The involvement of international experts in competitions for key judicial bodies is one of the most important safeguards to ensure their independence. In June 2025, the mandate of the initial composition of the Competition Commission responsible for selecting members of the HQCJ came to an end. Under the current law, international experts will no longer participate in the process.
This development could trigger a chain reaction of phasing out international involvement in other selection procedures, putting at risk the progress already made in judicial reforms.
In 2023, after a four-year pause, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) — the body responsible for selecting and evaluating judges — resumed its work. This resumption was one of the seven conditions necessary to initiate EU membership negotiations for Ukraine.
The selection to the HQCJ took place under new rules: Ukraine abandoned the quota-based approach and introduced a competitive procedure for appointing HQCJ members. This process was overseen by the Competition Commission. Its first composition consisted of six members: three were nominated by the Council of Judges of Ukraine, and the other three by international organizations with impeccable reputations. International experts held a decisive vote — their involvement ensured the independence and credibility of the process.
On June 1, the term of office of the first composition of the Competition Commission expired. Going forward, current legislation provides that only national bodies may nominate members to this Commission. This prospect prompted a strong response from 90 civil society organizations, whose joint statement emphasizes that national bodies remain unreformed and lack public trust, making it essential to continue the involvement of international experts in this Competition Commission.
Nevertheless, on July 22, the High Council of Justice (HCJ) initiated the formation of the Commission without including international experts. As a result, the urgency of the issue and the cost of non doing have increased significantly.
Why is continued international participation critical not only for the HQCJ selection, but also for a range of other key public bodies? Let’s take a closer look.
On June 1, the term of office of the first composition of the Competition Commission expired. Going forward, current legislation provides that only national bodies may nominate members to this Commission. This prospect prompted a strong response from 90 civil society organizations
Kateryna Ryzhenko
Obstacles and risks in relaunching the HQCJ
In 2023, the HQCJ effectively “restarted” from scratch — all sixteen members were appointed in a single day. Over the course of two years, one member, Roman Ihnatov, stepped down, and his seat remains vacant. On August 12, the HCJ will decide whether either of the two candidates recommended by the Commission can be appointed to the position. Most likely, the HCJ will refuse to appoint either candidate, as such a precedent already exists.
While the work of the HQCJ has faced criticism, civil society has repeatedly noted that there have been no critical incidents that would undermine public trust in the institution. For example, the Public Integrity Council, which assists the HQCJ in judicial career procedures, has referred to constructive cooperation with the Commission, despite some disagreements and no grounds for distrust. Civil society has also expressed cautious optimism regarding the HQCJ’s performance — both in practice-based reviews and broader evaluations of its work.
At the same time, the HQCJ has been subjected to pressure from the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), a fact acknowledged by the Commission itself and by civil society organizations. The High Council of Justice, for its part, recognized that the SBI’s actions posed a threat to the authority of the judiciary. Interestingly, the SBI had previously submitted a request regarding the dismissal of former HQCJ Chair Roman Ihnatov, who described these actions as pressure.
It is worth noting that the current HQCJ members’ terms are scheduled to end in 2027. This means Ukraine will once again face a large-scale competition and a complete renewal of the Commission. However, as mentioned above, under current legislation, the new HQCJ will be selected by a Competition Commission formed by the Council of Judges of Ukraine, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Bar Council, and the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine. The work of these institutions, particularly their questionable appointments to various competition commissions and their three-year failure to nominate members to the High Council of Justice, has been repeatedly criticized by civil society. These issues were also noted by the European Commission in its enlargement report.
It is already clear that the next composition of the HQCJ will inherit a wide range of responsibilities from its predecessors:
- Completing the selection of candidates for 1,800 local judge positions
- Finalizing the qualification assessment of approximately 1,500 judges, which could lead to many dismissals based on the results
- A potential competition for the Supreme Court.
The competence and integrity of future HQCJ members will directly determine how effectively these tasks are carried out. Given the scale of the work ahead, the next HQCJ will either significantly clean up and renew the judicial corps, or cause it irreparable harm.
The issue of the new composition of the Competition Commission will become even more pressing if, on August 12, the High Council of Justice fails to appoint a new member to the HQCJ. In that case, the new Commission will immediately begin conducting a competition to fill the vacancy.
The presence of only one vacancy may be used manipulatively — framed as a “test run” for national stakeholders. Some may argue that they should be given a chance, and that appointing one more member to a body that already has 15 members would not significantly affect the institution’s work, even if the procedure is flawed.
Appointing even a single candidate who has not undergone a fair competition would already pose a threat to the work of the HQCJ. In particular, the HQCJ applies a practice whereby individual members are responsible for specific processes. This gives them the autonomy to make decisions that do not require general discussion or a vote. At the same time, such a member can significantly shape the direction and pace of the procedure they oversee. If they are subject to external influence, this could lead to delays or even the derailment of, for example, a particular competition.
In this context, the appointment of “just one” member nominated by national bodies would be part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the HQCJ. This strategy could involve gradually forcing current members to step down one by one — for example, by using criminal proceedings — and then replacing them, using the same mechanism, with more loyal members.
