Obstacles and risks in relaunching the HQCJ 

In 2023, the HQCJ effectively “restarted” from scratch — all sixteen members were appointed in a single day. Over the course of two years, one member, Roman Ihnatov, stepped down, and his seat remains vacant. On August 12, the HCJ will decide whether either of the two candidates recommended by the Commission can be appointed to the position. Most likely, the HCJ will refuse to appoint either candidate, as such a precedent already exists.

While the work of the HQCJ has faced criticism, civil society has repeatedly noted that there have been no critical incidents that would undermine public trust in the institution. For example, the Public Integrity Council, which assists the HQCJ in judicial career procedures, has referred to constructive cooperation with the Commission, despite some disagreements and no grounds for distrust. Civil society has also expressed cautious optimism regarding the HQCJ’s performance — both in practice-based reviews and broader evaluations of its work. 

At the same time, the HQCJ has been subjected to pressure from the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), a fact acknowledged by the Commission itself and by civil society organizations. The High Council of Justice, for its part, recognized that the SBI’s actions posed a threat to the authority of the judiciary. Interestingly, the SBI had previously submitted a request regarding the dismissal of former HQCJ Chair Roman Ihnatov, who described these actions as pressure.

It is worth noting that the current HQCJ members’ terms are scheduled to end in 2027. This means Ukraine will once again face a large-scale competition and a complete renewal of the Commission. However, as mentioned above, under current legislation, the new HQCJ will be selected by a Competition Commission formed by the Council of Judges of Ukraine, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Bar Council, and the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine. The work of these institutions, particularly their questionable appointments to various competition commissions and their three-year failure to nominate members to the High Council of Justice, has been repeatedly criticized by civil society. These issues were also noted by the European Commission in its enlargement report. 

It is already clear that the next composition of the HQCJ will inherit a wide range of responsibilities from its predecessors:

1. Completing the selection of candidates for 1,800 local judge positions 
2. Finalizing the qualification assessment of approximately 1,500 judges, which could lead to many dismissals based on the results
3. A potential competition for the Supreme Court.

The competence and integrity of future HQCJ members will directly determine how effectively these tasks are carried out. Given the scale of the work ahead, the next HQCJ will either significantly clean up and renew the judicial corps, or cause it irreparable harm.

The issue of the new composition of the Competition Commission will become even more pressing if, on August 12, the High Council of Justice fails to appoint a new member to the HQCJ. In that case, the new Commission will immediately begin conducting a competition to fill the vacancy.

The presence of only one vacancy may be used manipulatively — framed as a “test run” for national stakeholders. Some may argue that they should be given a chance, and that appointing one more member to a body that already has 15 members would not significantly affect the institution’s work, even if the procedure is flawed. 

Appointing even a single candidate who has not undergone a fair competition would already pose a threat to the work of the HQCJ. In particular, the HQCJ applies a practice whereby individual members are responsible for specific processes. This gives them the autonomy to make decisions that do not require general discussion or a vote. At the same time, such a member can significantly shape the direction and pace of the procedure they oversee. If they are subject to external influence, this could lead to delays or even the derailment of, for example, a particular competition.

In this context, the appointment of “just one” member nominated by national bodies would be part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the HQCJ. This strategy could involve gradually forcing current members to step down one by one — for example, by using criminal proceedings — and then replacing them, using the same mechanism, with more loyal members. 

In this way, filling “just one” vacancy would serve as an incentive to create further vacancies, including through pressure. Such a scenario could ultimately lead to increased persecution of HQCJ members.

Problems with the HQCJ competition could trigger a domino effect in other selections

The removal of the international component from the HQCJ selection process could set a dangerous precedent and influence Parliament’s decisions regarding the further involvement of independent experts in other selection bodies. The Competition Commission for selecting HQCJ members is the first in line where the participation of independent international experts is ending, even though the HQCJ itself has not yet had the chance to operate fully following its relaunch. 

For example, this situation could negatively affect the work of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE), which assesses whether candidates for the High Anti-Corruption Court meet the criteria of integrity and professional ethics. The PCIE’s mandate is expected to expire in May 2026.

Similarly, in the coming years, the participation of international experts in competitions for posts in bodies such as the High Council of Justice, the Constitutional Court, and possibly the National Anti-Corruption Bureau is also expected to end.

