From Three Draft Laws to One: A Legal Analysis of the Revised Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030

On July 15, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy endorsed the revised version of the draft Law on Approving the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 (No. 15230-d). It was prepared by merging three earlier texts: the draft law by MP Anastasiia Radina (No. 15230), the alternative draft by the Cabinet of Ministers (No. 15230-1, withdrawn from consideration after the government’s resignation), and the alternative draft by MP Petro Poroshenko and others (No. 15230-2).

We have previously analyzed the first two draft laws with respect to the subsections that fall within TI Ukraine’s area of expertise. This analysis focuses on the changes made in the final version compared with the earlier government draft. It covers provisions on both the anti-corruption segment of criminal justice and corruption prevention.

Key takeaways

The comparison shows that the revised version is stronger than the government’s and takes on board some of the comments we had raised regarding all three earlier versions. Among the most important points:

• the range of potential powers granted to the Head of SAPO has been expanded — to initiate criminal proceedings against MPs and to approve motions for investigative actions against them (1.10.3.1); a separate problem has been added on the mismanagement of seized assets (1.10.4), along with a comprehensive block on the selection of SBI leadership (2.2.9); and the risks of informal or political influence over the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General are now acknowledged;
• a separate block has appeared on the effectiveness of financial control measures and the internal procedures of NACP (1.6.8) — this partially closes the gap regarding the ineffectiveness of the e-declaration verification mechanism, which we had flagged in our analysis of earlier versions, and is a significant improvement;
• another positive change is the expansion of the list of declarants in line with EU recommendations; once the Strategy is adopted, the range of officials required to file declarations despite the low corruption risks in their work will be reviewed;
• a detailed provision has been included on statutorily defining the level and structure of salaries for all categories of NACP staff (1.10.1.1), which had been cut back in the government’s version;
• however, the provision on the participation of independent experts delegated by international partners in selecting members of the HQCJ and the HCJ does not make their involvement mandatory, which is a negative change;
• the draft law has also removed the provision allowing NACP to issue binding orders to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement the measures of the State Anti-Corruption Program, which significantly weakens the Strategy;
• the gap concerning the minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures remains unaddressed — contrary to OECD recommendations.

What the new draft law strengthened

Criminal justice

Stronger powers for the Head of SAPO (1.10.3.1). Under Draft Law No. 15230-1 (the government version), the Head of SAPO was granted only the powers to independently send extradition requests, set up joint investigation teams, and extend the time limits for pre-trial investigation. 

In 15230-d this has been substantially expanded: the Head of SAPO is now given the right to independently enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding MPs and to approve motions concerning them before the investigating judge, without involving the Prosecutor General. In our view, adopting these provisions is extremely important, especially in light of the upcoming expiry of the current Head of SAPO’s term. 

Measures to implement changes in ARMA’s work have been set out. In 15230-d, a new problem 1.10.4 appeared, concerning the mismanagement of assets transferred to ARMA. The expected results of solving this problem include introducing transparent and cost-effective asset management mechanisms, modernizing the Unified State Register of Assets to enable end-to-end tracking of the status of each seized asset, and establishing effective mechanisms for identifying assets so they can be transferred to the ARMA. It should be borne in mind here that the legislative framework already adopted allows some of these measures to be carried out, but amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code are also needed — ones that would require the prosecution to obtain an opinion from ARMA before filing a motion to transfer assets into management. 

NABU’s independence (1.10.2.1). 15230-d adds two points that were absent from 15230-1: staffing NABU through maximally open competitions, and strengthening communication with the public via the Public Oversight Council.

Corruption prevention

The effectiveness of financial control: new Problem 1.6.8. None of the earlier versions of the Strategy addressed the ineffectiveness of NACP’s e-declaration checks. Now a separate block has appeared, providing for the full and substantive implementation of the recommendations of the external independent assessment of the NACP, refinement of the risk-based approach with priority coverage of senior officials, and the simplification, consistency, and greater effectiveness of the internal procedures for analyzing declarations. These expected strategic results are fully in line with Ukraine’s European integration commitments, in particular the latest EU Enlargement Report on Ukraine. This is the main positive change in the new draft law as regards corruption prevention.

