be the first to open and the last to close at the final stage of negotiations — after the consent of all EU member states.

he Shadow Report was prepared by a coalition of civil society organisations, led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, within the framework of the EU Project Pravo-Justice grant, implemented by Expertise France. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union.

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Alongside TI Ukraine, the report was prepared by The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, the Ukrainian Bar Association, Europe Without Barriers, and European Pravda.