A vivid example of the risks posed by fully nationalized processes is the unlawful decision by the Cabinet of Ministers not to appoint the head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU), despite a transparent competition and the backing of international partners. Even the presence of international experts on the commission and heightened attention from G7 ambassadors was not enough to prevent this unlawful decision. 

It is already possible to anticipate what may happen to future competitions if international involvement is discontinued. 

Undoing the progress

The experience of the HQCJ shows the journey of an institution in the process of being established. That path is not without missteps or criticism from stakeholders. At times, the institution has also faced political pressure, as in the case of the criminal proceedings initiated by the State Bureau of Investigation. 

Yet the HQCJ is not the only body undergoing formation. Stakeholders must therefore do everything possible to create the necessary conditions for the development of all such new or reformed institutions. A key prerequisite is an independent and transparent selection process, as the performance of any institution ultimately depends on its composition. A fair and high-quality competition ensures that worthy candidates trust the process and are willing to apply.

In recent years, it has been the involvement of independent international experts that has secured candidates’ trust in such selection procedures. However, the provision for this involvement is not permanent — it is governed by so-called “sunset clauses,” meaning that it is a temporary measure. This approach is logical: over time, Ukraine was expected to build robust domestic institutions capable of assuming full responsibility for competitions. 

However, practice shows that a single iteration of forming a body through an independent and transparent process is not enough to safeguard progress and trust, especially when future procedures are planned to be handed over to unreformed national bodies. It is important to prevent the gradual reshuffling of collegial bodies, where the absence of an independent selection process leads to increased pressure on appointed members.

Once again, the competitions for positions at the ESBU despite the government ultimately appointing a winner, and at the Constitutional Court of Ukraine illustrate the national bodies’ unpreparedness to assume full responsibility. In the ESBU case, the government unlawfully refused to appoint the competition winner, without any rational explanation other than political motives. In the Constitutional Court case, Parliament has delayed for nearly six months the appointment of judges from among independently selected candidates. The body conducting the competition has publicly stated that the delays and unlawful demands are coming from the Verkhovna Rada. 

While the participation of international experts is indeed a temporary measure, now is clearly not the time to end it. On the contrary, several more rounds of competitions are needed to preserve the progress made and ensure the sustainable development of these institutions. 

In fact, the idea of a competition commission selecting more than one composition of a body has already been reflected in law. For example, Parliament has twice voted on the term of international experts’ involvement in the selection process for the Disciplinary Inspector Service of the High Council of Justice. Ultimately, MPs supported a timeframe that would cover two full-scale competitions for the Service — a sound and reasonable approach.

To preserve and prevent

Members of Parliament can still save the HQCJ competition — a chance they can seize now. To this end, the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada’s Anti-Corruption Committee, Anastasiia Radina, along with her colleagues, has registered Draft Law No. 13382. The draft proposes extending the mandate of international experts so they can also participate in the selection of the next composition of the HQCJ in 2027. Parliament will have the opportunity to adopt this law in August, when it reconvenes for plenary sessions.

Passing this draft law is crucial to avoid setting a dangerous precedent that would block access to one of the key branches of power. This issue is especially critical in light of the political resistance to appointing independently selected candidates, as seen in the cases of the ESBU director and Constitutional Court judges. 

To avoid repeating the situation surrounding the HQCJ selection, the continued involvement of international experts in other competition commissions must be planned in advance. However, without broad support from civil society and international partners, such extensions are unlikely.

What is it like now?

The Competition Commission is an auxiliary body of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) established to conduct the competition and form a shortlist of candidates for the position of an HQCJ member. In particular, the Commission is tasked with verifying whether candidates meet the criteria of integrity and professional competence. After the Commission completes its work, the HCJ conducts interviews with the candidates and issues a reasoned decision on their appointment or rejection.

The Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges states that only the first composition of the Competition Commission was to include international experts. The term of this composition expired two years after the appointment of the first full HQCJ, i.e., on June 1, 2025.

The next composition of the Competition Commission will be formed by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (3 members), the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (1 member), the Bar Council of Ukraine (1 member), and the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine (1 member). Civil society organizations have previously pointed out that these bodies do not enjoy a high level of public trust.

It is expected that this new Competition Commission, without international representation, will conduct the next large-scale competition for the HQCJ. This will likely take place in June 2027, when the four-year term of fifteen out of sixteen current HQCJ members is scheduled to end.