That said, the new draft law retains the provision on the “insufficient rollout of automated tools” (1.6.4), which could potentially affect how well the above provisions are implemented. After all, the main and most critical problem with NACP’s financial control today is the automation of declaration checks, which can end up replacing full checks by the Agency’s staff. As a result, we get cases like the automated check of Herman Halushchenko’s declarations, where the former minister’s declarations twice passed such a check without any violations being detected — violations that investigative journalists later uncovered.

The range of declarants has been expanded (1.6.1, 1.6.7). The new draft law proposes extending financial control requirements to officials of state-owned companies (more than 50% state-held charter capital), staff of the patronage services of political office-holders, advisers to the leadership of the President’s Office, and members of the executive committees of local councils. This is a more ambitious provision than in the government’s version and, again, fully in line with EU recommendations. However, the government’s provisions are retained that narrow the list of persons holding responsible and especially responsible positions, and interim notifications are abolished.

Authorized units (1.3.2.5 and 1.3.2.6). Unlike the government’s version, Draft Law 15230-d provides for the mandatory definition of approaches to — and the introduction of — integrity checks for candidates applying to work in authorized units (as authorized persons) for corruption prevention and detection, before they are appointed. It also provides for effective mechanisms to respond to corruption risk assessments and to the systematic failure to implement anti-corruption measures.

Salaries of NACP staff (1.10.1.1). The government’s draft law provided only for a general “proper legal regulation of the financial provision” of NACP staff. In 15230-d this point is spelled out in more detail: amendments to the Law on Corruption Prevention are to define the level and structure of salaries for all categories of the Agency’s staff, to ensure transparency and minimize the variable component.

Competitions for leadership positions in other law enforcement bodies and the prosecution service

National Police. Both the government’s and the revised draft laws provide for a shift to appointing the leadership of the central and territorial bodies of the National Police exclusively through open competition. At the same time, 15230-d contains an important clarification: the competition must be held “with the involvement of independent experts.”

State Bureau of Investigation. When it comes to the competition for the SBI, the difference is most striking. In 15230-d, a separate problem 2.2.9 has appeared, with a comprehensive set of results: 

• improving the procedure for selecting the SBI Director, with substantial participation of independent experts delegated by international partners (with reference to benchmark 24.3.1 of the Cluster 1 interim benchmarks);
• holding an open competition for the position of Director under this improved procedure; 
• mandatory regular attestation of all SBI staff for integrity and professional fitness, with the involvement of civil society and international partners; 
• introducing a system of periodic external independent audit, a negative conclusion of which would be grounds for the early dismissal of the leadership.

The Prosecutor General’s Office and regional prosecutor’s offices. Both the government’s and the revised draft laws proposed reinstating competitions for prosecutor posts in the Prosecutor General’s Office and the regional prosecutor’s offices. However, 15230-1 justifies this reinstatement with a general reference to “the recommendations of the European Commission,” whereas 15230-d ties the provision to a specific interim benchmark — 23.6 (Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” of the EU Accession Process). In addition, the wording on selecting the Prosecutor General is tied to benchmark 23.2 of the Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” interim benchmarks — namely, that this procedure should become “more transparent and merit-based.”

What has been weakened or left unresolved in Draft Law 15230-d

The High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine. The provisions on involving international experts in forming the judicial governance bodies have been partly weakened (2.1.1.2). Instead of a clear obligation to involve independent international experts with a decisive vote, the document provides only for the possibility of their temporary involvement “where necessary” in the process of selecting HCJ and HQCJ members, in line with benchmark 23.2.1 of the Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” interim benchmarks. Such wording leaves room for discretion as to whether the selection procedure is improved at all.

Meanwhile, the events of the past two years show that the need for such improvement is beyond dispute. In the summer of 2025, the participation of international experts in the selection commission for HQCJ members ended when their terms expired, prompting a sharp reaction from 90 civil society organizations. And on August 5, 2026, at the hearing to set a preventive measure for former Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna, a SAPO prosecutor read out correspondence that may point to her possible influence over the composition of the selection commission for the Head of NACP, through government-delegated members. Similar dealings were mentioned in connection with the selection of the heads of the ESBU and the NABU. This case is yet another argument that abandoning the participation of international experts with a decisive vote is premature.

