What MPs Propose to Change in Asset Declaration and the Jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption System

On May 23, 2025, ninety MPs, the vast majority of whom belong to the presidential faction “Servant of the People,” led by the main author Oleksandr Tkachenko, registered Draft Law No. 13271-1 on “introducing stricter liability for corruption or corruption-related offenses.” 

On May 28, the working group under the lead Committee on Law Enforcement announced that work on the amendments would continue, taking into account all proposals received from its members. Already on June 5, the Committee recommended adopting the draft law as a basis in the revised version and as a whole, together with the rejection of Draft Laws No. 13271 and No. 13271-2.

This document is an alternative to the significantly weaker Draft Law No. 13271, authored by MP Serhii Vlasenko of the Batkivshchyna faction, which concerned “improving the procedure for holding officials accountable.” Vlasenko registered a separate draft law because a significant part of his similar initiatives was not included in Draft Law No. 12374-d on the ARMA reform, which had already been adopted at first reading on February 12, 2025. At the time, the Verkhovna Rada’s lead Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy rejected all these amendments for the second reading and proposed a substantially revised version for consideration in the plenary hall — a version Transparency International Ukraine recommended to be adopted as a whole.

Overall, the registration of the alternative Draft Law No. 13271-1 served as a counterweight to the more dangerous initiatives proposed by Vlasenko. It made it possible to neutralize the MP’s destructive proposals regarding electronic asset declaration, which lawmakers could have supported in the plenary hall. Such a development was entirely plausible, judging by previous successful votes by MPs in favor of harmful amendments during the improper reinstatement of declarations and the closure of the declaration register in the fall of 2023. That situation even prompted the President to exercise a veto. 

Transparency International Ukraine has prepared a legal analysis of the strengths and areas for improvement of Draft Law No. 13271-1, as well as the earlier positions of the NACP and SAPO, as expressed in their letters to the Committee ahead of the June 5 meeting.

Brief conclusions:

• Transparency International Ukraine supports the adoption of Draft Law No. 13271-1 as a basis with further refinement for the second reading and endorses the Committee’s rejection of alternative draft laws Nos. 13271 and 13271-2.
• Raising the liability thresholds for false asset declaration from UAH 0.3–6 million to UAH 0.45–7.5 million may be justified by the depreciation of the hryvnia, and since this is accompanied by an increase in fines, such legislative changes can be positively assessed at this stage. For the same reasons, we have no critical objections to raising the threshold for civil forfeiture from UAH 1.51 million to UAH 2.27 million.
• Lowering the threshold for illicit enrichment from UAH 9.84 million to UAH 9.08 million can be positively assessed, provided that the draft law is further refined before the second reading.
• Establishing time limits for inclusion in the Corruption Offenders Register for administrative and criminal offenses related to or constituting corruption (depending on the offense, the term may range from 1 to 8 years) puts an end to disproportionate interference with individual rights and fulfills one of the recommendations of the NACP’s external audit.
• Issues related to the mobilization of individuals accused of serious or especially serious corruption crimes are regulated. However, unlike Draft Law No. 13284, this new draft law does not propose suspending the statute of limitations in the event of a defendant’s mobilization.

Our recommendations:

• In the future, it is worth considering lowering the thresholds for liability for false asset declaration and for the application of civil forfeiture.
• Grant the NACP the authority to identify unjustified assets and collect evidence of their unjustified nature under Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code without being restricted by special procedures, and improve the civil forfeiture mechanism in line with the recommendations of our separate study. 
• Introduce a flexible option to transition from criminal proceedings for illicit enrichment to civil forfeiture based on the SAPO prosecutors’ assessment of the evidentiary basis in individual cases. However, to enable this, all proceedings related to illicit enrichment and civil forfeiture (with the exception of cases involving NABU, SAPO, and HACC officials) must be handled through the SAPO.
• The mechanisms for the NABU to claim cases for its own investigation should be improved in conjunction with the recommended granting of authority to the Bureau to investigate illicit enrichment and false asset declaration regardless of the declarant’s position, if the liability threshold is met.
• The subject of monitoring lifestyle, if this mechanism remains in the legislation, should be adjusted in the opposite direction — to provide the NACP with the ability to conduct proactive information and analytical work, similar to NABU’s approach, for identifying and preliminarily reviewing specific potential abuses.
• Extend the period of criminal record validity, including for those conditionally released from punishment.