This upcoming competition is highly significant, as the HQCJ, particularly its new composition, will be responsible for completing key procedures in the judicial career system that were launched or continued by the current HQCJ:

1) Qualification assessment of over 1,300 sitting judges,

2) Selection of 1,800 judges for local courts, and

3) A potential competition for the Supreme Court.

There is also a possibility that the next HQCJ composition may conduct a competition for the High Anti-Corruption Court without the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts. Under current legislation, the PCIE’s mandate will expire in May 2026.

What Draft Law No. 13382 proposes

According to the explanatory note, the aim of the draft law is to extend the mandate of the Competition Commission with international experts in its composition. The authors argue that this is necessary to ensure a high-quality selection process for the next HQCJ, given the importance of its tasks.

The draft proposes that the term of the Competition Commission with international experts be set at five years from the date of appointment of the first full HQCJ. In other words, this composition would remain in place until June 2028.

The draft also proposes an alternative condition for ending the Commission’s mandate. If, at the time the term is due to expire, a competition for HQCJ membership is underway, the Commission’s powers would continue until the HCJ issues a decision appointing a selected candidate.

This proposal clearly reflects a lesson learned from the situation surrounding the most recent HQCJ competition, when the Commission recommended two candidates on May 30, just one day before its mandate expired.

Given that the term of the first Competition Commission has now ended, the adoption of the draft law would initiate the formation of a new composition under the same rules that governed the previous selection process.

The draft law also stipulates that the term of office of a Competition Commission member may not exceed four years. However, former members would still be eligible to serve again.

Importantly, the draft confirms that the Competition Commission is considered quorate if it includes at least four members, two of whom must be recommended by international or foreign organizations. It also proposes preserving the decisive vote of international experts.

Conclusion

The adoption of the draft law would positively impact on the quality and independence of the HQCJ selection process. This is especially important given the near-total renewal of the HQCJ anticipated in 2027. A merit-based and transparent selection of new members is crucial in light of the responsibilities the HQCJ will bear.

It is also a positive development that the draft reflects lessons from the most recent competition, where candidate recommendations were made just before the HQCJ’s term expired. Extending the mandate in cases where competition is underway would help avoid rushed decisions or the need to restart the process.

Transparency International Ukraine emphasizes that ensuring a high-quality and independent HQCJ requires not just one, but several rounds of selection with the involvement of international experts. Phasing out their participation in the selection of HQCJ members could undermine the progress already achieved and risk the return of political influence over judicial governance.

In this context, one cannot but mention that the State Judicial Administration did not update the register of court decisions in the format of an open data set, despite the fact that it should do so daily. This makes it difficult to work with such information and automate its use.  

Moreover, a lot of attention in different countries is paid to the strategy of justice development. For example, the representative of the Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines mentioned the Strategic Plan for Judicial Innovation many times, which aims to create a new framework and introduce new approaches, but at the same time develop and reorient the existing ones. This, in her opinion, will help achieve the implementation of justice that responds to requests and operates in real time. 

It is interesting that we in Ukraine have also done a lot in these processes, but this progress is very difficult, and the experience of other countries and other expert organizations can help us, while our experience will help them. Of course, foreign experience should be processed in a meaningful way and best practices should be used rationally. 

We are in for a lot of work; this is no secret either for us or for other countries whose representatives I happened to talk to at the summit in Tallinn. But we know where we want to go, and we know WHAT to do. It is the matter of implementation that remains. Even if we rely on intermediate achievements in such processes, the end point becomes much more attainable.

Challenge One: Prosecuting Senior Judges

Judges are the category of persons from whom we expect professionalism, impartiality, and integrity. But as we can see, not all judges have these crucial qualities.  

Although we call the new high-profile investigation of the NABU the “Kniaziev Case,” we should remember that, according to available information, searches were carried out regarding as many as 18 people, many of them being the judges of the Supreme Court, and so far, only two defendants have been detained. 

Of course, this is a strong blow for Ukraine. But this case should still be considered positively from the perspective of the activities of our anti-corruption system. On the night of May 15-16, we saw that, despite various circumstances and hostilities in the country, the SAPO and the NABU had been conducting the investigations we could only dream of 10 years ago. Nevertheless, such investigations are another indicator that it is imperative to continue the reform of the judicial branch of power in Ukraine.  

