NABU, SAPO, HACC, and EU Integration: What the European Commission Proposes to Strengthen Them

In its 2025 Enlargement Report, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine address problems both at the stage of pre-trial investigation and at the level of adjudication of high-level corruption cases. 

For many Ukrainians, European integration is primarily associated with open borders and the opportunity to work and travel freely across Europe. In reality, however, EU accession means far more than that — it entails a fundamental change in the rules of the game within the country, where justice and the rule of law become the norm rather than the exception. It is precisely here that Ukraine faces its greatest challenges, as illustrated, for example, by the recent high-profile case of the so-called “Mindich tapes.”

On November 4, the European Commission published its latest report on Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership. While last year anti-corruption reforms were described as showing “some progress,” this year the assessment has been downgraded to “limited progress.” This is a signal that Ukraine may stall on its path toward European integration precisely because of ineffective anti-corruption efforts.

This article focuses on the improvements needed in the anti-corruption segment of criminal justice — namely, how to ensure effective criminal accountability for corruption. This includes two key components: effective and lawful investigation of corruption, which falls within the remits of the NABU and the SAPO, and fair adjudication within a reasonable time frame and proper enforcement of decisions of the High Anti-Corruption Court.

What needs to change in corruption investigations

In its report, the European Commission noted an increase in the number of indictments in NABU cases. This has clearly caused concern among certain representatives of the Ukrainian authorities who, instead of fulfilling Ukraine’s international commitments to enhance the capacity for effective investigations, are promoting harmful legislative initiatives designed to undermine the effectiveness of the NABU and the SAPO. This refers to the events of July 21–22, 2025, when Parliament, in fast-track mode, adopted, and the President signed, a law that restricted the independence of the anti-corruption bodies.

Although most of its provisions harmful to the Bureau and the anti-corruption prosecutor’s office were later repealed by another law, some Members of Parliament have not abandoned these efforts. Disregarding the warnings of EU commissioners and the clearly articulated demand of society, they continue to insert into various draft laws provisions that would allow influential suspects to evade criminal liability or even establish the lawfulness of their actions. For example, where they acted based on explanations issued by certain state bodies, as proposed in Draft Law No. 12439. The European Commission explicitly referenced such legislative initiatives in its report. 

At the same time, the authorities largely ignore recommendations that would genuinely improve NABU’s operational effectiveness. These include granting the Bureau the ability to conduct wiretapping autonomously (without involvement of the Security Service of Ukraine). For interested parties, it is extremely convenient to know in advance whose communications NABU intends to intercept, making it possible to warn “their” person ahead of time. 

Court examinations also remain a systemic problem. Corruption cases often have an economic dimension — they involve the proper valuation of works performed under state contracts or the determination of the amount of damage caused. Overburdened expert institutions, pressure on experts, or their bribery negatively affect both the quality and speed of evidence collection in corruption cases.

The European Commission also noted that the possibility of closing cases due to the expiry of pre-trial investigation time limits has still not been abolished. This provision allows suspects to avoid criminal prosecution simply because an indictment was submitted to the court with a delay of two or three days. The NABU cases were most often closed on this ground due to confusion stemming from shifting positions of the Supreme Court — when judges could not agree on which authority was responsible for extending investigation time limits or on how such time limits should be calculated.

The Commission further noted a decline in the number of corruption indictments initiated by the National Police and the State Bureau of Investigation. This alarming trend was also highlighted in our Shadow Report. It indicates a substantial decrease in the number of mid- and low-level corruption investigations that successfully reach the courts. Addressing this issue requires strengthening the analytical capacity of the Prosecutor General’s Office, which should analyze the reasons for case closures, assess the lawfulness of investigations, and determine whether corruption factors influenced the final decisions. 

The NABU also received specific “homework” from the European Commission. The audit report published in May 2025 contains a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the Bureau’s performance. In particular, European partners emphasized the need to improve the effectiveness of internal control management and to enhance safeguards against the unlawful disclosure of pre-trial investigation information. The latter recommendation is clearly relevant not only for the NABU but also for the SAPO.