How these issues are handled now 

The issues addressed by the draft law are currently regulated by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, as well as the Laws of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention and on Military Duty and Military Service. These legal regulations provide for the following types of liability for false asset declaration:

• Administrative liability for false asset declaration under Article 172-6 of the Administrative Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount ranging from 100 to 500 subsistence minimums for able-bodied persons (UAH 302,800 – 1,514,000 or USD 7,300 – 36,500 at the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) exchange rate as of June 5, 2025).
• Criminal liability for false asset declaration under Article 366-2(1) of the Criminal Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount from 500 to 2,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 1,514,000 – 6,056,000 or USD 36,500 – 146,000), in the form of a fine ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 51,000 – 68,000 or USD 1,230 – 1,640).
• Criminal liability for false asset declaration under Article 366-2(2) of the Criminal Code applies where false information is submitted in an amount exceeding 2,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 6.056 million or USD 146,000), in the form of a fine ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 68,000 – 85,000 or USD 1,640 – 2,050).
• Claims for the forfeiture and recovery to the state of unjustified assets under civil forfeiture pursuant to Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code are filed when the discrepancy between asset value and lawful income exceeds 500 subsistence minimums (UAH 1,514,000 or USD 36,500).
• Illicit enrichment under Article 368-5 of the Criminal Code is defined as acquiring assets in excess of lawful income worth more than 6,500 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 9,841,000 or USD 237,250).
• NABU detectives may investigate cases under Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the value of the subject matter of the offense is: 500 or more subsistence minimums for Articles 354, 368, 369, and 369-2 of the Criminal Code (UAH 1,514,000 or USD 36,500); over 2,000 subsistence minimums for Articles 191, 206-2, 209, 210, 211, 364, and 410 of the Criminal Code (UAH 6,056,000 or USD 146,000), provided the offense is committed by an official from a state body, law enforcement agency, the military, local government, or a state/municipal enterprise. 
• No term is currently established for the duration of an individual’s inclusion in the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses (“Offender Register,” formerly the “Corruption Register”) under Article 59 of the Law of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention. 

What is proposed in the Committee’s version of the draft law

The new provisions aim to revise the criteria for criminal and administrative liability in the area of asset declaration and illicit enrichment, the range of persons and thresholds for applying civil forfeiture, NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, and to establish maximum time limits for inclusion in the Offender Register, among other things.

Below is a detailed overview of the changes introduced in the draft law following its review by the Committee:

1. Administrative liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount ranging from 150 to 750 subsistence minimums (UAH 454,200 – 2,271,000 or USD 10,950 – 54,750).

2. Criminal liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount from 750 to 2,500 subsistence minimums (UAH 2,271,000 – 7,570,000 or USD 54,750 – 182,500), including a fine ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 68,000 – 102,000 or USD 1,640 – 2,460). 

3. Criminal liability for false asset declaration will apply where false information is submitted in an amount exceeding 2,500 subsistence minimums (UAH 7.57 million or USD 182,500), including a fine ranging from 6,000 to 8,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 102,000 – 136,000 or USD 2,460 – 3,280).

The 50% increase in the threshold for administrative liability and the 25–50% increase for criminal liability for false asset declaration does not raise critical concerns on our part. Once the proposed provisions are adopted, these thresholds in U.S. dollar equivalent will better align with the limits that were in place during the reinstatement of the declaration system following the destructive decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine at the end of 2020. At the time the new law is adopted, the U.S. dollar will cost approximately 50% more than on the day the current thresholds were approved by Parliament on December 4, 2020 — UAH 28.30 versus UAH 41.48 per USD as of June 5, 2025. Moreover, the increase in the maximum threshold for criminal liability under Article 366-2(2) of the Criminal Code is not even 50%, but only 25% — 2,500 subsistence minimums versus 2,000. 

In addition, the increase in criminal liability thresholds will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in fines, which makes this legislative initiative generally acceptable. However, since the proposed changes will have retroactive effect, a portion of currently pending investigations will have to be closed.