The case of the judges of the Supreme Court can well illustrate that the system of checks and balances, which we have been talking about for years, does yield results. Anti-corruption agencies are doing their job. Detectives and anti-corruption prosecutors are not afraid to conduct an investigation against senior corrupt officials for several months, catch them “red-handed,” as well as proactively publicly communicate about such proceedings the very next day after the high-profile detention of the head of the Supreme Court himself. However, now the NABU and the SAPO have an extremely difficult task — to bring this investigation to trial and, ultimately, win such a high-profile case in court.

But this case will also be a challenge for the judicial self-governance. We have already seen how quickly the Supreme Court terminated Kniaziev’s powers as a result of expressing no confidence in him — a process that could have lasted more than 20 days took place in a few hours. And this is not a matter of proof or his guilt to me, it is a matter of the reputation of the judge, in such a high position, when his actions and reputation directly affect the attitude to the entire judicial system in Ukraine.

But, even after losing the position of the head, Kniaziev remains a judge of the Supreme Court. Many further steps in this case will depend, for example, on the decisions of the High Council of Justice. All because of judicial immunity. 

To conduct further investigative actions against Kniaziev and assign him an interim measure, a decision of the High Council of Justice is required. And the speed of consideration and adoption of such a decision by the HCJ will also be a clear indicator of the readiness of the judicial self-government bodies for self-cleansing. 

Then, depending on the total number of judges who will be involved in this case, the question of replacing them may potentially arise. If we are really talking about 18 judges — this is almost 10% of the total composition of the court. It is not yet known how effectively the Supreme Court will be able to carry out its activities after the loss of so many people from among its staff. The scale of the declared scheme is unknown because the case may relate not only to one decision regarding Zhevaho.

Of course, we would very much like to believe that both the HCJ and the HQCJ will be ready to work effectively with these challenges, but, unfortunately, there is no full confidence in this yet because we have not seen examples of such work. These bodies themselves are still in the process of reform, and the case with the judges of the Supreme Court could be evidence of their successful upgrading.

Challenge Two: Maintaining Competitive Selection of Judges

In 2016-17, the competition for judges of the Supreme Court and its head was one of the first of its kind after the Revolution of Dignity, not only among the selections for judicial institutions, but also in general within the framework of public administration reform. And the Kniaziev case prompted discussions of whether such a selection was sufficiently effective. 

It is important to understand that competitions are not a panacea for corruption. This is not about choosing idols, but about competitive and transparent selection of the best available candidates. And only time will tell how candidates will prove themselves in their positions. 

That is why it is good that we already have effective bodies that are able to investigate and prosecute violations of the law, even if such violations are committed by judges. Especially if they are committed by judges.

Of course, according to the results of this case, it will be necessary to draw conclusions about the competitive procedure used to elect judges of the Supreme Court and find out why, after the selection, so many of them are involved in corruption cases. However, some warnings and risks in the selection to the Supreme Court were voiced before.

All these questions are another confirmation that the judicial reform should be continued. And the Kniaziev case should show everyone that as far as anti-corruption justice is concerned, judges are not unpunishable or protected, they will be brought to justice if their crimes are proven. 

In general, when we talk about a new format for the selection of candidates for judges, there is something to improve in this process. At very least, it is necessary to set out the procedure so that the decision of the Public Council of Integrity and independent international experts during the selection, for example, was decisive or at least directly influenced the final result. 

During the preliminary selection of judges to the Supreme Court, the conclusions of the Public Council should have been considered, but were not mandatory for consideration, did not have a final impact on the result of the decision of the HQCJ. And now we see that this definitely needs to change. By the way, it was with regard to some of the defendants in the case that the PIC presented negative conclusions or had reservations.

Challenge Three: Continuing Fight against Corruption at All Levels 

If this case with the Supreme Court is not a point of no return, then what is? Reconstruction is already well underway in Ukraine, and professional and independent courts will play a crucial role in its transparency. That is why the Kniaziev case will undoubtedly be indicative of how Ukraine is ready to confront the challenge of corruption in the judicial system.

This is what society within countries expects, and what international partners want from us. Therefore, if we want to receive large international investments in reconstruction, we must show that our judicial system is capable and ready to work professionally and impartially. 

All these things need to be carried out in parallel — changing the system and changing the staff. Because changing people without updating the rules will not yield any result.

That is why we need to continue implementing the best practices for judicial reform, which will work effectively in Ukraine, and hold accountable those who undermine all such efforts from the inside.