Fair adjudication within a reasonable time

Completion of the investigation and transfer of a case with an indictment to the HACC is by no means the end of criminal prosecution. The case must still be examined with full respect for procedural guarantees, without abuse of those guarantees, and within a reasonable time.

In some cases, this becomes an exceptionally difficult task, with which, regrettably, the HACC cannot always cope. The number of cases closed due to the expiry of limitation periods is increasing, and not primarily because of flaws within HACC itself. 

The tactic of deliberate delay is usually chosen by those suspects who see the approaching prospect of release from criminal liability and therefore use every possible procedural opportunity to prolong the proceedings until the case is closed. This includes unfounded recusals, marathon speeches lasting up to 40 hours during debates and final statements, repeated failures of participants to appear, holidays, sick leave, and hours-long deliberations over matters that are clear. In some instances, such cases had no real chance of being considered at all — they were referred to the HACC with only a few months remaining before the expiration of limitation periods.

For this reason, the European Commission devoted considerable attention to improving the statute of limitations framework and counteracting procedural delays — in other words, combating abuse of procedural rights. In addition, the report expresses expectations regarding HACC itself, which should develop a strategy to ensure the effectiveness of judicial proceedings. On November 28, the HACC published the corresponding strategy.

It is also important not to lose sight of the ongoing competition to fill 23 vacant judicial positions at the HACC. It is crucial that this process take place with the participation of the Public Council of International Experts, which together with the High Qualification Commission of Judges must ensure the selection of professional and ethically sound candidates. 

Without a high-quality selection of judges, it will be impossible to improve the effectiveness of adjudicating top-level corruption cases. However, this appears to run counter to the intentions of certain Members of Parliament, who have established a Temporary Investigative Commission whose activities have prompted serious concerns from the European Commission regarding respect for the balance between branches of power. In our view, these concerns are fully justified — the Commission’s representatives have taken decisions that indicate serious interference in the functioning of the judiciary.

What usually escapes broader public attention is how HACC verdicts are actually enforced. The European Commission did not focus on this issue separately in its report but did note general problems with the enforcement of court decisions across the board. We, in turn, recall that Ukraine still lacks a proper data collection system on the enforcement of HACC sentences. This makes it impossible to assess the real state of implementation of verdicts, including the confiscation of assets from convicted persons and the enforcement of other penalties.

Incidentally, the European Commission quite rightly drew attention to asset confiscation, more precisely, to the insufficient number of such cases. It pointed out that current legislation lacks mechanisms for seizure in the context of extended confiscation and that the grounds for applying special confiscation need to be improved. This fully aligns with the recommendations of our research, the implementation of which would prevent all kinds of ‘Midas figures’ from retaining their illicit wealth.

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As we can see, the European Commission has formulated specific requirements that Ukraine must fulfill in order to continue moving toward the EU. In essence, this is a list of systemic problems that have for years been blocking the effective fight against corruption and now require urgent resolution.

Ukraine has already covered a significant part of the path toward the EU. Specialized anti-corruption institutions have been established, many necessary laws have been adopted, and there have been convictions in high-profile cases. However, the moment has now come when Europe is no longer looking at the mere creation of institutions but at their real effectiveness. 

Recent investigations by the NABU and the SAPO give hope that both the level of such effectiveness and public awareness of it will continue to grow. At the same time, the efforts by certain representatives of the authorities to suppress the independence of anti-corruption bodies and the regular obstruction of their work indicate that these institutions are becoming increasingly dangerous for the most entrenched and institutionalized corruption. 

Yet the creation of NABU, SAPO, and HACC is not a clause in international agreements — it is a response to a clear demand from Ukrainian society after the Revolution of Dignity. That is why further strengthening their capacities and preserving best practices will make it possible to ensure the inevitability of criminal liability for those who, at a time of existential threat to the very existence of the Ukrainian state, continue to devise new schemes. So that no one will any longer question whether protective structures should be built for electricity generation facilities, or how financial flows should be structured so that law enforcement cannot reach them. Because they will reach them anyway.