4. Claims for the forfeiture and recovery to the state budget of unjustified assets under civil forfeiture pursuant to Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code will be filed when the discrepancy between the asset value and lawful income exceeds 750 subsistence minimums (UAH 2.271 million or USD 54,750).

The depreciation of the hryvnia also justifies the 50% increase in the threshold for civil forfeiture — from 500 to 750 subsistence minimums. The U.S. dollar is currently worth 67% more than on October 31, 2019, the date the current thresholds were adopted, when the rate was UAH 24.99 per USD. Therefore, this change also raises no objections. 

Similar arguments regarding the depreciation of the hryvnia are also expressed by SAPO in its position submitted to the lead Committee. We have previously noted that this threshold is directly linked to the effectiveness of the civil forfeiture mechanism, as the overall state expenditure for organizing the civil forfeiture process — gathering evidence by the prosecutor and proving the unjustified nature of the asset in court — must correspond to the outcome of the proceedings.

5. Illicit enrichment will involve the acquisition of assets exceeding lawful income in value by more than 3,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 9.084 million or USD 219,000) and, along with civil forfeiture, will be extended to include the category of persons listed in Article 3(2)(e) of the Law of Ukraine on Corruption Prevention.

The expansion of the list of persons against whom claims for recovery of unjustified assets can be filed, and to whom the Criminal Code article on illicit enrichment will apply, was recommended by SAPO. As a result, the version of the draft law after the Committee’s review includes a proposal to broaden the scope of individuals subject to illicit enrichment and civil forfeiture provisions. 

Thus, following the adoption of the new provisions, these mechanisms will also apply to the heads and members of expert teams assessing a person’s day-to-day functioning, as well as to the heads, deputy heads, members, and secretaries of non-staff permanent military medical and aviation medical commissions. In our view, this innovation deserves support.

6. NABU detectives may investigate cases under Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the value of the subject matter of the offense exceeds 5,000 subsistence minimums (UAH 15.14 million or USD 365,000), provided the offense was committed by an official of a state body, law enforcement agency, the military, local government, or a state/municipal enterprise under Articles 191, 206-2, 209, 210, 211, 364, or 410 of the Criminal Code. 

This proposal aligns with the findings of the external independent assessment, which positively assessed NABU’s policy of prioritizing criminal proceedings.

7. The retention period for data before removal from the Offender Register for corruption or corruption-related offenses will be as follows:

• in the case of civil or administrative liability – 1 year;
• in the case of criminal liability – until the conviction is expunged or annulled;
• in the case of criminal law measures applied to legal entities – 5 years.

Back in 2023, the Commission conducting the independent assessment of the NACP’s effectiveness emphasized the need to resolve this issue, noting that it could be perceived as a disproportionate interference with individual rights. At the time, TI Ukraine supported this recommendation from international auditors.

8. The transitional and final provisions are supplemented with rules regarding the mobilization of individuals accused of serious and especially serious corruption crimes. 

A court may suspend criminal proceedings against a person accused of a serious or especially serious corruption offense who has been called up for military service during mobilization or under contract, if it determines that the individual’s direct participation in defense-related activities makes it impossible for them to take part in court proceedings, including remote hearings via videoconference.

However, Draft Law No. 13271-1 does not propose suspending the statute of limitations during the mobilization of defendants, as provided in Draft Law No. 13284, which is currently under consideration by Parliament.

How the positive provisions of the draft law can be further strengthened

In the future, when improving Draft Law No. 13271-1, legislators should consider lowering the thresholds for criminal liability for making false statements in asset declarations, as well as extending the relevant statute of limitations. For example, false asset declaration is currently classified as a non-serious offense with a limitation period of three years, which in practice may be insufficient for conducting investigations and completing judicial proceedings.

Moreover, MPs should take into account that the current sanction for illicit enrichment — imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years — has a stronger deterrent effect in terms of future conduct and risk assessment by the person concerned than civil forfeiture. Accordingly, further lowering the threshold for illicit enrichment could have a corrective effect on the potential level of corruption, which can generally be regarded as a positive step in the fight against corruption. 

As for specific recommendations regarding the draft law, we at Transparency International Ukraine are convinced that Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code could be further amended to explicitly grant the NACP the authority to collect evidence without special procedures. Under the current version of Article 290(5) of the Civil Procedure Code, the NABU and SAPO, and, in legally defined cases, the SBI and the Prosecutor General’s Office, are empowered to detect unjustified assets and gather evidence of their unjustified nature, while the NACP is not included in this list. 