In this way, filling “just one” vacancy would serve as an incentive to create further vacancies, including through pressure. Such a scenario could ultimately lead to increased persecution of HQCJ members.
The presence of only one vacancy may be used manipulatively — framed as a “test run” for national stakeholders. Some may argue that they should be given a chance, and that appointing one more member to a body that already has 15 members would not significantly affect the institution’s work, even if the procedure is flawed.
Kateryna Ryzhenko
Problems with the HQCJ competition could trigger a domino effect in other selections
The removal of the international component from the HQCJ selection process could set a dangerous precedent and influence Parliament’s decisions regarding the further involvement of independent experts in other selection bodies. The Competition Commission for selecting HQCJ members is the first in line where the participation of independent international experts is ending, even though the HQCJ itself has not yet had the chance to operate fully following its relaunch.
For example, this situation could negatively affect the work of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE), which assesses whether candidates for the High Anti-Corruption Court meet the criteria of integrity and professional ethics. The PCIE’s mandate is expected to expire in May 2026.
Similarly, in the coming years, the participation of international experts in competitions for posts in bodies such as the High Council of Justice, the Constitutional Court, and possibly the National Anti-Corruption Bureau is also expected to end.
A vivid example of the risks posed by fully nationalized processes is the unlawful decision by the Cabinet of Ministers not to appoint the head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU), despite a transparent competition and the backing of international partners. Even the presence of international experts on the commission and heightened attention from G7 ambassadors was not enough to prevent this unlawful decision.
It is already possible to anticipate what may happen to future competitions if international involvement is discontinued.
The removal of the international component from the HQCJ selection process could set a dangerous precedent and influence Parliament’s decisions regarding the further involvement of independent experts in other selection bodies.
Kateryna Ryzhenko
Undoing the progress
The experience of the HQCJ shows the journey of an institution in the process of being established. That path is not without missteps or criticism from stakeholders. At times, the institution has also faced political pressure, as in the case of the criminal proceedings initiated by the State Bureau of Investigation.
Yet the HQCJ is not the only body undergoing formation. Stakeholders must therefore do everything possible to create the necessary conditions for the development of all such new or reformed institutions. A key prerequisite is an independent and transparent selection process, as the performance of any institution ultimately depends on its composition. A fair and high-quality competition ensures that worthy candidates trust the process and are willing to apply.
In recent years, it has been the involvement of independent international experts that has secured candidates’ trust in such selection procedures. However, the provision for this involvement is not permanent — it is governed by so-called “sunset clauses,” meaning that it is a temporary measure. This approach is logical: over time, Ukraine was expected to build robust domestic institutions capable of assuming full responsibility for competitions.
However, practice shows that a single iteration of forming a body through an independent and transparent process is not enough to safeguard progress and trust, especially when future procedures are planned to be handed over to unreformed national bodies. It is important to prevent the gradual reshuffling of collegial bodies, where the absence of an independent selection process leads to increased pressure on appointed members.
Once again, the competitions for positions at the ESBU despite the government ultimately appointing a winner, and at the Constitutional Court of Ukraine illustrate the national bodies’ unpreparedness to assume full responsibility. In the ESBU case, the government unlawfully refused to appoint the competition winner, without any rational explanation other than political motives. In the Constitutional Court case, Parliament has delayed for nearly six months the appointment of judges from among independently selected candidates. The body conducting the competition has publicly stated that the delays and unlawful demands are coming from the Verkhovna Rada.
While the participation of international experts is indeed a temporary measure, now is clearly not the time to end it. On the contrary, several more rounds of competitions are needed to preserve the progress made and ensure the sustainable development of these institutions.
In fact, the idea of a competition commission selecting more than one composition of a body has already been reflected in law. For example, Parliament has twice voted on the term of international experts’ involvement in the selection process for the Disciplinary Inspector Service of the High Council of Justice. Ultimately, MPs supported a timeframe that would cover two full-scale competitions for the Service — a sound and reasonable approach.
While the participation of international experts is indeed a temporary measure, now is clearly not the time to end it. On the contrary, several more rounds of competitions are needed to preserve the progress made and ensure the sustainable development of these institutions.
Kateryna Ryzhenko
To preserve and prevent
Members of Parliament can still save the HQCJ competition — a chance they can seize now. To this end, the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada’s Anti-Corruption Committee, Anastasiia Radina, along with her colleagues, has registered Draft Law No. 13382. The draft proposes extending the mandate of international experts so they can also participate in the selection of the next composition of the HQCJ in 2027. Parliament will have the opportunity to adopt this law in August, when it reconvenes for plenary sessions.
Passing this draft law is crucial to avoid setting a dangerous precedent that would block access to one of the key branches of power. This issue is especially critical in light of the political resistance to appointing independently selected candidates, as seen in the cases of the ESBU director and Constitutional Court judges.
To avoid repeating the situation surrounding the HQCJ selection, the continued involvement of international experts in other competition commissions must be planned in advance. However, without broad support from civil society and international partners, such extensions are unlikely.
To avoid repeating the situation surrounding the HQCJ selection, the continued involvement of international experts in other competition commissions must be planned in advance.
Kateryna Ryzhenko