Critical Issues in Ukraine’s Fight Against Corruption According to the OECD

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently published the results of the fifth round of monitoring Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan. It covered primarily the period of 2023–2024.

Experts from Transparency International Ukraine participated in discussions with the monitoring group, providing data and recommendations for the report. As a result, the document acknowledges certain progress while also specifying several critical problems to be solved.

TI Ukraine has long been drawing the government’s attention to problems within the criminal justice system that generally undermine the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.

 1. Low effectiveness in asset recovery

The OECD follow-up report highlights a critical situation regarding the recovery of assets derived from corruption-related crimes. Ukraine’s current practice still falls short of international standards on confiscation and recovery of illicit proceeds.

OECD experts emphasize a structural problem: in Ukraine, confiscation is predominantly applied as a form of punishment, which complicates the enforcement of such rulings abroad, since many jurisdictions do not recognize this type of confiscation. The number of final convictions with applied confiscation measures remains low.

The report also points out that Ukraine fails to properly track the implementation of confiscation orders in corruption cases — an issue TI Ukraine has repeatedly addressed in its materials on the effectiveness of confiscation mechanisms.

To resolve this complex problem, the entire confiscation system must be reformed. This includes improving the mechanisms of extended and special confiscation and introducing mandatory special confiscation in plea agreements.

2. Closure of high-profile cases due to procedural reasons

The OECD notes that during the reporting period, the HACC closed 15 cases due to the expiry of limitation periods, and another five were closed by the HACC Appeals Chamber. These included cases involving ten MPs, a minister, a deputy minister, a judge, and other senior officials. This issue has long been highlighted by TI Ukraine experts in their HACC case monitoring reports.

The so-called Lozovyi amendments on pre-trial investigation time limits continue to create opportunities for closing cases on formal grounds. TI Ukraine has previously analyzed these provisions in detail and supported the proposal to repeal the automatic closure clause.

This approach is reflected in Draft Law No. 12367-3, which aims to eliminate the possibility of automatic case closure due to the expiration of pre-trial investigation periods. Also, comprehensive amendments should be developed to improve the system of limitation periods.

3. NABU’s jurisdiction, autonomous wiretapping, and forensic examinations

The monitoring group also underscored that the NABU still depends on the Security Service of Ukraine to conduct wiretapping, which poses risks of information leaks in sensitive cases. Consequently, detectives sometimes refrain from using this critical investigative tool.

Another problem is that NABU’s jurisdiction does not extend to the Head of the Presidential Office and their deputies, even though individuals in these positions exert significant influence over state decision-making.

Furthermore, the NABU faces difficulties in accessing forensic expertise. In several categories of examinations, the Bureau relies on state forensic institutions, which often deliver expert reports in corruption cases with significant delays, thereby slowing investigations.

Although these issues may seem technical, they directly affect the effectiveness of high-level corruption investigations — a concern also raised in the NABU audit report. The OECD’s reiteration of these points further confirms the need for the authorities to ensure NABU’s autonomous wiretapping capability without the SSU involvement, extend detectives’ jurisdiction to all top officials, including the Head and Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office, and strengthen the independence of forensic experts working on corruption cases.

4. Limited procedural independence of the Head of SAPO

The OECD report also highlights that the Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is not fully independent in certain procedural matters, such as entering information about crimes committed by Members of Parliament into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations, handling extraditions, or forming joint investigative teams. International cooperation and the initiation of proceedings against MPs remain within the authority of the Prosecutor General, who is still not appointed through an open competitive process.

TI Ukraine has drawn attention to these issues, including in its Shadow Report. In our view, strengthening the procedural independence of the SAPO Head is necessary — granting authority over international cooperation and procedural matters involving Members of Parliament.

5. Ineffective management of seized assets

The OECD monitoring group confirms that the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) continues to face challenges related to institutional independence and operational efficiency. The Agency must ensure transparency and adhere to proper procedures to strengthen accountability and public trust.

Many of these challenges are expected to be addressed by the ARMA reform law adopted in June 2025. The law is expected to ensure a transparent and timely selection of the Agency’s Head, the prompt initiation of a high-quality international audit, and the introduction of transparent asset management procedures.

The next crucial step in ARMA reform should be the development and adoption of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the relevant bylaws.

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As the latest report shows, international partners have identified clear areas for improvement within the criminal justice system. This is significant, as the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, introduced by the OECD in 2003, remains an effective mechanism for international evaluation of anti-corruption progress in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Ukraine has been part of this program since its inception and has now undergone five monitoring rounds.