Likewise, the final version of the draft law should continue to expand the list of persons who may be subject to civil forfeiture and improve this mechanism overall. Previously, we at Transparency International Ukraine dedicated a separate study to the challenges of civil forfeiture, which included corresponding recommendations for enhancing the implementation of this concept. 

The draft law also fails to address the problem of enforcing the consequence of civil forfeiture that provides for the automatic dismissal of public officials. In the context of civil forfeiture, in addition to the recovery of unjustified assets, the individual must be dismissed from office after the court decision enters into force, with the exception of MPs. At the same time, there is already case law contradicting this provision. 

For example, one decision of the HACC Appeals Chamber on forfeiture entered into legal force on December 3, 2024, and in accordance with the requirements of the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Director of the SBI dismissed the relevant employee from their position. However, on February 12, 2025, the head of the State Bureau of Investigation reappointed that employee to the same position effective February 18, relying on the fact that the Law on the State Bureau of Investigation does not prohibit reappointment. 

Such practice undermines the civil forfeiture mechanism and may encourage public officials to make a psychological decision to acquire unjustified assets. After all, the only consequence they might face is forfeiture of the asset following court proceedings, while they may avoid dismissal and remain in a position that allows further accumulation of such unjustified property. 

Another nuance of the proposed provisions is that the reduction of the illicit enrichment threshold — and, accordingly, the upper limit for civil forfeiture — by UAH 0.75 million has an ambiguous nature, meaning that the change has both advantages and disadvantages.

This adjustment is not aligned with the threshold for aggravated criminal liability for false asset declaration — 3,000 subsistence minimums versus 2,500. Therefore, it would be optimal to harmonize the thresholds for aggravated liability for false declarations and for illicit enrichment, since the latter does not activate at the starting point of the aggravated false declaration threshold. This creates a gap of UAH 1.5 million between the two thresholds, allowing a declarant to avoid liability for illicit enrichment by exploiting this legal loophole. 

On the other hand, the current opportunities for effective use of civil forfeiture remain more limited than would be desirable. It is worth recalling that civil forfeiture operates under a lower standard of proof, making it a more accessible tool. It is based on the “balance of probabilities” principle, under which the burden lies with the state to prove that the assets are more likely unjustified than acquired from lawful sources. In contrast, illicit enrichment requires a significantly stronger evidentiary basis for an indictment, as guilt must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” — with all doubts in criminal proceedings interpreted in favor of the defendant. 

Currently, after a court acquittal in an illicit enrichment case, SAPO has no legal option to apply civil forfeiture measures to such individuals. Therefore, lowering the illicit enrichment threshold, which would result in more cases falling under this article, should not preclude the possibility of pursuing civil forfeiture in court if the suspect is acquitted. SAPO also raises this issue in its position, noting the need to preserve this option following the closure of a criminal case. 

To address this issue, it would be preferable for SAPO to be granted the authority to exercise procedural supervision in all illicit enrichment cases — a power not currently provided by law. In such a scenario, SAPO prosecutors could assess, on a case-by-case basis, the judicial prospects of pursuing a case either through criminal or civil proceedings. However, this should not overburden the institution, especially considering that its capacity is expanding and that illicit enrichment cases may only relate to assets acquired since 2019. In addition, the filing of an indictment should interrupt the statute of limitations for filing a civil forfeiture claim. However, the draft law contains no such provision, and it should therefore be improved in this respect.

Furthermore, the possibility for the NABU to investigate other cases that do not fall within the revised thresholds for criminal offenses or damage caused should not be ruled out. Prosecutors are authorized to assign cases to NABU detectives if the offense has caused or could have caused serious consequences for society or the state, and NABU detectives are empowered to investigate cases initially handled by other bodies upon the decision of the NABU Director and with the consent of the SAPO prosecutor. To ensure this, the procedure for requesting such cases and coordinating interactions between the NABU, the SAPO, and other investigative bodies should be improved.