The procedure for bringing administrative liability has been partly weakened (1.9.3.3). The government’s draft law contained two additional safeguards, absent from 15230-d, aimed at improving the system for holding people liable for administrative offenses:

• a ban on releasing offenders from liability on grounds of insignificance (with an exhaustive list of exceptions);
• the possibility of cassation review of decisions in cases involving a substantial fine, deprivation of a right, or administrative arrest.

This weakening is not critical, but it also seems ill-advised given the systemic problem with administrative proceedings based on NACP protocols.

The new draft law has also dropped the provision allowing NACP to issue binding orders to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement SAP measures (3.1.4 in 15230-1). This is a critical change that could severely undermine the quality and level of SAP implementation.

There is no provision on establishing effective cooperation between NACP and the State Financial Monitoring Service and the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service. Yet the similar provision for NABU (1.10.2.4) has been retained. Although the NACP, unlike the NABU, is not a body with pre-trial investigation functions, better cooperation with these bodies would meaningfully improve both the Agency’s financial control work and those bodies’ work in detecting financial violations.

Chapter III describes in detail the monitoring mechanism (quarterly) and the effectiveness assessment (ongoing annual and final), and point 3.4.6 contains an extensive list of baseline and target indicators. However, no minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures has been set — contrary to OECD recommendations.

Another unresolved problem is that civil forfeiture mechanisms do not cover situations where a person is acquitted by a court under the illicit enrichment article. This creates a legal gap, because an acquittal and the closure of proceedings are different procedural instruments. In the former, the court considers the case on the merits and finds the person not guilty, whereas in the latter no assessment of guilt is made, for procedural reasons. Without a clear indication that civil forfeiture can be applied after an acquittal, the state risks losing this tool in cases where individuals are acquitted because of weaknesses in the evidentiary base in criminal proceedings — which carry a higher standard of proof — despite the obvious mismatch between their wealth and their legal income.

The draft law proposes expanding the grounds for the disciplinary liability of public servants for breaches of anti-corruption legislation — in particular, where a court decision holding them administratively liable for a corruption-related offense takes effect. Such changes will not be effective, because the main reason disciplinary liability is enforced so poorly is that managers fail to apply the existing provisions of the Law on Corruption Prevention, together with the inconsistency between disciplinary and anti-corruption legislation. It would seem more sensible to focus precisely on these strategic results.

Conclusions and recommendations

The comparative analysis shows that the Committee used the merger of the three versions of the Strategy not to find the “lowest common denominator,” but to strengthen the document. On key aspects — the powers of the Head of SAPO, the selection of SBI leadership, competitions in the prosecution service, and the effectiveness of NACP’s financial control — Draft Law 15230-d has in places even surpassed the earlier versions.

However, the revised version is not without losses, and some of them have no obvious explanation. These and other shortcomings must be corrected when the relevant law is adopted. Between the first and second readings, it would be worth:

• framing the involvement of international experts in selecting HCJ and HQCJ members in categorical terms;
• restoring NACP’s power to issue binding orders to the heads of bodies and organizations for gross and systematic failure to implement SAP measures (3.1.4 in version 15230-1);
• reinstating the provision on cooperation between NACP and the State Financial Monitoring Service and the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service;
• restoring the two safeguards removed from 1.9.3.3 — the ban on releasing offenders from liability on grounds of insignificance, and the possibility of cassation review of decisions in cases involving a substantial penalty. Given the systemic problem with hearing cases based on NACP protocols, these provisions carry practical weight;
• clarifying the wording of Problem 1.6.4 so that the development of automated tools complements full checks rather than replacing them. Otherwise, the Strategy’s strongest innovation in corruption prevention (the new block 1.6.8) risks being implemented only as a formality;
• setting a minimum required level of implementation of SAP measures in line with OECD recommendations, and providing for consequences if it is not met;
• supplementing the provision on civil forfeiture so that it is available not only after the closure of proceedings but also after a person is acquitted by a court;
• refining the provisions on disciplinary liability to align anti-corruption and disciplinary legislation.

It is crucial that Parliament move to vote on the Strategy — with the above refinements taken into account — as quickly as possible, given Ukraine’s international commitments and the need to keep the document relevant. 

The experience of the previous anti-corruption policy cycle showed that adopting the Strategy and the SAP too late strips part of their content of relevance before implementation even begins. TI Ukraine will continue to monitor the Strategy’s adoption in Parliament.