No less important in resolving the issue of the absence of a maximum retention period in the so-called “Corruption Offender Register” is to take into account that the periods of criminal record validity under Article 89 of the Criminal Code are rather short, for example, in the case of a plea agreement that provides for exemption from actual punishment, the maximum period is 3 years. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the duration of the probationary period established under such agreements to at least 6 years, as was proposed in the government draft law on plea agreements. 

We have no objections to the retention periods proposed in Draft Law No. 13271-1 for inclusion in the Offender Register, provided that future amendments to the Criminal Code extend the periods of criminal record validity (to at least 6 years, as proposed in the government’s draft law on plea agreements), and also introduce a retention period for disciplinary offenses. The NACP’s proposal to remove individuals only from the public section of the Register also, in our view, deserves consideration by the legislature.

Which provisions of the original draft law were amended or removed by the Committee’s version?

In the vast majority of cases, the Committee succeeded in removing the most critical provisions from the original version of the draft law.

One particularly dangerous provision in the original draft was the narrowing of NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, which is already imperfect as it does not cover certain high-ranking officials. Such a narrowing could have occurred as a result of raising the thresholds for false asset declarations. If the MPs’ amendments had been adopted, new cases would have fallen outside the NABU-SAPO-HACC framework and instead been handled by the SBI – National Police – Prosecutor General’s Office – courts of general jurisdiction. This would have significantly undermined the effectiveness of pre-trial investigations and court proceedings in terms of ensuring the inevitability of punishment. 

Since the NABU, the SAPO, and the HACC have been granted legal authority to expand their staff, such legislative limitations on their jurisdiction and competence would have been inconsistent. On the contrary, the NABU should be empowered to investigate illicit enrichment and false asset declarations regardless of the declarant’s position, provided that the value meets the offense threshold.

The Committee rejected the proposal to raise the minimum bribe amount for NABU investigations, which could have allowed serious corrupt actors to escape accountability by transferring their cases to less specialized bodies — such as the SBI or National Police. For example, Kyiv City Council member Vladyslav Trubitsyn and five other individuals are currently being tried in absentia for receiving UAH 1.39 million in bribes in exchange for retail outlets in the capital. If such changes had been adopted, this case and others like it would no longer fall within NABU’s purview. 

The original draft also proposed that the NACP’s lifestyle monitoring period not exceed four months from the date of the relevant decision, and that monitoring would be limited exclusively to assets, income, expenditures, services, and other elements of lifestyle acquired or received while holding office, with no authority to monitor candidates for office. These provisions were excluded from the Committee’s version.

In general, the timeframe for lifestyle monitoring should not be regulated at the legislative level under optimal circumstances, as it is too minor an issue from a legal drafting perspective to warrant legislative attention. Nevertheless, the inclusion of such norms in Draft Law No. 13271-1 appeared to be a forced step, as the NACP has never imposed any time limits on lifestyle monitoring in its own subordinate regulations or methodological guidelines. 

According to our research on the lifestyle monitoring mechanism, such lack of time limits can result in excessive interference with the private lives of declarants, which is prohibited by law and may also constitute a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) — the right to respect for private and family life — potentially giving rise to cases before the European Court of Human Rights against Ukraine. 

The NACP also reported at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy that in 2023, the minimum duration of lifestyle monitoring was 3.5 months, the average duration was 10 months, and the maximum reached 18 months. In 2024, the minimum dropped to 2 months, the average stood at 9 months, and the maximum was 15.5 months. In a context where the state has only four years (from the date the disputed assets were acquired) under the statute of limitations for filing civil claims to recognize assets as unjustified, spending up to 1.5 years on lifestyle monitoring alone is excessive. Therefore, calling this procedure an effective tool seems somewhat inaccurate. It is also important to note that, unlike limitation periods for liability, the statute of limitations in these cases is calculated up to the moment the claim is filed with the court. 

Thus, introducing a four-month limit for lifestyle monitoring could be supported if it also included a provision for a justified extension of up to two additional months. The NACP’s proposal to the lead Committee to establish a 180-day monitoring period with the possibility of extending it by another 180 days is not relevant, as a full year of potential lifestyle monitoring does not resolve the issue of its excessive duration. For the same reason, SAPO’s proposal to leave lifestyle monitoring without any time limits should also not be taken into account. Therefore, in the future, the monitoring period should be regulated at the level of the NACP’s internal procedure.

More dangerous provisions in the original version of the draft law included proposals to limit the subject of lifestyle monitoring exclusively to assets acquired while holding office, and to exclude the verification of assets belonging to the declarant’s family members or third parties, which is currently allowed. From the perspective of the goals of the electronic declaration system, such changes would not only create a major legal loophole and the potential for legalizing unjustified assets — for instance, by resigning and later returning to office, or falsely claiming that assets were acquired before taking office — but would also set a dangerous precedent for further narrowing the scope of full declaration verifications. Although Draft Law No. 13271-1, unlike the problematic primary draft No. 13271 by Serhii Vlasenko, does not affect full verifications, the legislator could, in the future, use such a narrowing of lifestyle monitoring as a precedent for restricting the scope of full checks as well. 

It worth mentioning that international standards envisage a single procedure for verifying asset declarations, not a variety of them. This is why Transparency International Ukraine has proposed abolishing lifestyle monitoring altogether, as a procedure that duplicates full verifications. However, if monitoring is retained in legislation, it should be viewed as a preliminary check of specific potential abuses proactively identified by NACP staff through information and analytical work, similar to NABU’s model, which the NACP currently does not conduct. Where the declarant fails such monitoring, the Agency should initiate a full verification, covering all sections of the declaration. Such provisions could also be added as part of improvements to the draft law.

The original version of the draft law did not provide a comprehensive framework for the duration of inclusion in the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses (the “Offender Register,” formerly the “Corruption Register”). It proposed that this period should not exceed the relevant limitation established by Article 39 of the Code of Administrative Offenses — one year for those subjected to administrative sanctions — and the limitation periods set out in Article 89 of the Criminal Code, for those convicted of criminal offenses (with criminal record terms ranging from one to eight years). However, the original draft law made no mention of time limits for inclusion in the Register based on civil, disciplinary measures, or liability of legal entities. The version adopted by the Committee is therefore more comprehensive and coherent.

Conclusions

Transparency International Ukraine believes that Draft Law No. 13271-1 should be adopted as a basis, with further refinement in line with our recommendations. This improvement process should involve international partners, as well as representatives of civil society and anti-corruption institutions. We support the Committee’s decision to reject the alternative draft laws No. 13271 and No. 13271-2. 

To improve the draft law, we recommend the following:

• Reduce the administrative threshold from UAH 0.3 million to, for example, UAH 0.15 million and the criminal thresholds from UAH 1.5 million and UAH 6 million to, for example, UAH 1.2 million and UAH 2.4 million for false asset declaration liability, and reduce the threshold for civil forfeiture from UAH 1.5 million to, for example, UAH 1.2 million.
• Grant the NACP the authority to identify unjustified assets and collect evidence of their unjustified nature under Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code without being restricted by special procedures, and improve the civil forfeiture mechanism in line with the recommendations of our separate study. 
• Introduce a flexible option to transition from criminal proceedings on illicit enrichment to civil forfeiture, based on the SAPO prosecutors’ assessment of the evidentiary basis in specific cases. To implement this, all illicit enrichment and civil forfeiture proceedings (excluding those involving NABU, SAPO, and HACC officials) should be handled through the SAPO.
• Improve case referral procedures when granting the NABU the authority to investigate illicit enrichment and false asset declarations regardless of the declarant’s position, provided the offense meets the applicable liability threshold.
• The subject of monitoring lifestyle, if this mechanism remains in the legislation, should be adjusted in the opposite direction — to provide the NACP with the ability to conduct proactive information and analytical work, similar to NABU’s approach, for identifying and preliminarily reviewing specific potential abuses.
• Harmonize the thresholds for aggravated criminal liability for false asset declaration and illicit enrichment, for example, by reducing both to UAH 2.4 million.
• Consider the NACP’s proposal to remove individuals only from the public section of the Offender Register and introduce a specific retention period for inclusion based on disciplinary violations.
• Extend the criminal record duration to at least six years, including for individuals conditionally released from punishment.

At present, Draft Law No. 13271-1 revises key elements of criminal liability and NABU jurisdiction and includes several positive innovations. However, with further improvement of the draft’s provisions, there remains significant potential for a more positive impact on the effectiveness of Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy.